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vABSTRACT
The main objective of this thesis is to identify the primary reasons why firms choose to issue
unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. A sample of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994
and 2006 is investigated in examination of two competing hypotheses concerning the
inclusion of warrants. The popular Agency Cost hypothesis of Schultz (1993b) explains the
application of unit IPO as a form of staged financing for relatively young firms. The
competing Signalling hypothesis proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) emphasises
on the signalling mechanism unit IPOs provide in a market characterised by information
asymmetry.
My results support both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses’ common predictions
that unit firms are smaller and riskier than share-only firms. In unique support to the Agency
Cost hypothesis, evidence is found that the unit IPOs which are underwritten by less reputable
underwriters raise smaller proceeds than that of share-only IPOs. In direct test of the Agency
Cost hypothesis, the levels of agency costs are measured by the ‘efficiency ratios’, which are
found to be significantly lower for unit firms, indicating higher level of agency costs. On the
other hand, in direct test of the Signalling hypothesis, both the standard deviations of share
returns and the delay between announcement of unit IPOs and the first trading day are
calculated to proxy for the level of information asymmetry. These measurements suggest that
unit firms possess higher levels of information asymmetry than that of share-only firms,
which is consistent with the Signalling hypothesis.
Evidence from the initial underpricing provides strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis
that unit IPOs is significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs. Post-listing survival
and subsequent financing evidence is also in line with the Agency Cost hypothesis’ prediction
vi
that unit firms have lower survival rate than that of share-only IPO firms; however, unit firms
that do survive are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) for further funding.
A clear pattern of price run-up is observed before SEO announcements by unit firms and a
significant negative price adjustment is found when the SEOs are announced.
In the long-term, however, this thesis provides evidence that unit IPOs present significantly
worse underperformance comparing to both the matching share-only IPOs and various market
indices, regardless of the methods adopted to calculate abnormal returns. Such long-term
results contradict both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses and imply that unit
firms, being smaller and riskier businesses before they are publicly listed, cannot significantly
improve performance by simply attaching warrants, regardless as whether they are used to
reduce agency costs or to signal firm value. However, the choice to include warrants in IPOs
is not in vain. This thesis provides evidence that in the UK, several warrant characteristics can
influence the long-term performance of unit firms positively. The number of warrants, the
firm value sold as warrant proceeds, and the ratio of warrant exercise price to offer price, are
all positively and significantly related to the long-term abnormal returns of unit firms.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Competing hypotheses and the motivation of this research
In a unit IPO, the firm going public issues a combined package of shares and warrants rather
than share equity alone. If potential investors were to subscribe in a unit IPO, they will
immediately hold the company’s new ordinary shares in the offer. As warrant holders at the
same time,  they  will  have  the  option  to  hold  or  trade  the  warrants  attached  in  the  unit  until
expiration and then the option to exercise the warrants or let them expire. The warrants could
usually be detached from the shares after the IPO and traded separately until expiration.
Theoretical justifications for the use of unit offerings were initiated by two competing but not
mutually exclusive hypotheses. Firstly, the popular Agency Cost hypothesis of Schultz (1993b)
explains the application of unit IPO as a form of staged financing for relatively young firms.
Using the US data, Schultz illustrates that unit IPOs are used to limit agency costs by bonding
managers to optimal investment decisions, and in turn reducing the probability of excess waste
of free cash flows in less profitable projects. A unit offering usually provides relatively little
proceeds at the initial public offering since the exercise of attached warrants can potentially
materialise further cash infusion post-listing. Therefore, managers’ available cash flow
immediately after the IPO is limited and they have to spend their money ‘wisely’ by investing
in value-generating projects. After all, if the initial investment is not successful, the stock price
will not exceed the warrant exercise price and the second round of financing will fall through
almost automatically, as in protection of shareholders’ interests. On the other hand, if managers
choose  to  invest  in  value-revealing  projects,  the  stock  price  of  the  company will  exceed  the
warrant exercise price, and warrant holders will certainly exercise these warrants for a profit
2and the second round of cash infusion occurs in favour for the company’s growth. Such staged
financing arrangements reduce the opportunities for managers to ‘squander’ money on
unprofitable projects, especially for young firms in their early development stage.
As an alternative explanation for including warrants in an IPO, the Signalling hypothesis
proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) emphasises on the signalling mechanism unit
IPOs provide in a market characterised by information asymmetry. In such a market,
information about the issuing firm is not transparent between the firms’ managers (i.e. insiders)
and the public investors (i.e. outsiders). From the investors’ perspective, it is difficult to value
distinctly whether the firm is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ candidate in terms of potential investment
outcome. On the other hand, managers have all the information of their own companies, but
find it difficult to convey them to investors. Especially in a competitive environment, ‘bad’
firms constantly trying to imitate the market image of ‘good’ firms and to disguise themselves.
It is in the interest of ‘good’ firm insiders to signal favourable information on firm values and
distinguish themselves from the ‘bad apples’. In the signalling model, Chemmanur and
Fulghieri present three costly signalling mechanisms, namely, the fraction of equity retained by
insiders, underpricing of the new issue and inclusion of warrants in an IPO. Adding warrants to
an IPO means sharing firm value with warrant-holders; therefore, without doubt is one of the
signals of firm quality that would be too costly for ‘bad’ firms to mimic. However, to the
issuing firms’ advantage, such cost will only be realised if a favourable state of the company
occurs, in which there is a higher realisation of firm value.
Subsequent  studies  on  unit  IPOs  are  scarce  and  have  been  focused  to  examine  the  two
competing hypotheses, most of which aim to test the proposed predictions from both theories,
and find it difficult to conclude which is the more viable explanation. The Agency Cost and the
Signalling hypotheses have received both partial support and challenges. By the time of this
3research, the reasons why firms include warrants in their IPOs are inconclusive. I am therefore,
motivated to add further evidence from the UK to the growing unit IPOs literature. The main
objective of this thesis is to identify the primary reasons for including warrants in an IPO, and
the inter-relations between the inclusion of warrants and the after-market stock performance of
unit  firms  (Firms  that  conduct  unit  IPOs  are  defined  as unit firms in the remaining paper as
opposite to share-only IPO firms). I also straightforwardly focus on the conflicting areas across
different previous studies of unit IPOs and tests several on-going debates with a unique sample
of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994 and 2006.
1.2 Contributions of this research
1.2.1 New evidence adding to the unit IPO literature
The first reason I claim for the importance of this thesis is that my research focuses on unit IPOs
rather than share-only IPOs. The pricing and performance of IPOs have been one of the most
extensively researched areas in finance literature. The post-listing behaviour, such as short
and/or long-term performance of IPOs has been at the centre of academics’ attention. However,
very few studies associate the IPO pricing and aftermarket performance with the issuing firms’
choice of offer type (unit IPO versus share-only IPO). A significant proportion of IPO firms
choose to include warrants in their offerings in addition to common shares. Schultz (1993b)
recorded that 167 of 797 IPOs (21%) in the US are unit IPOs over the period of 1986 to 1988;
How and Howe (2001) reported that 134 out of 394 Australian IPOs (34%) issued from 1979 to
1990 choose to include warrants in the offerings. With a growing interest in unit-type offerings
instead of the traditional share-only IPOs, a more focused investigation into the reasons why
firms choose such ‘packaged’ IPOs is intriguing. My research incorporates the examination of
both short-run and long run patterns for unit IPO firms in comparison to share-only IPO
matching firms and various market indices. The literature on both initial underpricing and
4long-term performance of IPOs has been thoroughly reviewed. I replicate several conventional
methodologies in calculating abnormal returns whilst extending them along several dimensions
around my research focus of the unit IPOs.
1.2.2 Original data from the UK
The second contribution of this thesis is the regional choice of data. I collect and investigate a
sample  of  350  IPOs  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  The  empirical  tests  of  several
competing hypotheses of unit IPO theories conducted in this thesis have not been examined
with UK data before. I believe the unique environmental setting of the UK market, such as
exchange listing requirements and tax regulations etc., is valuable for reassessing the
robustness of the existing theories and inspiring new directions for future research.
The  originality  of  the  UK  data  is  explored  from  several  angles.  Firstly,  the  London  Stock
Exchange has two markets, the Official Listing and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM).
AIM is launched in June 1995 for smaller companies. The thesis provides evidence that in the
UK more unit IPOs are listed on AIM than those listed on the Official Listing. The segregated
study of unit IPOs listed on AIM and the Official Listing in the UK may provide a benchmark
for international comparisons of unit IPOs in different market settings.
Secondly, the regional market indices in the UK can provide unique benchmarks in testing the
robustness of existing unit IPO literature worldwide. Since unit IPO firms tend to be younger
and smaller comparing to share-only IPO firms, I employ regional UK index for smaller firms,
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index as the main benchmark to account for firm
size. When calculating long-term market-adjusted returns, the FTSE All Share (FTA) Index
include all the listed companies regardless of firm sizes is also employed, which provides an
overall indication of the market performance. Furthermore, since the listings of unit IPOs in my
5sample are highly concentrated on the Alternative Investment Market, I also apply AIM Index
as alternative benchmark to test the sensitivity of the long-term performance measures.
Last but not least, the choices of IPO issue methods in the UK are also unique, especially in
comparison to the US IPO studies. Both the Agency Cost hypothesis of Schultz (1993b) and the
Signalling hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) studied unit IPOs in the US, where
most  IPOs  are  issued  through  either  firm  commitments  or  best  efforts.  In  the  UK,  firms  go
public mainly through a public offer or a placing (Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi, 2006). In
a public offer, the underwriter offers the company’s shares to private and/or institutional
investors. Public offers in the UK are very similar to US firm commitments, both of which are
mainly used by larger firms, and underwritten by the sponsors who commit themselves to pick
up any remaining unsold shares. However, UK public offers are generally sold to individual
investors whilst the target of firm commitments in the US is institutional investors. A placing,
as another popular method of going public in the UK, is similar to best effort contracts in the US,
both of which are usually adopted by smaller firms and the underwriter does not provide a
guarantee like a public offer. If there is insufficient interest from investors, the issue is
withdrawn. However, a placing of shares is sold to a chosen group of institutional investors
whilst best efforts in the US are usually sold to individual investors. Roughly, 82% of the IPOs
in my UK sample (regardless of offer type) are issued through placement. I believe the unique
contractual features of UK IPOs can provide fresh insight into the different fashions in which
companies choose to go public.
 1.2.3 A focus on the conflicting findings in unit IPO theory
Contributing  to  the  limited  research  on  unit  IPO  theory,  my  thesis  directly  stresses  two
contradicting areas from the existing literature, aiming to explain the reasons why some
companies include warrants in their IPOs. A wide range of extant literature has been reviewed.
6In summary, most previous studies have concurred on the characteristics of unit IPO firms to be
smaller, younger and riskier than share-only IPO firms; unit firms also tend to have lower levels
of insider ownership, possess less income and fewer assets prior to the offering. However, so
far there have been ambiguous findings regarding two aspects: Firstly, evidence from the
degree of underpricing of unit firms comparing to share-only firms has been debatable. How &
Howe (2001) and Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) found no difference in underpricing between the
two types of firms. Jain (1994) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) found lower levels of
underpricing for unit firms and contrarily, Schultz (1993b) presented evidence that unit firms
are more underpriced than share-only firms. Secondly, there has not been a solid conclusion
about the role of underwriter reputation. Schultz (1993b) and his supporters contributed
evidence that unit IPO firms are more likely to use less prestigious underwriters; whilst How
and Howe (2001) conclude that the reputation of underwriters in Australia, which choose to
underwrite unit offerings, are just as good if not better than underwriters that choose to
underwrite share-only IPOs. My thesis aims to reassess the two controversial topics with UK
data, and provide evidence that unit IPOs in the UK are significantly more underpriced than
share-only IPOs, and the reputation of underwriters that market for those unit offerings plays a
crucial part in their aftermarket performance.
1.2.4 The study of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) issued by unit IPO firms
Another contribution this thesis offers is the study of unit firms that decide to issue a seasoned
equity offering within three years of the initial public offering. Most existing studies on
seasoned equity offerings have examined the fact that firms tend to issue additional equity when
their stock is experiencing a price appreciation and they tend to cluster right after the release of
earnings announcements. However, very few studies associate the managers’ decision to issue
additional  shares  with  the  choice  of  warrant-share  unit  offerings  at  the  beginning  of  firms’
public life. I believe a study into the seasoned offerings within five years of a unit IPO and the
7resulting price reaction to the announcements can further our understanding of relationships
between the corporate decisions to include warrants at the time of IPOs and the issuance of
additional shares in the after-market.
1.2.5 Original discussion of the warrant characteristics
Finally yet importantly, the originality of my research roots from the investigation into warrant
characteristics, in association with unit IPO underpricing and aftermarket performance. With
the rapid development of various financial instruments across the market segments, academics
are paying increasing attention to the characteristics of securities (Barclay and Smith; 1995a,
1995b). A warrant, being a class of financial derivative itself, has been introduced into initial
public offerings as an important source of financing for many firms. However, the attention
warrants have received in the finance literature is rather limited. This paper has the intention to
reveal the characteristics of UK warrants comparing to warrants issued in US, Australia and
Hong Kong. In each chapter, warrant characteristics are analysed in association with test results.
Models included in the paper are designed to capture the relationship between warrant
inclusion/characteristics and any abnormal returns, aiming to identify determinants of the
performance immediately post-listing and over a period of three years after the initial offering,
and to examine whether the inclusion of warrants is  a structured strategy that influences the
company’s stock performance. The comparative analyses on unit IPOs’ stock performance on
both the short-term and long-term perspective, together with carefully conducted
cross-sectional  analyses,  allow  my  research  to  provide  refreshing  evidence  in  the  role  of
warrants  in  an  IPO  process.  For  example,  in  examination  of  the  underpricing  of  unit  IPOs,
linear regressions were conducted with independent variables such as firm value sold as
warrants, number of warrants included in the unit offering, life of warrants until expiration, the
ratio of warrant exercise price to offer price, etc. I believe the research outcomes can provide
insight for both managerial insiders and investors.
81.3 The structure of this thesis
The  thesis  consists  of  six  chapters,  including  the  current  one.  CHAPTER  2  reviews  related
literature of unit IPOs. Theoretical predictions and arguments from Schultz (1993b) and
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) are thoroughly explained and illustrated. Subsequent
academic papers in discussion of the two original studies are reviewed systematically. Since the
existing literature on unit IPOs is limited, selective studies from the (share-only) IPO literature
are also surveyed for reference.
The empirical results of my research are structured into three chapters, each stressing a specific
research angle. CHAPTER 3 investigates the characteristics of unit IPOs in comparison to
share-only IPOs issued in the UK; and analyses, theoretically and empirically, the short-term
economic effects of a dual share-warrant financing strategy through unit IPOs and the factors
that might affect issuing firms’ decisions to choose unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. Two
competing hypotheses regarding the inclusion of warrants in IPOs are tested directly and with a
short-term focus. Direct tests on the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses conclude that
unit firms exhibit significantly higher agency costs than matching share-only firms, measured
by ‘efficiency ratios’; in addition, unit firms present higher levels of information asymmetry
than share-only firms do, prior to the IPOs. The initial returns and after-market short-term
buy-and-hold returns of unit IPOs in comparison to share-only IPOs for up to 21 days
post-listing are examined. Strong evidence is found that both unit IPOs and share-only IPOs
generate positive abnormal returns on the first day of trading (IRD2)  but  unit  IPOs  are
significantly more underpriced comparing to matching share-only IPOs, which is consistent
with the Agency Cost hypothesis. As alternative measure of underpricing, the first-week initial
returns (IRW2) are calculated and compared between unit and share-only IPOs. Despite a mild
decline in the magnitude of underpricing, unit IPOs in the UK still significantly outperform
share-only IPOs. Such outperformance persisted into the first week post-listing. Analysis using
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determinants of underpricing and the choice of offer types. Regression results provide strong
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis, that the choice to include warrants has a great impact on
the degree of initial underpricing. The UNIT dummy variable is positive and highly significant
at 1% level. Furthermore, both unit IPOs and share-only IPOs share some common features that
determine their degree of underpricing. The size, profitability, and debt leverage of the firms
prior to the IPO, and the reputation of underwriters are all negatively and significantly related
to the degree of underpricing. However, the regressions do not support any significant impacts
on underpricing from the firm age, listing years, and industry effect. To sum up, the initial
underpricing is a common IPO feature shared by both unit and share-only IPOs. However, unit
firms in general tend to be smaller, riskier, and less profitable firms with greater information
asymmetry than share-only firms prior to the IPO, and unit  IPOs are more likely to use less
reputable underwriters to market for smaller issues. These unique features determine that unit
IPOs will be significantly more underpriced at the first trading day than share-only IPOs.
CHAPTER 4 abstracts a sub-sample of unit IPO firms that issued a seasoned equity offering
within three years from the initial public offering. Schultz (1993b) argues that fewer unit firms
will survive comparing to firms, which issue share-only IPOs; however, unit firms that do
survive are more inclined to receive additional financing through seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs) post-IPO because the value-revealing projects have established the attractiveness and
profitability of their investment opportunities. In this chapter, tests are conducted focusing on
examining the post-listing survival and subsequent financing of unit firms; determinants of
firms’ decision to issue SEOs within three years of their unit IPOs are also analysed. Evidence
is found that unit firms have lower survive rates than share-only firms after their IPOs; and the
survived unit firms are more likely to issue SEOs than share-only firms are. These results
provide support to the Agency Cost hypothesis. In addition, with a ‘comparison period’
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approach, the SEOs are proven to be issued when the unit firms’ shares are overvalued, and a
negative price reaction is associated with the SEO announcements by unit firms.
CHAPTER 5 focuses on the long-term stock performance of unit firms three years after the IPO.
Following Mazouz et al. (2007), I extend both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses
into a longer time-scale and test the two competing theories for including warrants using the
long-term price performance approach. According to the Agency Cost hypothesis, if warrants
are included in IPOs to reduce agency cost, then unit firms are expected to possess better
management performance and therefore, higher long-term returns than share-only IPOs. In
testing  the  Signalling  hypothesis,  the  unit  firms  are  riskier  than  share-only  IPO firms.  If  the
favourable information about firm value successfully conveyed to the market by costly signals
such as including warrants, insider holdings, and underpricing the IPOs, unit firms should yield
higher long-term returns to compensate investors for bearing the extra risk (Mazouz et al.,
2007). Although explaining the long-term performance from different angles, both the Agency
Cost and the Signalling hypotheses predict that firms that choose unit IPOs outperform firms,
which choose to issue shares alone. In CHAPTER 5, long-term abnormal returns of unit firms
are therefore calculated using different methods against different benchmarks, and compared
with the long-term returns of share-only firms matched on size and industry. Results from the
cumulative abnormal returns, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and the wealth relatives all
provide strong evidence that unit IPOs in the UK significantly underperform both the market
indices and the matching share-only firms, which contradicts both the Agency Cost and the
Signalling hypotheses. Additionally, the long-term performance of unit IPOs are also analysed
cross-sectionally in relation to the characteristics of unit IPOs and attached warrants. Evidence
is found that unit IPOs issued during years of high market levels, bigger unit issues with larger
proceeds, and unit firms from high risk industries display significantly worse long-term
underperformance. Such results support the Agency Cost theory, that unit firms intentionally
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limit the size of their offers to bind managers to optimal investment decisions. Moreover, unit
IPOs with higher initial returns exhibit more severe underperformance against both the market
indices and the matching share-only IPOs. The negative relation between initial returns and
long-term performance is consistent with the Agency Cost theory, that unit firms are more
underpriced than share-only firms and have lower survival rate than share-only firms in the long
term. Finally, three linear least square regressions are conducted on the 3-year BHARs of unit
IPOs, the results of which confirm that certain characteristics of the unit firms, the unit issues,
and the attached warrants can significantly affect the long-term performance of unit IPOs.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Usually, companies go public through a sale of common stock, or alternatively they can also
choose a packaged offering. One such example of packaged security issues is the use of
warrants in initial public offerings (IPOs), popularly referred to as ‘unit IPOs’ or ‘unit
offerings’. It has been noticed by extant literature that a significant minority of IPO firms
choose a unit offering in preference to a share-only offering by adding warrants to their IPOs.
Warrants are included in over one-fifth of US IPOs (Schultz, 1993a) and in over one-third of
Australian IPOs (How and Howe, 2001). While considerable attention in previous literature has
focused  on  share-only  IPOs,  unit  offerings  representing  a  significant  fraction  of  the  IPO
population has not been sufficiently researched especially in the UK financial market. Warrants
included in the unit offerings are often cursorily described as a ‘sweetener’, which is used to
induce public interests for less popular issues. However, more precise and formalised
explanations have been proposed and dissensions genuinely debated.
Schultz (1993b) proposes the Agency Cost hypothesis and maintains that smaller, younger, and
riskier firms choose to issue unit IPOs to reduce agency cost by forming staged financing
through attached warrants. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) argue with the competing
Signalling hypothesis that  the inclusion of warrants in unit  IPOs serves as a costly signal to
conveying firm information to investors rather than sequential financing instrument.
Subsequent studies of unit IPOs largely reassess the two competing hypotheses with different
data set. Both How and Howe (2001) and Lee et al. (2003) investigate Australian unit IPOs and
provide more support to the Signalling hypothesis than to the Agency Cost hypothesis.
However, none of these papers can reject the Agency Cost hypothesis completely. So far, the
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studies on unit IPOs are inconclusive as which hypothesis should be the primary reason for the
inclusion of warrants in unit IPOs.
The  main  objective  of  this  survey  is  to  review  studies  on  the  unit  IPOs  and  theoretical
background related to the three empirical chapters: initial underpricing (CHAPTER3),
seasoned equity offerings (CHAPTER 4), and the long-term performance of unit IPOs
(CHAPTER 5). The first two sections present the popularly researched Agency Cost hypothesis
(section 2.2) and the Signalling hypothesis (section 2.3), which have been the centre of most
recent debate about unit IPOs. Section 2.4 is arranged to review the subsequent academic
studies and to epitomise the successive discussions around the two hypotheses’ rivalry. The
related literature on seasoned equity offerings (Section 2.5) and the long-term performance of
IPOs (Section 2.6), provides the theoretical background for CHAPTER 4, and CHAPTER 5.
2.2 Staged financing and the Agency Cost hypothesis
2.2.1 Rationale of the Agency Cost hypothesis
Jensen  (1986)  contends  that  firms  in  their  development  stage  will  typically  use  some of  the
proceeds of their IPO to complete research on a product or to conduct test-marketing. If the
initial investment is successful, the remaining funds can be used to begin production. If product
development or test marketing fails, the remaining funds from the IPO constitute a free cash
flow that management can squander on other negative net present value projects.
Motivated by Jensen’s (1986) free-cash flow theory, Schultz (1993b) examines 797 US IPOs
issued over the period of 1986-1988 and claimed that unit IPOs that combine shares and
warrants together are a type of strategically staged financing arrangement. He started his
argument with a commonly observed phenomenon that after raising capital from an IPO, if a
negative investment outcome is demonstrated after using a portion of the IPO proceeds,
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managers are tempted to over-invest for the sake of their job security. If given sufficient capital
up front, inefficient management will end up depleting money on unprofitable projects. Similar
to the problem in venture capital-backed projects, Sahlman (1990) brought forth that ‘an
entrepreneur will almost never stop investing in a failing project as long as others are providing
the capital’. Venture capitalists control such agency cost by providing the capital funding in a
sequence of infusions; a unit IPO can also achieve such staged financing without the
intervention of demanding venture capitalists. As a response to agency costs, Schultz (1993b)
inserts that including warrants in an IPO provides a form of multistage financing imitating the
sequential capital infusions in venture capital firms. A unit IPO usually proceeds relatively little
funding at the initial offering: just enough for necessary development and test marketing for a
new firm, but not enough for managers to squander away on negative NPV projects. A future
equity infusion depends more explicitly and therefore more objectively, on the results from the
limited initial investments. Schultz (1993b) also argues that unit offerings may be preferable to
relying on venture capitalists, despite the fact that those specialists concerned with their own
money are apt to provide efficient monitoring. However, they also charge a premium for
providing financing and this premium may be sufficient for many IPO firms to prefer a unit
public offering, which does not normally require an extra issuing cost to add warrants.
Schultz (1993b) explains that if the initial investment is successful, the profitability of the
project will reflect in the stock price that it exceeds the warrant exercise price. The exercise of
warrants will be triggered and the second round of financing occurs, meaning that this
sequential funding can then be materialised to begin production. On the other hand, if the initial
investment shows that the project is not viable with a negative NPV and the company is not able
to profitably inject additional funds, the stock price of the firm fall below the warrant exercise
price. Warrants will not be exercised and then the second round of financing will automatically
vanish, as is in shareholders’ (also warrant holders’) best interest.
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Schultz (1993b) also points out the staged equity financing through unit IPOs can also be
accomplished by a share-only IPO shadowed with a seasoned equity offering (SEO) or a rights
issue. However, a share-warrant unit IPO has the advantage of setting the warrant exercise price
(as the offer price of the seasoned issue of shares) in advance (equal to or above the current
stock price) comparing to SEOs issued after the initial public offerings. As a result, managers’
motivation of investing the IPO proceeds is no longer to secure their jobs; instead, they are
motivated to make optimal investment decisions so that excess cash will not be wasted in
negative net present value projects. More importantly, by setting the price at which subsequent
equities will be raised, managers are stimulated to convey sufficient information about the firm
value to ensure warrants will be exercised post-IPO and the agency costs are more effectively
mitigated than by relying on a costly secondary offering. In addition, many warrant agreements
require a reduction in the exercise price and an increase in the number of shares purchased by a
warrant if the firm sells additional shares at prices below the warrant exercise price. Therefore,
warrant in unit IPOs can be structured to prevent firms from selling shares for a second round of
equity financing without first determining the value of their projects. In general, warrant
agreements of this type make it more difficult for management to sell large amounts of equity at
prices below the warrant exercise price by effectively limiting the proportion of a firm’s fully
diluted equity that can be sold in a seasoned offer.
2.2.2 The testable predictions of the Agency Cost hypothesis
Schultz (1993b)’s Agency Cost hypothesis has a few testable implications that have been
examined with his US IPOs data sample. These implications have inspired future researchers
including myself to reassess the Agency Cost hypothesis with different dataset.
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2.2.2.1 Ex ante uncertainty and the choice to issue unit IPO
Schultz (1993b) reasons that firms that have chosen unit IPOs have shorter operating histories
and need the proceeds from the initial sale of shares to determine whether their potential
investments are worthwhile. Such firms would be expected to have little sales or earnings and
few assets or technologically sophisticated products prior to the offerings. In turn, their pre-IPO
assets and income are a smaller proportion of IPO proceeds comparing to share-only offering
firms. His test results confirmed that for each offer-size group, income and sales per asset are
lower for unit offerings and the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for
offer-size categories of $3- $20 million. It will be difficult for investors, and even the
management themselves, to evaluate and predict the project’s future performance. In such state
of high uncertainty about the future prospect, both issuing firms and market investors will
benefit more from the staged financing arrangement provided through a unit IPO. Therefore,
the Agency Cost hypothesis conjectures that firms with greater ex ante uncertainty about their
value or the profitability of the investments are more likely to choose unit IPO.
Schultz (1993b) proposed to measure the ex ante uncertainty in several ways. The first indicator
of ex ante uncertainty is firm age. Since by nature there is commonly more uncertainty about
the future prospect of newly established businesses, the Agency Cost hypothesis predicts that
firms choosing unit IPOs will be younger than firms choosing share-only offerings, measured
by the number of calendar days between the incorporation of firms and the Admission date of
their IPOs. Secondly, greater ex ante uncertainty could also depend on firm size. Within Schultz
(1993b)’s US IPO sample, most firms that issue unit IPOs have not yet made principal
investments in products or technologies and hence are small in size, measured both in market
capital value and total assets. Unit firms are therefore expected to be smaller than share-only
firms are. Last but not least measure of uncertainty is the post-IPO volatility of the firm’s stock
returns (Beatty 1989). Accordingly, the Agency Cost hypothesis anticipates that comparing to
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firms choosing share-only IPOs, unit IPO firms will have greater standard deviation of returns
after the IPO.
2.2.2.2 Insider ownership and the choice of warrant exercise price
It is precedented and logical to expect that if managers have a smaller stake in the company’s
equities there will be less incentive for better performance since there is less impact on their
personal wealth for making poor investments, and therefore higher agency cost is induced. Unit
IPOs, having part of the funding arranged in the future through the conditional exercise of
warrants, can provide limit proceed available to managers immediately after the initial
offerings. Therefore, managers are motivated to make optimal investment decisions and invest
in value-generating projects in order to materialise the second round of financing in form of
warrants.  Forasmuch  the  Agency  Cost  hypothesis  predicts  that  firms  with  a  lower  level  of
managerial ownership have a greater agency problem and will be more likely to choose unit
IPOs in order to alleviate such conflict. Because of the implicit incentive mechanism, a unit IPO
can serve to minimise agency cost; Schultz (1993b) infers that warrant exercise price shall be
set above the expected stock price to motivate managers to discover and invest in profitable
projects and convey such information to the public to assure exercise of warrants.
2.2.2.3 Post-IPO survival rate and subsequent financing of unit IPO firms
Since a unit IPO’s proceed (the first round of financing) is used to ‘test the water’, and
determine the viability of the potential investment, it automatically encourages managers to
focus on the profitability of the prospective projects and only invest in profitable projects with
positive net present values. Schultz (1993b) pointed out that ironically many firms applying
unit IPO will discover that there are not always positive net present value projects for them to
invest in. If this is the case, the warrants will be left to expire and the second of financing is
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automatically aborted. Under such ‘all or nothing’ scenario, unit firms are more likely to go out
of business and result in final delisting from the stock exchange. Therefore, fewer unit firms
will survive comparing to share-only firms. Subsequently, the Agency Cost hypothesis also
predicts that unit IPO firms have a lower survival rate after the offering.
Conjointly, the theory anticipates that survived unit firms are inclined to receive additional
equity financing post-listing, because the value-revealing projects have established the
attractiveness and profitability of their investments. After the exercise of warrants carrying
through, further funding are likely to be demanded with the company’s growth. Therefore,
Schultz (1993b) predicts that survivors among unit firms are more likely to issue seasoned
equity offerings in the future as the third, fourth round of financing and so on.
2.2.2.4 The initial underpricing of unit IPOs
It has been commonly documented that on average initial public offerings are issued at a
discount (Ibbotson, 1975; Ritter, 1984; Rock, 1986). Recent studies explained the reasons for
the underpricing phenomenon based on asymmetric information about the true value of the
issuing firms (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; and Welch, 1989).
Commonly, they argue that information asymmetry is the main reason that firms are inclined to
underprice their new shares to signal the true value of the firms to investors. These firms will
expect to recoup the loss from underpricing by issuing future seasoned offerings at a higher
price, when the popularity and market share of the company’s stocks have been established.
Given their younger age and smaller size, unit IPO firms have greater uncertainty about their
future performance, which will lead to greater underpricing (Beatty and Ritter 1986). The
Agency Cost hypothesis anticipates that firms tend to issue unit offerings when the value of
their projects cannot be easily accessed and evaluated. Such companies will encounter higher
information asymmetry and therefore a higher degree of underpricing will be required to
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convince the investors to buy their shares. In short, another testable implication of the Agency
Cost hypothesis proposed the possibility that unit IPOs will be more underpriced than
share-only IPOs after controlling for other determinants of underpricing.
2.2.2.5 Underwriter reputation
Since there is more uncertainty about unit firms’ future performance, it will be more
challenging to sell shares from such companies. Prestigious underwriters tend to avoid
marketing for unit firms in consideration of their own reputation in case the issue failed. Schultz
(1993b) predicts that underwriters of unit IPOs are more likely to be less reputable than those
who market for share-only IPOs. He also suggests that larger fees/compensation may be
required from firms that choose to issue unit IPOs. Therefore, underwriters will require higher
fees for the extra effort and to compensate for the extra risk they take on if they agree to
underwrite such issues. Barry, Muscarella and Cetsuypens (1991) documented that a large
number of warrants have been granted to the unit firms’ underwriters and they most likely to
take up a significant portion of the underwriting compensation. Schultz (1993b)’s result
extended the argument and claims that underwriters are more likely to receive warrants with a
unit IPO than firms that only issue shares in the offerings.
2.2.2.6 Industry effect and the choice of unit IPOs
Since  it  is  more  difficult  to  determine  the  potential  profitability  of  investments  in  some
industries than others, Schultz (1993) also expects differences in the frequency of unit offerings
across industry groups. To examine such character, he obtained Standard Industry
Classification Codes (SIC) from the Standard and Poor’s Directory. He reports industries with
most unit IPOs are business services, engineering, accounting, and management firms, health
services and personal services; there are mild fraction of unit IPOs in industries such as mining,
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fishing and farming, transportation, construction and financial services; but surprisingly, only 2
out of 52 firms in the transportation industry chose unit offerings.
2.2.3 Limitations of the Agency Cost Hypothesis
A number of limitations of the Agency Cost hypothesis have been demonstrated by academics
over the years. First, over-investing in negative NPV projects is a possibility that occurs in
almost all companies across industries, yet only a minority of IPOs are unit offerings. If the
main driving factor for choosing a unit offering is to minimize agency cost, such merit shall be
valued by firms in general. Unit IPOs shall be favoured as an economical and effective
financing instrument by most firms rather than only high-risk firms which are smaller in size
and younger in age. Therefore, the fact that not most IPO firms choose a unit offering as their
financing vehicle indicate that agency cost theory does not provide a complete explanation for
including warrants in IPOs. Secondly, the sample Schultz (1993b) collected includes a
significant proportion of mining firms, which indicate a higher propensity to use unit offerings.
By virtue of risky nature, many mining IPOs apply a short-lived ‘exploration lease’ and the
proceeds are used almost solely for geological assessment. But the result of the assessment and
prospect of the investment could be revealed within a certain period of time: if the natural
resources exist, warrants will be exercised and second round of financing will be brought
forward; if the natural resource is not found, warrants will lapse without any further exploration.
The third limitation of his study is that Schultz (1993b) paid relatively little attention to
post-listing behaviour, in terms of survival rate and subsequent capital raisings. The Agency
Cost hypothesis seems less reliable without validating the real value appreciation brought to the
unit firms subsequent to the IPO by choosing a unit IPO rather than share-only IPO. The
limitation of the Agency Cost hypothesis suggests that the application of unit IPOs cannot be
solely explained with minimising agency cost alone.
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2.3 Information asymmetry and the Signalling hypothesis
2.3.1 Information asymmetry and the rationale of the Signalling Theory
Information asymmetry is commonly referred to in economics and contract theory. Asymmetric
information is present when one party to a transaction has more or better information than the
other party. In financial markets, information asymmetry is much prominent. Especially in the
case of initial public offerings, a unique situation of information asymmetry surrounding
market value between sellers of a firm and its would-be buyers will occur endogenously and
efforts are required to transfer information1 between different market participants.
Leland and Pyle (1977) among brought forth a more systematic understanding of a financial
market characterised with informational asymmetries. They portray the informational
differences between ‘borrowers’ and ‘lenders’ in the financial market: borrowers tend to have
more sufficient information of their collateral, industriousness, and moral rectitude than
‘lenders’. Lenders would benefit from knowing the true quality of borrowers. However, moral
hazard2 arises when an individual or institution does not bear the full consequences of its
actions, and therefore has a tendency to act less carefully than it otherwise would. Because of
asymmetric information, borrowers in a transaction that has more information about its own
actions and intentions than the lenders is insulated from risk and the other party might end up
paying for the negative consequences of the risk. As a result, borrowers cannot be trusted to be
completely honest about their true characteristics because of the substantial rewards for
exaggerating positive qualities. In such dilemma, moral hazard obstructs the efficient
communication between market participants. It is especially the case when verification of true
value by third parties may be rather costly, sometimes even impossible. Nonetheless, Leland
1 Signals have been generally classified as both financial information (e.g., cash flows, dividends) and non-financial
information (e.g., advisers’ reputation, board experience) (Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Reber, Berry and Toms, 2005).
2 Moral hazard is the prospect that a party insulated from risk may behave differently from the way it would behave if it were
fully exposed to the risk.
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and Pyle (1977) contend that information on firm (or project) quality may be conveyed if
‘actions’ of firm insiders (or entrepreneurs) is in view to the public investors. One of the
observable actions, which may serve as a signal to the lending market about the true quality of
the firm, is the insiders’ willingness to invest in their own firms or projects. Such willingness
provides a signal of commitment and confidence and was captured by Leland and Pyle (1997)
as proportion of shares retained by company insiders. The insiders’ fractional holding of the
firm’s equity signals its expected future cash flows, i.e., higher levels of retained equity by
insiders are argued to signal larger cash flow in the future and in turn higher level of firm value.
This is simply because investors perceive that insiders would only be willing to hold relatively
undiversified portfolios of their own shares in expectation of compensating future returns.
2.3.2 Costly signals in IPO process
Signal No. 1: Equity retained by insiders
Leland and Pyle (1977) initiated a simple signalling model in which entrepreneurs (borrowers)
seek financing from shareholders (lenders) for their projects. They classified two types of firms
in the mean of their future cash flows and conjecture that risk-averse insiders have private
information about the mean of their own project’s cash flows. On such horizon, insiders of a
project with higher expected future cash flows are constrained to signal true value to the equity
market only through retaining a larger fraction of their firm’s shares than the poorer type firms.
As expected, retaining their own share will inevitably sacrifice the value from selling them to
the investors in the open market (also known as ‘money left on the table’). Nevertheless,
comparing the cost of retaining a larger fraction of the firm’s own equity to that of purely
risk-sharing considerations, the former is lower and therefore optimal for firms with higher
future cash flows.
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Such signalling rationale also explains the existence of financial intermediaries. Although
transaction costs could explain intermediation, their magnitude is not sufficient to be the sole
cause. Leland and Pyle (1977) propound that informational asymmetries may be a primary
reason that intermediaries exist. They argue that information about certain classes of asset such
as  mortgages  or  insurance  is  not  always  publicly  available  but  can  be  obtained  with  an
expenditure of resources. Such information can be beneficial to potential shareholders (lenders)
and they might expect certain organisations to exist to gather and sell such information. To
overcome the problem of the appropriability of selling information for profit and to insure the
credibility of the information being sold, the organisations are expected to become
intermediaries who buy and hold assets based on its specialised information.3
The resulting equilibrium in Leland and Pyle’s (1977) paper was highly distinguished from
models, which ignore informational asymmetries. Although their proposition only held under
very strict presumptions4, it has been considered as a benchmark and more importantly as a
starting point for further discussion of such signalling mechanisms, from where equity retention
by firm insiders has emerged as one of the most popular determinant of firm value. Ritter
(1984a) extended the analysis of retained equity and claimed that a positive relationship
between percentage equity retention and firm value could also be explained by the agency and
wealth effect arguments. The agency effect reasons that the firm insiders who have retained a
certain fraction of their own firm’s shares have greater incentives to control agency problems
and thereafter lead to higher firm value. On the contrary, Ritter (1984a) also proposed the
wealth effect argument in opposition to his agency effect stating that the higher the firm value,
the less equity that firm insiders need to offer to the public investors in order to obtain the
3 The appropriability problem refers to the ‘public good’ aspect of information that purchasers of information may share or
resell their information to others. The existence of intermediary solves such a problem because the firm’s information is
embodied in a private good- the returns from its portfolio without diminishing returns to the resellers.
4 Leland and Pyle (1997) made the ‘perfect competition’ assumption that the project is small relative to the market as a
whole; the entrepreneur perceives his decision with respect to the project to have a negligible effect on the returns and value
of his share of the market portfolio.
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capital they are trying to raise. In the overall attempt to separate the signalling effect from the
agency effect, Ritter concluded that the positive relationship between equity retention and the
value of the firm was optimally explained by the Agency Cost hypothesis.
Keasey and McGuinness (1992) rebut Ritter (1984a)’s proposition and dispute that the
attempted separation of agency and signalling effects are flawed at both the conceptual and
empirical  levels.  They  pinpointed  the  assumption  that  firm  insiders  seek  to  raise  a  constant
amount of capital, is notably dubious. Instead, they corrected wealth effect with an ‘institutional
effect’ reasoning that firm size could be the determinant of the fraction of equity retained by
insider. In particular, small firms may be inclined to issue more shares to create a larger market
and to assure trading volume in the aftermarket. They also indicate that the basic argument of
signalling theory is the firm insiders’ motivation to signal private information concerning the
potential of the firm, and the ability to control future agency problem should be inherited as part
of the potential. Therefore, Ritter (1984a)’s attempt to separate effects that are in fact
inter-penetrable is misleading. A number of other subsequent econometric models consistently
proved the positive relationship between equity retention and firm value with high degrees of
significance. However, Krinsky and Rotenberg (1989) using data for 115 Canadian IPOs for the
period between 1971 and 1983 and surprisingly found the equity retention variable is overall
insignificant across several regression equations. Nonetheless, the fractional retention of shares
by insiders has been commonly used to signify favourable information about the firm value.
Signal No. 2: Level of underpricing
Investment banks, consider many factors when pricing an IPO, and attempt to reach an offering
price that is low enough to stimulate interest in the stock, but high enough to raise an adequate
amount of capital for the company. Historically, initial public offerings are very often
underpriced to generate additional interest in the stock when it first becomes publicly traded.
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This can lead to significant gains for investors who have been allocated shares of the IPO at the
offering price. However, underpricing an IPO results in ‘money left on the table’ – lost capital
that could have been raised for the company had the stock been offered at a higher price.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) apply a two-parameter signalling model as a generalisation of
Leland and Pyle’s (1977) retained equity signalling argument. Besides the retained equities
(Signal No. 1), insiders can also take advantage of a second signal--- the underpricing of the
firm’s equity. Such signal is also considered as another costly separating equilibrium that good
firms use to distinguish themselves from the bad firms. A firm’s intrinsic value is therefore
positively related to the level its new issue is underpriced. Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) pinpoint
that, in some cases, the insiders’ fractional holding of their own company’s shares is not
sufficient to signal the true value of the project, for which they seek financing. Furthermore, the
shares must be offered at price lower than the spot market price (i.e., at a discount) so that the
uninformed investors could earn a zero risk-adjusted and ration-adjusted return. From a
different angle, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) focus on the familiar phenomenon of the
underpricing  of  unseasoned  new issues  of  common stock  and  demonstrate  that  rather  than  a
disengagement from the efficient market hypothesis, the underpricing phenomenon is a
consequence of the actions of rational agents to signal company’s true value. Grinblatt and
Hwang (1989)’s paper is very appealing in the sense that their model proved several previous
propositions about underpricing to be perfectly rational. Firstly, the model is consistent with the
rationale of underpricing proposed by many investment professionals arguing that the investors’
interest created by a lower-priced initial offering is inclined to lead to higher-priced shares in the
post-listing market. Secondly, their theory also provides support to Ibbotson (1975)’s
disputation that new issues may be underpriced in order to ‘leave a good taste in investors’
mouths’. However, in Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) assumptions firms are allowed to invest in
negative net present value projects. Such potential issuers are endogenously deterred from
26
floating an unseasoned offering. Moreover, a seasoned offering soon after the initial public
offering could reveal true firm value and might cause underpricing itself and thus weakens the
signalling property of underpricing as an explanation for the use of unit IPOs.
Signal No. 3: Inclusion of warrants in initial public offerings
Apart from equity retained by insiders and underpricing, Ross (1977) was the first to propose
the idea that including warrants in an IPO could also be used as a signalling mechanism in an
environment of information asymmetry. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) developed a more
sophisticated theory of unit offerings in the context of a one–shot equity offering where a
second, seasoned equity offering is no longer a necessary consideration to generate the use of
underpricing as a signal in IPOs. In their study, all three signalling devices are incorporated
into the IPO process, namely, equity retention by insiders, the underpricing of new shares and
inclusion of warrants in initial public offerings. Spring from the previous investigation, they
exploit a two-type model in which they identified type G firms to be firms with a higher
expected future cash flow (Good firms) and type B firms to be those with a lower expected
value of future cash flows (Bad firms). The two types of firms are allowed to differ in their
riskiness as well as in the mean of their future cash flows. As a result, type G firms may have
greater, equal, or lower riskiness comparing to type B firms.
They reason that in a full information setting, the application of unit offerings combining share
issues with contingent warrants should not favour firms with any advantages comparing to
share-only IPOs. However, in a simplified asymmetric information environment, Chemmanur
and Fulghieri (1997) demonstrate insiders’ concern about revealing their true firm value; prior
to an IPO, the company’s insiders know their own firm’s type. Having private information
about the quality and riskiness of their own company, they know the mean and variance of their
company’s future cash flows. However, even insiders are not certain which firm-value state
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will occur after the IPO. On the other hand, public investors do not have much information
about the true value of the firms approaching the capital market for financing and therefore
cannot discriminate ‘good firms’ from ‘bad firms’. Based on publicly available information,
investors will intuitively assess the underlying firms and form a broad belief. However, after
observing insiders actions, investors might change their initial assessment accordingly.
Consequently, it is in the best interest of insiders from good firms to take actions in order to
distinguish  themselves  from  the  bad  firms.  Insiders  from  bad  firms,  on  the  other  hand,  are
motivated to imitate the good firms with higher firm value and disguise themselves to appear to
have the same quality; unless, of course such attempt is too costly for them. Accordingly, Type
G firms (good firms) will structure their IPO with certain unique qualities in order to
distinguish themselves. Any attempt by the Type B firms (bad firms) to mimic such qualities
will impose a rather dear cost. Eventually, they cannot afford the camouflage and recede to sell
their securities in the IPO at their true value. In their model, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
define their equilibrium strategies as those that constitute a ‘separating sequential equilibrium’,
in which the dissipative costs of separation incurred to distinguish Type G firms from Type B
firms. All three signals, namely insider retention, underpricing, and inclusion of warrants are
costly separating devices. It is down to the firm management as of which signal(s) to apply and
the degree of combination if more than one device is employed.
 2.3.3 The three-signal equilibrium
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) began by allowing the firm to make the equilibrium choice
between insider holding and underpricing as two costly signals, in terms of maximising wealth
at the same time minimising signalling costs. Insiders from firms with higher future value are
able to cut back on the fraction of retained equity and simultaneously underprice their shares to
distinguish themselves from the firms with lower future value.
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Subsequently, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) introduced a third component into the
equilibrium signalling mix, namely the issue of warrants in unit IPOs. Firm insiders may use
any combination of the three signals to distinguish themselves. In this case, the good firm’s
concern is to select the optimal weight to maximise the expected utility. Both underpricing and
issuing warrants as signalling devices impose dissipative costs on the firm. However, it is
worthwhile to examine how issuing warrants differs from underpricing as a signalling device
in the interest of seeing how the conclusion of warrants in IPOs allows good firms to signal true
firm value more efficiently. As previously mentioned, giving away firm value to investors by
underpricing together with the retained equity of insiders’ own firms could potentially form an
effective signalling mix that facilitate insiders from the good firms to distinguish themselves
from the bad firm, whilst cutting back on the fraction they retain within the firm. In contrast,
warrants offer a way only to impose these expenses selectively, in the higher realisations of the
firm’s future value. Such quality easily makes sense for risk-averse insiders to dissipate value
selectively in only the higher states of the company, comparing to scantily selling underpriced
equity at the cost of losing company value. This ability shall also become more attractive to
insiders when their assessment of the firm riskiness is very high, since the warrants attached
along with the equity in the IPO allow good firms with high risk to satisfy the incentive
compatibility more efficiently. As a result, this option-like claim embedded into the IPO helps
to minimise the extravagant costs associated with asymmetric information, leaving the firm’s
insiders better off in the situations where the firm’s cash flow stream is highly risky. In
conclusion, the fraction of retained shares by insiders, the degree of underpricing, and the
inclusion of warrants are all costly signals that companies apply to reveal the true value of the
firms. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) demonstrate the conditions of a separating
equilibrium in which risk-averse insiders of good firms choose a balanced combination of
insider holdings, the degree of underpricing and the number of warrants (if any) that will
maximise their utility.
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 2.3.4 The testable predictions of the Signalling hypothesis
After  proposing  the  Signalling  hypothesis  to  explain  the  inclusion  of  warrants  in  IPOs,
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) also promote their theory with a range of testable predictions,
some of which are empirically supported by existing literature, while some others contribute a
new outlook in contrast to the previous research.
First of all, they predict that within a indistinguishable pool of firms prior to the IPO, the subset
of firms that employ unit IPOs will be riskier with a higher variability of future cash flows
compared  to  firms  that  issue  shares  alone  in  an  IPO.  In  other  words,  unit  firms  are  usually
riskier than share-only IPO firms are. Significant empirical support for this prediction is also
sustained by Schultz (1993b) in his Agency Cost explanation.
Secondly, since signalling mechanism is only meaningful in the context of information
asymmetry, which is customarily measured by residual stand deviation; Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997) predict that firms that choose a unit IPO will exhibit higher level of
information asymmetry than will share-only IPO firms will.
Thirdly, the Signalling hypothesis does not anticipate higher underpricing for unit IPOs
comparing to their share-only counter-parts. Instead, they predict that the underpricing of an
IPO (either unit or share-only) increases with firm riskiness. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
further demonstrate that Issuers can trade off the signalling costs of greater underpricing with
the costs of other signals such as insiders holding and including warrants.
The fourth prediction is that the exercise price of the warrants is likely to be set equal to the
expected stock price; different from the Agency Cost hypothesis that the exercise price of
warrants are tend to be set above the expected share price.
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A fifth prediction of the signalling framework demonstrates that in an unit IPO holding the
proportion of firm value sold as warrants constant, the fraction of equity retained by firm
insiders will decrease in firm riskiness. Chemmanur and Fulghieri also indicate in a share-only
IPO, there is also a negative relationship between fraction of equity retained by insiders and the
firm riskiness.
Another prediction is that in a unit IPO, holding the fraction of equity retained constant, the
proportion of firm value sold as warrants will increase with firm riskiness. The firm value sold
as  warrants  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  number  of  warrants  attached  in  unit  IPOs,  to  the  total
number of shares in the firm’s enlarged capital following the IPO.
Last but not least, the Signalling model confirms the commonly observed fact that unit IPO
firms are apt to use less prestigious underwriters. Chemmanur (1993) develop a model of
reputation acquisition by investment banks, who act as information producing intermediaries
in an equity market characterised by asymmetric information. Such model illustrates that more
reputable investment banks tend to set stricter standards in terms of the kind of firms for which
they will underwrite an equity issue. Therefore, it is intrinsically more risky firms that choose
unit IPOs and such unit offerings are marketed by less established underwriters.
2.4 The rivalry and interaction of the two competing hypotheses
The Agency Cost hypothesis of Schultz (1993b) and the Signalling hypothesis of Chemmanur
and Fulghieri (1997) are competing propositions but not mutually exclusive. Some predictions
from the Signalling hypothesis cannot be distinguished and cut off from those of the Agency
hypothesis. Firstly, both models indicate that in an equity market characterised by
informational asymmetry, insiders have private information about their own companies that the
potential public investors do not know. Secondly, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)’s
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prediction that unit IPO firms will be riskier with greater variability of future cash flows
comparing to share-only IPO firms. Such prediction is consistent with Schultz (1993b)’s
argument that unit IPO firms have a lower survival rate post-listing and unit IPOs are associated
with smaller firms which tend to be concentrated in speculative industries with shorter
operating histories, lower value of sales and less assets. Thirdly, both academic groups
mentioned that unit IPOs tend to be marketed by less reputable underwriters. This was
sustained by both theoretical and empirical literature on investment bank prestige, that more
prestigious underwriters are more willing to underwrite the IPOs for less risky firms.
Accordingly, both the Agency Cost hypothesis and Signalling hypothesis predict that unit IPOs
are commonly underwritten by less reputable underwriters. Last but not least, both theories
specify that high-risk firms prefer to package their equity offering with warrants and the
package as a whole tends to be underpriced. Furthermore, both hypotheses maintain that the
percentage of underpricing increase in firm riskiness.
However, there are also several important divarications between the two hypotheses. Firstly,
unlike Schultz (1993b), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) do not expect the underpricing
phenomenon to differ significantly between unit IPOs and share-only IPOs. The Agency Cost
hypothesis implies that unit IPOs tend to be more underpriced than share-only IPOs. On the
other hand, the Signalling hypothesis argues that both unit and share-only IPOs are underpriced.
High-risk  firms  choose  to  combine  their  equity  with  warrants  and  the  unit  as  a  whole  is
underpriced; correspondingly, lower risk IPO firms prefer to issue underpriced equity alone.
Secondly, as a unique contribution from Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)’s research, their
model predicts that the proportion of firm value sold as warrants by unit IPOs increases with
firm riskiness after controlling for the extent of ownership retained by insiders. Similarly,
holding constant the proportion of firm value sold as warrants, the fraction of equity retained of
insiders decreases firm riskiness. They also imply a negative relationship between the fraction
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of retained equity and the firm riskiness for IPOs without warrants. The Agency Cost
hypothesis makes no such predictions.
Several academics, inspired by both of the two competing hypotheses, have been debating
which one should be the primary explanation for including warrants in an IPO. Using data from
different regions and different periods, those following researchers showed support for some of
the applications and found evidence against others.
2.4.1 Evidence from Australia
2.4.1.1 Test one
How and Howe (2001) attempted to distinguish between the Agency Cost hypothesis and the
Signalling hypothesis for the use of unit IPOs. In the hope of testing the robustness of the two
existing theories of unit IPOs with the unique environmental setting, a large data sample of 396
Australian IPOs issued between 1979 and 1990 is examined. In the sample, 134 issues (34%)
are unit offerings and 262 (66%) are share-only IPOs, which suggest that unit offerings are
more  common  in  Australia  than  in  the  United  States.  On  one  hand,  How  and  Howe  (2001)
provide some evidence that is consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis. Their analysis was
stressed  firstly  to  reveal  firm  characteristics  for  unit  firms  in  comparison  to  share-only  IPO
firms. The descriptive statistics indicate that unit IPO firms are significantly younger, smaller,
and riskier than share-only IPO firms are. The average percentage of ownership retained by
issuers is about 13.5% higher for share-only IPO firms than for unit firms; and therefore with
lower levels of insider ownership, unit firms tend to have greater agency costs. Those findings
are consistent with both the Agency Cost hypothesis and the Signalling hypothesis. The
proportion of the unit IPO firms sold as warrants is found to be positively related to the firm
riskiness, which provides strong support to the Signalling hypothesis.
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On the other hand, How and Howe (2001) attained evidence that is contrary to the Agency Cost
hypothesis. Firstly, contrary to Schultz (1993)’s prediction that unit IPO firms are associated
with less prestigious underwriters, How and Howe (2001) argue that Australian unit IPOs’
underwriters have reputations that are at least as good as those who market for share-only IPOs.
Secondly, contradicting the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit firms are more likely to fail after
IPO comparing to share-only firms, How and Howe (2001) find more Australian unit firms
survived than share-only firms. Thirdly, three different efficiency ratios are defined and
calculated as measures of agency costs: operating revenue divided by total assets, EBIT
standardised by total assets and operating profit after tax as percentage of total assets. However,
in no case is there a significant difference in efficiency ratios between unit and share-only IPO
firms, which fail to support the Agency Cost hypothesis. Fourthly, the result for choice of
exercise price indicates that most unit IPOs set their exercise price near or equal to the offer
price of the new shares, which is contrary to the prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis, that
unit IPO firms tend to be more underpriced. Finally, How and Howe (2001) examine the size of
the offers across samples of unit IPOs and samples of share-only IPOs. They conclude that the
proceeds from the IPOs are not significantly different across the two samples, which contradict
the Agency Cost prediction that unit IPOs tend to raise smaller proceeds than share-only IPOs.
Towards the Signalling hypothesis, How and Howe (2001) find more supporting evidence.
Firstly, using a regression, they proved that the proportion of the firm value sold as warrants
increases with firm riskiness after controlling for the fractional equity retained by insiders.
Secondly, a direct test is conducted to examine the level of information asymmetry. Following
Krishnaswami et al. (1999), the levels of information asymmetry are measured as the residual
standard deviations and unit IPO firms exhibit higher level of information asymmetry as
predicted by the Signalling hypothesis. The differences are significant at the 5% level for both
parametric and nonparametric tests. Finally, industry and time-period effects are examined as
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well, and evidence was found for both effects: the residual standard deviation is higher for unit
IPO firms  comparing  to  share-only  IPO firms  for  the  ‘other  industry’  category.  The  earliest
time period (1979-1984) is not characterised by differences in information asymmetry across
the two samples but in the later period (1985-1990), comparing to share-only IPO firms, unit
IPO firms do exhibit significantly higher level of information asymmetry measured as the
residual standard deviation; which is consistent to the Signalling hypothesis’ prediction.
How and Howe (2001) made their own unique contributions to the unit IPO literature by
introducing debt leverage and the level of informed demand. Sample IPO firms’ debt to total
tangible asset ratios prior to listing are calculated to demonstrate the company’s leverage; and
unit firms present significantly lower leverage than share-only firms, which is not predicted by
either existing hypothesis. Such lower level of debt might echo the fact that it is harder for unit
firms to resort to debt financing for creditability issues. And the lower debt leverage in turn
suggests that unit firms are subject to less monitoring by banks and other creditors that usually
occur to firms with high level of debt financing, and therefore, reflect on higher vulnerability
towards agency cost. An alternative measure of leverage is calculated as total debt as the
percentage of market value of equity and such indicator also supports the conclusion. The
numbers of calendar days between the registration of prospectus and listing are calculated to
proxy for level of informed demand. Subsequently they use such proxy as a control variable in
the analysis of underpricing but no significant relation is found between the level of informed
demand and the level of underpricing for unit IPOs.
Finally, a logistic regression is conducted on the probability for a firm to choose a unit IPO in
relations to the firm specific characteristics. Several variables are regressed against the dummy
variable of offer type, which takes the value of 1 if firms issue unit IPOs. The results reveal that
smaller, younger, and riskier firms and firms with lower level of insider holdings are more
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likely to issue unit IPOs. These findings support both the Agency Cost and Signalling
hypothesis. In addition, evidence is found that mining firms are more likely to issue unit IPOs.
However, unit firms are not necessarily associated with prestigious underwriters or reputable
auditors; and the decision to choose a unit IPO is not affected by the sample period.
In conclusion, while predictions common to both Agency Cost hypothesis and Signalling
hypothesis are justified and confirmed by the Australian data, there is very little unique support
for the Agency Cost explanation, but some support for predictions unique to the Signalling
explanation. However, judging from their tests and support given to both explanations, the
extent of How and Howe (2001)’s argument and conclusion is rather nonaligned between the
two competing hypotheses reflecting a fair ‘horse race’. Such limitations are caused by their
less strict design of some test variables and measurements, and the absence of other tests such
as survival rate, subsequent financing, and the long-term price performance of unit firms, which
are covered in my thesis.
  2.4.1.2 Test two
Also with Australian industrial firms over a wider horizon5, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) made
further attempts to examine the competing Agency Cost hypothesis and Signalling hypothesis
and endeavour to enforce understanding of the use of unit IPOs. They investigate a larger
sample of 394 IPOs made between 1976 and 1994, in which 66 firms (17%) are unit IPOs.
Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) start with more strictly examining the original Agency Cost
hypothesis of Schultz’s (1993b), and re-stressed the limitations of the hypothesis and the
over-strict assumptions, which weaken the argument. They argue that as the result of agency
problem,  over-investment  in  negative  NPV projects  is  common for  almost  all  IPOs,  and  yet
5 Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) investigate a sample of 394 IPOs made between 1976 and 1994, in which 66 firms (17%) are
unit IPOs.
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only a minority of which are unit offerings. The fact that unit offerings are not entirely the most
popular choice of financing vehicle for most IPO firms also suggests that the Agency Cost
hypothesis cannot provide profound explanation as to why companies choose to include
warrants in their IPOs. Further to How and Howe (2001)’s illustration of distinguishable
features between Australian unit  offerings and US unit  offerings in term of warrant contract
characteristics, Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) listed more differences mostly in market setting and
the IPOs themselves: Firstly, Australian unit IPOs are typically smaller and younger than in the
US. Secondly, there is no organised venture capital market in Australia, leaving Australian IPO
firms to face a relatively straightforward choice of financing vehicles. Thirdly, the design of the
warrant component of Australian unit offerings is more restricted by legislative considerations.
They illustrate that Australian unit IPOs typically contain one warrant for every two shares with
the maximum life of 2.7 years on average, which is in general more limited than warrants used
in the US unit IPOs. In addition, different from US unit IPO warrants setting exercise price at a
premium to the offering price; Australian IPO warrants mostly have the same exercise price as
the initial selling price of the IPO shares. Such difference explains the fact that the expected
proceeds from warrant conversion relative to the initial offering proceeds in Australia is lower
than US unit offerings reported by Schultz (1993b). Finally, the use of the ‘B warrant’, which
confer additional warrants when exercised, is also reported to be relatively rare for Australian
unit IPOs comparing to US unit offerings.
On one hand, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) validate the firm characteristics of unit IPOs which
were justified in both hypotheses and with which the signalling explanation simply cannot be
clearly distinguished from those of Schultz’s (1993b) Agency Cost theory. They confirm that
under both hypotheses unit firms are customarily younger, riskier and smaller, with higher
levels of information asymmetry between insiders and potential investors, with insiders of unit
IPO firms retaining a smaller fraction of firm’s own equity. Evidence is provided that unit
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offerings also have a significantly higher variation in the post-listing stock returns, lower assets,
income, and sales relative to issue proceeds; which is also consistent with these firms being
riskier than share-only IPOs.
On the other hand, Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) highlighted several major conflicting results
from testing of the competing theories. Firstly, they point out that Schultz (1993b) expects unit
IPO firms have higher level of underpricing, whilst Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) find no
significant difference in underpricing between unit and share-only IPO firms. Instead, the
signalling model predicts that the percentage of underpricing is increasing with firm riskiness in
both unit and share-only IPOs. Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) reported a measure of the elapsed
time between registration of the IPO prospectus and the commencement of trading. They argue
that variation in this measure should proxy for fluctuations in the level of informed demand,
and  show that  it  is  positively  associated  with  the  level  of  underpricing.  Opposite  to  Schultz
(1993b)’s prediction, the results indicate marginally less (rather than more) underpricing for
unit IPOs. Such results instead shed light on the signalling explanation that riskier firms
intentionally trade off cost of underpricing to incorporate a third signal, namely inclusion of
warrants in an IPO. Secondly, Schultz (1993b) claims that unit IPO firms are found to have
higher failure rate than share-only firms and unit firms that did survive are more likely to
receive a subsequent issue after the initial offering. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) find no
evidence that Australian unit IPOs have a higher failure rate, or that they are more frequently
subject to takeover than share-only IPO firms. Again, they find no evidence of a systematic
relation between choice of offer type and subsequent equity issuance, which fails to support the
agency cost explanation. However, evidence was found that there is a significant positive
relation between initial underpricing and the SEO issuance, which is in support of a signalling
role for IPO underpricing. Finally, as a unique proposition, the signalling model anticipates that
after controlling for the extent of retained insider ownership of company shares, the proportion
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of firm value sold as warrants by unit IPO firms shall increase in the firm riskiness. Lee, Lee,
and Taylor (2003) confirmed such prediction.
Testing both the competing hypotheses with Australian data, Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003)
stressed the limitations on the extent to which How and Howe’s (2001) conclusions managed to
separate the competing explanations in terms of sample composition (1979-1990; 134 unit IPOs
and 262 share-only IPOs, 34%), the design of some tests and the absence of other tests. They
point  out  firstly,  there  are  a  large  proportion  of  mining  firms  included  in  How  and  Howe’s
(2001) sample (60 out of 130 firms are mining firms, 46%), which demonstrate a significant
higher propensity to use unit offerings, given the nature of mining industry.6 To make up for
such demerit, Lee, Lee and Taylor generalised the industry clustering to a wider range of
industry using the 23 two-digit Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) industry codes and provide
evidence on the relationship between choice of IPO type and industry that unit offerings are not
uniformly spread across industry groups. Surprisingly, there are a large number of IPOs in the
investment and financial services group, and ‘the proportion of IPOs using unit offerings is two
and half times the expected figure’. Secondly, How and Howe (2001) neglect one of Schultz’s
predications that there are significant differences in the proposed uses of IPO proceeds between
unit firms and share-only firms, and also fail to discuss the post-listing behaviour in depth.
Instead, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) form five categories based on prospectus disclosures:
working capital, debt repayment, capital expenditure, payments to vendor shareholders and
‘other’ to test the Agency Cost hypothesis. Therefore, it is expected that unit IPO firms should
allocate a significantly larger proportion of IPO proceeds to planned capital expenditure.
However, the results indicate otherwise: for unit IPOs, the ‘catch-all’ category (‘other’) is
significantly higher than for share-only IPOs, implying that unit IPOs are less specific about the
planned use of IPO proceeds. In such case, no support is found for the agency cost explanation
6‘Many of the mining IPOs own a short-lived exploration lease and the proceeds are used almost solely for geological
assessment.  As  this  is  a  fairly  transparent  process,  i.e.  either  a  commercial  resource  is  identified  or  it  is  not,  the  source  of
agency costs is unclear.’ Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003)
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for the use of warrants. Thirdly, How and Howe (2001) overlook Schultz (1993b)’s proposition
about the cost of going public; that unit IPOs tend to incur relatively higher underwriter fees, as
well as greater underpricing because of higher uncertainty about the future investment
outcomes. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) calculate the underwriter fees, brokerage fees,
commission fees, management fees, and other expenses and find no significant differences
between unit IPOs and share-only IPOs in terms of direct costs or other expenses incurred as
part of IPO process. They also reported market-adjusted underpricing, which can be thought of
an indirect costs to issuers and in contrast to Schultz’s prediction, no evidence was found that
unit offerings are more underpriced than share-only offerings. Furthermore, when direct and
indirect costs of going public are combined, the net result is that the total costs do not differ
significantly across the unit and share-only IPO samples. Last but not least, How and Howe
(2001) used underwriting frequency as a measure of underwriter reputation, which is
considered inaccurate. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) rely on a binary rating system as the
underwriter classifications designed to capture the extent to which an underwriter will be
viewed as prestigious.
To sum up, Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) tested the two competing hypotheses typically used to
explain the choice between a unit IPO and a share-only IPO. They claim no difference is found
in underpricing between unit IPOs and share-only IPOs, which is not in line with the Agency
Cost hypothesis, but agree with the Signalling hypothesis. They are also unable to find evidence
supportive of Schultz’s post-listing behaviour proposition and seasoned equity offerings as well
as the planned use of the IPO proceeds. Above all, they provide the exclusive feature that
distinguishes the Signalling hypothesis by confirming the positive relation between the fraction
of the firm sold as warrants and the firm riskiness after controlling for the level of insider
ownership. As a result, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) conclude that the use of unit IPOs with
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warrants attached reflects their role as a signalling mechanism raised by Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997) rather than an attempt to minimise agency costs as proposed Schultz (1993b).
2.4.2 Evidence from Hong Kong
Aiming to enhance the understanding of why firms include warrants as a bundle in their IPOs,
Mazouz, Saadouni and Yin (2007 a) examine the robustness of the agency cost and signalling
explanations of unit offerings with a unique dataset of listed Hong Kong IPO firms between the
year 1990 and 1997.
Using a sample of 130 (35%) unit IPO firms and 242 (65%) share-only IPO firms, they
reviewed the competing Agency Cost hypothesis and the Signalling hypothesis from their own
standpoint and come to three central  conclusions.  Firstly,  they find that unit  IPO firms have
higher profitability and better asset utilization rates than share-only IPO firms in the sample.
This finding contradicts the prediction from the Agency Cost hypothesis that warrants are
applied by firms with greater agency problem to reduce agency cost. Secondly, they
demonstrate that the proportion of firm value sold as warrants increase in the firm’s riskiness,
after controlling for the level of retained equity by insiders. Such proposition has been proved
by both How and Howe (2001) and Lee et al. (2003), and once again evidence is provided by
data from Hong Kong in support of the Signalling hypothesis. Finally, the study employs a
self-selection regression methodology to test whether firms include warrants in their IPOs to
reduce underpricing comparing to what it would have been in the absence of warrants.
Considering Hong Kong’s regional environment setting in terms of stock exchange listing
requirement and taxes, the characteristics of the warrants included in Hong Kong IPOs are apt
to have their unique features. This study compares the main warrants characteristics in Hong
Kong, the US and Australia. Descriptive statistics of warrant design are illustrated compared,
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such as shares per warrant, warrant exercise price, proceeds from the exercise of warrants, and
years to expiration. Firstly, unlike the US and Australian unit IPOs which usually contain one
warrant for every two shares, the unit IPOs issued in Hong Kong customarily contain one
warrant for every five shares issued. Secondly, the exercise price of warrants of unit IPOs is set
above the offer price of the IPO shares by up to 39% in Hong Kong. In comparison, US IPO
warrants are issued at a premium of up to 25% above the offer price (Schultz, 1993b); whereas
the exercise price of Australian warrants are set to be the same as the IPO offer price (How and
Howe, 2001). Thirdly, the average expected proceeds from the exercise of warrants relative to
the IPO proceeds in Hong Kong is nearly 89% when an average of 75% is reported for the US
study and an average of 58% is recorded for Australian unit IPOs. Finally, the average life of
Australian IPO warrants is reported to be 2.7 years (Lee, Lee and Taylor, 2003) and 4.1 years
for US IPO warrants (Garner and Marshall, 2005). This study recorded the life of Hong Kong
IPO warrants ranges from 1.25 years to 5 years with an average life of 2.69 years, which is
similar to Australian warrants but much shorter than the US warrants.
2.5 Related literature from seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)
CHAPTER 4 of this thesis investigate the subsequent financing of unit firms via their first
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) within five years of their unit IPOs. Therefore, related
literature on SEO issuance is selectively reviewed.
Existing literatures that investigate into the firm’s decision to raise additional funds through
seasoned equity issues is based on a fundamental theory brought forth by Myers and Majluf
(1984) that there is asymmetric information between the managers and public investors about
the potential investment opportunities and market value of the firm. Such asymmetric
information creates a pooling equilibrium between good firms with promising investment
opportunities and those firms that do not. The managers of firms that do not have good
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investment opportunities will only approve a seasoned offering if they believe, based on their
superior information, the firm is currently overvalued. Issuing additional shares of a currently
overvalued firm could create a wealth transfer from new shareholders to existing shareholders.
This of course, is based on the assumption that manager decisions are made in the existing
shareholders’ best interest; that they will gain if additional stock is sold when it is overvalued
and lose if additional stock is sold when it is undervalued, according to managers’ superior
information. Therefore, rational new investors are inclined to put a downward revision on the
firm’s equity value every time the managers announce an SEO and stock prices are expected to
drop immediately after the SEO. Not surprisingly, empirical studies of the publicly traded
firms’ decision to conduct a SEO mainly focus on empirical evidence of a negative market
reaction on SEO announcements and SEO issues. Most of these studies conclude that the drop
on the stock price at the SEO announcement and SEO issue date is a result of new investors
making a downward revision on their valuation of the firms since they view the SEO
announcements as a signal that the managers believe the firm is currently over-valued.
Several empirical studies examine whether managers time a window of opportunity to issue
additional shares when the firm is overvalued. Korajczyk et al. (1991) unearthed that IPO firms
tend to conduct an SEO immediately after a favourable earnings announcement. They claim
that an earnings disclosure dilutes the asymmetric information between managers and external
investors. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) stressed the managers’ market-timing ability
through analysing the abnormal returns in the early aftermarket. They document that following
the  first  two  months  after  the  announcement  of  SEO,  the  performance  of  seasoned  offering
firms is strongly negative. The findings of these studies support the argument that managers
announce seasoned equity offerings when the firm’s stock is overvalued, but the market does
not reassess the stock appropriately and the stock is still overvalued when it is issued, implying
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that managers behave opportunistically by exploiting market misevaluation and investors are
slow to react due to information asymmetry.
Harjoto and Garen (2003) examine the reason why the IPO firms decide to conduct a primary
seasoned equity offering (SEO), with a sample of 481 US IPOs issued during 1992 to 1997, in
which  42% of  the  IPO firms  issued  a  SEO within  the  four  years  following  their  IPO.  They
assume that the initial owners try to maximise the value of IPO proceeds and determine on the
optimal shares of insider and public shareholders based on anticipated growth of the firm at the
IPO stage. Nevertheless, the initial owners may decide to raise further funding when there are
unexpected growth opportunities post-listing. Using a two two-period model, the authors
investigate the factors that affect an IPO firm’s decision to issue seasonal equities due to the
shock that was not predicted by the managers at the time of listing and the size of a SEO during
the four years after the IPO. In the two-period context, their model indicates that the large
shareholder  of  an  IPO firm has  incentive  to  issue  an  SEO when the  firm is  experiencing  an
unanticipated positive shock post-IPO. They measure the IPO firm’s unanticipated growth in
two ways: an accounting measure, which is annual growth in net income; and a market measure,
which the excess stock return-drift in a year. Those indicators are found to increase the firm’s
likelihood of conducting a seasoned equity offering and increase the relative size of an SEO.
The authors also provide some evidence that the firm’s ex-ante uncertainty negatively affects
the firm’s decision to issue additional shares post-IPO.
Asquith and Mulins, Jr. (1986) examine the effect of 531 seasoned equity offerings on stock
prices and find evidence that the announcement of seasoned offerings reduces stock price
significantly. For industrial issues, regression results suggest that the announcement-day price
reduction is significantly related to the size of the equity offering. The results also indicate that
primary stock issues are more likely to occur after a run-up in stock prices. Regression results
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show that the announcement-day price reduction is negatively related to the stock price
performance in the year prior to the announcement day, which explained why firms tend to
issue equity after a rise in their share price. After exploring the timing of seasoned equity sales,
they found positive average cumulative excess returns in the two years preceding the
announcement of the issue, and the average cumulative excess returns in the two years
following the equity issue are at first slightly positive then negative. Therefore, Asquith and
Mulins, Jr. (1986) argue that firms sell stock following a period in which the stock outperforms
the market. However, they point out the decision to issue equity is more related to the
performance of the firm’s stock price relative to the market, than to the performance of the
market as a whole. Evidence is found that the market returns are positive in the two years
preceding the announcement of issue. Despite the fact that equity is sold following an increase
in the general level of index returns, the results reveal no ability by sellers to time the market.
The general index returns continues to rise in the two years following the equity issue. In
conclusion, the authors concur that although announcement of common equity offerings are
proven to reduce stock prices, implying a timing pattern for market-adjusted stock price
performance, but no evidence of an ability to time the general level of stock market is apparent
in the data. So far, only Schultz (1993b) proposed that survived unit firms are more likely to
receive additional funding than share-only firms. However, no existing research has discussed
in depth about the factors that affect unit firms’ decision to conduct SEO or the announcement
effect of SEOs, both of which are covered in the present thesis.
Byoun and More (2003) investigate the inclusion of warrants in seasoned unit offerings issued
between 1980 and 1997 in the US. In examination of the Signalling hypothesis, they calculate
the degree of underpricing as the percentage difference between the last trade price on the
offering date and the offer price. Their results indicate that the average underpricing is 1.74%
with 54% positive for unit offerings and 1.08% with 59% positive for share-only offerings. The
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two estimates are not significantly different; therefore, no substantial support concerning
underpricing has been observed in the seasoned equity offerings. As a major implication from
the Agency Cost hypothesis, the incremental abnormal returns from unit offerings relative to
the forecast abnormal returns under share-only offerings are calculated and compared. In line
with the Agency Cost hypothesis, Byoun and More (2003) provide evidence that firms with
lower insider ownership experience a higher announcement period abnormal return by issuing
units rather than shares alone. However, it is worth mentioning that in this thesis, all the unit
sample firms are IPO firms that included warrants at the time of listing, not SEO firms.
Nonetheless, this academic paper has been reviewed for reference. So far, only Schultz (1993b)
proposed that survived unit firms are more likely to receive additional funding that share-only
IPO firms. However, no existing research has discussed in depth about the factors that affect
unit firm insiders’ decision to conduct SEOs, which are tested with UK data in this thesis in
CHPATER 4. The pricing of SEOs following unit IPOs is not covered in the present study but it
might lead to future research interest.
2.6 International insight on the IPO long-term performance
CHAPTER 5 examines the competing Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses with a
long-term price performance approach. Since there is only one paper studying the long-term
performance  of  unit  IPOs  by  the  time  of  this  research,  selected  papers  on  the  long-term
performance of share-only IPOs are reviewed for reference. The literature on the long-term
performance of unit IPOs in Hong Kong and UK IPOs is reviewed in CHAPTER 5. This section
focuses on the international insight of IPO long-term performance from other markets.
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 2.6.1 The long-term performance of IPOs from different countries
Ritter (1991) examined the performance of 1526 US IPOs issued between 1975 and 1984 and
reported that for a 3-year holding period, IPOs substantially underperformed a control sample
of comparable seasoned firms matched by size and industry. Both the 3-year buy-and-hold
returns and the cumulative returns confirm that IPOs indeed underperform the matching
portfolio. To interpret the 3-year BHAR, wealth relatives are calculated as another performance
measure, which are less than one on average indicating significant underperformance. In
conclusion, Ritter (1991) provide evidence that US IPOs exhibit bad medium- to long-term
performance. Substantial variation are found in the underperformance year-to-year and across
industries, with companies that went public in high-volume ‘hot issue’ years performing the
worst. The patterns portray an IPO market in which investors are periodically overoptimistic
about  the  earning  potential  of  young  growth  firms,  and  where  firms  time  their  offerings  of
shares to take advantage of these ‘windows of opportunity’ .
Brav and Gompers (1997) present findings of US IPO long-run performance from a sample of
934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972-1992 and 3407 non-venture capital-backed IPOs from
1975-1992. Firstly, they test whether venture capitalists, especially who pursue investment in
promising young companies and bringing them public, affect the performance of newly public
firms in the long term. Their results suggest that when returns are weighted equally,
venture-backed companies enjoy better long-run performance comparing to
non-venture-backed IPO firms over a five-year holding period. Furthermore, Brav and
Gompers (1997) reveal that underperformance is not exclusively  an  IPO  effect.  When  IPO
firms are matched by size and book-to-market reference portfolios, the underperformance
disappeared. As a result, they claim that underperformance is a characteristic of small, low
book-to-market firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not.
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Although most IPO performance papers have been studying US data (e.g. Ritter, 1991;
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; and Gompers and Lerner, 2003; etc), there is a growing empirical
literature for countries outside the US. Data from non-US markets is not conclusive because of
the shorter time period employed and the cross-sectional correlation between returns of US
IPOs  and  the  return  of  IPOs  in  other  markets.  These  correlations  are  potentially  driven  by
common economic shocks and common movements in fads and sentiment. Nonetheless,
non-US IPO studies are also important for adding to the growing body of international insight
on the long run performance of IPOs. Loughran and Ritter (1994) summarise international
evidence on the short-term and long-term performance of companies going public in many
countries, in attempt to explain some of the inter-country patterns that have been observed. On
examining the timing and long-term performance of IPOs, returns on IPOs during the three
years after going public are equally weighted in their respective samples across 15 countries.
Significant long-run underperformance is found with riskier firms performing worse in the
long-term and when the market is at a higher level (‘hot period’). In addition, Loughran and
Ritter (1994) find in 14 out of 15 countries investigated, the IPO activity level is positively
related to the inflation-adjusted level of the stock market. A clear tendency is unearthed for high
volume years to be associated with worse long term performance. The returns on IPOs during
the three years after going public are calculated for a number of countries; Brazil, Finland,
Germany, Singapore, the UK, and the US all have negative adjusted returns in the aftermarket
despite some of them having positive raw returns before adjusting for market returns. Such
findings are interpreted as evidence that private firms around the world take advantage of
‘windows of opportunities’ to intentionally time their offerings for periods when market
valuations are high, with investors receiving low returns in the long run. In other words, if
companies are successfully timing their offerings for periods when the cost of equity capital is
relatively low, this should manifest itself in low returns subsequently being earned by investors.
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The IPO market in Germany only started growing since the mid-1980s comparing to more
mature markets like the US and UK. Although the number of IPOs in Germany is still
significantly lower than the Anglo-American countries, there has been a tremendous booming
of IPO activities within the last decade, making German IPO market a merging object in the
IPO literature. Ljungqvist (1993, 1994, and 1997) analyses the long-run performance of
German IPOs. In his first two papers, he concludes that German IPOs underperform the broad
stock market indexes significantly. However, in his third paper, Ljungqvist revised his finding
of underperformance by taking into account different IPO cohorts by year of listing: a neutral
performance of IPOs that went public during the years 1970-1987; but underperformance by
27.2% for 1988-1990 cohorts. Ehrhardt (1997) claims that German IPOs perform neutrally,
comparing to the market index and size reference portfolios. Stehle and Ehrbardt (1999) also
provide evidence of a neutral performance of 187 IPOs for the year 1960-1992 in comparison to
value-weighted and equally weighted reference portfolios. But Stehle et al. (2000) report a
long-run underperformance of roughly 6% over three years.
Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005) investigate 52 firms that went public in Spain during the period of
1987–1997 in different windows of one, three and five years. Long-term event studies of stock
returns are adopted aiming to assess the value of investing in the average sample firm with
respect to an appropriate benchmark over the horizon of interest. Long-run abnormal returns are
computed as the returns on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firms minus the return on a
buy-and-hold investment in a benchmark for the corresponding period. Following Barber and
Lyon (1997) the author claim that long-term investor experience is better captured by
compounding short-term returns to obtain long-term buy-and-hold returns. The opposing
explanations for long-term performance, namely the Signalling hypothesis and the
Overreaction hypothesis are tested against each other. This study’s results confirmed the
predictions made by the Signalling hypothesis that IPO firms with higher initial underpricing
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should exhibit higher long-term performance. According to the signalling hypothesis, IPO
firms pursue a multiple issue strategy when they choose both the offer price and the proportion
of  the  firm  they  offer  at  their  IPO.  To  minimise  the  information  asymmetry  exists  between
issuers and investors, the high-quality firm owners can signal the ‘true value’ through the price
and the retained company shares, since only good firms will be able to recover the initial loss
from underpricing through subsequent seasoned offerings. In conclusion, Alvarez (2005)
reveals that the Spanish IPO firms have not underperformed for the first 12 months post-listing.
However, coming into the periods of 36 months and 60 months, negative abnormal stock
returns have been observed. Such result is in line with the international literature on long-term
underperformance.
Controversial results on the long-term performance of IPO have also been recorded from
several Asian markets. In Hong Kong, McGuinness (1993b) reports a significant negative
market-adjusted return of -18.26% for the 500 day post-listing. Paudyal et al. (1998) uncover
that the long term market-adjusted performance of IPOs and privatization IPOs in Malaysia are
not significantly different but that initial return and underwriters’ reputation are important
determinants of long run performance. Jelic et al. (2001) confirm that in Malaysia IPOs with
higher initial return suffer worse underperformance in the long term but they find no significant
relation between underwriter reputation and long run performance. Instead they find that
optimistic management earnings forecasts, percentage of shares sold and size of issues are
weakly associated with poor performance in the long term.
 2.6.2 Theoretical explanations for the long-term performance of IPOs
Ritter (1991), Lerner (1994), and Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000) all try to provide a
behavioural explanations for poor performance subsequent to the IPOs. They suggest that stock
prices periodically diverge from the fundamental values and managers and investment bankers
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take advantage of overpricing by selling stock to overly optimistic investors. Such explanation
is on one hand consistent with the broadly observed evidence, but on the other hand is anathema
to those who argue the market efficiency.
Teoch, Welch, and Wong (1998) proposed the earnings management hypothesis to explain the
relation between earnings management of the IPO firm measured by discretionary current
accruals, and its aftermarket underperformance. Their analysis show that conservative IPOs
with less discretionary accruals exhibit little underperformance, but aggressive IPOs with high
discretionary accruals suffer significant underperformance in the aftermarket.
Sapusek (2000) reviewed several possible explanations for the underperformance of IPO firms.
Firstly, the Decline-of-profitability hypothesis suggests that to achieve a share price as high as
possible for the issue, owners, or managers inflate the firm’s earnings before the issue and the
profitability of IPO firms declines after going public. Secondly, Sapusek (2000) proposed that
the aftermarket underperformance in German IPO market might also be explained by the
Continuous-selling hypothesis. She pinpointed that the original owners of the IPO firms in her
sample – especially families, who are the major shareholders of non-quoted German firms – do
not tend to sell their shares all at once; rather they prefer to sell shares in smaller lots in the
months and years after the issue. ‘The transfer of control is carried out in various stages and not
at once’. Such continuously offered shares can partially explain the decline of profitability of
the company itself, which in turn have a downward impact on the share price. Moreover, the
increased supply of shares causes a decline of stock prices over the years following the issues.
The continuous-selling hypothesis is to some degree related to the Downward-sloping
demand-curve hypothesis, as an explanation for underperformance in the long term, which
suggest that an increased amount of shares offered leads to a decline of the equilibrium prices
and eventually result in aftermarket underperformance. Thirdly, Sapusek (2000) brings forth
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the Index-firm-investment hypothesis or the negative small-firm effect, which insert that in
Germany most investors, especially foreign investors, prefer to buy stocks of more established
firms that are listed on the main market indexes. As a result, the index-listed firms are the liquid
and most requested stocks in German capital market. On the other hand, since IPO firms are
often smaller firms, whose prices are commonly priced too optimistically at the time of issue;
such initial underpricing will reverse in the aftermarket. Therefore, the Index-firm-investment
hypothesis predicts that IPO firms will suffer worse performance in the aftermarket.
Schultz (2003) proposed pseudo market-timing hypothesis7 to explain the poor performance of
stocks that have recently issued equity. He argues that equity sales will concentrate at peak
prices ex-post, even though companies cannot determine market peaks ex-ante. Because of
such pseudo market timing, the probability of observing long-term underperformance ex-post
in event-time may far exceed 50%. If IPOs perform well, even more firms will go public in the
period. However, the likelihood of losing money on average is in turn increased. Such potential
explanation is consistent with Loughran and Ritter (1994)’s observation that the volume of IPO
activity increase with the level of the market in 14 out of the 15 countries examined. On the
other hand, the pseudo market-timing explanation believes that the poor performance of equity
issuers is real and significant ex-post, since IPOs only have underperformed relative to their
ex-ante expected returns. Such explanation stays in line with the efficient market hypothesis. In
addition, pseudo market timing is also different from the methodological concerns from Barber
and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999). Using simulations Schultz (2003) show that poor
performance following IPOs can be expected even with proper benchmark, no bid-ask bounce,
correctly estimated t-statistics and normally distributed returns.
To sum up, the various theoretical explanations for the long-term performance of (share-only)
IPOs provide a background, in which the long-term abnormal returns of unit IPOs are tested.
7 An example of pseudo market timing please see Schultz (2003) page 485.
52
Although the aim of this thesis is not focused on explaining the long-term underperformance，
the results from CHAPTER 5 suggest that unit IPOs suffer significantly worse performance in
the long run, comparing to share-only IPOs. Such outcome is in line with behavioural
explanation suggesting that firm insiders might be able to take advantage of overly optimistic
investors. The potential exercise of warrants can enlarge the market-share of unit firms and
increase the supply of shares, which can also be contributing to the long-term
underperformance.
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 CHAPTER 3
SHORT-TERM PERFORMANCE OF UNIT IPOs IN THE UK
3.1 Introduction
The ability and means to raise capital to finance growth is a major challenge to new and small
businesses. Banks and other lenders tend to require higher premiums for non-traded shares and
sometimes even impose restricted covenants on private firms for the information asymmetry
and agency problems. Constrained by the limited sales history and the absence of publicly
available information on their future aspects, these young and small firms seek certain
mechanisms to go public on relatively favourable terms, and issuing unit IPOs is one of them.
This chapter investigates, theoretically and empirically, the short-term economic effects of a
dual share-warrant financing strategy through unit IPOs and the reasons that might affect firms’
decision to choose unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. According to the literature survey in
CHAPTER 2, two major hypotheses explaining the inclusion of warrants in IPOs are still
competing to be the primary reason why firms choose to include warrants in their IPOs. Schultz
(1993b)’s Agency Cost hypothesis claims that firms attach warrants to reduce agency costs by
forming a staged financing through the conditional exercise of warrants. Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997)’s Signalling hypothesis argues that including warrants in IPOs is not for the
purpose of solving the agency problem, but instead as a signalling mechanism to more
efficiently convey favourable information about firm value to the public. The primary aim of
this study is to reassess the two competing hypotheses, regarding the inclusion of warrants in
IPOs with a short-term focus. Characteristics of firms issuing unit IPOs, initial returns and
short-term performance are compared with their share-only counter-parts. Variables of interest
and other control variables are defined in TABLE 3.1.
INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE
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Firstly,  to  identify  differences  between  unit  IPOs  and  share-only  IPOs,  I  examine  the
distributions of IPOs by year, trading locations, issuing methods and industry sectors. A
portfolio of matching share-only IPOs is selected according to firm size and industry;
descriptive statistics emphasising on firm characteristics and financial features are compared
and illustrated. Descriptive results indicate that comparing to share-only IPOs, unit IPOs are
generally issued by smaller and riskier firms with less assets and income prior to IPOs; the
fraction of insider holding is also lower for unit IPO firms than share-only IPO firms. These
results are consistent with both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses. However, I do
not find any evidence that unit firms are younger than share-only IPO firms, which provides
conflicting evidence to the existing literature with UK data.
Secondly, following How and Howe (2001), I conduct ‘direct tests’ of the two competing
hypotheses  in  Section  3.5.3.  On  one  hand,  two  out  of  the  three  ‘efficiency  ratios’  as  direct
measures of agency cost are significantly lower for unit IPO firms, indicating that unit firms
suffer more agency cost than share-only firms do. On the other hand, residual standard
deviations of daily share prices are examined as measurement of information asymmetry and
unit firms appear to be riskier and suffer more information asymmetry than share-only IPOs.
Therefore, the results from direct tests provide supporting evidence to both the Agency Cost
and the Signalling explanations for including warrants.
Thirdly, in Section 3.5.4 and 3.5.5, I examine the initial returns of unit IPOs in comparison to
that of share-only IPOs. The focus is on the conflicting predictions about the relation between
choice of offer types and the degree of underpricing from the Agency Cost hypothesis (unit
IPOs are more underpriced) and the Signalling hypothesis (underpricing increases with firm
riskiness). Initial returns for both the first trading day and first trading week are compared and
the results indicate that unit IPOs are significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs in
55
both measures, which is consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis. Furthermore, linear
regressions on determinants of underpricing are conducted. In support to both the Agency Cost
and the Signalling hypotheses, smaller, riskier firms with worse profitability prior to listing
exhibited higher underpricing.
Overall, the results from my research on the short-term performance of unit IPOs in comparison
to share-only IPOs provide partial support to both the Agency Cost and the Signalling
hypotheses. The UK data do not prefer any hypothesis to be the sole reason for including
warrants. Nonetheless, the warrants represent a potential opportunity for additional capital
infusions into the firm. UK companies are obviously attracted to this opportunity in the IPO
process. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a brief literature
review on short-term performance of unit IPOs in the background of short-term underpricing of
IPOs.  In  Section  3.3,  a  number  of  testable  hypotheses  in  examination  of  the  short-term
performance of unit IPOs are motivated; Section 3.4 outlines the data collection process and
related methodologies, the results of which are tested and presented in Section 3.5. Finally,
Section 3.6 summarises the results to draw conclusions of this chapter.
3.2 Literature Review
Schultz (1993b) proposes with the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit IPOs are applied as a
multistage financing strategy to reduce agency costs by limiting the probability that excess
capital will be invested in negative net present value projects all in one shot. Schultz (1993b)
maintains that young, small, risky firms are more likely to employ less reputable underwriters
to issue unit IPOs with warrants attached. These firms are generally high technology companies
or service oriented. The Agency Cost hypothesis makes several predictions about unit IPOs:
Firstly, unit IPOs will be intentionally underpriced; more so than share-only IPOs in
compensation of the higher uncertainty to induce investors’ interests. Secondly, unit IPOs are
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generally smaller issues than share-only IPOs. Unit IPOs can only raise limited proceeds as the
first round of financing in order to restrict the amount of free cash flow available to managers
before the profitability of the investment is assured. Thirdly, firms choosing to form staged
financing through unit IPOs are expected to suffer more agency problems and should have
lower fraction of insider holding. Last but not least, by including warrants in IPOs, a potential
second round of financing is formed, but only if the initial investment funded by IPO proceeds
is successful and the company’s stock price exceeds the warrant exercise price. Therefore, the
warrant exercise price is expected to be set above the offer price to provide an incentive
mechanism for the managers.
The competing justification for including warrants in IPOs is the Signalling hypothesis brought
forth by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). In a world characterised by information asymmetry,
they develop a theory that good quality high-risk firms issue units to convey information about
true firm value to public investors. Such theory is closely related to the initial underpricing of
new shares and the proportion of insider holding. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) argue that
‘good’  firms  with  higher  risk  tend  to  adopt  a  combination  of  three  costly  signals  to  convey
information to investors and repel competitors with lower firm value. Several predictions are
proposed about unit IPOs: Firstly, consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis, they expect unit
IPOs to be issued by younger, smaller, riskier firms; the true value of which are more difficult
for investors to assess. Secondly, the firm value sold as warrants is anticipated to be positively
related to riskiness, after controlling for insider holding. Thirdly, the fraction of insider holding
is predicted to be negatively related to firm riskiness, holding firm value sold as warrants
constant. Additionally, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) do not claim that unit IPOs are more
underpriced than share-only IPOs. Instead, they insert that the package of equity and warrants is
underpriced as a whole and the degree of underpricing is positively related to firm riskiness.
Last but not least, the Signalling hypothesis recognises warrants as a signalling mechanism for
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firm value rather than an incentive mechanism for management performance and therefore
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) predict that the exercise price of the attached warrants is set
equal to (not above) the offer price of new shares.
One of the most distinguished conflicts between the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses
for the use of unit IPOs is the degree of underpricing. On one hand, Schultz (1993b) claims that
unit IPOs are chosen by smaller, younger, and riskier firms to reduce agency cost. Such firms
tend to have more uncertainty about their future prospect and therefore are more underpriced
than share-only IPOs. On the other hand, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) do not support such
relation between unit firms and underpricing. Instead they predict that the degree of
underpricing will hold positive relation to firm riskiness after controlling the fraction of insider
holding; the firm value sold as warrants is also positively related to firm riskiness after holding
insider retained ownership as constant.
Testing of the two competing hypotheses has been conducted by several academic papers. How
and Howe (2001) investigate why firms include warrants in their IPOs with a sample of
Australian IPOs. They found that the unique implications of the Agency Cost hypothesis are
generally not supported by Australian data. Using four different measures, How and Howe
(2001) claim that despite the seemingly greater underpricing for unit IPOs, the difference in
means is not significant at conventional levels. However, their results are largely in line with
the predictions of the Signalling hypothesis. Results from linear regressions indicate that the
degree of underpricing is significantly related to firm riskiness. Overall, the evidence from
Australian unit IPOs favours the Signalling hypothesis in that the warrants included in IPOs
serve as a signalling mechanism to convey information about firm value to the public.
Also using Australian data, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) examine the inclusion of warrants in
unit IPOs issued by Australian industrial firms. They report that out of a sample of 394 IPOs
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issued between 1976 and 1994, the 66 unit IPOs are typically issued by riskier, smaller firms
with lower level of retained ownership, using less reputable underwriters than share-only IPOs
do. These results support both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses. Lee, Lee, and
Taylor (2003) do not find any significant difference in underpricing between unit and
share-only IPOs as the Agency Cost hypothesis predicted. However, they do provide evidence
consistent with a prediction unique to the Signalling hypothesis; that the proportion of firm
value sold as warrants is positively related to firm riskiness when the fraction of insider holding
is kept constant.  Overall,  they conclude that the inclusion of warrants reflects their  role as a
signalling mechanism rather than an instrument to reduce agency costs.
Mazouz, Saadouni and Yin (2006a), using a sample of unit IPOs from Hong Kong, provide
evidence that firms include warrants in their IPOs to reduce underpricing relative to what it
would have been in the absence of warrants. Such results contradict the Agency Cost
hypothesis that unit IPOs tend to be more underpriced than share-only IPOs. However,
consistent with the Signalling hypothesis, Mazouz, Saadouni and Yin (2006a) reveal that after
controlling for the level of insider holding, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants
increase in firm riskiness, which implies that holding other signalling mechanisms constant,
such as the fraction of insider holding, unit IPOs should incur lower underpricing comparing to
share-only IPOs. Therefore, the evidence from Hong Kong unit IPOs also supports the
Signalling hypothesis but conflicts with the Agency Cost hypothesis. Warrants in Hong Kong
IPOs are more likely to be included for signalling purposes rather than as a mechanism to
reduce the agency costs of excessive free cash flow.
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3.3 Hypotheses
 3.3.1 Common predictions from both the Agency and the Signalling hypotheses
The Agency Cost hypothesis proposed by Schultz (1993b) delineates that smaller, younger,
riskier firms exhibit more agency problems. These firms are more likely to choose unit IPOs
instead of share-only IPOs in order to reduce agency costs and restrict management’s
investment decisions through the staged financing provided by the attached warrants. Some
predictions from the Signalling hypothesis on characteristics of unit firms cannot be
distinguished from those of Schultz (1993b)’s. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) conjecture
that  firms  with  higher  uncertainty  about  future  cash  flow  are  more  difficult  for  investors  to
evaluate and therefore are more motivated to signal firm value through unit IPOs. These firms
tend to be younger, smaller, and riskier than those issuing shares without warrants.
How and Howe (2001) support these predictions common to both the Agency cost and the
Signalling hypotheses. They confirm that Australian unit IPOs issued between 1979 and 1990
are indeed younger, smaller, and riskier than share-only IPOs. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003)
substantiate the Australian evidence with a new sample of unit IPOs issued over a longer period
of 1976-1994. They confirm that unit IPOs are younger and riskier than share only IPOs but
they did not compare firm size between unit and share-only IPOs in absolute terms. Instead,
they report unit firms to have lower assets relative to issue proceeds than share-only IPO firms.
Marciukaityte and Pennathur (2007) investigate unit placements in the US and provide
evidence that unit firms are smaller and younger than share-only placing firms in the US.
Mazouz et al. (2007a) examine the unit IPOs from Hong Kong. Consistent with evidence from
the US and Australia, they report that the issuers of unit IPOs are significantly younger, smaller,
and riskier than the share-only IPO issuers.
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To test the robustness of the three common predictions from Agency Cost and the Signalling
hypotheses on firm age, firm size and riskiness of unit IPOs comparing to share-only IPOs, I
retrace the same testable predictions (shown as H3.1, H3.2, and H3.3) with a new sample of IPOs
issued in the UK from a more recent period of 1996-2006. Firm age (AGE), is calculated as the
number of calendar days between firm incorporation to the date of listing. Firm size is measure
with both the market capitalisation (MKTCAP) on offer price immediately post-listing and the
total asset of the issuing firm prior to the IPO (TTLASSET). Firm riskiness (RISK) is measured,
following How and Howe (2001), as the residual standard deviations of the share prices 200
days following the IPOs.
H3.1: Unit firms are younger than share-only IPO firms
H3.2: Unit firms are smaller than share-only IPO firms in terms of market capitalisation and total asset
H3.3: Unit firms are riskier than share-only IPO firms
Schultz (1993b) also predicts that unit firms tend to employ less reputable underwriters to
market for the offers than those employed for share-only IPOs. Unit firms are normally younger,
smaller with higher agency costs and less profitability prior to the IPOs. These firms are less
likely to be accepted as creditable clients by highly reputable underwriters. The Signalling
model consents that it is intrinsically riskier firms that choose unit IPOs and such unit offerings
are apt to be marketed by less established underwriters. Chemmanur (1993) develops a model
of reputation assessment by investment banks, who act as information producing intermediaries
in an equity market characterised by asymmetric information. Such model illustrates that more
reputable investment banks tend to set stricter standards in terms of the kind of firms, for which
they will underwrite an equity issue. How and Howe (2001) adopt underwriting frequency8 to
proxy for an underwriter’s reputation. Contrary to the Agency Cost hypothesis, their results
indicate that the underwriter’s reputation is significantly higher for unit IPOs than for
8 How and Howe (2001) define the underwriting frequency as the number of times an underwriter was chosen to underwrite
the sample firms.
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share-only IPOs. They conclude that in Australia the underwriters who market for unit IPOs are
at least as reputable as those who underwrite share-only IPOs. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) find
evidence that share-only IPOs use high quality underwriters more frequently than unit IPOs do.
This is consistent to the agency cost prediction that prestigious underwriters, concerned with
the upkeep of their own reputation, might be less willing to market riskier issues and therefore,
unit IPOs are more likely to be underwritten by less reputable underwriters. Mazouz et al.
(2007a) report that Hong Kong unit IPOs tend to be brought to the market by less reputable
underwriters, which is consistent with US and Australian evidence. However, the authors use
international operations as a proxy for underwriters’ reputation. Any international underwriters
are considered as more reputable than the local underwriters, which might not always be the
case. As a result, the grounding of the underwriter reputation proxy may not be robust. Since
evidence on the reputation of underwriters that market for unit IPOs is inconclusive, I introduce
the dummy variable REPUTATION to take the value of 1 if an IPO is issued by reputable
underwriters; 0 if otherwise. Classification of the UK prestigious underwriters from Jelic
(2008)9 is adopted, which select the top 5% of the most reputable underwriters in the UK
ranked by the number of new issues an underwriter has been involved as leading underwriting
and/or advisory roles since 1980. In turn, I propose Hypothesis 3.4 that unit IPOs in the UK are
more likely to be underwritten by less reputable underwriters (H3.4).
H3.4: Unit IPOs are issued by less reputable underwriters
3.3.2 Predictions exclusively motivated by the Agency Cost hypothesis
The first unique prediction by the Agency Cost is on the fraction of insider holding. Schultz
(1993b) promotes the implicit monitoring mechanism of a unit IPO to motivate insiders and
9 Jelic (2008)9To Disclose or not to Disclose: Earnings Forecasts in IPO Prospectuses- European Financial Management
Symposium on Initial Public Offerings at Oxford University - Said Business School (April 2008). In this study, a list of all
banks involved in 4,807 previously identified listings in the UK primary market is created. From the list, banks that played
leading underwriting and/or advisory roles are identified. The top 5% of the most reputable investment banks are selected by
the number of underwritten deals.
62
minimise agency costs. If managers from unit firms invest the IPO proceeds in value generating
projects, the share price will exceed warrant exercise price, and the second round of financing
through exercise of warrants occurs and these new funds can then be used to begin production.
On the other hand, if the initial investment of IPO proceeds failed with a negative NPV and the
company is not able to profitably inject additional funds, the warrants will not be exercised and
then the second round of financing will automatically vanish, as is in shareholders’ (also
warrant holders’) best interest. Agency Cost hypothesis therefore, predicts that firms with a
lower level of managerial insider ownership have a greater agency problem and will be more
likely to choose unit IPOs in order to alleviate such conflict.
However, Mazouz et al. (2007a)’s data from Hong Kong does not support such prediction that
unit firms have significantly lower level of insider ownership. They report that the level of
ownership retained by the insiders is not significantly different between unit and share-only
IPO firms. However, they insert that such results should not necessarily be concluded as
evidence against the prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis, as this might be a result of the
clustering in the retained ownership among Hong Kong IPOs10. Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1997) predict that the fraction of insider holding is negatively related to firm riskiness but their
Signalling hypothesis does not mention any difference of insider holding between unit and
share-only firms. How and Howe (2001) provide evidence that the average percentage
ownership retained by issuers is about 13.5% higher for Australian share-only IPOs than for
unit IPOs, which is in line with the Agency Cost hypothesis. They maintain that firms with
lower level of insider holding are more likely to have greater agency costs and therefore are
more likely to include warrants in IPOs to alleviate agency problem. However, the authors warn
that they do not have complete data on the share holdings of managers. Instead they calculate
the percentage retained shares held by issuers, which include common employee holdings, to
10 The authors explain that in the Hong Kong listing regulations require a minimum of 25% of any class of listed securities to
be held by the public.
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proxy for managerial ownership. Such an approach casts doubt on the precision of the insider
holding result. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) on the other hand, report that in Australia the
proportion of IPO proceeds that are paid to existing owners is significantly larger for share-only
IPO firms, despite the fact that insiders retain a larger post-issue proportion of the shares in
share-only IPOs than for unit offerings. The post-issue insider holding has limited power of
explanation for firms’ decision to include warrants at the time of IPOs. Therefore, to reassess
the Agency Cost theory’s prediction on the insider ownership with UK data, hypothesise that in
the UK, unit firms have lower level of insider ownership than that of share-only IPOs (H3.5).
Furthermore, to correct for the less promising measures of insider holdings applied in previous
studies, I calculated the percentage of insider holdings by directors and senior management
(without the common employee holdings) of the issuing firm prior to the IPO (INSIDER).
H3.5: Unit IPO firms have lower levels of insider holding comparing to share-only IPO firms
Another testable prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis is that unit firms are less profitable
and have less asset unitisation prior to listing comparing to share-only IPO firms. How and
Howe (2001) conducted a direct test on the Agency Cost hypothesis, to assess whether unit
firms exhibit  higher agency costs than share-only firms. They use three ‘efficiency ratios’ to
measure the profitability and asset utilisation and also to proxy for the degree of agency costs:
(1) total revenue over total assets, (2) earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets,
and (3) the after tax net income (NI) over total assets. Evidence is found that unit firms present
significantly lower efficiency ratios; indicating higher agency costs than share-only firms.
Mazouz et al. (2007a) calculate these efficiency ratios with data from Hong Kong. Contrary to
the predictions of the Agency Cost hypothesis, they show that the profitability and asset
utilisation of Hong Kong unit firms are higher than that of share-only IPO firms. Aiming to
provide  further  evidence  on  the  testing  of  the  Agency  Cost  hypothesis  with  UK  data,  I
hypothesise that unit firms have less income by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs (H3.6).
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Furthermore, measured by the three efficiency ratios, unit firms have higher level of agency
costs than share-only IPOs (H3.7).
H3.6: Unit firms have less income (Revenue) prior to IPO comparing to share-only IPO firms
H3.7: Unit firms have higher agency costs in terms of profitability and asset utilisation ratios
Schultz (1993b) also maintains that unit IPOs exhibit several unique characteristics of the
offering when going public that differ from those of share-only IPOs. Firstly, he conjectures
that the size of unit IPOs is intentionally limited to raise relatively little funding as the first
round of financing, in order to restrain the amount of free cash flows available to managers
immediately after the IPO: just enough for necessary development and market testing for a new
firm but not enough for managers to ‘squander away’. Future equity contributions depend more
explicitly and therefore more objectively on the outcome of the initial investments. As such, the
Agency Cost hypothesis predicts that unit IPOs generally have smaller issue size in terms of
gross proceeds comparing to share-only IPOs. How and Howe (2001)’s study on Australian
unit IPOs provides some degree of support to such prediction on smaller issue size for unit IPOs.
They report that both the mean and median average gross proceeds of the unit IPOs are smaller
than those of share-only IPOs. Contrarily, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) report that the median
proceeds  for  unit  IPOs  in  their  Australian  sample  is  larger  than  that  of  share-only  IPOs.
However, the results on issue size from both papers are not significant at conventional levels.
On the other hand, Marciukaityte and Pennathur (2007) find that average dollar proceeds from
unit placements are smaller than share-only placements in the US. However, the fraction of
proceeds as a percentage of market capitalisations at the placing price is significantly larger for
unit placements than for share-only placements. Mazouz et al. (2007a) document that the gross
proceeds from share-only IPOs are significantly larger than the gross proceeds of unit IPOs in
Hong Kong, which is consistent with the Schultz (1993b)’s prediction. The above mixed
findings on the issue size motivate me to reassess this specific prediction of the Agency Cost
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hypothesis with UK data. As such, I calculate and compare the expected gross proceed as the
measure of issue size between the unit IPOs and their matching share-only counter-parts.
Hypothesis 3.8 (H3.8) predicts that in the UK, unit IPOs raise less gross proceeds than that of
share-only IPOs.
H3.8: Unit IPOs raise less expected gross proceeds than share-only IPOs (smaller issue size)
The most exclusive prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis is that unit IPOs are more
underpriced than share-only IPOs. According to Schultz (1993b), unit firms with less income
and fewer assets prior to IPOs infuse more uncertainties about future prospects into the pricing
of new shares. Riskier firms are subject to more divergence of investor opinion and therefore
more difficult for the underwriter to price, which in turn may result in higher underpricing.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)’s Signalling hypothesis argues that the degree of
underpricing, for both unit and share-only IPOs increase with firm riskiness without giving
conclusive prediction on whether unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs. How
and Howe (2001) report that despite the greater underpricing of unit IPOs in Australia, the
difference in means is not significant at conventional level and hence fails to support the
Agency Cost hypothesis. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) also find no significant difference in
underpricing between Australian unit and share-only IPOs. Mazouz et al. (2007a) on the other
hand, extend the understanding of the Signalling hypothesis and explain that if warrants are
included to signal unit firms’ quality to the investors, the inclusion of warrants should be
perceived as a creditable signal and unit IPOs should be underpriced less. Their results provide
evidence that unit firms in Hong Kong actually incur lower underpricing than if they had issued
share-only IPOs instead. To sum up, there are three groups of inconclusive results concerning
underpricing of unit IPOs in comparison to share-only IPOs. Schultz (1993b) insists that
American unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs. How and Howe (2001) and
Lee et al. (2003) document that there is no difference in underpricing between Australian unit
66
IPOs and share-only IPOs. Finally Mazouz et al. (2007) report that in Hong Kong unit IPOs
incur less underpricing than share-only IPOs. To verify the conflicting results from different
countries, I add to the literature by testing whether unit IPOs in the UK are more underpriced
than share-only IPOs (H3.9). The raw initial returns (IRD1), market-adjusted initial returns (IRD2)
and the continuously compounded log initial returns (IRD3) on the first trading day are
calculated relative to the IPO offer price as underpricing measure. In addition, the
market-adjusted first-week initial returns (IRW1) and the continuously compounded first-week
initial returns (IRW2) relative to the IPO offer price are also computed as robustness test. To
further examine the relationship between the degree of underpricing and offer type I also
conduct a probit regression of underpricing later on, using a UNIT dummy as dependent
variable, which takes the value of 1 if the IPO is a unit offering, 0 if it is a share-only IPO.
H3.9: Unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs
Last but not least, according to the Agency Cost hypothesis, warrants are included in unit IPOs
to reduce agency costs by binding managers to optimal investment decisions. Schultz (1993b)
predicts that the exercise price of warrants will be set above the IPO offer price to create
incentives for managers to invest only in value-generating projects. Alternatively, the
Signalling hypothesis considers the inclusion of warrants as a costly signal to convey
favourable information about firm value. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) predict that the
warrant exercise price should be set equal to the IPO offer price to signal firm value. How and
Howe (2001) discuss the choice of warrant exercise price in their study of Australian unit IPOs.
They report that most unit IPOs in their sample set the exercise price of warrants near or equal
to the offer price. This observation is contrary to the prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis.
However, their study does not provide any statistical inference and only weakly supports the
Signalling hypothesis. Therefore, I am motivated to reassess the two competing hypotheses and
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their predictions on the choice of warrant exercise price by testing Hypothesis 3.10. I include a
PRATIO variable, which is computed as the ratio of warrant exercise price to the offer price of
the unit IPO. If PRATIO is above one, then the warrants in the unit IPO is issued out-the-money
(by  choice)  in  support  to  the  Agency Cost  hypothesis.  On the  other  hand,  if  the  PRATIO is
equal to or below one, the warrants are issued on- or in-the-money in support of the Signalling
hypothesis.
H3.10: Warrant exercise prices will be set above the offer price
3.3.3 Predictions exclusively motivated by the Signalling hypothesis
The Agency Cost hypothesis, which stresses the importance of multi-stage financing for
smaller, younger, and riskier firms, is supported by some academic papers but on the other hand
confronted with challenging results. As a competing explanation for including warrants in an
IPO, the Signalling hypothesis proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) emphasises on
the signalling mechanism unit IPOs provide in a market characterised by information
asymmetry. In such market, information about the IPO firm is not transparent between the two
investment terminals: the firms’ managers (i.e. insiders) and the public investors (i.e. outsiders).
From the investors’ prospect, it is difficult to value distinctly whether the firm is a ‘good’ or
‘bad’ candidate in terms of potential investment outcome. At the other terminal, insiders have
all the information of their own companies but find it hard to convey them to investors.
Especially in a competitive environment where ‘bad’ firms constantly trying to imitate the
market image of ‘good’ firms and try to disguise themselves; it is in the interest of ‘good’ firm
insiders to find separating mechanisms to distinguish themselves from the ‘bad apples’.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) present three costly signalling mechanisms, namely the
fraction of equity retained by insiders, underpricing of the new issue and the inclusion of
warrants in an IPO. Adding warrants to an initial public offering means sharing firm value with
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warrant-holders; and therefore, is too costly for ‘bad’ firms to mimic. However, such cost will
only be realised if a favourable state of the company occurs, in which there is a higher
realisation of firm value. Risk-averse insiders of high-quality firms will apply a mixture of all
three signals in order to maximise their utility function. The Signalling hypothesis leads to the
following predictions.
Firstly, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) predict that unit firms have higher levels of
information asymmetry and are therefore more likely to include warrants to convey information
about firm value. However, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) do not formulise variables to
measure the degree of information asymmetry. Using Australian data, How and Howe (2001)
conduct a ‘direct test’ on the degree of information asymmetry using the residual standard
deviations of unit firms’ stock prices for one year post-listing as a proxy for the level of
information asymmetry. Their results indicate that the unit firms have significantly higher
residual standard deviations than share-only IPOs, and therefore exhibit higher levels of
information asymmetry, which is consistent with the Signalling hypothesis. Lee, Lee, and
Taylor (2003) on the other hand, do not test for the difference in information asymmetry
between unit and share-only IPO firms. Marciukaityte and Pennathur (2007) study a sample of
unit placements issued in the US, predict that unit placements are attractive to a clientele of
overoptimistic investors, and therefore are small and risky with high level of information
asymmetry. Mazouz et al. (2007a) also investigate whether firms include warrants in their IPOs
to signal firm quality in Hong Kong. They provide results for the relation between unit issuance
and market conditions using a dummy variable for hot issue period. They find that unit IPOs are
more likely to be issued in cold periods where both information asymmetry and risk are at their
highest, which is supportive to the Signalling hypotheses. However, no direct test on the level
of information asymmetry for unit firms and share-only firms is conducted. To reassess the
Signalling hypothesis’ prediction, I motivate two variables to measure the level of information
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asymmetry of the issuing firms, namely the residual standard deviations of share prices (RISK)
and the time lag between prospectus publication and listing date (DELAY). In test of the
Signalling explanation for including warrants, I hypothesise (H3.11) that unit IPOs will exhibit
higher level of information asymmetry than share-only IPO firms, indicated by higher RISK
and longer DELAY.
I follow How and Howe (2001) and calculate the residual standard deviations of IPO firms’
share prices for two years following the initial listing  to proxy for the level of information
asymmetry (also defined  previously as RISK to measure firm riskiness). The RISK for both
unit IPOs and their matching share-only counterparties are compared in test of the Hypothesis
3.3 that unit firms are riskier than share-only IPO firms are.
Another variable I employed to measure the level of information asymmetry, DELAY is
defined as the number of days between the publication of company prospectus and the listing
dates. How and Howe (2001) calculated DELAY as a proxy for Rock (1986)’s level of
informed demand. They argue that issues, which sell more quickly, have a higher level of
informed demand and these issues are expected to be more underpriced. Issues that sell more
slowly are likely to be less underpriced due to lack of interest on the part of ‘informed investors’.
Despite being insignificant, the Australian evidence from How and Howe (2001) indicates that
the mean DELAY of unit IPOs is significantly longer than share-only IPOs.
Furthermore, no previous paper has examined the DELAY of unit IPOs in comparison to
share-only IPOs in the UK. The length of time lag between prospectus publication and listing
date is influenced by many factors in the UK, such as offer size, industry sector, and structure of
the issuing company, quality of underwriters and the method of flotation being used etc. A
prospectus is central to a flotation. The document has two main functions: Firstly, it sets out all
the information, which has to be made public to investors under the UKLA’s Listing Rules.
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Secondly, it plays a crucial role for the company itself, amounting to a coherent description of
the business and its prospects. Pricing of the new shares is one of the most delicate decisions
before finalising the prospectus, and may be affected by events and conditions outside the
company’s control. The underwriters and sponsors will aim for a realistic price, which the
market will find attractive, whist the company wants to optimize the money raised. The offer or
placing price is practically the last thing to be finalised in a prospectus before publication,
which could happen any time between 6 weeks and 48 hours prior to official listing.11
According to the Signalling, hypothesis unit firms have higher level of information asymmetry,
the interest from ‘informed investors’ are therefore expected to be lower. As a result, the
underwriters might strategically prolong the time lag between the publication of prospectus and
the initial trading, so that more information about firm value could be conveyed to the investors.
Therefore, to test Signalling hypothesis’s prediction that unit firms suffer higher level of
information  asymmetry,  I  expect  that  unit  IPOs  will  have  longer  DELAY  between  the
publication of prospectus and the listing day. Later on, I also apply DELAY as a control
variable in the regression analyses of underpricing.
H3.11: Unit IPO firms will exhibit higher level of information asymmetry than share-only IPO firms
The second unique prediction by the Signalling hypothesis is that the proportion of firm value
sold as warrants increases with the firm riskiness, after controlling for retained equity by
insiders12. How and Howe (2001) calculate the firm value sold as warrants as proceeds derived
from warrant exercise divided by the sum of warrant proceeds plus IPO proceeds. Their results
indicate that firm value sold as warrants are positively and significantly related to firm riskiness.
However, How and Howe (2001) only use the proportion of warrant proceeds relative to total
proceeds  of  unit  IPO as  the  proxy of  firm value  sold  as  warrants,  but  does  not  measure  the
11 At  least  48  hours  before  admission,  the  formal  application  for  a  listing  is  submitted  to  the  UKLA.  At  the  same  time  a
formal application for admission to trading is submitted to the Exchange. The listing is officially granted by the UKLA in
conjunction with admission to trading being granted by the Exchange.
12 Proposition 5 of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
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proportion of the firm’s equity represented by warrants, as described by Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997). On the other hand, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) conduct a similar test by
regressing the fraction of firm value sold as warrants on retained insider holding and firm
riskiness. Their results also identify a significant positive relation between firm riskiness and
firm value sold as warrants, which is measured by proceeds from the potential exercise of
warrants as percentage of the market capitalisation at offer price immediately after IPOs.
Mazouz et al (2007a) also directly examine Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)’s prediction that
firm value sold as warrants increases with firm riskiness while maintaining the insider holding
as constant. An OLS regression is estimated with firm value sold as warrants as the dependent
variable, with insider holding and firm riskiness as independent variables. Significant positive
relation is found between firm value sold as warrants and the firm riskiness after controlling for
the level of insider ownership, which is consistent to the predictions of the Signalling
hypothesis. Following Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003)’s suggestion I calculate the firm value sold
as warrants using potential proceeds from the exercise of warrants as percentage of the market
capitalisation of the unit IPOs at offer price (VALUE). The VALUE variable is incorporated in
several regression analyses to add fresh evidence from UK data in examination of this
Signalling hypothesis’ unique prediction. I therefore, hypothesise that the proportion of firm
value sold as warrants will increase with firm riskiness, holding the fraction of equity retained
constant (H3.12).
H3.12: The proportion of firm value sold as warrants will increase in firm riskiness, holding the fraction of equity
retained constant
Finally, according to the Signalling hypothesis, the degree of underpricing increases with firm
riskiness, after controlling for insider holding 13 . Such prediction only focuses on one
determinant of underpricing but avoids the comparison of underpricing between unit IPOs and
13 Proposition 7 of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
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share-only IPOs. How and Howe (2001) find a positive coefficient on firm riskiness when it is
regressed against the degree of underpricing. However, the positive relation between firm
riskiness and underpricing is not significant with Australian data. Again, the testing of this
proposition from the Signalling hypothesis was not covered in Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) and
Mazouz et al (2007a). As a result, Hypothesis 3.14 tests this prediction with UK data. I use both
the HGSC-adjusted initial returns on the first trading day (IRD2) and the HGSC-adjusted
first-week initial returns (IRW1) as the underpricing measure.
H3.13: The degree of underpricing increase in firm riskiness
3.3.4 Original testable predictions
In previous Section 3.3.1-3.3.3, I reassess the two competing hypotheses by providing new
evidence with a sample of UK unit IPOs. Both the common and competing predictions of the
Agency Cost and the Signalling theories are re-examined with UK data through proposed
Hypotheses 3.1-3.14. However, to my best knowledge, existing empirical studies on unit IPOs
largely focus on whether unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs since this is the
major divarication between the two competing explanations of including warrants in an IPO.
Evidence from the possible determinants of underpricing, especially in relation to unit firm
characteristics and warrant characteristics are very limited. The market setting in the UK is
different from that in the US, Australia and Hong Kong, not only in terms of exchange listing
regulations but also in the characteristics of the warrants attached to IPOs. As a contribution of
this  paper,  I  propose  several  original  testable  predictions  to  detect  potential  associations
between unit firm characteristics, warrant contractual characteristics, and the degree of
underpricing.
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 3.3.4.1 Unit firm characteristics
Firstly, regarding unit firm characteristics, both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses
made predictions about the age, size, riskiness, and the profitability of unit firms comparing to
share-only firms. However, neither theory mentioned the level of leverage (i.e. the debt
component in the capital structure) and its potential impact on firms’ decision to choose unit
IPOs. Jenson (1986) stipulate that debt component in a capital structure can limits managerial
discretion, since debt service limits free cash flow, and lenders have incentive to monitor
management to ensure the repayment. Since unit firms are generally younger, smaller, riskier
firms comparing to share-only IPOs, they are expected to have fewer assets and less trading
history prior to IPOs. Such firms will not be recognised by banks and other lenders as creditable
candidates for cheaper debt financing, which confirm why these firms decide to include
warrants for potential future capital infusion. Therefore, to examine whether there is any
difference in the capital structure between unit firms and share-only firms, my first original
hypothesis predicts that unit firms will have less debt component in their capital structure. The
debt leverage is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total asset comparing to those of
share-only firms matched on firm size and industry. The variable LEVERAGE is also included
in the regression analysis for underpricing later on.
H3.14: Unit firms have lower leverage than matching share-only IPO firms have
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) claim that for the degree of underpricing will increase in firm
riskiness. Schultz (1993b) conjectures that unit IPOs will be more underpriced than share-only
IPOs. How and Howe (2001) segment their Australian unit IPO sample by the Main Board and
the Second Board. In Australia, the Second Board generally listed shares of newer firms, which
are not large enough to join the Main Board. How and Howe (2001) document that two-thirds
of the IPOs in their sample are listed on the Main Board. However, none of these papers relates
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the degree of underpricing to the listing location of the IPOs. To fill this gap, in my UK sample,
IPO listings are divided between the Main Board and the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM).When choosing listing locations, managers are aware that the AIM is popularly chosen
by smaller riskier firms because of the less strict listing requirements. Managers may
intentionally underprice the IPOs to promote the sale of new shares. Thus, I expect unit IPOs
that are listed on the Alternative Investment Market will be more underpriced than those listed
on the Main Board. A dummy variable AIM is introduced in the regression analyses of
underpricing later on to incorporate the listing location effect. The AIM dummy, which takes
the value of 1 if a unit IPO is listed on the Alternative Investment Market, 0 if otherwise, is
predicted to be positively related to the underpricing measure (H3.16).
H3.15: AIM-listed unit IPOs are more underpriced than those listed on the Main Market
3.3.4.2 Warrant characteristics
Schultz (1993a) studies the exercise-forcing calls of warrants and reports that the call
announcement negatively affects the company’s share price. Howe and Wei (1993) investigate
the valuation effects of warrant life extension and provide evidence that the market perceives
the announcement of extension as a favourable indication for the stock price. Howe and Su
(2001) examine the discretionary reductions in warrant exercise price and conclude that the
option to lower warrant exercise price is an efficient feature of the warrant contract. Howe et al.
(2005) emphasise on a step-up provision in the warrant agreement where the underlying
warrant has a scheduled increase in its exercise price, which is fully disclosed in the contract.
They assert that the market correctly anticipates this event, and that warrant holders take their
actions rationally to refrain from exercising.
The above studies are limited to investigate contractual characteristics of equity warrants
independent of an initial public offering. Warrants are included in over one-fifth of US IPOs
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(Schultz, 1993b) and in over one-third of Australian IPOs (How and Howe, 2001). In the unit
IPO literature, most studies debate on whether issuing firms include warrants to reduce agency
costs (Schultz, 1993b) or to signal firm value (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997). Furthermore,
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) provide evidence that both the firm value sold as warrants
and the degree of underpricing increase in firm riskiness after controlling for insider holding.
Very few papers investigate the warrants characteristics or/and have examined any potential
association between warrant contractual characteristics and the degree of underpricing. As one
may expect, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants depends not only on the number of
warrants issued, but also the exercise price and life of warrants. These warrant characteristics
vary significantly across unit offerings (Garner and Marshall; 2005). It is reasonable to
anticipate that certain contractual features of warrants in unit IPOs may affect underpricing of
the unit as a whole. I am therefore, motivated to include several variables to examine warrant
characters in relation to the underpricing of unit IPOs with a fresh sample from the UK. Such
variables include the life and exercise price of warrant contract, any provisions for change of
exercise price, and the callability of warrants, and finally the eventual outcome of the warrant
contracts (exercised or lapsed).
Schultz (1993a) reports that warrants are included in unit IPOs as a potential second round of
financing when they are exercised before or at expiration. The life of a warrant contract, also
known as the exercise period or maturity of warrant, is therefore, defined as the time between
issuance and expiration date. How and Wei (1993) insert that the longer maturity will increase
the value of the warrants.14 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) imply that unit firms attaching
warrants with longer life is riskier than a firm whose warrants have shorter life. How and Howe
(2001) observe that warrants in Australian unit IPOs are generally shorter lived than US
warrants. They explain the shorter maturity of warrants with a high concentration of unit IPOs
14 Howe and Wei (1993) examine the valuation effects of warrant extensions. Such data were not available to me for
warrants attached to unit IPOs in the UK. However, I consider this paper a valuable inspiration for future research.
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in mining industry. Mining firms own a short-lived ‘exploration lease’ to decide the outcome of
geological assessment of the fields, which is not a time-consuming process. No further
examination of warrant maturity is covered their study. Garner and Marshall (2004) focus on
the amendments of warrant terms and reveal that warrant life extension is less likely when the
firm is riskier. Garner and Marshall (2005) report significantly higher underpricing among
American unit IPOs whose warrants have longer exercise periods.
The existing discussions on the life of warrant and the information it conveys are not conclusive
and no such studies have been carried out in the UK. I am therefore motivated to examine the
maturities of warrants and its relationship with the underpricing of unit IPOs. According to the
Signalling theory, if there is more time before the warrant expiration, more firm-value will be
assigned to warrant-signals, given the same exercise price and number of warrants. Unit IPOs
with high value-bearing warrants attached may send strong signals about firm-value and are
expected to be less underpriced. On the other hand, the logic of Agency Cost theory suggests
the longer the warrant life, the longer time lag between the two stages of financing (IPO
proceeds and warrant proceeds). The monitoring and incentive mechanism brought forth by the
inclusion of warrants could be interpreted by investors as less effective. As a result, unit IPOs
with long-maturity warrants have to be underpriced more than those with short-lived warrants,
in order to compensate the extra risk that investors believe they would bear if they are to
subscribe such issues. In examination of the two competing hypotheses, I hypothesise that in
the UK, the underpricing of unit IPOs decrease in the length of warrant maturity.
H3.16: The maturity of warrant is negatively related to the underpricing of unit IPOs.
The second warrant character under discussion is the exercise price, which is specified in
warrant agreements at the time of unit IPOs. Schultz (1993b) predicted that in order to create
the incentive to reduce agency costs, issuing firms intentionally set the warrant exercise price
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above the offer price of the new issue. By doing so, the managerial insiders are bond to optimal
investment decisions in order to increase the company’s share price and exceed the warrant
exercise price to materialize the second round of financing. On the other hand, Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997) imply that issuers send signals of their future prospect to the public investors
by  setting  the  exercise  price  of  warrants  equal  to  the  expected  stock  price.  How  and  Howe
(2001) also observe the choice of exercise price and the evidence from Australian unit IPOs is
contrary to Schultz (1993b)’s prediction and weakly supports Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1997)’s. Such competing predictions have been examined in previous Section 3.3.2 of thesis
with UK data (Hypothesis 3.10). According to either explanation, the exercise price of warrants
is not decided randomly. However, neither the Agency Cost nor the Signalling theory discussed
whether the choice of warrant exercise price has impact on the underpricing of unit IPOs.
Garner and Marshall (2005) segregate the initial day returns of a sample of American unit IPOs
with the median ratio of warrant exercise to IPO offer price but find no relation between the
ratio and the level of underpricing. Therefore, I introduce the variable PRATIO, defined as the
ratio of warrant exercise price to the IPO offer price to proxy for the probability of realizing
expected future cash flows. The PRATIO is lower than 1, if the warrants are issued
in-the-money (exercise price < offer price), in which case warrant holders may exercise the
warrant straight after the unit IPOs or detach warrants from the unit and trade them
independently.  The  PRATIO is  equal  to  1,  if  the  warrant  exercise  price  equals  the  expected
offer price. On the other hand, when the warrant exercise price is intentionally set above the
offer price of the IPOs, the PATIO is higher than 1. Warrants with PRATIO lower than one
have immediate value to investors; whereas warrants issued either on- or out-of-money may
have speculation value for investors in the future. According to the Agency Cost hypothesis,
unit IPOs with low PRATIOs are less effective in monitoring management and reducing agency
costs and as a result should be more underpriced to attract trading interest. On the other hand,
the Signalling hypothesis implies that PRATIOs should be equal to 1 and therefore will be
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independent of the degree of underpricing. In test of the two competing theories, I propose
Hypothesis 3.18 as below:
H3.17: PRATIO is negatively related to the underpricing of unit IPOs
Some issuing firm include optional provisions in a warrant agreement and the right for issuing
firm to ‘call’ warrants before expiration is one of them. Schultz (1993a) states that in a perfect
market, value-maximising managers have the incentive to call warrants (if they are callable) as
soon as they are in the money, in order to expropriate the time premium on the warrants. By
forcing  the  exercise,  the  value  of  the  remaining  time  premium  from  the  warrant  holders
transfers to the shareholders. Managers will invest the proceeds from the forced exercise if the
firm has good projects and otherwise return the proceeds to the shareholders. However, market
imperfections such as agency costs imply that a warrant call indicates more free cash flows at
managers’ discretion (proceeds of the warrant call), which may not be applied to
value-maximising uses. Such possibilities lead investors to react negatively towards the
acquisition of additional equity capital through a warrant call if they have reasons to believe the
issuing firm has poor investment opportunities or unused debt capacity.
Schultz (1993b) inserts that strategically attaching warrants in IPOs can help reducing agency
costs for smaller, younger, and riskier firms. How and Howe (2001) documents that Australian
warrants are not callable whereas most US warrants are. Alderson and Betker (2003)
questioned the Agency Cost explanation for the inclusion of warrants in unit IPOs with their
study of the announcement effect of warrant calls. They mention that forced warrant exercise is
expected to elicit a stock price reaction in response to unanticipated increase in agency costs.
They found firms calling warrants for redemption usually experience negative abnormal returns
on the announcement date. Furthermore, evidence was provided that the negative share price
reaction to the announcement is concentrated among inefficient firms with low leverage whose
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agency costs of managerial discretion may be high. In other words, the market reacts adversely
to a warrant call when the announcement reveals that the firm is either issuing equity when debt
capacity exists or planning to invest when it has poor investment opportunities. Evidence from
Alderson and Betker (2003) suggests that some firms are likely to incur substantial agency
costs when the warrants are called for redemption and the unit IPO is ‘an imperfect instrument
for controlling agency costs’.
However,  no  further  examinations  of  the  callability  of  warrants  and  its  effect  on  the
underpricing have been covered by previous unit IPO literature. A warrant call is a
leverage-decreasing event, which results in the acquisition of unrestricted cash. If the issuing
firm lacks good investment opportunities or has high debt capacity, a warrant call increases the
agency costs of managerial discretion. Schultz (1993a) reports that warrant holders might sell
their warrants rather than exercise them when they are called. Market makers or specialists who
buy these warrants might then use them as part of their hedging or speculating strategies. In any
case, both the possibility of a warrant call and the likely use of the exercise proceeds add further
uncertainty  to  future  involvement  with  the  issuing  firm.  In  the  presence  of  agency  costs  of
managerial discretion, forcing exercise, and injecting equity into the company is bad news
because shareholders fear that the proceeds will be misapplied. Therefore, I suspect that unit
IPOs  with  callable  warrants  attached  might  have  to  underprice  the  issue  more  to  attract
investors’ interest. Hypothesis 3.19 is proposed to test such prediction with UK data.
H3.18: Unit IPOs with callable warrants attached are more underpriced than those with non-callable warrants
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3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Data collection
I originally collected a sample of 601 unseasoned issues of equity listed on the London Stock
Exchange between 1994 and 2006, of which 216 are unit offerings and 385 are share-only
offerings. Consistent with the previous literature, the following firms are excluded from the
sample through ‘data cleaning’ process: (1) the closed-end funds, (2) investment trusts, (3) real
estate holding companies, (4) companies without a copy of prospectus available and (5)
companies with missing data. In addition, some IPOs are mere Introductions (or Admissions) to
the Official Listing or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Since there is no new shares
issued and in no case, warrants attached, such IPOs are also excluded from this study. Only
firms  go  public  with  a  first  sale  of  shares,  through  either  ‘Placing’  or  ‘Open  Offer’  or  a
combination of both, are included in the sample. After cross-referencing between DataStream
and Thomas One Banker databases for any conflicting data15, those restrictions result in a final
sample of 350 initial public offerings consist of 258 share-only offerings and 92 unit offerings
as shown in TABLE 3.2.
INSERT TABLE3.2 HERE
Prospectuses of all the sample firms are analysed and the information on the offerings is
obtained including: the type of the IPO (unit IPOs with warrant attached or share-only IPOs),
the name of the underwriter(s), industry sector of the issuing firm, incorporation date of the
company, the publication date of the prospectus and the listing date of the offering, market
segment (AIM or Main Board), placing (or offer) price, number of new shares in issue, enlarged
share capital and market capitalisation at the placing (or offer) price following the IPO,
15 Certain data recorded on DataStream is different from those reported in Thomas One Banker. Firms with conflicting data
between the two databases are therefore excluded from the sample for the sake of precision.
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expected gross proceeds, total expenses of the offering and net proceeds from the offering,
insider subscription as percentage of the enlarged capital following the listing.
In case of unit IPOs, I also collect information on the warrant characteristics, including number
of warrants, exercise price of the warrants and subscription price of warrants (in rare cases they
are not given for free), conversion rate, and the issuance and expiration dates of the warrants.
Information on the exercise or cancellation of warrants before expiration is mostly collected
from company websites under the Investor Relationship or Press Release sections. To further
perceive the characteristics of unit IPOs, I also obtained information from the prospectuses on
whether the warrants are callable after issuance, and whether the issuing company assumes the
right to change the exercise price of warrants given certain conditions after the IPO.
Other firm specific financial data and accounting information such as revenue, earnings before
interest and taxation (EBIT), net income after taxation before dividend payment, and tangible
asset, total assets, total liabilities for the year prior to IPO are also collected from the
Prospectuses. The aftermarket daily share prices post-IPO are obtained from DataStream’s
equity return index datatype (RI) and cross-referenced with FAME database. DataStream
provides adjusted price series for companies in their database excluding dividends. In most
cases, the two sources of data provide consistent outcome. In case of any inconsistency, the
DataStream return index is applied.
3.4.2 Selection of matching firms
Within  the  258  share-only  IPO firms  in  the  sample,  a  portfolio  of  matching  firms  is  created
following the procedure adopted in Ritter (1991). 92 matching share-only IPO firms are
selected individually for the unit IPO firms issued between 1994 and 2006. I firstly split the unit
firms into four groups according to prospectus publication dates. 6 unit IPOs with prospectus
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dates from the year 1994-1995 are matched with share-only IPOs from the year 1994; 21 unit
firms going public between 1996-1999 are compared with share-only IPOs from the year 1996;
27 unit IPOs from 2000-2003 are matched with share-only firms from the year 2000; and 38
unit IPOs from 2004-2006 are compared with 2004 share-only offerings. Secondly, matching
firms with closest market value and the same industry are chosen. Matching share-only firms
are only used once and when there is no share-only firms match the industry for the matching
years, another sample firm with the same industry were selected from the closest year.
3.4.3 Abnormal returns on the first day of trading
To evaluate the degree of underpricing, the daily initial returns on the first trading day (IRD) are
calculated for both the unit and share-only IPOs. The first underpricing measure is the discrete
initial return (i.e. raw initial return) shown as IRD1 in EQUATION 3.1, which is calculated in
the usual manner by using the first closing price of firm i on the day of listing,  i.e.  the first
trading day (Pi,1)  and  the  IPO  offer  price  (Pi,0), which is assigned to the last day of the
subscription period of firm i’s  IPO.  To  account  for  market  movement,  IRD2 is the
market-adjusted initial return on the first trading day, computed as the difference between the
raw initial return of firm i and the return of Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index on
the same day as illustrated in EQUATION 3.2, where PHGSC, 1 is the HGSC Index price at the
end of the first trading day of firm i and PHGSC, 0 is the HGSC Index price at the last day of the
subscription period of firm i’s IPO. The HGSC Index is a sub-Index for smaller firms. Since
unit IPOs tend to be issued by smaller firms, using HGSC Index to account for market
movement can adjust for firm size.
For robustness test purpose, I also examine the degree of underpricing by calculating weekly
initial returns (IRW) for the first trading week. IRW1 in EQUATION 3.4 is the HGSC-adjusted
first week initial returns, calculated using the offer price (Pi, 0) and the closing price on the fifth
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trading day of the IPO (Pi, 5); PHGSC, 0 is the HGSC Index price at the last day of the subscription
period of firm i’s IPO and PHGSC, 5 is the HGSC Index price on the fifth trading day of firm i’s
IPO. Following How and Howe (2001), the continuously compounded initial returns are also
calculated. IRD3 in EQUATION 3.3 is the natural logarithm of market-adjusted daily initial
return; whereas IRW2 in EQUATION 3.5 is the natural logarithm of market-adjusted weekly
initial return. To examine the effect of different indices on the degree of underpricing, the FTSE
All Shares (FTA) Index and the FTSE Alternative Investment Market (AIM) Index are also
adopted as alternative market benchmarks to calculate initial returns in EQUATION 3.1-3.5.
The results are very similar to the initial returns calculated against HGSC Index and therefore
not discussed in the thesis.
EQUATION 3.1
EQUATION 3.2
   EQUATION 3.3
EQUATION 3.4
 EQUATION 3.5
  3.4.4 The short-term after-market performance following the IPOs
After examining the initial underpricing on the first day of trading and the initial share price
run-up in the first trading week relative to the offer price, I also investigate the short-term
after-market share price performance for unit IPOs and matching share-only IPOs. The HGSC
Index-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHARt) for 2, 7, 14, and 21 days post-listing, are
calculated respectively, excluding the initial returns on the first trading day. Without the
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commonly observed abnormal positive returns on the first day of trading, I believe the
short-term after-market buy-and-hold returns can provide further insight on the performance of
unit firms immediately post-listing comparing to their share-only counter-parts. Another
purpose of testing the short-term performance is to observe whether the positive returns at the
first trading day caused by initial underpricing are persistent in the after-market; or are they
only temporary and will vanish shortly after the IPO is completed. As presented in EQUATION
3.6, the market-adjusted n-day buy-and-hold returns (n= 2, 7, 14, and 21) are calculated as the
difference between the raw buy-and-hold returns of the IPOs and the buy-and-hold returns of
the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index for the corresponding period. Ri, t is the
raw daily return of IPO firm i for  event  day t post-listing, and RHGSC,t is  the  daily  return  of
HGSC Index over the same period.
EQUATION 3.6
3.5 Tests and Results
3.5.1 Data distribution
As shown in TABLE 3.3, the final sample of 92 unit IPOs are recorded between 1994 and 2006
and the number of unit IPOs for each cohort period are clearly increasing. Only 6.52% are
issued during 1994-1995 period comparing to 22.83% during 1996-1999, 29.35% during
2000-2003, and the highest 41.30% during 2004-2006 period. On the other hand, a final sample
of 258 share-only IPOs recorded between 1994 and 2006 allocates more evenly over the years
with 16.67% during 1994-1995 period, comparing to a peak of 29.07% during 1996-1999,
26.36% during 2000-2003, and 27.91% during 2004-2006 period.16 Both unit and share-only
IPOs were more buoyant between 2000-2006 reflecting a strong stock market and a 'good
16 ‘The UK IPO market was so buoyant during 2005 that it has matched the activity generated during the boom times of the
2000 and 2001 dot com era’. Research by KPMG corporate finance has found in 2005, 307 new companies have joined AIM
or the main board of the London Stock Exchange raising combined funds of £8.3bn.
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supply of suitable companies', which is consistent with the boom times of the 2000 and 2001
‘dot com era’ and more recently the ‘Bio-Tech boom’.
Sorted by trading locations, both unit IPOs and share-only IPOs have a higher percentage of
sample  firms  that  are  listed  on  the  Alternative  Investment  Market  (AIM)  (72.29%  in  total)
comparing to those trading on the Official Listing (27.71% in total). However, unit firms are
more concentrated on AIM (88.04%) than share-only IPO firms (66.67%). As a sub-market for
smaller companies, the AIM market was established by the London Stock Exchange in 1995,
with the intention that it should be a less costly route for smaller companies to raise capital with
a  more  flexible  regulatory  system  than  is  applied  to  the  main  market.  Since  then,  the  AIM
market has continued to flourish, going from strength to strength. AIM was driving IPO growth,
making it 'the natural market for smaller and many mid-cap companies'. Its popularity is rising,
with overseas as well as UK companies appreciating the lighter regulatory touch and tax
advantages. No requirement is made on the capitalisation or number of shares issued, which
provide smaller firms the flexibility when floating shares. In 2005, 40 companies moved
directly  from the  Main  Market  to  AIM,  whereas  only  2  companies  moved from AIM to  the
Main Market17. Considering that unit firms tend to be smaller, younger firms, it is not surprising
that  in  my  sample  unit  IPO  firms  are  more  concentrated  on  AIM  than  on  the  Main  Market
Official Listing.
In Panel C of TABLE 3.3 the sample IPOs are sorted by issue methods. Mudambi and Goergen
(1999) investigate 240 IPOs of non-investment trust companies issued on the UK official List
during the period of 1991-1995, and document a unique characteristic of the listing methods in
the UK IPO market. They report that only 9 listings were pure offers whilst 98 listings were a
mixture of placings and offers in their UK sample. They explain that in the late 80s placements
became the favoured method to bring a company public to the market partially due to a
17 London Stock Exchange AIM Fact Sheet 2005
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relaxation of the placing rules.18 Mudambi and Goergen (1999) also provide evidence that most
of the small and medium sized companies in the UK choose placement for listing whist offers
for sale tend to be adopted by larger firms. Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2006) stipulate
that the choice between public offers and placings has important implications in terms of who
bears the risk of the issuing failing and of its costs. Their UK study find that firms with higher
ex anti uncertainty are more likely to choose a placing contract, which is not necessarily
underwritten by highly reputable sponsors and if the sponsor fails to place an agreed minimum
number  of  shares  then  the  placing  is  withdrawn.  On the  other  hand,  large  and  multinational
firms tend to favour a public offer, in which reputable underwriters provide strict creditor
screening and guarantee to pick up any unsold shares. In this UK unit study, the majority 82%
of the 350 sample IPOs are issued through placing whist only 5% are issued through open offer
(the rest 13% through a combination of placing and open offer). Such percentage distribution
remains roughly the same in both the unit IPO and the share-only IPO subsamples, which
suggest that the popularity of ‘Placing’ exist regardless of whether having warrants attached or
not. Furthermore, after controlling for the combined ‘Placing and Offer’ issue method, fewer
unit IPOs (4%) are issued through ‘Offer’ than share-only IPOs (5%) are. Such distribution in
the sample is consistent with the evidence provided by Mudambi and Goergen (1999) and
Goergen, Khurshed and Mudambi (2006). The sample firms’ preference of issuing method can
be explained by the contractual features of the two different issue methods and the
characteristics of issuing firms themselves. A placing is a cheaper issuing method which
popularly adopted by smaller companies. A placing of shares is usually sold to a selected group
of large investors and any unsold shares are not guaranteed by underwriters. Unit firms are
naturally younger smaller firms that will choose to issue their new shares through placing. The
share-only IPOs also seem to share the preference for placing, possible due to the less
18 The trend to use placings as a method of listing accelerated from 1986 onwards, when the London Stock Exchange
increased the limit on the size of placings from £3 million to £15 million. Fro example the number of placings on the LSE
increased from 3 in 1985 and 17 in 1986 to 46 in 1987.
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expensive underwriting fees and more selective investors. On the other hand, an open offer has
a wider ownership distribution being issued to both institutional and public investors and
underwriters for an open offer, who take more commission fees, will bear the risk and cost for
any unsold shares. Such issue method is therefore, more popular among larger and more
prestigious companies.’
Sorted by industry groups (Panel D of TABLE 3.3), one outstanding feature of unit firms is the
high concentration in mining industry. In my sample, 33.70% of the unit-IPOs are within the
mining, resources, and energy industry group, which can be confirmed with the high
concentration of AIM listing. The AIM market has proved particularly popular with mining and
resource companies, but has attracted a whole range of entrants such as High Technology and
IT. The high percentage of mining firms can also be explained by the nature of the mining
industry. Most mining firms will issue an ‘exploration lease’ when any possible natural
resources were proposed. The lease will only last for a limited period since the outcome of the
project should become clear shortly after exploration. Such features of the mining and resources
firms naturally encourage them to include warrants in the IPOs, so if the exploration succeeds,
the second round of financing will go through; conversely, if the exploration failed, the further
funding will fall through automatically to stop further loss. The similar high percentage of
mining firms is presented in How and Howe (2001)’s study on Australian unit IPOs.
Nevertheless, in Hong Kong, Mazouz et al. (2007) only document four mining firms in their
sample. Such difference can be explained by the geographical locations of natural resources.
Share-only IPOs have higher percentage of firms in all the other industry groups. Within the
unit IPO sample, the second highest concentration is in the support service industry, then
subsequently in the IT and High-tech industry.
INSERT TABLE 3.3 HERE
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As illustrated in TABLE 3.4, whilst using market capitalisation and total asset as two proxies
for firm size, it is obvious that unit firms are smaller than share-only IPO firms in every size
quartile for both market value and book value. The mean market capitalisation at offer price for
share-only IPO firms (£49.3 million) is more than twice as that of unit IPO firms’ (£23.6
million). Unit firms’ mean total asset one year prior to IPO is only £5.3 million comparing to
share-only IPO firms’ £15.7 million (nearly tripled). Such results confirm both the Agency Cost
and Signalling hypotheses that unit firms are indeed smaller, comparing to share-only IPO
firms. In examination of unit firms’ profitability before the unit IPOs, the revenue and net
income after tax are also sorted into quartiles. The results indicate that one year prior to the IPO,
unit firms have significantly less sales in every quartile both before and after taxation than
share-only IPO firms do, which is consistent with Schultz (1993b)’s prediction. In addition, this
result also contributes to the Signalling hypothesis in that it is more difficult for investors to
evaluate unit firms’ profitability in the future, and therefore less profitable IPO firms signify
future potential to investors by including warrants in the IPO.
Four quartiles of the IPO offer size are calculated. Unit IPOs raise much less gross proceeds
than share-only IPOs do in every quartile. The mean gross proceeds for unit IPOs is only £6.5
million, while the mean gross proceed for share-only IPOs is about £16.6 million (nearly three
times the unit IPO issue size). This outcome supports the Agency Cost argument that warrants
are included in unit IPOs as a second stage of financing to reduce agency cost, therefore the size
of initial offerings as the first round of financing to ‘test the water’ is intentionally limited
comparing to share-only IPOs. In this way, managers of unit firms will have less free cash flow
immediately after IPO and will be motivated to invest the initial proceeds in value-generating
projects in order to trigger the exercise of warrants and materialise the second round of
financing. The Signalling hypothesis made no prediction regarding offer size.
INSERT TABLE 3.4 HERE
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3.5.2 Descriptive data and the differences between unit IPOs and share-only IPOs
According to both the Agency Cost and Signalling hypotheses, we expect that unit IPOs are
preferred by younger (H3.1), smaller (H3.2), riskier (H3.3) firms with lower insider ownership
(H3.5), less income (H3.6), higher agency costs (H3.7), and smaller offering size (H3.8). To test the
hypotheses set up in section 3.3, descriptive data to indicate firm characteristics is identified
and calculated from the information collected for both the unit sample and the matching
share-only  IPO  sample.  The  definitions  of  variables  are  summarised  in  TABLE  3.1  and
descriptive results are illustrated in TABLE 3.5. The age of the firm (AGE), is defined as the
number of calendar days between the firm incorporation date and the date of listing; in a few
cases when the listing date is not available, the date when the trading of new shares commences
is applied. The riskiness of the issuing firm (RISK) is measured by the standard deviations of
after-market returns19 spanning 200 days after the IPO, excluding the initial returns. The size of
the firm is designated with both total asset (TTLASSET) and the market capitalisation
(MKTCAP) at offering price immediately following the IPO. The total asset is collected from
the balance sheet by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO and the market capitalisation is
computed as the product of number of shares immediately after the IPO and the offer price. The
size of the offering (PROCEEDS) is reported as the gross proceeds from the offering calculated
by multiplying the number of new shares in the issue with the offer price. Insider ownership
(INSIDER)  is  calculated  as  the  percentage  of  the  number  of  shares  directors  and  senior
management hold in the company to the enlarged share capital immediately following the
listing. The number of shares under any executive option schemes is also taken into
consideration in insider subscription. However, holdings of the company shares by common
employees or any other companies are not identified as insider ownership. The profitability
measure is the gross revenue (REVENUE) of IPO firms collected from the prospectus by the
19 Since the standard deviation of aftermarket returns has become a widely accepted measure of risk in the IPO literature, it
is also employed in this paper to mirror firm risk.
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end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs. (LEVERAGE) is the ratio of total debt to total assets,
both collected from the prospectus as well.
In TABLE 3.5, the mean and median, minimum and maximum values of the descriptive
statistics for both unit IPOs and matching share-only IPOs are compared. Student’s t-tests and
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (MW) tests are undertaken to examine the significance level
of difference in means and medians. The Pearson moment correlation coefficients between
each pair of variables are calculated to measure degree of linear relationship between the two
variables. The p-value of a two tailed hypothesis test of the correlation coefficient being zero is
also presented in TABLE 3.5. Contrary to the Hypothesis 3.1 from Section 3.3 regarding firm
age, the unit firms in the UK are in fact significantly older in both the mean (8.8 years) and
median(1.1 years) age, comparing to the mean (3.4 years) and median (0.7 years) age of
matching share-only IPO firms. (Hypothesis 3.1 is rejected).
Measured by the market capitalisation at offer price immediately following the IPO, unit firms
are significantly smaller in firm size than share-only firms in both mean and median terms. The
average market capitalisation of unit firms after IPO is £23.617 million, which is much lower
than the average market capitalisation of share-only IPOs (£31.578 million). The difference is
highly significant at 1% level. Another firm size measurement is the total asset by end of the
fiscal year prior to the listing. The average total asset of unit firms is £5.325 million comparing
to £9.772 million for share-only firms and the difference is marginally significant at 15%,
which can be expected due to limited sample size. Nonetheless, by median values, unit firms
are significantly smaller than share-only counterparts at 1% level indicated by the p-value from
Mann-Whitney test. As a result, Hypothesis 3.2 cannot be rejected.
Firm RISK is estimated as the residual standard deviations of the sample firms using daily
discrete returns for 200 days following the listing of the IPO (excluding initial returns). As
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Hypothesis 3.3 predicted, unit IPO firms present significantly higher average standard
deviations (Mean 0.045, Median 0.039) than share-only IPO firms (Mean 0.036, Median 0.033).
The differences in both means and medians are highly significant at 1%. Thus, unit firms are
indeed  riskier  than  share-only  IPO  firms,  which  confirm  both  the  Agency  Cost  and  the
Signalling hypothesis. Contrarily to the Agency Cost prediction, although unit firms appear to
have lower insider ownership (mean 35.43%, median 33.57%) than that of share-only firms
(mean 38.88%, median 38.83%), the difference in means and medians are not significant. As a
result, Hypothesis 3.5 is not statistically supported by the UK data.
Measured by total revenue, the unit firms in the UK have less income prior to listing comparing
to matching share-only firms, which is in line with the Agency Cost theory. The differences in
means  and  medians  are  both  significant  at  5%  level.  The  average  revenue  for  unit  firms  is
£5.462 million comparing to £10.648 million for share-only IPO firms. The less promising
historical financial records reflecting higher level of uncertainty of the firm’s profitability,
which is consistent with the fact that unit firms are riskier than share-only IPO firms. Therefore,
Hypothesis 3.6 proposed in Section 3.3 is not rejected.
Unit firms also exhibit much smaller issue size measured by the expected IPO proceeds. An
average unit IPO can only raise £6.581 million before any expenses; whilst the average gross
proceeds of share-only IPOs is £12.755 million, which is nearly twice the size of a unit offer.
The difference in means is significant at 5% level as indicated by a Student t-test, whereas the
difference in medians is highly significant at 1% level suggested by the p-value  of  a
Mann-Whitney test. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.8 cannot be rejected. Expectedly, the total
expenses of unit IPOs is also significantly lower than that of share-only IPOs.
Tested as one of this research’s unique predictions (Hypothesis 3.14) on unit firm
characteristics, unit firms also present lower leverage, calculated as the ratio of total debt to
92
total asset (mean 47.3%, median 34.3%) than that of share-only IPO firms (mean 88.9%,
median 66.2%), the differences in both means and medians are significant at 1% level.
Therefore, the original Hypothesis 3.14 is supported by the UK data. The result on debt
leverage before listing confirm that share-only firms are generally less risky with better
historical trading records, and it is easier for them to secure cheaper debt financing with banks
comparing to unit IPO firms that are not as creditable. It is therefore expected for unit firms to
seek further financing after the IPO through exercise of warrants.
In conclusion, the descriptive statistics indicate that compared to share-only IPO firms, unit
IPO firms in the UK are significantly smaller and riskier with less income prior to the IPOs,
which confirms the common ground of both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses.
Contrary to both hypotheses, my UK data does not support the common argument that unit
firms are significantly younger than share-only IPOs. Unit IPOs also seemingly exhibit lower
insider ownership than that of share-only IPOs but the difference is not significant and therefore
unable to support the Agency Cost prediction. However, in unique support to the Agency Cost
hypothesis, unit IPOs are significantly smaller offers than share-only IPOs are, which confirm
the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit firms intestinally limit the size of the unit IPO proceeds so
the managers will not have excessive free cash flow for careless investments. Instead, they only
have enough money to start production and test the market. As a result, managers of unit firms
are motivated to spend the proceeds carefully by only invest in value-generating projects so that
the company’s share price will increase to allow the exercise of warrants as the second round of
financing. Considering the higher risk, naturally unit firms do not stand out as the best
candidate for investors’ choice. In such instance, including warrants in the IPO to form a staged
financing can provide investors more open options for future involvement in the investments. If
the unit firm enjoys better performance in the future, warrants will naturally be exercised and
investors will be happy to be more involved with the company by holding more shares in it. If
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the unit firm suffers bad performance after the IPO, warrants will expire to protect investors’
interest and no further involvement will occur.
INSERT TABLE 3.5 HERE
3.5.3 Direct tests of the Agency Cost and Signalling hypotheses
Following How and Howe (2001), the most straightforward test of the Agency Cost hypothesis
is to examine whether unit IPO firms have a greater level of agency cost than share-only IPOs.
The  most  straightforward  test  of  the  Signalling  hypothesis  is  to  see  whether  unit  firms  have
higher levels of information asymmetry and therefore greater incentive to signal firm value than
share-only firms do.
Following Ang et al. (2000), ‘efficiency ratios’ are employed as measures of agency cost. Three
different efficiency ratios are calculated using data by end of the accounting year prior to the
IPO: revenue divided by total asset (REV/TTLASSET), earnings before interest and taxes
divided by total asset (EBIT/TTLASSET), and net income divided by total asset
(NI/TTLASSET). The means and medians, minimum and maximum values of the three ratios
with the p-values from both Student’s t-test for means and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney
test for medians are presented in Panel-A of TABLE 3.6. Results indicate that the first two
efficiency ratios (revenue-to-total asset and EBIT-to-total asset) are significantly lower for unit
IPO  firms,  suggesting  lower  levels  of  profitability  and  asset  utilisation  and  therefore  higher
level of agency cost, comparing to those of share-only IPO firms. The third ratio of net income
to total asset is still lower for unit IPOs, however the differences in means and medians are not
significance at conventional level. Nonetheless, this paper provides partial support for the
Agency Cost hypothesis with two efficiency ratios. It is safe to reason that unit firms exhibit
significantly lower profitability and asset unitisation before listing than share-only firms
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matched on firm size and industry, therefore have more incentive to limit agency cost and
encourage management to make optimal investment decisions by including warrants in their
IPOs. Hypothesis 3.7 stating that unit firms have higher agency costs in terms of profitability
and asset utilisation ratios than share-only counterparts cannot be rejected.
Following How and Howe (2001)’s direct test on the Signalling hypothesis, information
asymmetry is measured as the residual standard deviations using daily discrete returns for 200
days following the listing (which is the same measure of RISK variable). The time lag as the
number of calendar days between the registration of firm prospectus (i.e. when the information
of a new issue is announced) and the listing of new issues (or the first trading day), is also
calculated to proxy for the level of information asymmetry in the offering (DELAY). As shown
in Panel-B of TABLE 3.6, unit firms present significantly higher residual standard deviations in
both mean (0.045) and median (0.039) values than those of share-only firms (Mean, 0.036;
Median, 0.033), suggesting unit IPOs are associated with higher level of information
asymmetry. The p-values from both the Student t-test and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney
test are highly significant at 1% level. Between registration of prospectus and commence of the
trading (DELAY), unit firms on average experience longer time lag (13 days) comparing to that
of share-only firms (10 days), the difference in means is significant at 5% level. The median
days of delay between the announcement of IPO and the first trading day are both 7 days for
unit IPOs and share-only IPOs. Such an outcome can be explained by the fact that unit firms
tend to prolong the time lag between Prospectus publication and the listing day intentionally to
convey more information on firm value. Overall, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.11 in this study,
direct tests suggest that unit firms present higher levels of information asymmetry comparing to
that of share-only offerings and therefore have greater motivation to signal the true firm value
to the public by including warrants.
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In conclusion, the direct test on Agency Cost hypothesis using three efficiency ratios provides
partial support to Schultz (1993b) that unit IPO firms present much less efficient use of their
total assets to generate profits and therefore have more agency problems, comparing to
share-only IPO firms which exhibit higher efficiency ratios. On the other hand, the direct tests
on the Signalling hypothesis provide conclusive support. The information asymmetry measured
by the residual standard deviations indicates that unit firms suffer more asymmetric information
and have more motivation to include warrants to signal true firm value. Such results are
consistent with the signalling explanation (Hypothesis 3.11 cannot be rejected).
INSERT TABLE 3.6 HERE
3.5.4 Initial underpricing and short-term after-market performance of unit IPOs
Early research documents that initial public offerings are on average issued at a discount
(Ibbotson, 1875; Ritter, 1984; and Welch, 1989). In other words, initial underpricing has been
recognised as a feature of IPO in general. The Signalling hypothesis of Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1997) only predicts that the degree of underpricing will increase with firm riskiness,
which is tested in the last  section. More specifically,  the Agency Cost hypothesis of Schultz
(1993b) predicts that unit IPO firms are more underpriced than are share-only IPO firms.
Schultz  (1993b)  interprets  that  firms  tend  to  include  warrants  in  their  IPO when they  suffer
more agency cost and the value of their projects cannot be easily evaluated. In order to convince
the investors to purchase their shares and participate in the company’s future development, they
choose to include warrants and to underprice their shares at the same time. To test whether unit
IPOs are more underpriced than matching share-only IPOs, I examine both the initial returns
and the short-term after-market performance of unit IPOs in comparison to share-only IPOs.
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Following How and Howe (2001) and Jelic et al. (2001) I calculate the raw initial returns (IRD1),
HGSC Index-adjusted initial returns (IRD2), and continuously compounded initial returns
(IRD3) on the first trading day (EQUATION 3.1-3.3 in Section 3.4) for both the unit IPOs and
their share-only counterparts. The Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index is chosen
to adjust for general market movement. Since unit IPOs tend to be issued by smaller firms,
HGSC Index as benchmark can account for firm size. As alternative underpricing measure for
robustness check, I also calculated the weekly initial returns for the first trading week. IRW1 in
EQUATION 3.4 is the HGSC-adjusted first week initial returns, whereas IRW2 in EQUATION
3.5 is the natural logarithm of market-adjusted weekly initial returns, both of which are
calculated using the closing price on the fifth trading day relative to the IPO offer price.The
mean, median, minimum, and maximum values with the standard deviations of each initial
return measures are illustrated in TABLE 3.7 for 92 unit IPOs and 92 share-only IPOs matched
on firm size and industry.
INSERT TABLE 3.7 HERE
Panel A of TABLE 3.7 illustrates the initial underpricing for the first trading day and first
trading week before dealing with outliers. By all five IR measures, the UK unit IPOs exhibit
significantly higher initial returns comparing to their share-only counterparts, in both their
means and medians. The average raw initial return on the first trading day (IRD1) for unit firms
is 51.02% comparing to share-only IPO firms which average at only 7.55%; whereas the
median raw initial return for unit IPOs is 25.00%, which is much higher than the 5.03% median
for  share-only  IPOs.  After  adjusting  for  market  movements  from  Hoare  Govett  Smaller
Companies (HGSC) Index, the market-adjusted initial returns of unit IPOs (Mean 50.89%,
Median 24.76%) are significantly higher than those of share-only IPOs (Mean 7.56%, Median
4.94%). As robustness check, IRW1 measures the initial share price run-up during the first
trading week relative to the offer price. The HGSC-adjusted weekly initial returns remain
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significantly higher for unit IPOs (Mean 47.09%, Median 21.59%) than for their matching
share-only counterparts (Mean 17.58%, Median10.19). After comparing the first-day and
first-week initial returns for both unit and share-only IPOs, a clear pattern can be recognised:
after the first trading day the magnitude of underpricing decreased over the first week for unit
IPOs whereas the initial returns of matching share-only IPOs inflated by the end of first trading
week. Nonetheless, unit IPOs still remain significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs.
To  correct  for  the  high  standard  errors  caused  by  extreme  values  of  raw  initial  returns,  I
calculate the continuously compounded initial returns (EQUATION 3.3 and EQUATION 3.5).
The log initial returns for both the first trading day (IRD3) and first trading week (IRW2) provide
smoother results after controlling for extreme values by taking logarithm of the discrete returns.
The minimum, maximum values and the standard deviations in Panel A suggest possible
outliers in the sample. The maximum raw initial return for unit IPOs is 431.25% whilst the
minimum is -0.33%; and the standard deviation is 0.726. For matching share-only IPOs, raw
initial returns range from -80% to 130% with standard deviation to be 0.290. To deal with
possible bias from outliers, I ranked the initial returns, eliminated the top-5 and bottom-5
extreme values from the sample, and calculated the trimmed means and medians as
robustness-test, the results of which are presented in Panel B of TABLE 3.7. After excluding
outliers, the minimum and maximum values exhibit much smaller gaps with smaller standard
deviations for both unit and matching share-only samples. The raw initial returns for unit IPOs
vary between the maximum 183% and the minimum 4% with standard deviation of 0.390;
whereas the raw initial returns for share-only IPOs range from the maximum of 39.76% and the
minimum of -38.46% with a standard deviation of 0.143. All five underpricing measures
remain highly significant with smaller magnitude in both the trimmed means and medians.
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Overall, TABLE 3.7 strongly indicates that unit IPOs significantly outperform share-only IPOs
on the first trading day and within the first trading week. The differences in both means and
medians for all underpricing measures are significant at 1-5% level before and after dealing
with outliers, which provide strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit IPOs are
more underpriced than share-only IPOs.
To examine whether the abnormally high initial returns on the first trading day will sustain after
the  completion  of  IPOs,  I  also  calculate  the  HGSC-adjusted  buy-and-hold  abnormal  returns
(BHAR) relative to the first trading day for 2, 7, 14, and 21 days in the after-market. The results
of BHARs are presented in TABLE 3.8. Panel A illustrates the mean, median, minimum and
maximum  values  of  the  HGSC-adjusted  BHARs  before  dealing  with  outliers.  Two  days
post-listing, the average HGSC-adjusted buy-and-hold return for unit sample is 9.2%
comparing to the 3.49% for matching share-only sample. The difference in means is significant
at 5% level. The 7-day interval generates very similar result as the 2-day interval. It is safe to
conclude that unit IPOs are still significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs one week
post-listing. When the interval is extended to 14 days and 21 days post-listing, the unit IPOs
still appear to outperform share-only IPOs matched on size and industry. However, the
differences are only significant in median values. Nonetheless, Panel A of TABLE 3.8 presents
clear evidence that up to three weeks after the completion of going public and the first trading
day,  unit  IPO  firms  still  experience  significantly  higher  abnormal  returns  than  those  of
matching share-only IPO firms.
The minimum and maximum values from Panel A of TABLE 3.8 suggest possible bias from
extreme values. Unit 2-day BHARs vary between the minimum -32.43% and maximum
74.38% whilst the share-only counterparts range from the minimum -23.33% to the maximum
145.01%. By the end of the third week after the initial trading day, unit 21-day BHARs has the
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minimum of -40.88% and the maximum of 174.39%, whereas the share-only counterparts
demonstrate much bigger gap between the minimum of -25.76% and the maximum of 220.84%.
To deal with the outliers, Panel B exhibits the trimmed means and medians of BHARs after
eliminating the top-5 and bottom-5 extreme outliers from the original sample, after which the
gaps between minimum and maximum values decreased substantially. For all short-term
intervals, unit IPOs keep outperforms their share-only counterparts 21 days into the
after-market. The differences in trimmed means and medians for all intervals remain
statistically significant at conventional levels.
INSERT TABLE 3.8 HERE
In conclusion, with UK data, this paper provides strong evidence that underpricing exists for
both unit and share-only firms at the time of IPOs. Furthermore, in support of the Agency Cost
hypothesis, unit IPOs indeed experience significantly greater underpricing than that of
share-only IPOs on the first trading day and within the first week of trading. Furthermore, the
positive abnormal returns persist for at least three weeks after the completion of IPOs. For the
after-market 2, 7, 14 and 21-day BHAR returns, unit IPO firms still significantly outperform
their share-only counterparts matched on firm size and industry. However, the magnitude of
underpricing declined significantly. Overall, both the initial underpricing and the short-term
after-market performance post-listing provide strong support to Agency Cost hypothesis that
unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs. Therefore, Hypothesis 3.9 cannot be
rejected.
3.5.5 Determinants of underpricing
The Agency Cost hypothesis predicts that firms tend to issue unit offerings when the value of
their potential investments cannot be easily valued by the public investors; and these firms tend
100
to suffer higher agency cost. Schultz (1993b) found evidence that unit IPOs are issued by
smaller, younger firms that have fewer assets and income than firms that choose share-only
IPOs. Welch (1989) argues that management has information about firm value that cannot be
noiselessly conveyed to the public, suggesting asymmetric information about firm value will
encourage firms to underprice their IPOs to signal their value and expect to recoup the costs of
underpricing by receiving a higher price for future seasoned offerings. All of these factors are
consistent with greater uncertainty about the prospects of firms that issue units. Therefore,
underpricing models based on uncertainty and asymmetric information about the firm’s value
implies that, all else being equal, unit IPOs should be more underpriced than share-only IPOs.
To more closely test the relation between the type of IPO and underpricing, an Ordinary Least
Square regression is conducted with the HGSC-adjusted first-trading-day initial returns (IRD2)
as the dependent variable (EQUATION 3.7). Selected independent variables are included in
examination of several empirical findings of determinants of IPO underpricing. UNIT dummy
is firstly included to indicate offer types. Managers of smaller, less profitable firms might have
to sacrifice higher discount in order to convince investors to purchase their shares. I therefore,
include the ASSET/PROCEED and REV/PROCEED variables in measurement of the size and
profitability  of  the  issuing  firm.  Both  variables  are  expected  to  be  negatively  related  to  the
degree of underpricing. The debt component of an issuing firm can be required to support a
company’s  operation  and/or  expansion.  On  one  hand,  lower  debt  leverage  can  put  more
pressure on issuing firm to underprice the equity issue more to raise the fund needed. On the
other hand, larger debt leverage might indicate more desirable investment opportunities are
present and the issuing firm might be in need for more equity funding. In turn, the IPO will need
to be more underpriced to assure subscription. Therefore, I also include a DEBT/PROCEED
variable to detect any association between the leverage of the issuing firm and the degree of
underpricing of the IPO. ASSET/PROCEED, REV/PROCEED and DEBT/PROCEED are the
101
total asset, total revenue and total debt of IPO firms prior to listing, all standardised by gross
proceeds of the IPOs. The market-to-book ratio (MK2BK) is another indicator of firm size. It is
computed as market capitalisation at the offering price divided by the total asset of the firm one
year prior to the IPO. The size of the offering is determined as the natural logarithm of expected
gross proceeds, noted as Ln(PROCEED). The dummy variable REPUTATION is employed to
assess the prestige of underwriters, which brought the underlying company public; the variable
takes the value of 1 if the underwriter has a high reputation ranking, 0 if otherwise20. Schultz
(1993b) predicts that reputable underwriters are associated with less underpricing and therefore
the REPUTATION dummy is expected to be negatively related to the degree of underpricing.
The OLS regression results are illustrated in Panel A of TABLE 3.9. UNIT dummy is positively
related to the initial underpricing on the first trading day, suggesting that unit IPOs are
substantially  more  underpriced  than  share-only  IPOs.  The  positive  coefficients  on  UNIT
dummy remain highly significant at 1% level through out the group of regressions.
The first column presents an estimate when all variables are included in the regression. The
standardised size (ASSET/PROCEED), profitability (REV/PROCEED), and debt leverage
(DEBT/PROCEED) of issuing firms prior to listing and the REPUTATION of underwriters are
all negatively and significantly related to the degree of underpricing on the first trading day,
suggesting that firms with less asset, lower income, and less debt financing experience higher
level of underpricing. Such results are consistent to Agency Cost theory that unit firms, which
are smaller firms with less sales record prior to the IPO, are more underpriced than share-only
IPOs. On the other hand, the market-to-book ratios and the size of the offerings
(Ln(PROCEED)) are not significant determinants of the degree of underpricing, although the
negative signs of coefficients are as expected.
20 The reputation ranking is determined following Jelic (2008), in which a list of all financial institutions involved in 4,807
previously identified listings in the UK primary market is created. The number underwriting deals in which a bank played
leading underwriting and/or advisory roles are identified to proxy for their reputation; and the top 5% of these banks are
selected as having a high reputation ranking.
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Regression  2  focuses  on  the  profitability  of  the  IPO  firms  in  relation  to  the  degree  of
underpricing. The efficiency to earn income measured by the ratio of total revenue to gross
proceeds (REV/PROCEED) is regressed against the degree of initial underpricing, after
controlling for the firm size (MKT2BK) and the offer type (UNIT). The standardised revenue is
negatively related to the degree of underpricing and significant at 1% level. The result supports
the argument that IPO firms, which have worse profitability, generate higher initial returns,
which is in line with the Agency Cost hypothesis. IPO firms’ degree of leverage measured by
the ratios of total debt and asset to gross proceeds, and the market-to-book ratio are highlighted
in Regression 3. Results indicate a negative relation between IPO underpricing and all three
leverage  ratios.  Firms  with  less  total  assets  and  total  debt  relative  to  gross  proceeds  are
significantly more underpriced. However, the coefficient on MKT2BK ratio is not significant at
conventional level. Regression 4 emphasises on the features of the offerings by including
variables indicating offer type (UNIT), market-to-book ratio (MKT2BK), offer size
(Ln(PROCEED)), and the REPUTATION of underwriters. Coefficient on UNIT dummy
remains significantly positive whereas a significant (at 10% level) negative relationship is
confirmed between the degree of underpricing and the REPUTATION of underwriters,
implying that IPOs marketed by less reputable underwriters are more underpriced than those
which were brought public by more prestigious underwriters. The log gross proceeds do not
have significant impact on the degree of underpricing when both unit and share-only IPOs are
examined jointly.
Regression 5 summarises all the significant variables from the previous regressions. Overall,
results from OLS regressions on the determinants of underpricing provide partial support to the
Agency Cost hypothesis. A positive and highly significant relation between the UNIT dummy
and the first-trading-day initial underpricing (IRD2) is confirmed throughout all five regressions
in strong support to Schultz (1993b)’s prediction that unit IPOs are more underpriced than
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share-only IPOs. Significantly negative coefficients on the standardised total assets, revenue,
total debt, and the REPUTATION dummy are found, implying the degree of underpricing
decrease in the size, profitability, debt leverage of issuing firms and reputation of the
underwriters. The above outcomes are all consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis.
However,  the  OLS  regressions  do  not  support  any  statistically  significant  impacts  on
underpricing from the issue size (Ln (PROCEED)), and MKT2BK ratio.
Due to limited size of the unit IPO sample, potential omitted variable problem is suspected that
decision to issue unit IPO is connected with unobservable factors in addition to the degree of
underpricing. Therefore, I conduct a group of 2-Stage Least Square regressions using the same
variables as in OLS regression. The UNIT dummy is selected as the instrumented variable in a
first-stage regression (EQUATION 3.8). The instrument variables include: insider holding
(INSIDER), firm riskiness (RISK), time lag between Prospectus publication and listing
(DELAY), MINING industry dummy, POST2000 listing year dummy, firm age (AGE), total
asset (TTLASSET), total debt (TTLDEBT), and net income (NI) of issuing firms prior to the
IPOs,  all  of  which  are  factors  that  may  affect  a  firm’s  decision  on  offer  type  (UNIT).  The
instrumented offer-type dummy noted as ‘Inst.UNIT’ is then included in the second stage
regression to test any relationship between the degree of underpricing and the offer type.
Panel B of TABLE 3.9 reports 2-Stage Least Square (2SLS) regression results using
EQUATION 3.9 and the subsets of its variables. In comparison to Panel A, the 2SLS results are
largely consistent to the OLS results. The coefficients on instrumented UNIT dummy remain
positive and significant at 1% level for all five 2SLS regressions, indicating robustness of the
model  on  the  prediction  that  unit  IPOs  are  more  underpriced  than  share-only  IPOs.  The
standardised firm size (ASSET/PROCEED), standardised profitability (REV/PROCEED), and
the REPUTATION of underwriters are still significantly and negatively related to the degree of
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underpricing, with minor changes in magnitude and significance level of the coefficients. The
debt-to-proceed ratio in the 2SLS regressions ceased being significant, whist the
market-to-book ratio become significant determinant of the degree of underpricing. The log
gross proceed measuring issue size remain insignificant. Overall, the TABLE 3.9 provide some
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis that IPOs issued by smaller firms with less earning and
debt component are more underpriced than those issued by bigger firms with higher
profitability and debt leverage. In addition, IPOs marketed by more reputable underwriters are
underpriced less than those brought public by more prestigious underwriters. Most importantly,
unit IPOs are significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs.
Robustness check on the models in TABLE 3.9 is carried out by using the first-week initial
return (IRW1) as the alternative underpricing measure, which provides very similar conclusions
comparing to the original regressions using IRD2. Both underpricing measures indicate that the
offer type is positively related to the degree of underpricing and the UNIT dummy remains
highly significant at 1% level. In other words, unit IPOs are significantly more underpriced
relative to the offer price than share-only IPOs on both the first trading day and the first trading
week. However, there are noticeable changes in magnitude and significance level of the
coefficients. On one hand, the issue size (ln (PROCEED)) does not have statistically significant
impact on the degree of underpricing when the first-day initial return (IRD2) is used as the
independent variable; whereas when the first-week initial return (IRW1) is used as the
alternative measure of underpricing, the coefficient on the Ln(PROCEED) variable becomes
significant at 10% level indicating that smaller issues are more underpriced. On the other hand,
a significant negative relationship was supported by the first-day initial underpricing (IRD2)
and the debt leverage of the issuing firm in the OLS regression in TABLE 3.9; however, the
DEBT/PPROCEED leverage ratio, despite having the same negative signs, become
insignificant  determinant  in  both  the  OLS  and  2SLS  regressions  when  the  first-week  initial
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returns (IRW1) is used as the alternative underpricing measure. Such differences are expected
since the first trading day normally involves high volatility in trading volume and therefore the
underpricing could be abnormally high (or low). Overall, the initial underpricing in the UK is a
common IPO feature shared by both unit and share-only IPOs. However, as the Agency Cost
hypothesis predicted, unit IPOs are significantly more underpriced than share-only IPOs.
Ordinary Least Square:
EQUATION 3.7
2-Stage Least Square:
Stage One:
EQUATION 3.8
Stage Two:
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3.5.6 Warrant characteristics and underpricing of unit IPOs
 3.5.6.1 Warrant characteristics
Warrants are included in over one-fifth of US IPOs (Schultz, 1993b) and in over one-third of
Australian  IPOs  (How  and  Howe,  2001).  In  the  unit  IPO  literature,  most  studies  debate  on
whether issuing firms include warrants to reduce agency costs (Schultz, 1993b) or to signal
firm value (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997). Yet, very few papers provide in depth
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discussion on the characteristics of the warrants attached in unit IPOs. These warrant
characteristics vary significantly across unit offerings (Garner and Marshall; 2005). Panel A
of TABLE 3.10 summarises the characteristics of warrants attached to unit  IPOs in the UK,
with their mean, median, maximum and minimum values and standard deviations. The
average LIFE of UK warrant is 4 years. The average warrant exercise price is £0.46
comparing to the average offer price of £0.44. The UK data provide support to Schultz
(1993b)’s prediction that warrant exercise price is set above the offer price. Such result is
confirmed by the average ratio of exercise price to offer price (PRATIO=1.25), implying UK
unit firms on average, have 4 years to arraign a 25% appreciation in its share price in order to
realise  the  additional  inflow  of  equity  capital  from  exercise  of  warrants.  A  PRATIO  higher
than 1 indicates that warrants are issued out-of-money, with their exercise price set above the
offer price. In other word, these warrants will have no value until the share price rise above
the warrant exercise price in the aftermarket. Consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis,
unit firms in the UK commonly set the warrant exercise price above the offer price of the unit
IPO. In order to trigger the exercise of warrants and materialise the second round of financing,
the management of the issuing firm will be motivated to increase the company’s share price.
On average 13.98 million warrants are issued along with a unit IPO in the UK, representing
54.08% of the new shares issued. In addition, the average firm value sold as warrants,
calculated as the proceeds from exercise of warrants divided by the market capitalisation at
offer price immediately after the unit IPO, is 15.02% in the UK.
As  illustrated  in  Panel  B  of  TABLE  3.10,  certain  warrant  characteristics  vary  significantly
across different unit offerings. 44.56% of the UK unit IPOs issued warrants whose exercise
period is equal to or longer than 5 years but only 9.78% of warrants’ life is less than a year.
Only 13.04% of these warrants are in fact issued in-the-money with immediate value after
issuance, whereas 32.61% of warrants have their exercise prices set above the offer price; but
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54.35% of the sample is issued on-the-money with equal exercise price and IPO offer price.
Interestingly, not all warrants have fixed exercise price for their entire life. In fact, more than
half  (56.52%) of  the  UK warrant  contracts  enclosed  a  provision  for  issuing  firms  to  reserve
the rights to change the warrant exercise price after issuance if certain criteria were met.21
Moreover,  before  the  expiration  26.09%  of  UK  warrants  are  callable  by  the  issuing  firms,
although the majority of the sample (73.91%) is not. The dummy variable CALLABLE is
motivated to take the value of 1 if the unit IPO have callable warrants attached, 0 if otherwise.
Later on, the CALLABLE dummy is included in regression analyses in relation to the
underpricing  of  unit  IPOs.  Last  but  not  least,  the  eventual  outcomes  of  the  warrants  are
classified. Only 16.30% of UK warrants are actually ‘exercised’, that is, the issuing firm
announced such action after issuance on their websites. 58.7% of the warrants are considered
‘lapsed’, with no announcement made about exercising the warrants before or at the
expiration date. Since the UK unit IPOs in my sample date up to the year 2007, by the time of
this research there are still 25% warrants outstanding with the potential to be either exercised
or lapse eventually.
INSERT TABLE 3.10 HERE
In TABLE 3.11, selected warrant features are compared across UK, Australia and the US.
Evidently,  warrants from different countries share some similar characteristics,  whilst  others
differ.  Firstly,  warrants  attached  to  unit  IPOs  in  both  Australian  (2.8  years)  and  the  UK  (4
years) are shorter lived than US warrants (5 years) on average, although UK warrants still
have longer exercise period than Australian counterparts. Secondly, in the US, warrants are
‘typically issued out of the money’ (Howe and Howe, 2001). Schultz (1993b) records that the
exercise price of warrants is on average 25% above the issue price. Whereas Australian
21 Due to limited availability of data at the time of this research, the ‘direction’ of the change in warrant exercise price is not
discussed in this thesis. A reduction and an increase in warrant exercise price are expected to have different effects. Future
research interests are welcome.
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warrants  are  commonly  issued  on  the  money  with  the  exercise  price  equal  to  the  IPO  offer
price. In the UK, the average ratio of warrant exercise price to IPO offer price is the same as
US figure (1.25). However, only 32.61% are issued strictly out of the money, whilst 54.35%
are issued on the money. The third feature in comparison is the share-per-warrant ratio, which
indicates  number  of  shares  per  warrant  in  a  unit.  In  both  Australia  and  the  US,  it  is  the
convention that a unit is combined with one new share and one warrant; whilst in the UK, a
unit  on  average  contain  two shares  and  one  warrant.  That  is  to  say,  for  every  two shares  an
investor subscribe there will be one warrant attached bearing the right to buy another share in
the future at exercise price. In addition, the ratio of warrant proceeds to IPO proceeds is also
compared across countries. Schultz (1993b) documents that in the US, the warrant proceeds
(if they were ever exercised) take up 75% of the IPO proceeds. How and Howe (2001) record
that the ratio of warrant proceeds to IPO proceeds in Australia is on average 58%. The UK
data indicate that the potential proceeds from exercise of warrants represent roughly 61% of
the IPO proceeds. Furthermore, Australian warrants are not callable at all but most US
warrants are (How and Howe, 2001). In my UK sample, 26.09% warrants are callable but the
majority is not. Last but not least, the inclusion of any embedded B-warrant is observed and
compared. In some unit IPOs, when the attached warrants are exercised, additional warrants,
i.e. the B-warrants will be automatically issued to warrant holders. As the statistics indicate,
in Australia and the UK, unit warrants rarely include embedded B-warrants but Schultz
(1993b) documents that approximately 25% of the warrants attached to US unit IPOs contain
B-warrants. Such provision creates a three-stage sequence of financing: the IPO proceeds, the
exercise of the A warrants, and the exercise of the B warrants. How and Howe (2001) explain
that  in  some  industries,  multiple  stages  of  financing  is  necessary.  For  instance,  the  IPO
proceeds can be used to support product development; the A warrant proceeds can be
materialised to fund test marketing; and if the production and marketing proved to be
successful, the B warrant can then be the third round of cash infusion to finance the full scare
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production and sales. The near absence of embedded B-warrants in Australia and the UK may
be due to the different investment opportunity set compared to what US firms are subject to.
INSERT TABLE 3.11 HERE
3.5.6.2 The underpricing of unit IPOs
The underpricing of the unit IPOs, measured by the HGSC-adjusted initial return on the first
trading day (IRD2), are tested separately in association of selected characteristics of the
issuing firms and the attached warrants. Four regressions using EQUATIONS 3.10 and the
subsets of its variables are reported in TABLE 3.12. Firm value sold as warrants (VALUE) is
calculated as warrant proceeds at exercise price divided by the enlarged capitalisation after
IPO. The LIFE of warrants is the number of years between warrants issuance and expiration.
As motivated in Hypothesis 3.16, the maturity of warrant is expected to be negatively related
to the underpricing of unit IPOs. PRATIO is included to proxy for the issuing firms’ choice of
exercise price comparing to the IPO offer price and is predicted to be negatively related to
initial returns of unit IPOs (Hypothesis 3.17). According to the Agency Cost hypothesis, I
would expect that most warrants to be issued out-of-money, to create incentive for
management to reduce agency cost and boost company’s share performance – because the
attached warrants as the second round of financing will only be exercised when the
company’s share price exceeds the warrant exercise price. Several dummy variables are
included: CALLABLE dummy is predicted to be positively related to IRD2,  in  test  of
Hypothesis 3.18, whilst REPUTATION and AIM dummy variables are included to control for
underwriters reputation (Hypothesis 3.4) and the listing locations (Hypothesis 3.15) of unit
IPOs, both of which are anticipated to be negatively related to the degree of underpricing. The
distribution of unit IPOs by year and industry in TABLE 3.3 indicate clear clustering in listing
year post 2000 and in the mining industry group. The industry-effect dummy MINING is
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therefore included to take the value of 1, if the underlying company belongs to the mining or
natural resources industry sector; 0 if otherwise. In mining industry, the outcome of
exploration and the performance of issuing firms largely depend on the location and existence
of natural resources. How and Howe (2001) stipulate that the mining firms typically own a
short-lived ‘exploration lease’, and the proceeds from the unit offering are used for a detailed
geological assessment of the field(s). If the field shows a sufficiently high concentration of
minerals, the firm will need additional financing soon after the IPO and the warrants will be
exercised. Otherwise, the warrants will be leave to. High volatility and risk are expected in
this sector of the IPO market. As result, to persuade investors to bear the extra risks involved
in mining industry, I expect IPOs issued by mining firms will be more underpriced than issues
from other industry sectors. The year-effect dummy POST2000 divides the sample period into
two groups. It is set to equal 1 if an IPO is issued during the period 2000-2006; 0 if an IPO is
issued during the period 1994-1999. Since both the Internet Bubble and the Bio-Tech Bubble
took place post 2000, I predict that IPOs issued during the sample period 2000-2006 will be
more underpriced than IPOs issued during the comparison period 1996-1999.
The results from the regressions are presented in TABLE 3.12. Regression 1 includes all the
variables; results indicate that the initial returns of unit IPOs significantly increase when the
issuing firms are riskier (RISK) with larger fraction of INSIDER holding prior to the listing.
In addition, unit IPOs with CALLABLE warrants attached are significantly more underpriced
on the first trading day than those with non-callable warrants attached. On the other hand, the
debt LEVERAGE of issuing firm prior to listing, firm VALUE sold as warrants, the
underwriter REPUTATION and the listing on AIM market are all negatively and significantly
related to the initial returns of unit IPOs on the first trading day. The coefficient on LIFE of
warrants is negative whereas the PRATIO of warrant exercise price to IPO offer price is
found to be positively related to the degree of underpricing. However, the coefficients of both
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variables are not statistically significant. The coefficients on MINING and POST2000
dummies are both positive but not significant in any regressions and therefore, the listing year
and industry effect do not theoretically affect the underpricing of unit IPOs.
In the second regression, I focus on variables that feature warrant characteristics. The firm
VALUE sold as warrants is negatively related to the initial returns of unit IPOs whilst the
callability of warrants (CALLABLE) is positively related to underpricing of unit IPOs. Both
estimates are significant at 5% level. Results imply that unit IPOs with higher firm value
assigned  to  warrants  are  less  underpriced  and  unit  IPOs  with  callable  warrants  attached  are
more  underpriced.  The  ratio  of  warrant  exercise  price  to  offer  price  (PRATIO)  and  warrant
LIFE remain insignificant at conventional levels.
Regression  3  tests  all  the  dummy  variables  in  relation  to  underpricing.  The  CALLABLE  is
positively related to the dependent variable whilst the REPUTATION and AIM dummy
variables are significantly negative. Such results imply that callable warrants result in higher
underpricing in unit IPOs whereas more prestigious underwriters and the listing on the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) are associated with less underpricing. On the other
hand, the mining-industry effect and the year of issues do not affect the underpricing of unit
IPOs significantly. Finally I group all the significant variables in Regression 4. Results
confirm that the significance level and the signs of the variables are robust. The Adjusted R2
are all relatively small for the regressions, which can be explained by the limited sample size.
However, all four regressions have significant F-statistics, which substantiates the robustness
of the tests results.
To further check for robustness of the regression, alternative underpricing measure IRW1 is
used as the dependent variable, which is HGSC-adjusted first-week initial return relative to
the IPO offer price. The robustness check using IRW1 as the dependent variable provides very
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similar evidence as the regressions using IRD2 with minor changes in the magnitude and
significance level of the coefficients, the results of which is presented in APPRENDIX II.
In conclusion, the linear regression analysis of underpricing for unit IPOs provide partial
support to both the Agency Cost hypothesis and bring forth several unique predictions of this
thesis. Firstly, consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis, unit firms tend to underprice the
new  shares  more  when  there  is  higher  level  of  insider  holding,  higher  firm  riskiness,  lesser
proportion of firm value sold as warrants22; and/or when the unit IPOs are issued by less
reputable underwriters. However, the mining-industry effect does not affect the degree of
underpricing in unit IPOs, which fail to support Schultz (1993b)’s prediction. Secondly, debt
leverage is found to be negatively and significantly related to the initial return on the first
trading day23, which is in line the first unique prediction of this thesis (Hypothesis 3.14).
Thirdly, AIM dummy is significantly negative; implying that unit IPOs listed on the
Alternative Investment Market is less underpriced than unit IPOs listed on the Official Listing,
which contradicts Hypothesis 3.15. Such outcome may be explained by the fact that unit IPO
firms, being smaller, riskier, and less profitable prior to listing, will encounter more
competitors with better quality on the Official Listing, which has stricter listing requirements
comparing to AIM. As a result, unit IPOs issued on the Official List will be more pressurised
to underprice their new shares in order to attract subscription interests. Furthermore, none of
the  warrant  LIFE  or  the  PRATIO  of  warrant  exercise  price  to  IPO  offer  price  significantly
affect the degree of underpricing in unit IPOs and therefore the UK data fail to support
predictions in Hypothesis 3.16 and 3.17. Last but not least, evidence is found that unit IPOs
with callable warrants attached are more underpriced than their non-callable counterparts,
which is consistent with Hypothesis 3.18 of this thesis.  The possibility of a warrant call  and
22 The firm VALUE sold as warrants is only marginally significant in the robustness test with alternative underpricing
measure IRW1 (APPENDIX II)
23 The LEVERAGE of unit firms prior to listing becomes only marginal significant in the robustness check when the
alternative underpricing measure (IRW1) is adopted (APPTENDIX II).
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the likely use of the exercise proceeds add further uncertainty to future involvement with the
issuing firm and increase the agency costs of managerial discretion, especially if the issuing
firm lacks good investment opportunities or has high debt capacity. Investors therefore,
consider a callable warrant less favourable concerning that the proceeds might be misapplied.
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3.5.7 Choice of offer type
To test the determining factors of firms’ decision to choose unit, I employ a probit model
(EQUATION 3.11) using the UNIT dummy as the dependent variable. The independent
variables are firm characteristics prior to the listing. In test of the previous findings that
smaller, younger, and riskier firms tend to choose unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs, the
variables of firm AGE, TANGIBLE asset, and firm riskiness are included in the probit
regressions. The Agency Cost hypothesis also argues that firms with lower insider ownership
and more agency problem include warrants to create monitoring incentives. The variable of
INSIDER ownership and the efficiency ratio of EBIT to total asset (EBIT/TTLASSET) are
therefore included as proxies for agency costs. In examination of the Signalling explanation
for including warrants, DELAY is included as measurement of asymmetry information. The
LEVERAGE of issuing firm prior to the listing is also adopted in test of Hypothesis 3.14 that
unit IPO firms have lower leverage than share-only IPO firms. Investigating whether the
industry effect and the listing location have any impact on the firms’ decision of offer type,
the MINING and AIM dummy are incorporated in the regression as well.
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Estimates of the probit regression and regressions that use subsets of the variables are
illustrated in TABLE 3.13 reporting the marginal effects24 of these variables on the choice of
offer type. The first column (Regression 1) presents variables in test of the common
predictions of both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses. Consistent with both
theories, firm size measured by the TANGIBLE asset is negatively related to the UNIT
dummy,  whilst  the  firm riskiness  is  positively  related  to  the  UNIT dummy.  Both  results  are
highly significant at 1% level. The marginal coefficients of these variables indicate that with
1% decrease in firm size and 1% increase in firm riskiness, the probability of firms choosing
unit IPOs will increase by 0.01% and 367.39%, respectively. It is apparent that firm riskiness
has much greater impact on the firms’ decision to issue unit IPOs than firm size has.
Unexpectedly, the age of firm is positively related to the UNIT dummy, indicating higher
chances of a unit offering to be issued among older firms. Despite being statistically
insignificant, such estimate is contrary to the previous findings of the US studies by both
Schultz (1993b) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) stating that unit firms tend to be
younger in age comparing to share-only IPOs. The same positive relationship between firm
age and underpricing is also found in linear regressions in this UK study (Section
3.5.5).Therefore, firm age is not necessarily the distinguishing factor that affects the choice to
issue unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs in the UK.
Regression 2 highlights predictions exclusively motivated by the Agency Cost hypothesis.
Results indicate that the fraction of insider holding (INSIDER) and the efficiency ratio of
EBIT to  total  assets  (EBIT/TTLASSET)  are  negatively  related  to  the  UNIT dummy and are
both  significant  at  10% level.  The  marginal  effects  of  these  variables  indicate  that  with  1%
decrease in insider holding and the efficiency ratio, the probability of a firm choosing to issue
unit IPO will increase by 10.89% and 1.70%, respectively. Schultz (1993b) also predicts that
24 STATA reports marginal effects for all predictors but not for the constant terms. Therefore, the intercepts of regressions presented in
TABLE 3.13 is estimated coefficients.
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mining firms are more likely to choose unit IPOs over share-only IPOs, which is confirmed
by the significantly positive coefficient on the MINING dummy in Regression 2. The
marginal effect of 1% increase in the probability of a firm being in the mining industry
increase the likelihood of unit IPO issuance by 19.42%.
Regression 3 focuses on testing the Signalling hypothesis. Firm RISK, INSIDER holding,
DEALY between prospectus publication and listing date are proxies for information
asymmetry in previous studies (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997; How and Howe, 2001, etc.).
Riskier firms with lower insider holding are expected to suffer higher information asymmetry;
these firms will tend to prolong the time lag between prospectus publication and the final
listing strategically to convey more information before the first sale of new shares. The
industry dummy MINING and the listing location dummy AIM are also included to reflect
level of information asymmetry. Being in mining industry and/or listed on AIM, implies
higher uncertainty in firm value and hence more difficult for public investors to assess.
Results from Regression 3 indicate that RISK, DELAY, MINING, and AIM are all positively
related to the UNIT dummy at 1% significance level; whereas INSIDER holding is negatively
and significantly  related  to  the  UNIT dummy at  5% level.  These  results  are  consistent  with
the  Signalling  predictions  that  firms  with  higher  level  of  information  asymmetry  are  more
likely to include warrants in IPOs as a signal of firm value.
Regression 4 examines any impact on issuing firms’ choice to include warrants, from the two
firm characteristic variables originally motivated from this thesis: the LEVERAGE of issuing
firm prior to the IPO, and the listing location dummy AIM. In Section 3.3.4, Hypothesis 3.14
and 3.15 are promoted to compare these two firm characteristics between unit IPOs and
share-only IPOs. Descriptive statistics in Section 3.5.2 provide evidence that unit IPO firms
tend to have statistically lower leverage prior to listing and are more concentrated on the
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Alternative Investment Market (AIM) than share-only IPO firms do. In Regression 4 these
two features of issuing firms are regressed against the choice of offer type, i.e. the UNIT
dummy. The MINING dummy variable is also included to control for any industry effect
since the distribution of unit IPOs by industry in TABLE 3.3 indicates clear clustering in the
mining industry group25. Results of Regression 4 illustrate that the listing location dummy
AIM is positively related to the UNIT dummy and the p-value is highly significant at 1%
level. Such result implies that 1% increase in the likelihood of issuing firms being listed on
AIM instead of the Official Listing can marginally increase the probability of these firms
choosing unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs by 21.96%. The coefficient on the industry
dummy  MINING  is  also  positive  and  significant  at  1%  level.  Despite  the  coefficient  on
LEVERAGE having a negative sign as Hypothesis 3.14 predicted, the marginal effect is not
significant at conventional level.
Regression 5 includes all the predictors of EQUATION 3.11 as robustness check for the
results of previous regressions. Consistent with the results from Regression 1–4, most
variables are significant except for LEVERAGE, which remains statistically insignificant.
Overall, the probit regressions support the following arguments: (1) Consistent with the
common predictions from both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses, the
probability of a firm choosing to issue unit IPOs (instead of share-only IPOs) increases when
the issuing firm is small  and risky. (2) Contrary to the results from US studies of unit  IPOs
(Schultz, 1993b; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), in the UK, the probability of firms
choosing to include warrants in fact increase with firm age, although not significantly. (3) In
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis, firms are more likely to include warrants in their IPOs
when the proportion of insider holding and the efficiency ratio of EBIT to total asset are low
(in other words, when the agency costs are high). (4) In line with the Signalling hypothesis,
25 The listing year dummy variable POST2000 is eliminated from the regression since the variable was not significant and
affects the overall quality of the model.
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having higher level of information asymmetry, indicated by higher firm riskiness, lower
insider holding, longer delay between prospectus publications and listing day, and being in the
mining  industry,  can  also  increase  the  probability  of  firms’  choosing  unit  IPOs.  (5)  The
likelihood of an issuing firm choosing unit IPOs increases when the debt leverage in the firm
prior to the IPO is low. However, this prediction is not statistically supported in the probit
regression. (6) IPO firms listed on AIM are more likely to choose unit IPOs over share-only
IPOs comparing to IPO firms listed on the Official Listing.
INSERT TABLE 3.13 HERE
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has investigated the characteristics of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994
and  2006;  and  analysed,  theoretically  and  empirically,  the  short-term  economic  effects  of  a
dual share-warrant financing strategy through unit IPOs and the reasons that might affect
firms’ decisions to choose unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. Two competing hypotheses
about the inclusion of warrants in IPOs, namely the Agency Cost and the Signalling
hypotheses, are tested with a short-term focus by examining the initial returns (for both the
first trading day and first trading week) and short-term after-market performance of a sample
of UK unit IPOs in comparison to share-only IPOs.
Common predictions from both the Agency Cost and Signalling hypotheses are examined
with UK data. As shown in Panel A of TABLE 3.14, the UK data support the predictions that
unit  firms are smaller and riskier than share-only IPO firms. However,  unit  firms in the UK
are not necessarily younger than share-only IPO firms. Predictions exclusively proposed by
Schultz (1993b) are tested and the results are presented in Panel B of TABLE 3.14. In the UK,
unit firms suffer more agency cost measured by efficient ratios; and they are less profitable
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with less income and less asset prior to the unit IPOs. However, contrary to Agency Cost
hypothesis’ prediction, in the UK, unit firms actually appear to be older than their share-only
counterparts; and do not have significantly smaller insider holding than share-only IPO firms.
Furthermore, UK data also indicate that unit IPOs tend to issue smaller proceeds and are more
likely to be marketed by less reputable underwriters. The package of equity and warrants as a
whole is more underpriced than share-only IPOs. Unit IPOs experience significantly higher
initial returns relative to IPO offer price both on the first day of trading and for the first
trading week. Overall, Schultz (1993b)’s Agency Cost hypothesis is partially supported by
UK data with exceptions of the age and insider holding of the firms.
Arguments of the Signalling hypothesis proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri(1997) are
tested and results illustrated in Panel C of Table 3.14. Both the residual standard deviations of
stock prices and the time delay between the prospectus publication and the IPO listing day are
employed to proxy for the level of information asymmetry. The results indicate that unit firms
in the UK present significantly higher levels of information asymmetry than share-only IPO
firms, which implies that unit firms have strong incentives to include warrants as a signalling
mechanism to convey information about firm value to public investors. The regression
analyses in this chapter also confirm that the degree of initial underpricing and the proportion
of firm value sold as warrants are both positively and significantly related to firm riskiness.
To supplement the existing literature on unit IPOs with UK evidence, I contribute a number of
original predictions, the results of which are displayed in Panel D of TABLE 3.14. Firstly, the
UK data support Hypothesis 3.14 that unit firms have lower leverage than share-only IPO
firms prior to listing, which implies that having low debt component in their capital structure
may encourage firms to add warrants in their IPOs to as additional financing. Secondly, unit
IPOs listed on AIM market are found to be significantly less underpriced than those listed on
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the Official Listing. As a result, Hypothesis 3.15 is rejected. A final contribution of this
chapter is the examination of warrant characteristics in relation to the short-term performance
of unit IPO firms. In the UK, warrant exercise prices are commonly set above the offer price
of the IPO, since the average PRATIO of warrant exercise price to IPO offer price is higher
than one. If warrants can only be exercised when the share price exceeds warrant exercise
price, then setting the warrant exercise price above the IPO offer price can serve as an
incentive mechanism to motivate managers to spend the IPO proceeds carefully to reveal true
value of the firm. This finding is consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis. I also examine
whether the maturity and call-ability of warrants have any impact on the initial underpricing
of the unit IPO firms. Evidence was found that unit IPOs with callable warrants attached are
significantly more underpriced than IPOs combined with non-callable warrants. Investors
negatively consider the warrant calls as further uncertainty in their future involvement of the
issuing firms (Hypothesis 3.18 cannot be rejected). However, the UK data does not support
any significant relation between warrant maturity and the degree of underpricing and
therefore Hypothesis 3.16 is rejected. Whether they affect unit firms’ performance in median–
to long-term is further investigated in CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5.
INSERT TABLE 3.14 HERE
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TABLES
TABLE 3.1
Definition of variables
Variables Definition
AGE Number of calendar days between firm incorporation and the listing date
AIM Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is listed on Alternative Investment Market (AIM),
0 if otherwise
ASSET/PROCEED The ratio of total assets divided by the gross proceeds from IPO
BHARn n-day buy-and-hold returns post-listing, excluding the first day of trading
CALLABLE Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if attached warrants are callable before expiration, 0 if otherwise
DEBT/PROCEED The ratio of total debt divided by the gross IPO proceeds
DELAY Number of calendar days between the registrations of prospectus and commence of the trading
EBIT Earnings before interests and taxes of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
EBIT/TTLASSET Ratio of earning before interests and taxes to total asset by the end of the year prior to the IPO
EXPENSE Percentage total expense to gross proceeds of the IPOs
INSIDER Percentage of directors’ holdings in their own company immediately after the listing
IRD1 Discrete raw initial return on first trading day (EQUATION 3.1)
IRD2 HGSC-adjusted initial return on the first trading day (EQUATION 3.2)
IRD3 The continuously compounded HGSC-adjusted initial return (EQUATION 3.3)
IRW1 HGSC Index-adjusted weekly initial returns for the first trading week (EQUATION 3.4)
IRW2 The continuously compounded HGSC-adjusted weekly initial return for the first trading week
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt to total asset by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
LIFE Number of years before warrant expiration
Ln(PROCEED) The natural logarithm of the expected gross proceeds from the IPO
MKTCAP Market capitalisation of the issued share capital following the listing at the placing price
MKT2BK Market-to-book ratio of IPO firms immediately post-listing
NI Net income after taxes by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
NI/TTLASSET Ratio of net income to total asset by the end of the year prior to the IPO
NUMBER Number of warrants included in the unit IPOs
PRATIO The ratio of warrant exercise price to the offer price
PROCEEDS The expected gross proceeds of the IPOs
REPUTATION Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the underwriter has a high reputation ranking
REV/TTLASSET Ratio of total revenue to total asset by the end of the year prior to the IPO
REV/PROCEED The ratio of total revenue divided by the gross proceeds from IPO
RISK Firm riskiness, measured by the residual standard deviations of the discrete share return 200 days
following the IPO
TANGIBLE The tangible asset of the sample firms by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
TTLASSET Total assets of the sample firms by end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
TTLREVENUE Total revenue of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
UNIT Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO include warrants, 0 if otherwise
VALUE Firm value sold as warrants calculated as warrant proceeds as percentage of  firm market
capitalisation after IPO
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TABLE 3.2
Criteria for sample selection
Original sample Unit(216)
Share-only
(385)
All IPOs
(601)
Less: Investment Trusts and funds -96 -2 -98
Less: Warrants attached to Rights issues -6 -0 -6
Less: Real Estate Holding & Development -20 -10 -30
Less: Firms that cannot be matched to DataStream -22 -7 -29
Less: Cross-listings from other exchanges -6 -0 -6
Less: IPOs with missing data and pure Introduction IPOs26 -19 -8 -27
Final sample 92 258 350
26 Some IPOs are pure Introduction or Admission to the Official Listing or Alternative Investment Market, without the sale
of any new shares. Such IPOs are excluded from this study.
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TABLE 3.3:
Distribution of IPOs by Year, Trading Location, Issue method and Industry
Unit IPOs (92) Share-only IPOs (258) Total (350)
N % N % N %
A. By year of listing
1994-1995 6 6.52% 43 16.67% 49 14%
1996-1999 21 22.83% 75 29.07% 96 27.43%
2000-2003 27 29.35% 68 26.36% 95 27.14%
2004-2006 38 41.30% 72 27.91% 110 31.43%
B. By trading location
Official Listing 11 11.96% 86 33.33% 97 27.71%
AIM 81 88.04% 172 66.67% 253 72.29%
C. By issue method
Placing 75 81.52% 213 82.56% 288 82.29%
Offer 4 4.35% 14 5.42% 18 5.14%
Placing and Offer 13 14.13% 31 12.02% 44 12.57%
D. By industry Group
Mining27 31 33.70% 43 16.67% 74 21.14%
IT & Hi-Tech28 12 13.04% 54 20.93% 66 18.86%
Healthcare&
Pharmaceuticals29 9 9.78% 28 10.85% 37 10.57%
Support Service30 22 23.91% 71 27.52% 93 26.57%
General retail31 9 9.78% 34 13.18% 43 12.29%
General Industrials32 6 6.52% 25 9.69% 31 8.86%
Others 3 3.26% 3 3.26% 6 1.71%
*The share-only sample has not been matched at this stage for general comparison reason.
27 Mining industry groups include: general mining, oil and gas producers and oil equipments, resources and energy
companies
28 IT & Hi-Tech industry groups include: software & computer development and service firms, other high technology
businesses and fixed-line communication and telecommunication firms.
29  Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals industry groups include: healthcare equipment & services, pharmaceuticals &
biotechnology firms
30 Support services industry groups include: media, publishing & marketing services, general financial services and other
business support services.
31 General retail industry groups include: food& drug, personal goods, household goods, beverage & wine, travel & leisure
businesses.
32 General industrials industry groups include: automobiles & parts, constructions & materials, industrial engineering,
industrial metals, industrial transportation and technology hardware & equipments, electronic & electrical equipments
businesses.
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 TABLE 3.4
Firm characteristics by quartiles
Two measures are calculated to proxy for firm size: Market capitalisation is computed as the product of
total shares outstanding immediately after the IPOs and the offer price. Total asset is collected from the
balance sheet prior to the IPOs. Profitability is measured by gross sales and net income (NI) after tax and
interests.  Both  figures  are  also  collected  from  the  balance  sheet  prior  to  the  IPO.  Issue  size  of  IPOs  is
measured by the expected gross proceed of the IPO, which is the product of number of new shares being
offered and the offer price.
(£000) Unit Share-only Total
A: Firm Size
Market capitalisation
Mean 23,618 49,330 42,492
1st Quartile 5,017 10,006 7,600
Median 10,053 25,155 20,111
3rd Quartile 26,918 49,729 43,260
Total Asset
Mean 5,325 15,674 12,954
1st Quartile 279 935 635
Median 1,058 2,807 2,270
3rd Quartile 3,277 11,453 8,612
B: Profitability
Sales
Mean 5,462 20,386 16,463
1st Quartile 0 141 2
Median 69 3,035 2,041
3rd Quartile 3,739 14,871 11,741
NI
Mean -380 496 265
1st Quartile -251 -285 -280
Median -6 29 0
3rd Quartile 98 658 400
C: Issue size
Gross Proceeds
Mean 6,581 16,606 13,971
1st Quartile 1,323 2,750 2,156
Median 2,950 7,000 5,156
3rd Quartile 5,646 18,090 15,000
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TABLE 3.5
Differences in firm characteristics for Unit IPOs and Share-only IPOs
The firm characteristics of the 92 unit IPOs are compared to their matching share-only counterparts. The AGE of
firm is calculated as the calendar days between firm incorporation and the listing date. MKTCAP is the market
capitalisation of the issued share capital following the listing at the offer price. TTLASSET is the total asset of
the  sample  firms  by  end  of  the  fiscal  year  prior  to  the  IPO.  The  RISK  of  the  issuing  firm  is  measured  as  the
residual standard deviations of the discrete share return 200 days following the IPO. TTLREVENUE is collected
by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO. The INSIDER ownership is calculated as the percentage of
directors’ holdings in their own company immediately after the listing; executive options are also included in the
holding. PROCEEDS represent the issue size of the offerings, i.e. the expected gross proceeds of the IPOs.
EXPENSE defines the total expense of the IPOs. LEVERAGE is measure by the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The means and medians, minimum and maximum values are presented with standard deviations. A paired
t-test is conducted in testing any differences between means whilst the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test are
undertaken to indicate differences in medians. The Pearson moment correlation coefficients between each pair of
variables are calculated to measure degree of linear relationship between the two variables. The p-value of a two
tailed hypothesis test of the correlation coefficient being zero is also presented in brackets.
Unit IPOs
 ( N=92)
Share-only IPOs
(N=92)
Correlation
Coefficient
p-values from
 t-test or MV test
AGE (Days) Mean 3,229 1,249 0.14 0.032b
Median 387 255.500 (0.184) 0.081b
Min 11 17
Max 50,541 24,512
St.Dev 8,612 3,091
MKTCAP(£m) Mean 23.617 31.578 0.168 0.001a
Median 10.053 14.847 (0.110) 0.091b
Min 0.304 0.008
Max 10.053 329.755
St.Dev 38.180 49.465
TTLASSET (£m) Mean 5.535 9.772 -0.032 0.153
Median 1.174 2.155 (0.761) 0.012a
Min 0.025 0.050
Max 142.009 179.812
St.Dev 17.328 23.276
RISK Mean 0.045 0.036 0.263 0.001a
Median 0.039 0.033 (0.311) 0.002a
Min 0.003 0.003
Max 0.106 0.120
St.Dev 0.020 0.020
INSIDER (%) Mean 35.430 38.880 -0.057 0.688
Median 33.570 38.830 (0.589) 0.633
Min 0.350 0.240
Max 90.900 89.900
St.Dev 0.1952 0.2133
TTLREVENUE (£m) Mean 5.462 10.648 -0.051 0.056b
Median 0.068 10.215 (0.629) 0.034b
Min 0.000 0.000
Max 97.280 374.100
St.Dev 13.832 40.525
PROCEEDS (£m) Mean 6.581 12.755 0.091 0.027b
Median 2.950 5.000 (0.388) 0.003a
Min 0.168 0.300
Max 100.000 209.789
St.Dev 13.204 25.853
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(Continued) Unit IPOs
 ( N=92)
Share-only IPOs
(N=92)
Correlation
Coefficient
p-values from
 t-test & MV test
EXPENSE (%) Mean 17.760 20.767 0.047 0.005a
Median 16.150 16.19 (0.658) 0.019a
Min 1.500 0.460
Max 52.950 96.800
St.Dev 0.1059 0.1652
LEVERAGE Mean 0.473 0.889 -0.023 0.001a
Median 0.343 0.662 (0.830) 0.000a
Min 0.000 0.000
Max 2.346 7.814
St.Dev 0.495 1.062
* Share-only IPOs in this table represent the portfolio of 92 matching firms matched by issue years, market capitalisation and industries.
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TABLE 3.6
Direct Tests of the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses
Three Efficiency Ratios are calculated as the measurements of agency cost: the ratio of revenue to total asset
(REV/TTLASSET), the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total asset (EBIT/TTLASSET) and the ratio
of net income to total asset (NI/TTLASSET). The mean and median value of each ratio for both unit IPOs and
matching share-only IPOs are illustrated with their standard error in brackets. To measure information
asymmetry, the residual standard deviation (Std.Dev) of the sample firms are estimated using daily data for the
200 days after the listing, excluding the initial return. Another proxy for the level of information asymmetry is
the time lag as number of calendar days between registration of firm prospectus and the day of listing The
means and medians, minimum and maximum values are presented with standard deviations. A student
t-test is conducted to examine difference in means, and the non-parametric Mann- Whitney test is
conducted to test for difference in medians. The p-values of both tests are presented to indicate significance
level. The Pearson moment correlation coefficients between each pair of variables are calculated to
measure degree of linear relationship between the two variables. The p-value of a two tailed hypothesis test
of the correlation coefficient being zero is also presented in brackets.
Variables Unit IPOs
(N=92)
Matching
Share-only IPOs
(N=92)
Correlation
Coefficients
t-test &
MV test
A. Efficiency Ratios
REV/TTLASSET Mean 0.991 1.148 -0.075 0.045b
Median 0.059 0.444 (0.478) 0.090c
Min 0.000 0.000
Max 8.684 10.811
Std. Dev 1.550 1.852
EBIT/TTLASSET Mean -0.385 0.165 0.021 0.052b
Median 0.000 0.046 (0.844) 0.080c
Min -20.640 -2.9103
Max 2.750 2.702
Std. Dev 2.577 0.771
NI/TTLASSET Mean -0.604 -0.3469 -0.068 0.361
Median -0.009 -0.0235 (0.523) 0.481
Min -20.640 -5.727
Max 3.348 3.408
Std. Dev 2.514 0.885
B. Information Asymmetry
RISK Mean 0.045 0.036 0.263 0.001a
Median 0.039 0.033 (0.311) 0.002a
Min 0.003 0.003
Max 0.106 0.120
Std. Dev 0.020 0.020
DELAY (Days) Mean 12.960 10.413 -0.026 0.101c
Median 7.000 7.000 (0.804) 0.158d
Min 2.000 2.000
Max 60.000 57.000
Std. Dev 11.150 9.349
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TABLE 3.7
Initial underpricing of unit IPOs and matching share-only IPOs
Panel A illustrates the mean, median, minimum, and maximum values of the initial returns for the first trading day (IRD) and first trading week (IRW), respectively,
for 92 unit IPOs and 92 share-only IPOs matched on firm size and industry. IRD1, is the raw initial returns on the first trading day, calculated as (P1/P0)-1, whereas
IRD2 is the HGSC index-adjusted initial returns on the first trading day, calculated as [(P1/P0)-1] - [(HGSC1/HGSC0)-1]. IRD3, is the continuously compounded log
initial return on the first trading day, IRD3=Ln (1+IRD2). IRW1 is the HGSC index-adjusted weekly initial return for the first trading week, calculated as [(P5/P0)-1] -
[(HGSC5/HGSC0)-1]; whilst IRW2 is the continuously compounded weekly initial return, IRW2=Ln (1+IRW1). P0 is the IPO offer price assigned to the closing date of
the subscription period. P1 and P5 are the closing share prices at the end of first and fifth trading days post-listing. HGSC0, HGSC1, and HGSC5 are the HGSC Index
prices on the same dates corresponding to P0, P1, and P5 for each IPO sample. Panel B exhibits the same measures of initial underpricing after controlling for outliers
by eliminating the top-5 and bottom-5 extreme values from each sample. The trimmed means, medians and the minimum, maximum values of the trimmed data are
presented accordingly. In both panel, the differences in means are examined by paired Student’s t-test, whist differences in medians are examined by non-parametric
Mann-Whitney tests, the p-values of both procedures are presented to indicate significance levels (subscripts a,b,c, represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively)
Panel A: Initial underpricing for the first trading day (IRD) and first trading week (IRW) before excluding outliers (N=92)
IRD1 (Raw) IRD2 (HGSC) IRD3=Ln (1+IRD2) IRW1(HGSC) IRW2=Ln (1+IRW1)
Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match
Mean 0.5102 0.0755 0.5089 0.0756 0.3408 0.0322 0.4709 0.1758 0.3080 0.1769
(t-Test) (0.000)a (0.001)a (0.000)a (0.002)a (0.033)b
Median 0.2500 0.0503 0.2476 0.0494 0.2212 0.0482 0.2159 0.1019 0.1955 0.1090
(MW Test) (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.002)a (0.003)a (0.003)a
Min -0.0033 -0.8000 -0.0033 -0.8052 -0.0033 -1.6360 -0.1463 -0.8312 -0.1581 -1.7789
Max 4.3125 1.3000 4.3079 1.2995 1.6692 0.8327 4.4234 2.1086 1.6907 1.1342
(Std.Dev) (0.726) (0.290) (0.725) (0.290) (0.339) (0.311) (0.755) (0.416) (0.353) (0.371)
Panel B: Initial underpricing for the first trading day (IRD) and first trading week (IRW) after excluding outliers (N=82)
IRD1 (Raw) IRD2 (HGSC) IRD3=Ln (1+IRD2) IRW1(HGSC) IRW2=Ln (1+IRW1)
Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match
Trimmed Mean 0.3924 0.0655 0.3914 0.0671 0.2996 0.0522 0.3461 0.1444 0.2644 0.1195
(t-Test) (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
Trimmed Median 0.2500 0.0503 0.2476 0.0494 0.2212 0.0482 0.2159 0.1090 0.1955 0.1034
(MW Test) (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
Min 0.0400 -0.3846 0.0390 -0.3831 0.0382 -0.4831 -0.0057 -0.3476 -0.0057 -0.4272
Max 1.8333 0.3976 1.8360 0.3976 1.0424 0.3347 1.9554 0.9406 1.0836 0.6630
(Std.Dev) (0.390) (0.143) (0.391) (0.142) (0.236) (0.143) (0.399) (0.207) (0.242) (0.176)
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TABLE 3.8
Short-term after-market performance of unit IPOs and matching share-only IPOs
Panel A presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum values of the HGSC Index-adjusted after-market buy-and-hold returns (BHARn) for 92 unit IPOs and 92
share-only IPOs matched on firm size and industry, respectively, excluding the initial returns on the first trading day (n= 2, 7, 14, and 21 days). Panel B exhibits the
trimmed means and medians of BHARs for the same intervals after eliminating the top-5 and bottom-5 extreme outliers out of the original sample. The differences in
means are examined by Student’s t-test, whist differences in medians are examined by non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests, the p-value of which are presented to
indicate significance levels (subscripts a,b,c, represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
Panel A: Short-term after-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns before excluding outliers (N=92)
BHAR2 BHAR7 BHAR14 BHAR21
Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match
Mean 0.0920 0.0349 0.0906 0.0346 0.0906 0.0413 0.0761 0.0373
(t-Test) (0.042)b (0.039)b (0.213) (0.370)
Median 0.0311 0.0005 0.0355 0.0038 0.0532 -0.0034 0.0254 -0.0077
(MW Test) (0.004)a (0.033)b (0.012)a (0.098)c
Min -0.3243 -0.2333 -0.3097 -0.3269 -0.3685 -0.2999 -0.4088 -0.2576
Max 0.7438 1.4501 0.9890 1.3548 1.1734 2.0159 1.7439 2.2084
(Std.Dev) (0.182) (0.180) (0.203) (0.187) (0.230) (0.266) (0.274) (0.277)
Panel B: Short-term after-market buy-and-hold abnormal returns after excluding outliers (N=82)
BHAR2 BHAR7 BHAR14 BHAR21
Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match Unit Match
Trimmed Mean 0.0787 0.0129 0.0824 0.0188 0.0746 0.0075 0.0536 0.0039
(t-Test) (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a (0.000)a
Trimmed Median 0.0311 0.0005 0.0355 0.0038 0.0532 -0.0034 0.0254 -0.0077
(MW Test) (0.001)a (0.015)b (0.003)a (0.046)b
Min -0.1242 -0.0985 -0.1063 -0.1608 -0.2067 -0.1486 -0.2195 -0.1713
Max 0.4080 0.2243 0.4363 0.2730 0.4817 0.3468 0.4766 0.3286
(Std.Dev) (0.123) (0.062) (0.138) (0.085) (0.144) (0.095) (0.144) (0.107)
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TABLE 3.9
Determinants of underpricing and offer types
Panel A illustrates results from the Ordinary Least Square regression (EQUATION 3.7) on the determinants of
underpricing examining 258share-only IPOs and 92 unit IPOs issued during the period of 1994-2006. The
dependent variable is the HGSC-adjusted first-day initial return relative to the offer price (IRD2). Due to limited
sample size of the unit IPO sample, Panel B exhibits results from the Two-staged Least Square Regressions as
robustness check for omitted variable problem (EQUATION 3.8-3.9). The offer type dummy UNIT is selected
as the instrumented variable in the first-stage regression. The instruments include: insider holding (INSIDER),
firm riskiness (RISK), time lag between Prospectus publication and listing (DELAY), MINING industry dummy,
POST2000 listing year dummy, firm AGE, total asset (TTLASSET), total debt (TTLDEBT), and net income (NI)
of issuing firms prior to the IPOs, all of which are potential factors that might affect a firm’s decision to choose
unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs. In Stage two regressions, underpricing (IRD2) is the dependent variable,
defined as the HGSC-adjusted initial return relative to IPO offer price on the first trading day. The instrumented
offer-type dummy (Noted as Inst.UNIT) and other motivated factors are then included in the second stage
regressions to test for any relationship between the degree of underpricing and the offer type of the IPOs.
Numbers in parentheses are the p-values of coefficients to indicate significance level. Regression 1 includes
ALL variables in discussion, whereas Regression 2 and 3 respectively include variables on the ‘profitability’ and
‘leverage’ of the underlying IPO firms prior to listing. Regression 4 highlights the characteristics of the offering
at the time of the IPO. Regression 5 summarise variables, which remain significant in all the previous
regressions. Definitions of variables refer to TABLE3.1. a, b, and c: Significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%,
and 10% level respectively
Panel A: OLS regressions on determinants of underpricing and offer type (N=350)
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N=350 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept -0.3052
(0.281)
-0.2053
(0.000)a
-0.1966
(0.000)a
-0.2470
(0.193)
-0.2134
(0.000)a
UNIT 0.3192
(0.000)a
0.3295
(0.000)a
0.3424
(0.000)a
0.3559
(0.000)a
0.3306
(0.000)a
ASSET/PROCEED -0.0135
(0.100)c
-0.0040
(0.070)c
-0.0140
(0.091)c
REV/PROCEED -0.0091
(0.019)b
-0.0067
(0.006)a
-0.0089
(0.021)b
DEBT/PROCEED -0.1351
(0.104)c
-0.0145
(0.086)c
-0.0145
(0.085)c
MKT2BK -0.0002
(0.228)
-0.0002
(0.205)
-0.0002
(0.174)
-0.0002
(0.124)
Ln(PROCEED) -0.0087
(0.610)
-0.0131
(0.477)
REPUTATION -0.0641
(0.107)c
-0.0267
(0.104)c
-0.0325
(0.051)b
Adjusted R2 26.44% 26.96% 26.36% 25.22% 26.98%
F-statistic 16.68
(0.000)a
13.21
(0.000)a
15.99
(0.000)a
12.54
(0.000)a
12.49
(0.000)a
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(Continued)
Panel B: 2SLS regressions on determinants of underpricing and offer type
Stage One:
Stage Two:
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N=350 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept -0.4054
(0.249)
-0.0724
(0.052)b
-0.0646
(0.084)c
-0.4252
(0.235)
-0.1029
(0.028)b
Inst.UNIT 0.8925
(0.000)a
0.8634
(0.000)a
0.8633
(0.000)a
0.9144
(0.000)a
0.9066
(0.000)a
ASSET/PROCEED -0.0190
(0.039)b
-0.0105
(0.047)b
-0.0200
(0.030)b
REV/PROCEED -0.0070
(0.105)c
-0.0043
(0.102)c
-0.0071
(0.101)c
DEBT/PROCEED -0.0196
(0.134)
-0.0189
(0.146)
MKT2BK -0.0004
(0.035)b
-0.0004
(0.037)b
-0.0005
(0.030)b
-0.0005
(0.025)b
-0.0004
(0.033)b
Ln(PROCEED) -0.0200
(0.355)
-0.0216
(0.325)
REPUTATION -0.0904
(0.064)c
-0.0858
(0.101)c
-0.1094
(0.098)c
Adjusted R2 9.89% 9.27% 9.81% 9.56% 10.16%
F-statistic 6.52
(0.000)a
4.86
(0.001)a
6.26
(0.000)a
5.58
(0.000)a
8.92
(0.000)a
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TABLE 3.10
UK Warrant characteristics in Unit IPOs
In Panel A, the mean, median, maximum, and minimum values of several warrant
characteristics with standard deviations are presented for the 92 UK unit IPO sample issued
between the year 1994 and 2006. Panel B exhibits the distribution of the length of warrant life,
the ratio of warrant exercise price to offer price (PRATIO), the possibility of any CHANGE
in the warrant exercise price before expiration, the callability of warrants before expiration
and finally the potential outcome of warrant contracts.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Characteristics Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev
Exercise price (￡) 0.46 0.20 5.00 0.01 0.7390
PRATIO 1.25 1.00 12.50 0.08 1.3342
NUMBER (m) 13.98 5.13 285.70 0.06 31.7938
VALUE (%) 15.02 9.83 112.38 0.03 0.1905
LIFE(years) 4.00 4.10 10.00 0.21 2.2915
Panel B: Distribution of warrant characteristics
Category Number Percentage
B1. Length of warrant life
<1 year 9 9.78%
2 years 13 14.13%
3 years 21 22.83%
4 years 8 8.70%
> 5 years 41 44.56%
B2. Ratio of exercise price to IPO price (PRATIO)
Exercise price < IPO price ( In-the-money; PRATIO < 1) 12 13.04%
Exercise price = offer price (On-the-money; PRATIO=1) 50 54.35%
Exercise price > offer price (Out-of-money; PRATIO >1) 30 32.61%
B3. Change of warrant exercise price after issuance
 With provision 52 56.52%
 Without provision 40 43.48%
B4. Callability of warrants before expiration
 With provision 24 26.09%
 Without provision 68 73.91%
B.5 Outcome of warrants
 Exercised 15 16.30%
 Lapsed 54 58.70%
Outstanding 23 25.00%
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TABLE 3.11
Comparison of warrant characteristics across countries
Warrant characteristics are compared across UK, Australian and the US. LIFE of warrant is
the average number of years between the issuance and expiration of warrant contracts.
PRATIO is  the  ratio  of  warrant  exercise  price  to  the  offer  price  of  the  unit  IPO.  Shares  per
warrant, is the median number of shares per warrant in a unit. CALLABLE indicate whether
the  unit  IPO prospectus  contain  a  provision  for  the  unit  firm to  reserve  the  right  to  call  the
warrants before expiration date. B-WARRANT examines whether the warrant agreements
include any embedded B-warrants.
Characteristics UK Australia US
LIFE 4.00 2.80 5.00
PRATIO 1.25 1.00 1.25
Share per warrant 2.00 1.00 1.00
Ratio of warrant proceed to IPO proceed 61% 58% 75%
CALLABLE 26.09% Not callable Mostly
B-WARRANT Rarely Rarely 25%
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TABLE 3.12
Regressions of unit IPO underpricing and warrant characteristics
Linear Square Regressions are estimated for a sample 88 unit IPOs after excluding 4 outliers identified by
Cook’s Distance33. The first-day initial underpricing (IRD2) is the dependent variable in regressions.
Regression 1 include ALL the motivated variables. Regression 2 hightlight warrant characteristic variables.
Regression 3 focus on all the dummy variables and Regression 4 confirms all the significant variables from
previous regressions. The p-values of coefficients are reported in parentheses to demonstrate level of
significance. INSIDER is the percentage managerial holding in the issuing firm. RISK of firm is calculated
as the residual standard deviations of the share prices 200 days post-listing. EXPENSE is the total cost of
IPOs as percentage of expected gross proceeds. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total asset one year
prior to the IPO. PRATIO is the ratio of warrant exercise price to the offer price, PRATIO>1 indicates
warrants are issued out-of-money, whereas PRATIO<1 imply that warrants are issued in-the-money.
VALUE is the firm value sold as warrants, calculated as the potential warrant proceeds at exercise price as
percentage of unit firms’ market capitalisation at offer price immediately post-listing. LIFE is computed as
the number of years from the issuance of warrants until expiration. CALLABLE takes the value of 1 if the
warrants attached in the unit IPO are callable before expiration, 0 if the warrants are still outstanding or
lapsed.  REPUTATION is  set  to  the  value  of  1  if  unit  IPOs  are  marketed  by  reputable  underwriters,  0  if
otherwise. AIM is equal to 1 if unit firms are listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 0 if
otherwise.  MINING is set  to be 1 if  the unit  firm is from the mining industry,  0 if  otherwise.  POST2000
takes the value of 1 if the unit IPO is issued during the sample period 2000-2006, 0 if during the sample
period 1996-1999.
N=88
(After excluding 4 outliers)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 0.2370
(0.487)
0.4267
(0.016)b
1.0755
(0.000)a
0.1433
(0.634)
INSIDER 0.7049
(0.050)b
0.6929
(0.050)b
RISK 2.1241
(0.024)b
2.9574
(0.010)a
LEVERAGE -0.2874
(0.043)b
-0.2927
(0.035)c
PRATIO 0.0448
(0.405)
0.0646
(0.261)
VALUE -0.4596
(0.053)b
-0.5403
(0.038)b
-0.4714
(0.099)c
LIFE -0.0115
(0.709)
-0.0069
(0.832)
CALLABLE 0.3737
(0.019)b
0.3596
(0.039)b
0.3323
(0.040)b
0.3304
(0.030)b
REPUTATION -0.6063
(0.002)a
-0.5251
(0.005)a
-0.5671
(0.002)a
AIM -0.3846
(0.053)b
-0.5039
(0.012)a
-0.4172
(0.025)b
MINING 0.1601
(0.304)
 0.2161
 (0.158)
POST2000 0.0560
(0.731)
0.1171
 (0.471)
F-statistic 4.21
(0.001)a
3.51
(0.003)a
4.38
(0.001)a
5.28
(0.000)a
Adjusted R2 32.83% 10.16% 20.47% 30.79%
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (two-tailed test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (two-tailed test).
         c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tailed test).
33 Four influential observations with both high Cook’s Distance level and Leverage value higher than 0.42 (3p/n, where p is the number of
model terms including constant; n is the number of observations) are identified. After removing these outliers the model improved
significantly in terms of significant level and goodness of fit and hence these 4 outliers are excluded and the number of observation for
TABLE 3.12 N=88.
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TABLE 3.13
Probit Regressions of the probability that firms choose to include warrants in IPOs
Probit regressions are estimated for a sample of 258 share-only IPOs and 92 unit IPOs issued between the years 1994-2006. The offer type dummy UNIT is the dependent variable
in each regression. Regression 1 tests the common predictions from both the Agency and Signalling hypotheses, whereas Regression 2 and 3 test each hypothesis’ unique
predictions, respectively. Regression 4 highlights the original predictions from this thesis whilst Regression 5 includes all the motivated predictors. Coefficients are presented after
accounting for marginal effects. AGE is the number of days between firm incorporation day and the IPO admission day. TANGIBLE is the tangible asset of issuing firms prior to
the IPOs. RISK is firm riskiness calculated as the residual standard deviations of firm’s stock prices 200 days post-listing. INSIDER is the fraction of insider holding before listing.
EBIT/ASSET is the efficiency ratio of earning before interests and taxes divided by total asset of issuing firm prior to IPO. DELAY is the number of days between prospectus
publication and the listing of IPOs. MINING takes the value of 1 if the issuing firm is from the mining industry, 0 if otherwise LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total asset.
AIM is equal to 1 if the IPO is listed on the Alternative Investment Market, 0 if otherwise. Estimated marginal effects of variables are reported with p-values in parentheses to
demonstrate significance levels. Subscripts a, b, c, indicate that the estimates are significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively (two-tailed z-test). Pseudo
R2, LR Chi2, log likelihood, and correctly predicted percentage are presented to indicate the goodness of fit.
No. of Observation
(N =350)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept -1.0927(0.000)a
-0.6388
(0.000)a
-1.7840
(0.000)a
-1.7060
(0.000)a
-1.7513
(0.000)a
AGE 0.0001(0.204)
0.0002
(0.203)
TANGIBLE -0.0001(0.012)a
-0.0002
(0.079)c
RISK 3.6739(0.001)a
3.0441
(0.009)a
2.5782
(0.024)b
INSIDER -0.1089(0.078)c
-0.1817
(0.0526)b
-0.1739
(0.077)c
EBIT/TTLASSET -0.0170(0.103)c
-0.0218
(0.106)c
DELAY 0.0074(0.003)a
0.0050
(0.053)b
MINING 0.1942(0.001)a
0.1557
(0.008)a
0.1664
(0.000)a
0.1436
(0.015)a
LEVERAGE -0.0075(0.472)
-0.0180
(0.129)
AIM 0.1956(0.001)a
0.2196
(0.000)a
0.1984
(0.002)a
Pseudo R2 8.16% 7.30% 14.54% 12.25% 16.83%
LR Chi2 (n) 32.89(0.000)a
16.85
(0.001)a
47.67
(0.000)a
38.77
(0.000)a
67.42
(0.000)a
Log Likelihood -185.16 -186.88 -172.29 -176.92 -166.56
Correctly Classified 75.14% 74.00% 73.93% 73.93% 75.64%
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TABLE 3.14
Summary of testable hypotheses and results
Hypothesis Results
Panel A:Common predictions:
H3.1: Unit firms are younger than share-only IPO firms Rejected
H3.2: Unit firms are smaller than share-only IPO firms in terms of market capitalisation and total assets Not rejected
H3.3: Unit firms are riskier than share-only IPO firms Not rejected
H3.4: Unit IPOs are issued by less reputable underwriters Not rejected
Panel B: In test of Agency Cost hypothesis:
H3.5: Unit IPO firms have lower levels of insider holding comparing to share-only IPO firms Rejected
H3.6: Unit firms have less income (TTLREVENUE) prior to IPO comparing to share-only IPO firms Not rejected
H3.7: Unit firms have higher agency costs in terms of profitability and asset utilisation ratios Not rejected
H3.8: Unit IPOs raise less expected gross proceeds than share-only IPOs (smaller issue size) Not rejected
H3.9: Unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs Not rejected
H3.10: Warrant exercise prices will be set above the offer price Not rejected
Panel C: In test of Signalling hypothesis:
H3.11: Unit IPO firms will exhibit higher level of information asymmetry than share-only IPO firms Not rejected
H3.12: The proportion of firm value sold as warrants will increase in firm riskiness, holding the fraction of equity retained constant Not rejected
H3.13:The degree of underpricing for unit firms is positively related to firm riskiness Not rejected
Panel D: Unique predictions of this thesis:
H3.14: Unit firms have lower leverage than matching share-only IPO firms have Not rejected
H3.15: AIM-listed unit IPOs are more underpriced than those listed on the Main Market Rejected
H3.16: The maturity of warrant is negatively related to the underpricing of unit IPOs Rejected
H3.17: PRATIO is negatively related to the underpricing of unit IPOs Rejected
H3.18: Unit IPOs with callable warrants attached are more underpriced than those with non-callable warrants Not rejected
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CHAPTER 4
SURVIVAL AND SUBSEQUENT FINANCING OF UNIT IPOS
IN THE UK
4.1 Introduction
An IPO indicates the beginning of the public life of a company. CHAPTER 3 examines the
Agency Cost and Signalling hypotheses for the inclusion of warrants in IPOs by providing
evidence  with  a  short-term focus  from the  time around listing.  Evidence  can  also  be  sought
from post-listing events. This chapter examines the two competing hypotheses in the
medium-to-long term aftermarket through the survival of unit firms and issuance of seasoned
equity offerings by unit IPO firms, in comparison to share-only IPO firms.
Two unique implications of the Agency Cost hypothesis concern the post-listing survival and
subsequent financing of unit firms. The fifth implication of Schultz (1993b) argues that since
a unit IPO’s proceed (the first round of financing) is used to ‘determine the viability of the
potential investment; it automatically encourages managers to focus on the profitability of the
prospective projects and only invest in profitable projects with positive net present values.
Schultz (1993b) pointed out that ironically, many firms issuing a unit IPO will discover that
there are not always positive-NPV projects for them to invest in. If this is the case, the
warrants will only be left to expire and the second round of financing is automatically aborted.
Under such ‘all or nothing’ scenario, unit firms are more likely to go out of business and
result in final delisting from the stock exchange. Therefore, the Agency Cost hypothesis
predicts that fewer unit firms will survive comparing to share-only firms.
On the other hand, the Agency Cost hypothesis conjointly predicts that unit firms that do
survive are inclined to receive additional equity financing in the near future, because the
value-revealing projects have established the attractiveness and profitability of their
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investments. Further funding is likely to be demanded with the company’s growth. Seasoned
equity offerings (SEOs) represent another important source of funding for publicly listed
companies either from existing shareholders or from new investors. Therefore, Schultz (1993b)
predicts that survivors among unit firms are more likely to issue SEOs following the IPOs.
The Signalling hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) does not provide any specific
predictions concerning the post-listing survival rate of unit firms. Alternatively, the signalling
theory claims that IPO firms strategically adopt costly signals at the time of listing, such as
insider holding, underpricing of new shares, and inclusion of warrants (in unit IPOs), to
attract more after market interests; and will recoup the cost of signalling by issuing seasoned
equity  offerings  at  a  higher  price  later  on.  However,  the  likelihood  of  unit  firms  to  receive
additional funding is not discussed in comparison to those of share-only IPO firms. Therefore,
the  primary  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  investigate  the  post-listing  survival  rates  and
subsequent equity financing of unit and share-only IPO firms in the UK.
Schultz (1993b) claims that a staged equity financing through unit IPOs can also be achieved
by a share-only IPO followed by a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Both financing strategies
involve a second round of capital infusion following the IPOs. For unit IPOs, the second
round of financing will occur conditionally, if the company’s stock price increases enough
post-IPO to allow exercise of warrants. More shares will be issued just like a seasoned equity
offering but through the exercise of warrants. For share-only IPOs followed by a seasoned
equity offering, the second round of financing will occur whenever the management sees fit to
issue  additional  shares.  However,  a  unit  IPO  does  have  two  advantages  comparing  to  a
share-only IPO followed by seasoned equity issues. Firstly, for a unit IPO, the price for the
seasoned equity issues (i.e. the warrant exercise price) is set in advance. By doing so,
managers could be motivated to use the IPO proceeds to reveal the firm quality and the
profitability of the projects they invested in; because if the second round of equity financing is
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to be achieved through warrant exercise, the IPO proceeds must be used to ascertain the value
of the firm’s projects. Additionally, warrant agreements can be structured to prevent firms
from selling shares for a second round of equity financing without determining the value of
their projects first. If the initial investment is non-profitable, the share price will stay below
the warrant exercise price and the warrants will not be exercised; therefore, the second round
of financing will automatically fall through. On the other hand, seasoned issues following
share-only IPOs do not serve to monitor and bond management investment decisions; neither
are there any built-in criteria to protect shareholders interests in case the projects fail.
It  is  logical  to  ask  the  questions  that,  if  the  attached  warrants  in  a  unit  IPO  can  serve  as  a
seasoned offering and better, why do some unit IPO firms still decide to conduct a second sale
of additional shares after the unit IPO. How many unit firms actually end up exercising the
warrants attached in the IPOs? To answer these research questions, the second objective of
this chapter is to examine the determinants of firms’ SEO issuance. A sub-sample of unit IPO
firms that decide to conduct a seasoned offering in comparison to the sub-sample of unit IPO
firms  that  do  not  issue  additional  equity  within  three  years  of  their  unit  IPOs  is  studied.  No
research has been carried out to examine the exercise of warrants after the unit IPOs have
been issued, which is also covered in this pilot study. I believe these original tests can shed
some new light on the existing unit IPO literature.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 The Agency Cost hypothesis’ predictions on the survival rate and subsequent
financing of unit firms
Schultz (1993b)’s Agency Cost hypothesis stipulates that in development-stage firms,
managers have an incentive to take on any projects without careful selection as long as they
can  keep  their  jobs,  and  they  will  not  stop  investing  in  negative  NPV  projects  if  given
139
sufficient funding up front. Unit IPOs can effectively arrange staged financing and prevent
management from taking non-profitable projects by providing a small amount of IPO
proceeds to begin production and management cannot obtain a second round of financing
before they can prove a project’s value.
According  to  the  Agency  Cost  hypothesis,  inclusion  of  warrants  in  unit  IPOs  is  a  form  of
staged financing that will only occur in the firm value’s higher realisation, when the stock
price is above the warrant exercise price. Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have many
similar features to the attached warrants; in the way that staged equity financing achieved by a
share-warrant unit IPO can also be achieved through a share-only IPO followed by a seasoned
share offering (SEO). However,  an advantage of a unit  IPO is that  the price of the seasoned
offering shares is set in advance as the warrant exercise price. If the second round of financing
is to be achieved through exercise of the warrants, the proceeds from the IPO must be used to
ascertain the value of the firm’s projects. Interestingly, Schultz (1993b)’s US data shows that
most of the warrant exercise prices in unit offerings are set above the current stock price.
Schultz argues that such an offer would motivate management to use the IPO proceeds wisely
to  convey  information  about  the  firm’s  true  value.  Because  only  when  the  share  price  rises
above the warrant exercise price would the second round of financing materialise. In my UK
sample, most warrants attached to the initial public offerings are issued with their exercise
price set equal to or above the offer price of the IPO. More specifically, 54.35% of the unit
warrants are issued on-the-money, with their exercise price set equal to the placing price;
33.7% of the warrants are issued out-of-money, with their exercise price set above the placing
price; and only 11.96% of the warrant exercise prices are actually set below the placing price,
in which case those warrants could be exercised straight after the IPO for profits.
The Agency Cost hypothesis predicts that because the unit IPO proceeds are used to reveal the
viability and profitability of potential investments, many firms that include warrants in their
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IPOs will find that there are no value-generating projects available for them to invest in after
the IPO. With the bonding limit from warrant agreements, these firms are unable to receive
further funding through exercise of warrants to support company growth, and as a result,
fewer of these firms will survive comparing to share-only firms. Schultz (1993b) reports that
only 58.8% of unit firms in the US survive a full three years after their IPOs, comparing to
88.9% of share-only IPO firms. However, the sixth implication of Agency Cost also predicts
that unit firms that did survive will be more likely to receive additional equity funding.
How and Howe (2001) examined the survival rates and subsequent financing of unit IPO
firms. They define firms as survived if they are still listed on the Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) at the end of nth year. Percentage survival rates of unit firms compared with share-only
IPO firms are calculated for one, two, and three years after their IPOs. Results indicate that
one year after the IPO, 99.3% unit firms and 99.6% share-only IPO firms survived; two years
after IPO, 97.8% of unit firms comparing to 95.6% of share-only IPO firms survived; and
after a full three years 89.6% of unit firms and 85.5% of share-only firms survived. Contrary
to the US evidence, Australian data report that more unit firms survived than share-only IPO
firms  did  three  years  after  their  IPOs.  However,  the  difference  is  not  significant.  How  and
Howe (2001) also conduct logistic regressions on the profitability of failure within one, two,
and three years post-listing. However, the coefficient on the dummy variable for unit offerings
is not significant in any of the regressions. Furthermore, in examination of Schultz (1993b)’s
sixth implication that survived unit firms are more likely to receive additional equity
financing following their IPOs, How and Howe (2001) also investigate the subsequent
financing activity of their Australian sample IPO firms. They select a subsample of IPO firms
including 184 share-only and 90 unit IPOs, in which they can track each firm for three years
after  its  IPO.  They  consider  both  rights  offering  and  private  placement  as  additional  equity
financing and identify the first date after the IPO on which additional financing was received.
Results indicate that 52% of the share-only IPO firms made an SEO within three years of their
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IPOs and 59% of the unit IPOs made an SEO over the same interval. The authors claim that
although these proportions are consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis, the difference is
not significant at conventional level. Overall, How and Howe (2001)’s evidence on the
survival and subsequent financing of Australian unit IPOs do not statistically support the
Agency Cost hypothesis.
Lee,  Lee,  and  Taylor  (2003)  investigating  a  different  sample  of  Australian  unit  IPOs  over  a
longer period, provide further evidence on the post-listing behaviours of unit firms in
comparison to share-only firms. Firstly, they reason according to Schultz (1993b)’s argument,
that unit firms have higher agency costs than those of share-only IPO firms; if this is the case,
unit firms are expected to have higher rate of post-listing failure than that of share-only firms.
The authors report the percentage failure rate for unit and share-only firms, one, two, and
three years following the IPO respectively. No evidence is found that unit IPOs have a higher
failure rate, or that they are more frequently subject to takeover than share-only firms. To
confirm the result they also conduct a logistic regression for one, two and three year failure
rates respectively, with the independent variables being; the decision to use a unit IPO, issue
size, age, underwriter quality and initial underpricing. Again, they find no evidence that unit
IPOs have higher probability of being delisted than share-only IPO firms. Secondly, Lee, Lee
and Taylor (2003) also examine the subsequent equity financing activities of the unit and
share-only IPO firms post-listing. They identified all subsequent equity issues during the first
two post-listing years and find that around 52% of all IPOs make a seasoned equity offering
(SEO) within two years of their IPOs. Although unit firms appears to have higher percentage
SEO issuance (55%) than that of share-only firms (51%), no significant difference between
unit and share-only IPO firms in their propensity to seek further equity within two years of
their  IPOs  is  found.  They  also  run  a  logistic  regression  on  a  dummy  dependent  variable  of
SEO issuance (1 if  the firm issues a SEO in the two years after listing,  0 if  otherwise).  Test
results indicate that there is no systematic relation between choice of offer type and
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subsequent equity raisings, which contradicts the Agency Cost hypothesis. However, they do
find a significantly positive relation between initial underpricing and the decision to issue a
SEO, which is consistent with the Signalling hypothesis; that IPO firms intentionally
underprice the issue or/and include warrants (in case of unit IPOs) and will recoup the
signalling costs by issue seasoned equity offerings at a higher offer price after their IPOs.
Overall, Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) are unable to support the Agency Cost hypothesis and its
implications of post-listing survival and subsequent equity financing of unit IPO firms.
As suggested by the Agency Cost hypothesis, additional equity financing is delayed for unit
IPOs until the profitability of their investment projects is verified by the market. Therefore, if
the issuing firms of unit IPOs survive, they are more likely to receive additional equity
financing following their IPOs. Mazouz et al. (2007) test this prediction with their sample of
unit IPOs issued in Hong Kong, providing evidence that 25% of unit IPOs comparing to 23%
of share-only IPOs raised additional capital via seasoned equity issues within three years of
their IPOs. However, the difference is not statistically significant and therefore unable to
support Schultz (1993b)’s prediction on the subsequent financing of unit IPO firms.
Furthermore, the survival rate of unit IPO firms comparing to those of share-only IPO firms
are not covered in Mazouz et al. (2007) and therefore their results on the likelihood of unit
firms receiving additional funding are not based on the premise of the survival of unit firms.
4.2.2 The Signalling hypothesis’ prediction on the subsequent financing
The Agency Cost hypothesis predicts that fewer unit firms will survive comparing to
share-only firms, although survived unit firms are more likely to issue seasoned equity
offerings for additional funding. The Signalling hypothesis does not make any prediction on
survival rate or the probability of subsequent financing. Instead, the Signalling hypothesis of
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) demonstrate insider concerns about revealing their true firm
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value  as;  prior  to  an  IPO,  the  company’s  insiders  know their  own firm’s  type.  On the  other
hand, public investors do not have much information about the true value of the firms
approaching the capital market for financing and therefore cannot discriminate ‘good firms’
from ‘bad firms’. It is in the best interest of insiders from good firms to take actions and
structure their IPO with certain unique qualities in order to distinguish themselves from the
bad firms. Any attempt by the bad firms to mimic such qualities will impose a rather dear cost.
Eventually, they cannot afford the ‘camouflage’ and recede to sell their securities in the IPO
at their true value. In their model, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) identify three costly
signals, namely insider retention, underpricing, and inclusion of warrants. They predict that
unit firms use three costly signals to convey information about firm value and attract more
investors, and they expect issuing firms to recoup the costs of signalling at the IPO stage by
issuing seasoned equity at a more favourable price after the market has verified the firms’
quality in the post-listing period. However, the likelihood of unit firms to receive additional
funding is not discussed in comparison to those of share-only IPO firms.
None of the other academic papers on unit IPOs including Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
have further examined the stock price performance around the SEO announcements in testing
of the Signalling hypothesis. Therefore, no evidence has been provided whether unit firms did
issue seasoned equity at favourable prices to recoup the cost of underpricing, including
warrants and retention of insider holding at the time of their IPOs. However, several empirical
studies on share-only seasoned equity offerings did examine whether managers time a
window of opportunity to issue additional shares when the firm is at maximum value. Spiess
and Affleck-Graves (1995) stressed the managers’ market-timing ability through analysing
the  abnormal  returns  in  the  early  aftermarket;  they  document  that  following  the  first  two
months after the announcement of SEO, the performance of seasoned offering firms is
strongly negative. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) also document that seasoned equity
issuers experience poor long-term stock performance compared to matched non-issuers. Kale
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and Payne (1998) test the ‘windows of opportunity’ argument and also provide evidence that
the previous months’ stock prices are on the increase for firms that issue a seasoned offering.
Harjoto and Garen (2003) examine the reason why the IPO firms decide to conduct a primary
seasoned equity offering (SEO), with a sample of 481 US IPOs issued during 1992 to 1997, in
which  42% of  the  IPO firms  issued  a  SEO within  the  four  years  following  their  IPO.  They
assume that the initial owners try to maximise the value of IPO proceeds and determine on the
optimal shares of insider and public shareholders based on anticipated growth of the firm at
the IPO stage. Nevertheless, the initial owners may decide to raise further funding when there
are unexpected growth opportunities that emerge after the initial public offering. Using a
two-period model, the authors investigate the factors that affect an IPO firm’s decision to
issue an additional equity offering due to the shock that was not predicted by the managers at
the time of the initial public offering, and the relative size of a SEO during the four years after
the IPO. In the two-period context, their model indicates that the large shareholder of an IPO
firm has an incentive to issue an SEO when the firm is experiencing an unanticipated positive
shock  post-IPO.  They  measure  the  IPO  firm’s  unanticipated  growth  in  two  ways:  an
accounting measure, which is annual growth in net income; and a market measure, which is
the excess stock return-drift in a year. Those indicators are found to increase the firm’s
likelihood of conducting a seasoned equity offering and increase the relative size of a SEO.
The authors also provide some evidence that the firm’s ex-ante uncertainty negatively affects
the firm’s decision to issue additional shares post-IPO.
Most of these empirical studies confirm that the firm’s decision to issue additional equity is
usually preceded by a positive stock price drift and/or favourable earnings releases, and then
followed by downward revisions at the SEO announcement dates, and thereafter. The findings
of these studies support the argument that seasoned equity offerings are announced when the
firm’s  stock  is  overvalued,  but  the  market  does  not  reassess  the  stock  appropriately  and  the
stock is still overvalued when it is issued. This implies that managers behave opportunistically
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by exploiting market misevaluation and investors are slow to react due to information
asymmetry. However, further evidence on unit firms recover cost of signalling strategy at the
time of their IPOs by issuing seasoned equity at higher price, is still absent in the literature.
4.3 Hypotheses
4.3.1 Predictions on the survival of unit IPO firms
The fifth prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis is that unit firms are more likely to fail
than firms that issue share-only IPOs. Schultz (1993b) records 59% of unit firms in the US
survived three years after their IPOs, comparing to 89% of share-only IPO firms. How and
Howe (2001) report with conflicting results in Australia that more unit firms (89.6%) survived
than share-only firms (85.5%) three years after their IPOs. However, the difference is not
significant at conventional level. They also conducted a logistic regression on the probability
of IPO failure within one, two, and three years post-listing but again, the results are not
significant. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003), confirm that they cannot find any evidence that
Australian unit firms experience higher failures than share-only firms do. Mazouz et al. (2007)
only discussed the subsequent financing for unit and share-only firms in Hong Kong, but the
survival of unit firms is not covered in this study. Viewed collectively, unit firms in the US
provide evidence of lower survival rates than share-only IPO firms three years post-listing,
whilst the evidence from the Australia is not conclusive. Research on the survival rate of unit
and share-only IPO firms is absent from both Hong Kong and the UK. To reassess this unique
implication of the Agency Cost hypothesis with UK data, I predict with Hypothesis 4.1 that
unit IPO firms in the UK have lower survival rate than their matching share-only counterparts.
In order for a stock to be traded on an exchange, the company that issues the stock must meet
the listing requirements set out by the exchange. If a company fails to satisfy exchange listing
requirements such as minimum bid price, minimum publicly traded shares, minimum
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shareholders’ equity, minimum market capitalisation or certain financial ratios, it will be
involuntarily delisted from the exchange. Therefore, the survival rate is calculated as the
number of IPOs, which are still actively trading n years (n= 1, 2, and 3) post-listing, as
percentage of the total sample size at the time of listing. Furthermore, I also introduce the
ACTIVEin dummy in the probit regression analysis of the unit IPO survival rate. The
ACTIVEin takes  the  value  of  1,  if  the  sample  IPO firm is  still  listed  and  actively  trading  on
London Stock Exchange n years post-listing (n=1, 2, and 3), 0 if otherwise.
However, not all the delisted firms are removed from the exchange listing for negative
reasons. It is worth mentioning that, some companies choose to voluntarily delist from an
exchange. These companies would usually have merged with or been acquired by another
company, or management has decided to take the company private. 34  Some smaller
companies delist to save on the high cost of complying with regulations and exchange listing
fees. In these cases, a voluntary delisting does not necessarily lead to bankruptcy. Future
research is called for to incorporate data on the reasons of delisting.
H4.1: Unit IPO s have lower survival rate than their share-only counterparts
4.3.2 Predictions on the subsequent financing of unit IPO firms
The sixth implication of the Agency Cost hypothesis maintains that unit firms intentionally
delay equity financing until the profitability of their projects is verified by the market. Schultz
(1993b) predicts that survived unit firms are more likely to receive additional equity financing
following their IPOs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) made no similar conjectures regarding
the subsequent financing of unit firms. How and Howe (2001) report that higher percentage of
Australian unit firms (59%) made seasoned equity offerings than share-only firms (52%) did.
However, the difference is not significant and therefore unable to support the Agency Cost
34 Espenlaub, Khurshed and Mohamed (2009) find that at times half of delistings are due to M&A.
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hypothesis. Lee, Lee, and Taylor (2003) provide similar results from Australia that more unit
firms (55%) issue SEOs than share-only firms (51%) do. The difference, however, remains
insignificant. Mazouz et al. (2007) confirm with evidence from Hong Kong that unit firms
and share-only firms are not significantly different in terms of the propensity for SEO
issuance. Viewed collectively, evidence on the subsequent equity financing for unit firms in
comparison to share-only firms is inconclusive among US, Australian, and Hong Kong data.
No previous study on this unique prediction of the Agency Cost hypothesis has been
conducted for the UK data. This chapter, therefore, proposes Hypothesis 4.2 as shown below.
H4.2: Survived unit IPO firms are more likely to issue SEOs than survived share-only IPO firms
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) predict that unit firms use a combination of costly signals
such as insider holding, underpricing and including warrants in their IPOs, to signal firm
quality and broaden public interests in the issues. After the market has verified the firm
quality and the profitability of their projects, these firms can recoup the signalling costs by
issuing seasoned equity offerings at a higher price. Previous research on share-only SEOs has
suggested that firms exploit the best time to issue additional equity when company’s shares
are potentially over valued (Loughran and Ritter, 1995). Such theory is also applied to
share-warrant unit SEOs. For example, Marciukaityte et al. (2007) report a 40% mean
one-year pre-placement holding-period return for the unit placing sample. On the other hand,
from the investors prospective, Myers and Majluf (1984) brought forth the adverse selection
model stating that rational investors tend to revise the firm value downwards when a seasoned
equity offering is announced because they believe managers will only issue additional shares
when  they  believe  their  company’s  shares  are  currently  overvalued.  As  a  result,  a  negative
price adjustment following the SEO announcement is predicted.
However, none of Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses on unit IPOs has examined the
stock price performance around their SEO announcements. To fill this gap between the unit
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IPO and SEO literature, this chapter also investigates SEO announcements made by unit IPO
firms. Hypothesis 4.3 predicts that there is a significant stock price run-up before SEO
announcements made by unit IPO firms. In addition, Hypothesis 4.4 predicts that there will be
a negative price effect after the SEO announcements were made by unit IPO firms. If UK data
simultaneously supports both hypotheses, I can provide evidence that SEOs issued by unit
IPO firms are announced when the company’s shares are overvalued.
H4.3: There is a significant stock price run-up before SEOs are announced by unit IPO firms
H4.4: There is a negative price effect to the SEO announcements made by unit IPO firms
4.3.3 Predictions on SEO issuance and warrant characteristics
Schultz (1993b) predicts that unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPOs and the
survived unit firms are more likely to issue SEOs than survived share-only firms. However,
whether the issuance of SEOs has any direct relation to the characteristics of the unit IPOs,
especially to any warrant-specific characteristics, is not discussed. To extend the Agency Cost
hypothesis’ implications on the subsequent financing of unit firms with UK evidence, the last
group of hypotheses are proposed, targeting to examine the decision for unit firms to issue
seasoned offerings in association to the characteristics of the unit IPOs and more specifically
the characteristics of attached warrants. According to the Agency Cost hypothesis unit IPOs
are more underpriced than share-only IPOs at the time of listing. I therefore predict that unit
IPOs that are more underpriced are more likely to conduct seasoned equity offerings within
three years of their listing (Hypothesis 4.5). A dummy variable SEO is introduced to take the
value of 1 if the issuing firm has conducted their first seasoned offering within three year
post-listing, 0 of otherwise. According to Hypothesis 4.5, the initial underpricing should be
negatively related to the SEO dummy.
H4.5: Unit firms that are more underpriced at their IPOs are more likely to conduct SEOs
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Concerning the choice of warrant exercise price, Schultz (1993b) documents that in the US
most  of  the  warrants  attached  to  unit  IPOs  are  issued  out-of-money  with  warrant  exercise
price set above the IPO offer price. He explain that issuing firms do so on purpose to create
incentives for managers to make optimal investment decisions so that the unit firms’ share
prices will increase enough to allow warrants to be exercised. Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1997) do not agree with the Agency Cost explanation, they argue that according to the
Signalling hypothesis, issuing firms will set the warrant exercise price equal to the IPO offer
price  to  signal  true  firm  value.  The  debate  of  choice  of  warrant  exercise  price  has  been
discussed in the previous CHAPTER 3. In extension of this argument, I predict that if warrant
exercise price is set above IPO offer price to create incentive to reduce agency cost, the
attached warrants are more likely to be exercised to materialise the second round of financing;
in turn, the unit firm is less likely to issue additional SEO for further funding. A dummy
variable OUT is motivated to take the value of 1 if the warrants are issued out-of-money with
the warrant exercise price above the IPO offer price, 0 if otherwise. Therefore, I hypothesise
that in the UK, unit firms, which issued warrants out-of-money at the time of their IPOs, are
less likely to conduct a seasoned equity offerings three e years post-listing (Hypothesis 4.6).
H4.6: Unit firms, which issued warrants out-of-money, are less likely to conduct SEOs
Contrary to Schultz (1993b)’s American results, How and Howe (2001) do not find evidence
that in Australia survived unit firms are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings. They
also compare the characteristics of the warrants from Australia to the US warrants attached to
unit IPOs, and report that Australian warrants are shorter lived than US warrants. However, in
their study, whether there is any association between the life of warrants and the likelihood of
SEO issuance is not discussed. The longer time unit firms have before the warrants expire, the
better chance these warrants will be exercised, and the less need for seasoned equities. To test
this potential relation, I define the variable LIFE as the number of years between warrant
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issuance date and the warrant expiration date and hypothesise that in the UK, unit firms
whose attached warrants have shorter LIFE are more likely to issue seasoned equity within
three years of their listing (Hypothesis 4.7). LIFE is therefore anticipated to be negatively
related to the SEO dummy.
H4.7: Unit firms whose attached warrants have shorter life until expiration are more likely to issue SEOs
The Agency Cost hypothesis also stipulates that unit IPOs choose to include warrants to
reduce agency costs by staging a second round of financing through the attached warrants.
The attached warrants if exercised, serve as a seasoned offering, except that the offer price of
the seasoned issue (the warrant exercise price) is set in advance. On the other hand, if the
company’s share price stays below the warrant exercise price, the warrant will not be
exercised and the second round of financing falls through automatically. In the latter case, the
management are more likely to conduct a seasoned equity offering to replace the second
round of financing by warrants. Therefore, I predict that the unit IPO firms, whose attached
warrants have not been exercised or already expired, are more likely to conduct a second issue
of shares within three years after the initial public offering (Hypothesis 4.8). The dummy
variable EXERCISE of warrants is motivated to take the value of 1 if the warrants have been
exercised within three years following the unit IPO, 0 if otherwise. The EXERCISE dummy is
expected to be negatively related to the SEO dummy.
H4.8: Unit firms, whose attached warrants have not been exercised or expired, are more likely to conduct
SEOs within three years post-listing
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4.4 Data and Methodology
4.4.1 Data collection
For all 350 sample IPOs, the delisting dates for all sample firms that are no longer trading,
have been collected from DataStream database and cross-referenced with data from Thomas
One Banker database. The delisting date is then compared to the listing date of the IPOs to
decide the value of ACTIVEin dummy, which takes the value of 1 if firm i is still listed and
actively trading n years  post-listing,  0  if  otherwise.  The  ACTIVEin dummy is employed to
proxy for the survival of IPO firms in probit regression analysis later on. Information on the
seasoned equity offering (SEO) events is collected from Thomas One Banker Database. A
subsample  of  SEO  unit  firms  is  abstracted  from  the  sample  of  unit  IPOs.  The  firms  are
included in the SEO subsample if they met the following requirements: (1) the firm conducted
a unit initial public offering (IPO) with warrants attached between 1994 and 2006; (2) the firm
was  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange  (LSE);  (3)  the  seasoned  equity  offerings  are  the
primary offer that involves sales of new shares35; (4) the seasoned offering announcement
date  is  available  on  Thomas  One  Bank  or  DataStream  databases.  Adjusted  share  prices
post-listing excluding dividends are obtained from DataStream’s Equity Return Index
datatype (RI) and cross-referenced with FAME database. Financial data for the SEO firms are
collected from DataStream and Thomas One Banker database; and firm specific information
is  collected  from  the  IPO  prospectus.  The  information  on  the  exercise  or  expiration  of
attached warrants in case of unit IPOs are collected from the company’s website under press
release and confirmed by the company news on Thomas One Banker. If there is no available
information on either exercising or expiration of warrants up to the expiration date of warrant
contracts, I assume that the warrants are left to expire.
35 There are generally two types of SEOs, namely, the secondary seasoned offering and the primary seasoned offering. A
secondary offering involves the sale of shares from a group of existing shareholders; as a result, the number of shares
outstanding remains the same and the firm receives no proceeds from the sale. A primary offering consists of new shares
issued by the firm, which receives the proceeds. In this study, I focus on the decision of unit IPO firms to issue additional
shares after the unit IPOs, therefore, only primary seasoned offerings are considered.
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4.4.2 Methodology
4.4.2.1 Comparison period returns
A ‘comparison period return’ approach is adopted to examine the stock price performance
around the seasoned offering announcement date. Pre-announcement and post-announcement
periods are defined as the 90 days immediately preceding and following the announcement
period. The ‘announcement period’ is defined as the stock offering announcement date plus
the following trading day, in the case that the announcement could have occurred after the
close of trading on the event day. Each trading day is defined under the event-time framework
by  the  number  of  trading  days  preceding  or  following  the  announcement  date.  The  average
daily return for the 90 trading days immediately following the announcement period is
defined as the ‘comparison period’.
A  portfolio  of  daily  returns  is  computed  for  each  event  day  by  taking  an  equally  weighted
average of individual securities’ raw returns. The difference between the portfolio average
daily return over the announcement and comparison periods are calculated to measure the
average impact of SEO announcements on stock price performance. The significance level of
the price reaction is tested by a one-tail t-test of the difference in the above two average
returns, with the hypothesis that the announcement period average returns are higher than the
comparison period average returns. The standard t-statistic of the difference in means of two
independent samples is used. The standard deviations for the announcement period and
comparison period mean daily returns are calculated from the time series of portfolio daily
returns over the two-day announcement period and the 60-trading-day comparison period
respectively.
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4.4.2.2 Pre– and Post–SEO stock performance measures
Prior research in the UK market has favoured the use of both the cumulated abnormal returns
(CARs)  and  buy-and-hold  abnormal  returns  (BHARs)  approaches.  In  this  study,  both
measures of stock price performance are adopted. Firstly, average monthly adjusted-return
(ARt) for 30, 60, and 90 trading days after the seasoned equity offering is computed as:
                                    EQUATION  4.1
Where, RSEO,it is the total return on seasoned equity offering firm i in event day t, and RFTA,it is
the total return on the comparison FTSE All Share (FTA) Index over the same period. The
cumulative adjusted return through event day s (CARs) is the sum of the average monthly
adjusted-returns for event day 1 to month s. Alternatively, to check for robustness, I also
calculate market-adjusted holding-period returns for the 30, 60 and 90 trading days, defined as
EQUATION 4.2, where Ri,t is  the  raw  return  of  firm i on  day t, RFTA is  the  return  on  FTA
Index over the responding period, and k is equal to 30, 60, and 90 trading days over which the
holding period return is to be computed. If the offering firm is delisted prior to the 30, 60 and
90 trading days after its seasoned equity sale, the holding-period returns of that firm and
responsive market index returns are truncated on the same day.
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4.5 Tests and results
4.5.1 Survival of unit firms compared to share-only firms
One of the Agency Cost hypothesis’ testable implications is that, after raising money from the
unit IPOs, unit firms are often unable to find positive-NPV project to invest in and the
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attached warrants end up expiring without materialising further funding. As a result, Schultz
(1993b) predicts that all else being equal, fewer of them will survive comparing to share-only
IPOs. The Signalling hypothesis makes no prediction about relative survival rate and
subsequent financing. To reassess this unique prediction of the Agency Cost theory with UK
data through Hypothesis 4.1, I adopt a basic binary survival study using the listing
membership on London Stock Exchange (LSE) to proxy for the survival of sample IPOs. A
company is considered as survived if it is not delisted36 from the London Stock Exchange.
Reasons for delisting include: the sample firm has an insufficient number of market-makers,
fails to pay fees, has insufficient capital, and acquired or merged with another company.37
The delisting  dates  for  all  sample  firms  that  are  no  longer  trading  have  been  collected  from
DataStream database and cross-referenced with Thomas One Banker database.
As shown in Panel A of TABLE 4.2,  I  reported the numbers of censored IPO sample which
are still actively trading (N1) and which have been delisted (N2) by the end of 1, 3, and 5 years
after their initial public offerings. One year immediately after the IPOs, 90 out of 92(97.83%)
unit IPOs are censored as ‘survived’, whereas all of the share-only firms (100%) are still
listed on the exchange. The disparity is much bigger when the time interval increases to three
years post-listing: 88.76% of share-only firms remain actively trading, but only 72.83% unit
firms survived. Five years following the IPOs, 187 share-only firms (72.48%) are censored as
‘survived’ comparing to only 58 (63.04%) of unit firms. These results are consistent with the
Agency Cost hypothesis that unit firms are more likely to be delisted than firms that issue
shares  alone.  Schultz  (1993b)  explains  that  managers  will  take  on  any  (even  negative  NPV)
projects to maintain their jobs, and will do so if given enough free cash flow up front.
Incorporating warrants in an IPO effectively forms a second round of financing, but the
36 It is worth mentioning that companies that are delisted are not necessarily bankrupt, and may continue trading over the
counter. However, delisting can make it more difficult for a company to raise money, and in this respect, it sometimes is a
first step towards bankruptcy.
37 Due to lack of data on any acquisition or merger events of the sample firms,  if  the company is  acquired or merged with
another company, they are also classified as failed, since the stock under the current company name will also be delisted.
However, it is rather a generalization to define acquisition and merger as ‘failure’ and more specific definition of ‘failure
rate’ is encouraged in future research.
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funding can only be materialised when the share prices exceed the warrant exercise price.
Such an arrangement will prevent management from wasting capital on non-profitable
projects. In reality, many unit firms will find that there are no positive-NPV projects to
ascertain their company’s value, resulting in unit warrants being left unexercised and expired.
The potential second round of funding falls through almost automatically and therefore,
without further funding, the company are more likely to go out of business.
A key characteristic of survival analysis is that survival data are usually censored. Censoring
occurs when incomplete information is available about the survival time of some individuals.
It is worth mentioning that the data collection of this thesis was finished by 31st December
2009, which is the cut-off date for censored data. The cumulative survival rates are calculated
as  the  [N1/  (N1+N2)] by the end of year 1, 3, and 5, respectively. The robustness of this
approach  is  limited  in  the  sense  that  beyond  the  cut-off  date,  certain  censored  observations
may continue to survive for a long time or fail shortly after, the possibilities of which are not
incorporated in the survival rate calculated in TABLE 4.2. More sophisticated survival studies
such as the Kaplan-Meier method38 is recommended for future research interests.
I am aware that underlying factors other than the offer type might affect the survival of IPO
firms. In order to analyse the survival rate of unit and share-only firms more precisely, I apply
the probit model shown in EQUATION 4.3, using the dummy variable of firm i surviving for
n years post-listing as the independent variable as motivated in Section 4.3.1 ( ACTIVEin, and
n=1, 3, or 5). The likelihood that a firm will survive within one, three, or five years following
its  IPO  is  estimated  in  relation  to  several  firm  characteristics,  the  results  of  which  are
presented in TABLE 4.2. Definitions of variables are listed in TABLE 4.1. Dummy variable
of offer type (UNIT) is included to test whether unit firms have lower survival rate as the
38 Kaplan-Meier method of calculating survival rates accounts for the number of censored observations at risk of being
delisted at the start of any one period, depends on how many have been delisted in the previous periods. As a result the total
number of observations declines over time.
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Agency Cost hypothesis predicted. The certification effect associated with using reputable
underwriters is expected to imply a higher probability of survival after the offering. Therefore,
the underwriter REPUTATION dummy is expected to be positively related to the survival
dummy. HGSC-adjusted first-day initial returns (IRD2) are incorporated to consider the
market’s expectations for the firms at the time of IPOs. Firms whose shares are not sold at
considerable discount might fail to attract enough subscription to support their operating
activities post-listing. Therefore, I expect that firms with higher initial returns at the time of
their IPOs are more likely to survive. The proportion of insider ownership (INSIDER) is
anticipated to affect a firm’s chance to survive after IPO positively (Schultz, 1993b). The ratio
of total debt to total asset is employed as an indicator of a firm’s the ability to seek cheaper
debt financing rather than equity financing (LEVERAGE). A lower debt component in a
firm’s capital structure might also affect the firm’s ability to achieve cheaper financing to
maintain its growth and ultimately their survival. Total asset of firms (ASSET) are included to
reflect on ex ante uncertainty regarding firm value.
i6543210 2ACTIVE zjjjjjjj +++++++= iiiiDiini TTLASSETLEVERAGEINSIDERIRREPUTATIONUNIT
EQUATION 4.3
Test results from three probit regressions reporting the marginal effects, are shown in Panel B
of TABLE 4.2. When the dependent variable is the probability of a firm surviving within one
year after IPO (n=1): The UNIT dummy is negatively significant at 1% level, implying that
with 1% increase in the probability of firm i choose to issue a unit IPO (instead of share-only
IPO), the chance of firm i surviving post-listing decrease by 15.23%. INSIDER ownership is
positively significant, suggesting that 1% increase in insider holding will improve the
probability of survival after one year of listing by 7.67%. Both results are consistent with
Schultz (1993b)’s prediction that unit firms which have lower insider ownership than
share-only firms are less likely to survive. The initial return is significantly positive at 10%
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level. The coefficient indicates that 1% increase in the initial return on the first trading day
will increase the survival rate of the issuing firm by 0.87%. REPUTATION of underwriters
and issuing firms’ ability to secure cheaper debt financing (LEVERAGE) are both positively
related to survival rate but they are not significant determinants of the likelihood of a firm’s
survival  one  year  after  IPO.  No significant  relation  is  found between the  survival  rate  of  an
IPO firm and its firm size (ASSET) for the 1-year period post-listing.
When test period is prolonged to three years post-listing, the initial return (IRD2) stopped
being a significant factor in determining a firm’s survival. The underwriters REPUTATION
on the other hand, becomes significantly different from zero at 1% level, suggesting that if the
issuing firm’s probability of using a prestige underwriter increases by 1% at the time of IPO,
the possibility of firms’ survival 3 years post-listing increase by 12.84%. INSIDER ownership
also remains positively significant at 5% level. LEVERAGE and ASSET remain insignificant.
For the five-year survival regression, initial returns (IRD2)  and  INSIDER  ownership  at  the
time of IPO, no longer significantly affect the chance of the firms’ survival in the long term.
However,  the  offer  type  of  the  IPO  (UNIT),  the  underwriters  REPUTATION,  and  the  firm
size (ASSET) prior to listing do have a significant impact on a firm’s long-term survival. The
REPUTATION dummies remain highly significant at 1% level for both the 3-year and 5-year
intervals, indicating that firms which employ relatively prestigious underwriters for their IPOs,
have a better chance of surviving three to five years post-listing. ASSET become significantly
negative at 10% level when the 5-year interval is applied, implying that 1% increase in firm
size will increase the firm’s long-term survival by 1.29%. For all three probit regressions, the
UNIT dummy is significantly different from zero at 1% level; providing strong support for the
Agency Cost hypothesis (Hypothesis 4.1) that unit firms are more likely to fail one, three or
five years post-listing comparing to share-only IPO firms.
INSERT TABLE 4.2 HERE
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In TABLE 4.3, I present the means and medians of selected firm characteristics for unit firms
and share-only firms, which survived the full 3-year period following their IPOs39. In
comparing certain features of unit firms and share-only firms that survived, I believe the UK
data can provide some supporting evidence as in why unit firms have lower survival rates than
that  of  share-only  firms.  Definitions  of  the  variables  are  listed  in  TABLE  4.1.  Unpaired
Student’s t-tests assuming different variances for survived unit portfolios and share-only
portfolios are conducted in determining the significance of differences in means; whilst the
nonparametric Mann-Whitney (MW) Test’s p-values are also illustrated to indicate the
significance of differences in medians.
Firstly,  I  examine  the  firm-specific  characteristics  such  as  size,  age,  risk,  earnings,  and
leverage of the survived unit firms comparing to those of survived share-only firms. Three
measures are selected to compare firm size: tangible assets (TANGIBLE), total asset
(TTLASSET), and market capitalisation immediately after IPO (MKTCAP). As the results in
TABLE 4.3 indicate, unit firms, which survived the full three-year period, are significantly
smaller than the share-only firms are. All three measures are much lower for survived unit
firms and the differences in both means and medians are highly significant at 1% level
indicated by t-statistics and p-values  from  MW  Tests.  Firm  riskiness  is  on  the  other  hand,
significantly higher for survived unit firms comparing to that of survived share-only firms.
Both differences in means and medians are highly significant at 1% level. Survived
share-only firms also have a much larger debt component in their capital structure than
survived unit firms do. The total debt (TTLDEBT) for survived share-only firms averages at
£12.85 million comparing to only £4.27 million for survived unit firms. The difference in
medians  for  total  debt  between  the  two  types  of  firms  is  also  significant  at  1%  level.  The
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) is much lower for survived unit firms (mean £0.75
39 My reasoning for selecting the sub-sample of firms that survived the 3-year period after their IPOs is twofold: Firstly,
there is a rather noticeable disparity between the survival rates of unit firms and share-only firms three years after listing,
comparing to the 1-year post-listing subsample. Secondly, the characteristics of unit and share-only firms in the third year
following their IPOs should have explanatory power for their survival rates in the fifth year post-listing.
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million, median £0 million) comparing to that for survived share-only firms (mean £3.55
million, median £0.9 million). A t-statistic of 4.95 and a p-value of 0.0000 from the MW test
indicate that both the differences in means and medians are highly significant at 1% level. The
survived unit firms also appear to have older age and lower insider holding comparing to
those of the share-only firms, which survived throughout the same period. However, these
two results  are  not  significant.  As  the  above  results  indicate,  unit  firms  which  have  already
survived the three-year period after their IPOs are significantly smaller, riskier, with lower
debt leverage and less earnings than share-only firms that survived the same time interval.
Those firm-specific characteristics confirmed the survival rate results before, which states that
fewer unit firms will survive comparing to share-only firms. In addition, those characteristics
also determine that in a longer test-period of five years, fewer of these unit firms will survive
with small firm size, higher risk, less earnings and limited ability to secure cheaper debt
financing, which is consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis.
Secondly, I examine the size, underpricing, and cost of the IPOs for unit and share-only firms
that survived after three years of their IPOs. As illustrated in TABLE 4.3, survived unit firms
have much less proceeds from their IPOs than those of survived share-only firms. Survived
share-only  firms  on  average  raise  £16.76  million  from  their  IPOs,  nearly  three  times  the
average proceeds from survived unit firms (£6.88 million). The t-value if 4.15 for difference
in  means  is  highly  significant  at  1%  level  so  is  the  MW p-value (0.0000) for difference in
medians. With more money raised from the IPOs to support their growth, share-only firms are
more likely to survive than unit firms with limited IPO proceeds; which again supports the
Agency  Cost  hypothesis.  The  HGSC-adjusted  initial  returns  on  the  first  trading  day  are
significantly higher for survived unit firms than for share-only firms in both means and
medians at 1% level. The abnormally high degree of underpricing for unit IPOs may attract
more aftermarket trading; however, if there are no value-generating projects for unit firms to
invest in, the bonding effect of attached warrants will discourage managers from wasting their
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IPO proceeds on negative-NPV projects. As a result, unit firms are less likely to receive
enough funding to support their growth and in turn, eventually run out of business. The total
expense of the IPO is much higher for survived share-only firms than for survived unit firms.
Considering the high underpricing cost of unit firms, it is safe to assume that the high cost of
share-only IPOs are mostly spent on expensive underwriting fees, to hire more reputable
underwriters. As proven previously in the logistic regressions, the certification effect of
prestigious underwriters is significantly and positively related to a firm’s long-term survival.
Overall,  the  characteristics  of  the  offerings  confirmed that  unit  IPOs  are  smaller  issues  with
high underpricing and less reputable underwriters. Such firms are less likely to survive
comparing to share-only firms whose IPOs are underwritten by prestigious agents with much
larger proceeds to support their growth.
Finally, in direct test of the Agency Cost hypothesis, I calculate the efficiency ratios defined
in CHAPTER 3 for unit and share-only firms which survived the full 3-year period after their
IPOs. The first ratio of total revenue to total asset (REV/TTLASSET) suggests that survived
unit firms have much lower efficiency ratio than survived share-only firms. The difference in
means is significant at 10% level and the difference in medians is significant at 1% level. The
second ratio of EBIT to total asset (EBIT/TTLASSET) provides the same result. The third
efficiency  ratio  of  net  income  to  total  asset  (NI/TTLASSET)  is  also  lower  for  unit  firms.
Despite that the difference in means is not significant; the difference in medians is highly
significant at 1% level. Lower efficiency ratios for survived unit firms suggest that unit firms
have lower profitability in asset utilisation and therefore higher agency costs than share-only
firms. In strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis, the data from the UK proves that unit
firms with higher agency costs have lower survival rates than share-only firms have.
INSERT TABLE 4.3 HERE
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4.5.2 The subsequent financing of survived unit firms and share-only firms
The question that shall now be asked is; why do firms still choose unit IPOs if unit firms are
‘more likely to fail’? Another implication of the Agency Cost hypothesis is that unit firms
delay equity financing until the profitability of their projects is verified, implying that unit
firms that did survive are more likely to receive further financing through seasoned equity
offerings (SEOs) comparing to survived share-only firms. The Signalling hypothesis makes
no comparable prediction. The hypothesis is reassessed in this section with UK data. I first
construct three subsamples (ACTIVE1, ACTIVE 3, and ACTIVE 5) of firms that survived 1,
3, and 5 years post-listing. Within the three subsamples, I define survived unit firms as
received subsequent funding if they conduct their first SEO at any time during the five years
after their initial public offerings. The same definition for subsequent financing applies to
survived share-only firms that issued their first SEO within five years post-listing.
4.5.2.1 Summary statistics and probit model
TABLE 4.4 illustrates the number of unit IPOs and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) that
were conducted by a unit IPO firm during different cohort years. Additionally selected
characteristics of the underlying firms are presented. The cohort periods are determined
according to the market conditions. Monthly returns on the FTSE All Share Index, the FTSE
Small Cap Index, and Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index (HGSC) are calculated and
charted in FIGURE 4.1 to decide the ‘hot’ versus ‘cold’ market conditions. As indicated in
FIGURE 4.1, the periods of 1994-95, 1999, and 2001-03, are when the market suffered severe
declines  of  the  index  returns.  In  those  sub-periods,  the  number  of  unit  firms  that  decide  to
issue seasoned offerings is scarce (10 SEOs in total), comparing to the number of SEOs
issued when the market exhibit strong performance (11 SEOs during 1996-98, 11 in the year
2000, and 27 SEOs during 2004-06).
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INSERT TABLE 4.4 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 4.1 HERE
To test Hypothesis 4.2, that survived unit firms are more likely to issue subsequent financing,
I firstly present descriptive statistics in Panel A of TABLE 4.5. The percentage of unit and
share-only firms that decide to issue SEOs within three years post-listing and the percentage
of SEO issuance among firms, which survived the full three-year period following their IPOs,
are illustrated and compared. As the results indicate, 84.57% of the full sample of unit and
share-only firms (350 firms in total) are still actively trading three years after their IPOs,
57.43% of which issued seasoned offerings within this three-year period. A much higher
82.09% of unit firms which survived the three-year period post-listing issued seasoned equity
offerings comparing to only 50.22% for survived share-only firms. Such percentage results
are in line with the Agency Cost hypothesis that despite the lower survival rate, unit firms,
which did survive, are more likely to receive additional funding through SEOs.
I also run a probit regression on the propensity of issuing seasoned offers using a dummy
variable SEO as the dependent variable shown in EQUATION 4.4. UNIT dummy is included
to indicate offer type. ACTIVE3 dummy aims to capture any relationship between the
probability of additional financing and firm survival rate three years post-listing. The
HGSC-adjusted initial return on the first trading day (IRD2) is employed to test whether initial
underpricing will affect long-term financial decisions. Net proceeds of the IPOs
(NETPROCEED) are included to detect any possible relation between offer size of the initial
public offering and the possibility of a second offering. LEVERAGE is calculated as total
debt divided by total asset to examine whether the debt component of the capital structure has
any effect on equity financing decisions. The marginal effects of variables are reported in
Panel B of TABLE 4.5. Both the UNIT dummy and survival dummy (ACTIVE3) are
positively related to SEO dummy and are highly significant at a 1% levels, indicating that unit
firms that did survive are more likely to receive subsequent financing. Net proceeds of the
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IPO are negatively significant at a 5% level, implying that firms that raise less funding in the
initial  public  offerings  are  more  likely  to  issue  additional  shares  within  3  years  of  the  IPO.
The initial returns of IPOs and debt leverage are not significant determinates on the likelihood
of subsequent financing.
EQUATION 4.4
INSERT TABLE 4.5 HERE
4.5.2.2 Comparison of survived unit SEO firms and survived share-only SEO firms
To confirm the results on the issuance of SEOs from survived unit and share-only firms, in
TABLE 4.6 I have illustrated means and medians of selected characteristics for unit SEO
firms in comparison to share-only SEO firms within n years of their survival (n=1, 2, and 3).
Unpaired Student’s t-tests assuming different variances are conducted in determining the
significance of differences in means, whilst the non-parametric Mann-Whitney (MW) tests
are conducted to examine differences in medians. The p-values are presented to indicate the
significance level of differences in means and medians.
Firstly, several variables are selected to compare firm-specific characters. Firm size, measured
by both the tangible asset and the market capitalisation immediately after IPO, are
significantly larger in both means and medians for share-only SEO firms than for unit SEO
firms. The average riskiness of share-only SEO firms is significantly lower than that of unit
SEO firms at 1% level but the difference in medians is not significant. With smaller firm size
and higher risk, unit firms that survived may have a greater need to issue additional equity to
support their growth comparing to survived share-only firms; which possess more assets,
larger market shares and more stable growth. Unit SEO firms also seem to have much lower
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) than that of share-only SEO firms. Although the
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difference in means is not significant suggested by t-value,  the  difference  in  medians  is
significant at 5% level indicated by the p-value of the Mann-Whitney Test. Such results imply
that although some unit firms survived, on average they generate much less income than
survived share-only firms to support their growth. The amounts of total debt by the time of
IPOs (TTLDEBT) are also compared between the two sub-samples to indicate the ability to
secure cheaper debt financing. Despite the low significance level of difference in means, the
median total debt of share-only SEO firms are significantly higher than that of unit SEO firms
at 5% level. With less income and lower ability to secure debt financing, survived unit firms
are more likely to issue seasoned offerings to support their on-going operation whilst
share-only firms can reinvest their earnings or/and secure cheaper loans to expand.
In addition to firm-specific factors, I also compared characteristics of the IPOs between the
unit SEO firms and share-only SEO firms. With high significance levels in both differences in
means and medians, it is apparent that unit SEO firms raised much smaller proceeds from
their initial public offerings than share-only IPOs. Given the nature of unit IPOs discussed in
the previous chapter, the issue size of unit IPOs is intentionally limited at the starting-up stage
for  unit  firms  because  they  tend  to  be  younger,  smaller  and  riskier  firms.  After  the
profitability of the firms’ investment projects have been verified by the market, the second
round of financing will be materialised through the exercise of attached warrants. However,
only very few warrants included in the IPOs are actually exercised before maturity (Schultz
1993b). This could be why survived unit firms are more likely to receive further funding
through seasoned equity issues than share-only firms. Another two IPO-related characteristics
are compared between unit  SEO sample and share-only SEO sample.  As a major part  of the
total cost of going public, the degree of underpricing is significantly higher for unit SEO firms
than  for  share-only  SEO  firms.  However,  when  the  total  expenses  (EXPENSE)  of  IPOs  for
the two sub-samples are compared, the result reversed. Share-only SEO firms exhibit
significantly higher total cost for their IPOs than the total cost of unit IPOs. Combining the
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low underpricing cost and high total cost of share-only IPOs, it is reasonable to assume that a
share-only IPOs’ high expense comes from the underwriting fees, while unit IPOs are likely
to be underwritten by less reputable agents as the previous chapter has proven. For survived
unit firms, they have strong motives to issue additional equity at lower discount to recoup the
underpricing cost from their IPOs through less expensive underwriters. Survived share-only
firms, which have less IPO underpricing cost to recover and more expensive SEO
underwriting fees to pay, they will be more selective about any further equity issues.
Overall, the comparison results from both the firm-specific factors and the IPO-related
characteristics confirm the previous probit regression results that survived unit firms are more
likely to issue seasoned equity offerings than survived share-only firms do. The UK evidence
on the subsequent financing of unit and share-only firms provides strong support to the
Agency Cost hypothesis.
INSERT TABLE 4.6 HERE
4.5.3 Stock price performance around SEO announcements
4.5.3.1 The announcement effect
To test Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.4 proposed in Section 4.3, I first examine the stock price
movement closely around the SEO announcement day with a 10-day window before and after
the announcement. TABLE 4.7 illustrates average abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) from 10 days preceding and following the announcement day for
the unit SEO firms in comparison to the benchmark index. In most cases, the news is
announced on event day -1, i.e. the Announcement Day (AD), and reported the next day.
Event day 0, i.e. the Publication Day (PD) is the day when the decision of a seasoned offering
is published, as documented in the Thomas One Banker database or the DataStream database.
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If an equity offering is announced before the market closes, then the market’s reaction to the
news actually predates the publication by one day. If the news is announced after the market
closes, the market will respond the next day and the reaction in fact takes place on event day 0.
I define both event day -1 and event day 0 as the ‘Announcement Period’ (AP).
As the results in Panel A of TABLE 4.7 indicate, the average raw return on event day 0 is
2.332% with several slight reversals before the announcement on event day -10, -3, and -2.
Nonetheless, the average abnormal returns of unit SEO firms have been clearly increasing 10
days before the announcement period. Such pattern is confirmed by the pervasively positive
and increasing cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The 10-day cumulative return for unit
SEO firms is 5.350% on the announcement day (AD) and 7.822% on the publication day (PD).
However, the general level of market returns 10 days before the announcement does not show
any sign of a stock price run-up. Rather, the average daily returns on the FTA Index are
largely negative for the 10 days before announcement. Despite the market’s less favourable
movement  before  the  announcement,  the  SEO  firms  show  a  more  apparent  pattern  of  stock
price appreciation before the announcement. The market-adjusted cumulative abnormal
returns are constantly positive 8 days before the announcements.
After the announcement day, the average raw returns on the SEO stocks deteriorate
significantly. The SEO stocks fall sharply immediately after the announcement on event day
+1, with all the 10 daily average raw returns being negative after the announcement day. The
results from the cumulative returns also affirmatively underpin the negative price reaction to
the announcement. The general level of market stays unaffected during the announcements,
displaying consistent negative returns on the FTA Index as before. The market-adjusted mean
abnormal returns after the announcement are significantly negative and declining with a very
mild reversal  on event day +5. The cumulative results confirm the deterioration of the stock
performance for the 10 days after the seasoned offering has been announced.
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In Panel B of TABLE 4.7, the two-day announcement period average CAR is computed, in
particular, to capture the effect of an announcement due to its timing relative to the market’s
trading  hours.  As  mentioned  previously,  if  the  decisions  of  SEO issuance  are  announced  on
event  day  -1  (the  Announcement  Day)  after  the  market  is  closed,  it  will  be  reported  on  the
next day (the Publication Day). If an equity offering is announced before the market closes,
then the market will react to the news on the Announcement Day. Therefore, both event day
-1 and event day 0 are defined as the ‘Announcement Period’. As Panel B demonstrates, the
cumulative returns for the two-day announcement period are significantly positive, which
confirms  the  results  from Panel  A that  there  is  an  apparent  price  run-up  10  days  before  the
SEO announcement.
INSERT TABLE 4.7 HERE
To explore the timing of SEO issuance over a longer period, the average cumulative abnormal
returns 90 days preceding and following the SEO announcements are illustrated in TABLE
4.8. Positive average cumulative abnormal returns are observed for the 90-days preceding the
announcement day. 90 days before the announcement, the average FTA-adjusted CAR is
-0.103% whereas the FTA-adjusted average CAR for the 60-day period before the
announcement is 4.05%. As the time draws closer to the announcement (30 days before the
announcement), the stock price run-ups display signs of acceleration (8.501% after market
adjustment). The average market-adjusted CAR five days before the announcement is 8.422%.
On the announcement day, the market-adjusted CAR surged up to 12.635%. After the
seasoned offerings have been announced, the average CARs decline significantly. From day
+25 onwards, the cumulative abnormal returns become negative and the decreasing trend
remained (-3.629% for day +30, -8677% for day +60, and -14.294% for day 90). Clearly,
throughout the whole 180 days surrounding the SEO announcements, the market index
provides very stable performance with very mild variation and remains unaffected by the
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events. To provide a visual conclusion; in FIGURE 4.2, I plot the average raw and
market-adjusted cumulative returns of the portfolio of unit firms that conducted SEOs within
three years of their unit IPOs, for 90 days before and after the SEO announcement. As clearly
displayed, a pattern of stock price appreciation before the announcement of seasoned
offerings and an apparent price decline afterwards is captured. The market index movements,
on the other hand, remain unaffected throughout the event of seasoned offerings.
To sum up, the study of stock price performance around SEO announcements made by unit
IPO firms supports both Hypothesis 4.3 that there is a significant price run-up before SEOs
are announced; and Hypothesis 4.4 that there is a negative price reaction to the SEO
announcements. Managerial insiders of these unit firms appear to sell additional shares
following a period in which the stocks outperform the market. Subsequent to the SEO
announcements, however, superior performance ceases and general underperformance of the
SEO firms are observed. Such deterioration of stock performance after the SEO
announcements can be explained by new investors ‘adverse selection’. As rational investors,
new subscribers expect the managers will only conduct an additional sale of shares when they
believe their company’s shares are overvalued. On behalf of the existing shareholders, the
managers are trying to exploit the window of opportunity and sell overvalued shares. While
such decisions are in the existing shareholders’ interests, the benefit comes at the cost of new
investors’ interests if they buy the overvalued shares. As a result, the new investors rationally
revise  their  valuation  of  the  SEO shares  downwards,  which  causes  the  stock  price  fall  right
after the seasoned issues have been announced. Despite the fact that seasoned issues are
conducted following a period of price appreciation, the results in TABLE 4.8 and FIGURE
4.2 provide no evidence of managers’ ability to time the market for their decision to issue new
shares. The performance of the FTA Index does not show significant volatility that can be
related to the SEO events. The results indicate increasing pre-announcement market-adjusted
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abnormal returns and decreasing post-announcement market-adjusted returns, but no timing
pattern for the general level of market returns surrounding the announcement date.
INSERT TABLE 4.8 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 4.2 HERE
4.5.3.2 Potential causes of price reaction
In order to assess the potential causes for stock price appreciation before SEO announcements,
a linear regression is conducted for individual announcement period returns, shown as
EQUATION 4.5. The following variables are included in the regression in the projection that
these indicators are used by the market in predicting any SEO announcement. The dependent
variable, price run-up of the SEO firms (SEOUP), is calculated as the buy-and-hold abnormal
returns 90 days before the announcement day. The market index level (MKTUP) is measured
by the buy-and-hold returns for the same period. Firm characteristics prior to listing such as
debt LEVERAGE, profitability (EBIT), INSIDER ownership, firm riskiness (RISK) are also
included in explanation of the price appreciation before SEO announcements. The last
variable is the FTA Index-adjusted monthly buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the SEO firms
for 12 months after the initial public offering, indicating their medium-term performance.
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EQUATION 4.5
As  the  results  from  TABLE  4.9  indicate  the  price  run-up  of  the  SEO  firms  (SEOUP),  is
positively related to the market index level (MKTUP) over the same period. The debt
LEVERAGE of unit firms prior to listing is also significantly and positively related to the
stock price appreciation before these unit firms announced to issue seasoned offerings. Such a
positive correlation implies that the higher debt leverage unit firms possess at time of listing
can significantly cause higher level of price increase before the SEO announcement. EBIT of
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unit  firms  prior  to  listing  is  negatively  related  to  the  level  of  price  increase  before  the  SEO
announcement. The p-value for this coefficient, however, is not significant. The INSIDER
holding of the unit firm at time of the IPO projects a significantly positive impact on the stock
price run-up preceding the announcement and it is significant at 5% level. Investors assume
that managerial insiders have more information about the expected future cash flows of their
companies. Since it is costly for managers to hold a substantial fraction of their own
company’s shares, managers are motivated to hold large stock positions only if they expect
higher future cash flows than the firm’s current value. Therefore, rational investors will view
managerial holdings as a credible signal of firm quality. A high level of insider holding even
at time of the IPO can positively influence the investors’ predictions of seasoned issues in the
future. The riskiness of unit firms (RISK) also has significantly positive influence on the
market expectation to predict a SEO announcement. Riskier unit firms experience higher price
run-up before the SEO announcement. The 12-month BHARs post-listing are positively
related to the level of price appreciation before the SEO announcements. The result is highly
significant at 1% level, implying that unit firms, which exhibit better medium-term stock
performance, will experience higher price run-up before issuance of SEOs. The coefficient of
determination R2 (46.79%) is presented to indicate the goodness of fit for the regression. The
magnitude of R2 is not high, which can be explained by the limited sample size. However, the
F-statistic is  highly significant at  1% level.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) for included
variables are all around the value of one, suggesting that there is no multicollinearity among
the independent variables. Overall, the regression results provide reliable indications.
INSERT TABLE 4.9 HERE
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4.5.4 Warrant characteristics and the decision to issue SEOs
Paul Schultz (1993) provides evidence that by issuing units, firms pre-commit to a seasoned
offering at the exercise price of warrants, designed to take place when the warrants are called
or voluntarily exercised. A sequential offering is applied for an IPO for the same reason that
venture capitalists provide equity financing in stages. Giving management more money than it
needs to fund current investments provides a free cash flow that might be squandered if
investment opportunities fail to materialise.
Staged equity financing can also be achieved through a share-only IPO followed by a
seasoned equity offering (SEO). However, an advantage of a unit IPO is that the price of the
seasoned offering shares is set in advance as the warrant exercise price. In addition, if the
second round of financing is to be achieved through exercise of the warrants, the proceeds
from the  IPO must  be  used  to  ascertain  the  value  of  the  firm’s  projects.  More  interestingly,
Schultz (1993)’s US data shows that most of the warrant exercise prices in unit offerings are
set  above  the  current  stock  price.  Schultz  (1993b)  also  argues  that  such  an  offer  would
motivate management to use the IPO proceeds wisely to convey information about the firm’s
true value; because only when the share price rises above the warrant exercise price would the
second round of financing materialise. Without such monitoring mechanisms, management’s
incentive would be to invest IPO proceeds to ensure the security of their jobs. In my UK
sample, 54.35% of the unit warrants are issued with their exercise price set equal to the
placing price; 33.7% of the warrants are issued out-of-money with their exercise price set
above the placing price; and only 11.96% of the warrants are actually issued in-the-money.
To examine the likelihood of a unit IPO firm issuing SEOs in association to the characteristics
of  warrants  attached  to  the  initial  sale  of  shares,  I  conduct  a  probit  regression  presented  as
EQUATION 4.6. The independent variable is the SEO dummy, which is equal to 1 if a unit
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firm issued a seasoned equity offering within three years of its IPO. The initial underpricing
on the first trading day (IRD2) is included to test Hypothesis 4.5 that unit firms, which were
more  underpriced  at  the  time  of  IPOs,  are  more  likely  to  conduct  SEOs  within  three  years
post-listing. In examination of Hypotheses 4.6-4.7, the OUT dummy takes the value of 1 if
warrants are issued out-of-money, 0 if otherwise and the LIFE of warrants is calculated as the
number of years between listing and warrant expiration day. The EXERCISE dummy takes
the value of 1 if the attached warrants have been exercised three years post-listing, 0 if
otherwise and is included to test Hypothesis 4.8.
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EQUATION 4.6
The results from probit regression are illustrated in TABLE 4.10. The initial underpricing is
negatively  related  to  the  SEO  dummy  at  10%  level,  in  rejection  of  Hypothesis  4.5.  As
previously documented in CHAPTER 3, unit IPOs are more underpriced than share-only IPO
firms. According to the Signalling hypothesis, the managerial insiders intentionally
underprice the initial sale of shares to signal firm quality in hope that they can recoup the cost
of underpricing through issuing seasoned offerings at a more favourable price. As such with
higher the initial underpricing, the management of unit firms should have higher incentives to
recover  the  cost  by  issuing  SEOs.  On  the  contrary,  the  results  from  my  unit  IPO  sample
generate a significantly negative coefficient (-0.1580) on the initial return variable, which
implies that unit IPO firms that achieved higher initial returns are less likely to conduct a
seasoned offer within three years of their IPOs. Therefore, the UK evidence from subsequent
financing of unit firms does not support the Signalling hypothesis’ prediction.
The coefficient on dummy variable OUT is significantly negative (-0.6019) at 5% level,
indicating that if the attached warrants in an IPO were issued out-of-money, it is less likely
that the unit firm will conduct a second offering within 3 years of its IPO. If insiders
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intentionally attach out-of-money warrants in unit IPOs, these warrants could only be
exercised when the company’s share price exceed the warrant exercise price. Implicitly, this
warrant feature creates an incentive for the management of unit firms to use the IPO proceeds
wisely to increase their companies’ share prices, so that the warrants will be exercised and the
second round of financing materialised. Therefore, the UK data provide strong support to
Hypothesis 4.6 that unit firms, which issued out-of-money warrants, are less likely to rely on
SEOs for future funding. Such explanation is in line with the Agency Cost explanation for
including warrants to reduce agency costs.
The  coefficient  on  the  gross  proceeds  from  warrant  subscription  if  they  are  to  be  exercised
(WARRANTPROCEED)  is  positive,  but  not  statistically  significant.  One  explanation  could
be that, the higher the projected warrant proceeds at the time of the IPO, the more funds the
unit IPO firm is planning to receive for the second round of financing to support future
value-generating activities. With the low probability of the warrants ever to be exercised, it is
more likely for those firms to turn to a seasoned equity issue for the funding of any projects
with positive NPV. A similar implication is drawn from the coefficient on warrants’ life. The
negative coefficient implies that the shorter the warrants’ life before expiration, the more
likely for them to expire before meeting the criteria to be exercised; and so the higher the unit
firms’ reliance on a seasoned equity sale to raise the funds.  Again,  the significance level for
this coefficient is relatively low and fails to support Hypothesis 4.7. The negative coefficient
on the EXERCISE dummy is not significant and fails to support Hypothesis 4.8, which
predicts that if unit firms did not exercise the warrants, they are more likely to issue SEOs as
the second round of financing. The underwriter REPUTATION is positive and significant at
10% level, indicating that if the unit IPO is marketed by a reputable underwriter, the unit firm
is more likely to conduct SEOs within three years post-listing.
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In conclusion, the above analysis confirms that some characteristics of the warrants attached
in a unit IPO possess predictive power over managerial decision of whether conducting a
seasoned equity offer within three years post-listing. The more underpriced the unit IPOs, the
less likely, that these unit firms will issue additional shares in the near future. Unit IPOs
whose attached warrants are issued out-of-money, are less likely to issue SEOs. On the other
hand, the warrant proceeds, time before warrant expiration, and the eventual outcome of
warrant contract (exercised or expired) do not have statistically significant impact on
management’s decision to conduct seasoned equity offering three years post-listing.
INSERT TABLE 4.10 HERE
4.6 Summary and conclusions
Continuing the examination of the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses in CHAPTER
3 with evidence from initial underpricing and short-term performance, CHAPTER 4 aims to
investigate the post-listing survival and subsequent financing of unit IPOs in test of the
competing explanations for including warrants. The test of the Agency Cost hypothesis are
motivated by Schultz (1993b)’s unique prediction that fewer unit firms will survive
comparing to share-only firms; but survived unit firms are more likely to issue seasoned
equity offerings for further funding. The examination of the Signalling hypothesis are
motivated by its prediction that unit firms which underprice the initial offering tend to issue
seasoned equity at higher prices to recoup the costs of signalling (occurred in the underpricing,
insider retention, and the inclusion of warrants) at the time of unit IPOs.
In Section 4.5.1, the descriptive results are consistent with the Agency Cost prediction that
unit firms are more likely to be delisted than firms that issue shares alone. A probit regression
analysis is conducted using survival dummy as the dependent variable and estimated in
relation  to  offer  type  dummy UNIT and  several  firm characteristics  for  one,  three,  and  five
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years post-listing respectively. For all three test-periods, the UNIT dummy is significantly
negative at 1% level; providing strong support for the Agency Cost hypothesis that unit firms
are more likely to fail comparing to share-only IPO firms. Evidence was found that firms with
higher insider ownership are more likely to survive up to three-years post-listing; firms with
higher  initial  returns  are  more  likely  to  survive  their  IPO  by  one  year.  On  the  other  hand,
firms, which were brought to the market by reputable underwriters, have a better chance of
surviving three to five years post-listing. No significant relation is found between the survival
rate of an IPO firm and its leverage level.
The mean and median values of selected firm characteristics for unit firms and share-only
firms, which survived the full 3-year period following their IPOs, are compared. Results
indicate unit firms which have already survived the three-year period after their IPOs are
significantly smaller, riskier, with lower debt leverage and less earnings than share-only firms
that survived the same time interval. Those firm-specific characteristics confirmed the
survival rate results before. The characteristics concerning the offerings, such as issue size,
underpricing, and the cost of the IPOs for survived unit and share-only firms are also
illustrated in comparison. Evidence is found that survived unit firms have significantly less
proceeds  from  their  IPOs  than  those  of  survived  share-only  firms.  With  less  money  raised
from the IPOs to support their growth, unit firms are less likely to survive, which again
supports the Agency Cost hypothesis. The HGSC-adjusted initial returns on the first trading
day (IRD2) are significantly higher for survived unit firms than for share-only firms in both
means and medians at 1% level. The abnormally high degree of underpricing for unit IPOs
may attract more aftermarket trading; however, if there are no value-generating projects for
unit firms to invest in, the bonding effect of attached warrants will discourage managers from
wasting their IPO proceeds on negative-NPV projects. As a result, unit firms are less likely to
materialise warrant proceeds to support their growth and are more likely to run out of business.
The total expense of the IPO is much higher for survived share-only firms than for survived
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unit firms, which confirms the previous finding that share-only IPOs tend to employ highly
reputable underwriters to market for their issues; and the certification effect of prestigious
underwriters significantly increase the chance of a firm’s long-term survival. Lower
efficiency ratios are also found for survived unit firms suggesting that unit firms have lower
profitability and asset utilisation and therefore higher agency costs than share-only firms.
Overall, in strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis, the evidence from the UK proves
that unit firms are smaller, riskier, with lower debt leverage, less earnings, and higher agency
costs; and unit IPOs are smaller issues with high underpricing and less reputable underwriters.
Such firms are less likely to survive comparing to bigger, less risky share-only firms with
more earnings, higher debt leverage, and lower agency costs; and whose IPOs are
underwritten by prestigious agents with less underpricing and much larger proceeds to support
their growth.
The second objective of this chapter is to test whether survived unit IPO firms are more likely
to issue seasoned equity offerings than share-only IPO firms are. As the results from Section
4.5.2 indicate, 84.57% of the 350 firms in total are still actively trading three years after their
IPOs, 57.43% of which issued seasoned offerings within this three-year period. A much
higher 82.09% of survived unit firms issued seasoned equity offerings comparing to only
50.22% for survived share-only firms. Such percentage results are in line with the Agency
Cost  hypothesis  that  despite  the  lower  survival  rate,  survived  unit  firms,  are  more  likely  to
receive additional funding through seasoned equity offerings. A probit regression on the
propensity of SEO issuance is conducted. Both the UNIT dummy and survival rate dummy
are positively related to SEO dummy and are highly significant at a 1% level, indicating that
unit firms that did survive are more likely to receive subsequent financing. Additional
evidence was found that firms, which raise less funding in their IPOs, are more likely to issue
seasoned offerings. Overall, The UK evidence from the subsequent financing provides strong
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis.
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Section 4.5.3 investigates the stock price reactions to the SEO announcements made by unit
IPO firms. Results suggest an apparent price run-up before the announcement of the seasoned
issues, and a significant decline in share prices after the SEOs have been announced. Such
results are robust for both the 10-day and 90-day windows. Evidence is found that managerial
insiders of the SEO firms sell stock following a period in which the stock appears to
outperform the market. Subsequent to the announcement of seasoned issues, superior
performance ceases and general underperformance of the SEO firms is observed. Such
deterioration of stock performance after the SEO announcement can be explained by new
investors ‘adverse selection’. Potential causes for stock price appreciation before the SEO
announcements is assessed with a linear regression conducted on the level of price run-up 90
days before the announcement day. Results suggest that the general market level, the
percentage of insider holding, the riskiness and the debt leverage of unit firms at time of the
unit IPOs can significantly influence new investors’ expectations in prediction of the
announcement of a seasoned issue and cause higher level of price increase before the
announcement day. Finally yet importantly, the FTA Index-adjusted 12-month buy-and-hold
abnormal returns of unit IPOs, indicating their medium-term performance, are also
significantly positive, implying that one year following the unit IPOs, well-performed unit
firms are more likely to issue seasoned equity offerings.
Section 4.5.4 examines the unit firm’s decision to issue SEOs in association of firm-specific
characters and warrant features at the time of IPOs. Evidence was found that some
characteristics of the warrants attached in a unit IPO possess predictive power over
managerial decision to conduct a seasoned equity offer within three years post-listing. Unit
IPOs, whose attached warrants are issued out-of-money, are less likely to issue SEOs. On the
other hand, the warrant proceeds, time before warrant expiration, and the eventual outcome of
warrant contract (exercised or expired) do not have statistically significant impact on the
issuance of seasoned equity offering three years post-listing, possibly due to limited sample
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size. Last but importantly, the SEO dummy is found to be negatively and significantly related
to the initial underpricing of unit IPOs, which implies that the more underpriced unit IPOs are
less likely to issue additional shares in the near future. Such results contradict the Signalling
hypothesis, which explain the inclusion of warrants and the underpricing are all costly signals
of firm quality and the cost of signalling will be recovered through seasoned issues at higher
price. Therefore, the UK evidence from subsequent financing of unit firms does not support
the Signalling hypothesis’ prediction.
Overall, the UK evidence from the post-listing survival and subsequent financing of unit IPO
firms provide strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis but fails to support the Signalling
hypothesis.  Unit  IPO  firms  in  the  UK  have  lower  survival  rate  than  that  of  share-only  IPO
firms. However, survived unit firms are more likely to receive further funding through
seasoned issues of shares than share-only firms are. In addition, there is a clear pattern of
price appreciation (price run-up) before the SEO announcements, and a negative price
reaction immediately after the SEO issuance. Evidently, the unit firms tend to issue seasoned
shares when they are overvalued. However, the more underpriced unit IPOs are less likely to
issue additional shares. The cost of underpricing, if it was meant for signalling firm quality, is
not always recovered via SEO issuance. The next chapter will continue to investigate the
reasons for choosing unit IPOs with a long-term focus.
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TABLES
TABLE 4.1
Definitions of included variables
Variables Definition
ACTIVE n Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm survived the full n-year period
following its IPO
AGE Number of calendar days between firm incorporation and the listing date
AIM Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is listed on Alternative
Investment Market (AIM), 0 if otherwise
BHAR-12 The HGSC Index-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of SEO firms 12 months
after their unit IPOs
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year
prior to the IPOs
EXERCISE Dummy  variable  that  is  equal  to  1  if  the  warrants  attached  to  the  IPO  are
already exercised at the time of this research, 0 if otherwise
EXPENSE Percentage of total expense to gross proceeds of the IPOs
INSIDER Percentage of directors’ holdings in their own company immediately after the
listing
IRD2 HGSC-adjusted initial return on first trading day
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt to total asset by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
LIFE Number of years before warrant expiration
Ln(PROCEED) The natural logarithm of the expected gross proceeds from the IPO
MKT2BK Market-to-book ratio of IPO firms immediately post-listing
MKTCAP Market capitalisation of the issued share capital following the listing at the
placing price
MKTUP The price run-up  in  the  HGSC  Index  over  the  90  days  before  SEO
announcements, which is measured by its buy-and-hold abnormal returns
NI Net income after tax by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
DEBT The ratio of total debt divided by the gross IPO proceeds
NETPROCEED The proceeds net of any expenses from the IPOs
OUT Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the warrants attached to the IPO
are issued out-of-money, 0 if otherwise
PROCEEDS The expected gross proceeds of the IPOs
REPUTATION Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the underwriter has a high reputation
ranking, 0 if otherwise
REVENUE The ratio of total revenue divided by the gross proceeds from IPO
RISK Firm riskiness, measured by the residual standard deviations of the discrete
share return 200 days following the IPO
SEO Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm issued the first seasoned equity
offer within 5 years of its IPO; 0 if otherwise
SEOUP The stock price run-up  for  SEO  firms  over  the  90-day pre-announcement
period, measured by its buy-and-hold abnormal returns
TTLASSET Total asset of the sample firms by end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
TTLREVENUE Total revenue of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
UNIT Dummy variable that  takes the value of 1 if  the IPO includes warrants,  0 if
otherwise
WARRANTPROCEED The gross proceeds from the warrant subscription if the warrants are
exercised
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TABLE 4.2
Survival of unit IPO firms and share-only IPO firms.
The complete sample of 350 IPOs listed on London Stock Exchange during the period of 1994-2006,
comprises of 92 unit firms and 258 share-only firms. Panel A exhibits the cumulative 1, 3, or 5-year
survival rate of both the unit and share-only IPO samples. Companies are classified as failure if they
are delisted from the London Stock Exchange because they have an insufficient number of market
makers, fail to pay fees, have insufficient capital, or have similar problems. N1 represents the number
of firms which are still actively trading on the exchange, whereas N2 represents the number of delisted
firms by the end of year n (n=1,3,or 5). The cumulative survival rate is calculated as the N1/ (N1+N2)
by the end of year 1, 3, and 5, respectively. Panel B presents three probit regressions, reporting
marginal effects on the factors that affect the probability of an IPO firm’s survival. The dependent
variable in each regression, is the binary survival dummy ACTIVEin, which takes the value of 1 if firm
i is still listed and actively trading by the end of year n (n=1, 3 ,and 5, respectively, in the three
regressions), 0 if otherwise. Under each time interval, the number of censored observations (N1) and
delisted observations (N2) are presented. The p-values  of  coefficients  are  reported  in  parentheses  to
demonstrate significance levels. Pseudo R2, LR Chi2, log likelihood, and correctly predicted
percentage are presented to indicate the goodness of fit.
Panel. A: Survival rates for 1, 3 or 5 years after IPO
Unit IPOs (92) Share-only IPOs (258) Total (350)
Period N1 N2 Survival
rate
N1 N2 Survival
rate
N1 N2 Survival
rate1 Year 90 2 97.83% 258 0 100% 348 2 99.42%
3 Years 67 25 72.83% 229 29 88.76% 296 54 84.57%
5 Years 58 34 63.04% 187 71 72.48% 245 105 70.00%
Panel B: Probit regression of survival within n years, reporting marginal effects
Number of observations
N =350
ACTIVEi1
(N1=348, N2=2)
ACTIVEi3
(N1=296, N2=54)
ACTIVEi5
(N1=245, N2=105)
INTERCEPT 0.2232(0.000)a
0.2526
(0.001)a
0.6983
(0.051)b
UNIT -0.1523(0.000)a
-0.2838
(0.000)a
-0.5458
(0.000)a
REPUTATION 0.0122(0.327)
0.1284
(0.005)a
0.4050
(0.000)a
IRD240
0.0087
(0.083)c
0.0137
(0.319)
-0.0022
(0.046)b
INSIDER 0.0767(0.001)a
0.1361
(0.050)b
0.0385
(0.763)
LEVERAGE 0.0110(0.165)
0.0142
(0.461)
0.0078
(0.591)
ASSET -0.0161(0.924)
-0.0164
(0.380)
-0.0129
(0.081)c
LR Chi2 76.65(0.000)a
77.38
(0.000)a
144.42
(0.000)a
Pseudo R2 40.29% 27.49% 31.27%
Log likelihood -56.78 -113.52 -158.69
Correctly predicted percentage 75.16% 76.13% 69.89%
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (z- test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (z- test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (z- test).
40 The HGSC-adjusted first-week initial return relative to the offer price IRW1 is also adopted as alternative underpricing
measure in the Probit regression in Panel B of TABLE 4.2. The results and conclusions are very similar and therefore not
included in this thesis.
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TABLE 4.3
Descriptive statistics of survived IPO firms 3 years post-listing
Means and medians of selected firm characteristics for share-only and unit firms, which
survived  the  full  3-year  periods  following  their  IPOs,  are  presented.  N  is  the  number  of
survived  firms,  which  are  still  listed  on  the  London  Stock  Exchange.  Definitions  of  the
variables are listed in TABLE 4.1. Unpaired Student’s t-Tests assuming different variances
for survived unit firms and share-only firms are conducted in determining the significance of
differences in means, whilst Mann-Whitney (MW) Test’s p-values are illustrated to indicate
the significance of differences in medians.
Survived
share-only firm
Survived
Unit firm
t-test and
MWtest
TANGIBLE(£m) Mean 5.58 1.16 0.010a
Median 0.52 0.02 0.000a
TTLASSET(£m) Mean 16.01 5.61 0.007a
Median 2.98 1.01 0.000a
MKTCAP(£m) Mean 49.35 24.64 0.003a
Median 25.11 9.82 0.000a
RISK Mean 0.034 0.045 0.009a
Median 0.03 0.04 0.000a
EBIT(£m) Mean 3.55 0.75 0.000a
Median 0.90 0.00 0.000a
TTLDEBT(£m) Mean 12.85 4.27 0.006a
Median 1.82 0.39 0.000a
INSIDER Mean 0.40 0.38 0.210
Median 0.40 0.36 0.344
GROSSPROCEEDS Mean 16.76 6.88 0.000a
(£m) Median 7.00 2.84 0.000a
IRD2 Mean 0.07 0.46 0.005a
Median 0.05 0.20 0.000a
TTLEXPENSE(£m) Mean 4.47 0.80 0.000a
Median 1.00 0.00 0.000a
REV/TTLASSET Mean 1.32 0.93 0.107c
Median 0.94 0.03 0.000a
EBIT/TTLASSET Mean 0.16 -0.40 0.070c
Median 0.23 0.00 0.000a
NI/TTLASSET Mean -0.35 -0.58 0.472
Median 0.01 -0.07 0.010a
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (two-tailed test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (two-tailed test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 4.4
Distribution of unit IPOs and SEOs by market condition
Average capital raised, is the average gross proceeds from the IPO in millions, average number of
new shares offered (millions), average insider holding (%), average firm-value sold as warrants
(%), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and total debt (TtlDebt). The sub-period of 1994-95,
1999, and 2001-03 are considered the cold market period; when the market suffers general loss and
has less IPO activities, whereas, the sub-periods of 1996-08, 2000, and 2004-06 indicate overall
price appreciation on the market index and display more IPO activities.
Issue
Period
Total
Unit IPOs
Total
SEOs
Capital
Raised
(£m)
Share
Offered
(m)
Insider
(%)
Firm-value
sold as
warrants
(%)
EBIT
(£m)
TtlDebt
(£m)
1994-95 6 3 3.2 15.4 24.9 13.8 2.5 4.0
1996-98 17 11 4.3 16.6 31.6 6.7 1.5 5.5
1999 4 1 3.1 10.5 39.1 15.0 0.5 1.3
2000 16 11 7.9 62.2 38.4 9.6 2.0 2.4
2001-03 11 6 3.3 29.8 54.8 25.7 1.3 2.6
2004-06 38 27 8.9 28.5 33.4 18.2 0.06 4.6
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TABLE 4.5
Subsequent financing for survived unit firms and share-only firms
The complete sample of 350 IPOs listed on London Stock Exchange during the period of 1994-2006,
comprises of 92 unit firms and 258 share-only firms. ACTIVE3 is the number (percentage) of IPO
firms that survived three years after the IPO. ACTIVE3 SEO indicates the number (percentage)
of firms, which survived the whole three-year period post-listing and issued a seasoned
offering. Probit regression is conducted on dummy variable SEO for all 350 IPOs in the
sample, which takes the value of 1 if firm i issued its first seasoned equity offering within 3
years after its IPOs. The marginal effects of variables are reported with the p-values in parentheses
to indicate significance level. Pseudo R2, LR Chi2, log likelihood, and correctly predicted percentage
are presented to indicate the goodness of fit. Definitions of included variables please refer to
TABLE 4.1.
Panel A: Proportion of sample firms issuing SEOs
Unit IPOs (92) Share-only IPOs (258) All IPOs (350)
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Active3 67 72.83% 229 88.76% 296 84.57%
ACTIVE3
SEO
55 82.09% 115 50.22% 170 57.43%
Panel B: Probit regression of the probability of issuing SEOs ( reporting marginal effects)
iiiiiii LEVERAGEACTIVENETPROCEEDIRUNITSEO zllllll ++++++= 5432210 3
Variable INTERCEPT UNIT IRD241 NETPROCEED ACTIVE3 LEVERAGE
Coefficient -0.4717
(0.000)a
0.2730
(0.000)a
-0.0617
(0.237)
-3.56E-08
(0.038)b
0.1879
(0.028)a
-0.0302
(0.233)
Pseudo R2 =15.44% LR Chi2= 26.40
       (0.054)b
Log likelihood= -129.39 Correctly predicted
percentage=61.09%
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (z- test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (z- test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (z- test).
41 Alternative measurement of initial underpricing is adopted using the first-week initial underpricing relative to the offer
price (IRW1), which provide similar results only with lower significance level. To save space, the results are not included in
this thesis.
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TABLE4.6
Descriptive statistics for survived unit SEO firms and share-only SEO firms
Means and medians for selected firm characteristics of unit firms and share-only firms are compared for sub-samples of firms that survived the full 1, 3, and 5 years
following their IPOs respectively. Unpaired Student’s t-Tests assuming different variances for survived unit firms and share-only firms are conducted in determining
the significance of differences in means, whilst Mann-Whitney (MW) Test’s p-values are illustrated to indicate the significance of differences in medians.
ACTIVE1 ACTIVE3 ACTIVE5
Variables Share-only
SEO
Unit
SEO
t-test
and
MW test
Share-only
SEO
Unit
SEO
t-test
and
MW test
Share-only
SEO
Unit
SEO
t-test
and
MW test
MKTCAP (£m) Mean 48.31 24.89 0.007a 48.96 25.38 0.047b 47.88 24.93 0.100c
Median 17.99 9.82 0.018a 18.18 9.82 0.013a 20.00 9.43 0.018a
TANGIBLE(£m) Mean 3.14 1.28 0.038b 3.19 1.31 0.097c 3.41 1.43 0.120
Median 0.21 0.03 0.017a 0.22 0.02 0.021b 0.22 0.03 0.055b
RISK Mean 0.040 0.044 0.004a 0.0400 0.0447 0.158 0.039 0.044 0.152
Median 0.04 0.04 0.130 0.0370 0.0387 0.156 0.04 0.04 0.182
EBIT(£m) Mean 2.20 1.02 0.270 2.24 0.68 0.045b 2.07 0.62 0.081c
Median 0.25 0.00 0.039b 0.25 0.00 0.012a 0.19 -0.004 0.043b
TTLDEBT(£m) Mean 8.45 5.08 0.324 8.58 5.12 0.377 8.38 5.07 0.440
Median 1.05 0.52 0.048b 1.05 0.39 0.027b 1.05 0.45 0.036b
GROSSPROCEED(£m) Mean 11.80 7.37 0.049b 11.93 7.62 0.125 12.08 6.58 0.061c
Median 5.02 2.84 0.001a 5.50 2.56 0.001a 5.50 2.45 0.001a
EXPENSE(£m) Mean 3.43 0.82 0.006a 3.48 0.83 0.009a 3.51 0.82 0.016a
Median 0.66 0.45 0.001a 0.70 0.40 0.001a 0.66 0.38 0.002a
IRD2 Mean 0.06 0.51 0.000a 0.05 0.48 0.001a 0.02 0.54 0.000a
Median 0.00 0.25 0.000a 0.00 0.24 0.000a 0.00 0.20 0.000a
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (two-tailed test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (two-tailed test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tailed test).
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TABLE 4.7
The immediate SEO announcement effect
Panel A: Stock performance surrounding the announcement day
The raw average return for the unit SEO firms on event day t, Rseo,t,are calculated as the sum of all daily
returns for event day t divided by the number of firms in the sample that trades on that day (nt). The
market movement, Rfta,t, is measured by the average daily abnormal returns of the FTSE All Share (FTA)
Index for the same time period. The market-adjusted average daily return for SEO firms on trading day t
(ARt) is the difference between average abnormal returns of unit SEO firms and the average abnormal
returns of the FTA Index, as å
=
-=
tn
i
itFTAitSEO
t
RR
n 1
,,t )(
1AR .  The  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  are
computed as the summation of average abnormal returns (ARs) for the market-adjusted abnormal returns.
SEO FTA MKT-ADJUSTED
DAY Rseo,t (%) Rfta,t (%) ARt (%) t-Test for AR CAR (%) t-Test for CAR
-10 -1.411 0.034 -1.445 -1.45 -1.445 -1.45d
-9 0.939 -0.085 1.024 2.30a -0.421 -0.37
-8 1.248 0.186 1.062 1.14 0.642 0.42
-7 1.074 -0.017 1.091 0.76 1.732 0.96
-6 0.217 -0.007 0.224 0.78 1.956 1.22
-5 1.593 -0.060 1.652 2.25a 3.608 1.66c
-4 1.688 -0.118 1.806 1.37 5.414 1.96b
-3 -0.347 -0.124 -0.223 -0.42 5.191 1.90b
-2 -0.021 -0.026 0.005 0.02 5.196 1.90b
-1 (AD) 0.345 0.192 0.153 0.33 5.350 1.88c
0 (PD) 2.332 -0.140 2.472 1.74c 7.822 2.17a
+1 -3.654 -0.078 -3.576 -1.74b 4.246 0.98
+2 -0.626 -0.129 -0.497 -0.83 3.749 0.84
+3 -2.749 -0.274 -2.475 -1.56c 1.274 0.26
+4 -0.567 -0.049 -0.518 -0.94 0.756 0.15
+5 -0.090 -0.155 0.065 0.14 0.821 0.16
+6 -0.442 -0.146 -0.296 -0.57 0.525 0.10
+7 -0.429 -0.004 -0.425 -0.91 0.100 0.01
+8 -0.779 -0.158 -0.621 -2.19a -0.521 -0.12
+9 -0.668 0.164 -0.833 -2.46a -1.353 -0.31
+10 -0.970 0.112 -1.082 -2.89a -2.435 -0.54
Panel B: The two-day announcement period stock reaction
The two-day return for firm i is CAR i,-1,0, where 0,1,01-iCAR ii ARAR += -，， And ARi,-1 is SEO firm i’s abnormal
return on the day prior to a published announcement of seasoned offering, and ARi,0 is the excess return to
firm i on the day an announcement is published to the market investors.
SEO MKT-ADJUSTED
2-day announcement CAR (%)
(StDev)
2.68
(0.1455)
2.63
(0.1482)
t-statistic 2.41a 2.36a
186
TABLE 4.8
The price performance of unit SEO firms comparing to the FTA Index
Average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for 90 days before until 90 days after the
announcement,  for  unit  IPO  firms  which  decide  to  issue  an  additional  sale  of  sales  within
five years of the initial public offering in the period 1994-2006. The cumulative abnormal
returns  for  both  the  SEO firms  and  the  FTSE All  Share  (FTA)  Index  are  calculated  as  the
summation of daily average abnormal returns: å
-=
=
90
90
t90,-CAR
t
tAR  The market-adjusted CARs are
the resulting difference between the SEO raw average CARs and the FTA Index CARs for
the corresponding period.
DAY Rseo,t(%)
Rfta,t
(%)
MKT-
Adjusted
AR%
t-Test
for AR
p-value
for AR
MKT-Ad
justed
CAR%
t-Test
for CAR
p-value
for CAR
-90 -0.219 -0.116 -0.103 -1.25 0.217 -0.103 -0.99 0.324
-85 2.143 0.038 2.105 1.24 0.221 1.594 0.90 0.373
-80 -0.917 0.137 -1.055 -1.73c 0.089 1.288 0.46 0.644
-75 0.693 0.096 0.597 1.34 0.185 3.163 1.27 0.211
-70 0.826 -0.120 0.946 1.75c 0.085 5.770 1.67c 0.100
-65 -0.680 0.075 -0.755 -2.00b 0.050 5.691 1.53 0.131
-60 0.199 0.034 0.165 1.23 0.224 4.045 1.43 0.158
-55 0.579 -0.052 0.631 1.12 0.266 4.080 1.07 0.290
-50 0.653 0.122 0.530 1.69c 0.097 4.993 1.06 0.295
-45 -0.195 -0.125 -0.070 -0.16 0.871 4.433 1.13 0.263
-40 0.768 0.021 0.747 2.07 0.043 5.845 1.31 0.197
-35 0.785 0.230 0.556 1.27 0.210 6.170 1.52 0.133
-30 1.684 0.149 1.536 1.48 0.144 8.501 1.56 0.125
-25 -0.232 -0.159 -0.073 -0.28 0.777 6.080 1.09 0.28
-20 0.265 -0.023 0.288 1.24 0.222 5.340 1.56 0.124
-15 0.423 -0.237 0.661 1.67c 0.101 6.019 1.93b 0.058
-10 0.939 -0.085 1.024 2.30b 0.025 3.368 1.45 0.154
-5 1.593 -0.155 1.652 2.25b 0.025 8.422 1.95b 0.054
0 2.332 -0.140 2.472 1.74c 0.087 12.635 1.96b 0.051
5 -0.090 -0.155 0.065 0.14 0.888 5.635 1.21 0.231
10 -0.970 0.122 -1.092 -2.89a 0.005 2.378 1.53 0.132
15 -0.966 0.111 -1.077 -2.37b 0.021 0.677 1.31 0.194
20 -0.571 0.063 -0.634 -1.66c 0.103 0.688 0.07 0.943
25 -1.627 0.163 -1.789 -1.93b 0.058 -2.421 -0.09 0.925
30 -0.670 -0.095 -0.575 -1.85c 0.070 -3.629 -0.72 0.475
35 -0.953 0.027 -0.980 -1.59c 0.114 -5.627 -0.77 0.447
40 -0.129 -0.291 0.163 0.18 0.862 -6.022 -0.89 0.376
45 -0.501 0.026 -0.527 -1.93b 0.054 -7.445 -0.95 0.348
50 -1.557 0.056 -1.613 -2.53a 0.014 -9.707 -1.21 0.232
55 -0.645 0.041 -0.685 -1.19 0.238 -9.895 -1.24 0.218
60 0.218 -0.017 0.235 0.35 0.726 -8.677 -1.03 0.306
65 -1.164 0.200 -1.365 -2.99a 0.004 -8.322 -0.87 0.390
70 -0.720 0.166 -0.886 -1.45 0.154 -8.935 -1.15 0.254
75 -1.731 -0.084 -1.647 -2.75a 0.003 -10.503 -1.25 0.216
80 -0.459 -0.153 -0.306 1.32 0.191 -12.615 -1.30 0.199
85 -0.455 0.055 -0.510 -1.43 0.157 -12.475 -1.42 0.162
90 -1.485 0.007 -1.493 -2.95a 0.005 -14.294 -1.96c 0.103
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TABLE 4.9
Linear regression on SEO price run-up before the announcement day
In order to assess the potential causes for stock price appreciation before SEO announcements, a linear
regression is conducted on the 59 SEO unit firms shown as EQUATION 4.5. The dependent variable,
price run-up of the SEO firms (SEOUP), is calculated as the buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the 90
days preceding the SEO announcements. The following variables are included in the regression in the
projection that these indicators are used by the market in predicting any SEO announcement. The
market index level (MKTUP) is measured by the buy-and-hold returns for the same 90-day period.
Firm  characteristics  prior  to  listing  such  as  debt  LEVERAGE,  profitability  (EBIT),  INSIDER
ownership, firm riskiness (RISK) are also included in explanation of the price appreciation before
SEO announcements. The last variable is the FTA Index-adjusted monthly buy-and-hold abnormal
returns of the SEO firms for 12 months after the initial public offering, indicating their medium-term
performance. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), adjusted R2, and F-statistics are presented to
indicate general goodness of fit of the model.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value VIF
C -0.4899 0.2416 -2.03b 0.048
MKTUP 2.1400 0.7328 2.920 0.005a 1.06
LEVERAGE 0.1151 0.0403 2.674 0.010 a 1.08
EBIT -1.65E-08 1.17E-08 -1.411 0.164 1.02
INSIDER 0.518855 0.2645 1.96 0.055b 1.01
RISK 8.1010 6.0462 1.90 0.064b 1.08
BHAR_12 0.5929 0.3361 4.35 0.000a 1.06
Number of observations = 59           Adjusted R2= 0.3669 F-Statistic=6.58a
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (t- test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (t- test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (t- test).
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TABLE 4.10
Probit regression on SEO issuance and warrant characteristics
A probit regression from EQUATION 4.6 is conducted on the independent variable SEO
dummy, which is equal to 1 if a unit firm issued a seasoned equity offering within three years
of its IPO. The initial underpricing IRD2 on the first trading day relative to the IPO offer price
is included to test Hypothesis 4.5 that unit firms, which were more underpriced at the time of
IPOs,  are  more  likely  to  conduct  SEOs  within  three  years  post-listing.  In  examination  of
Hypotheses 4.6-4.7, the OUT dummy takes the value of 1 if warrants are issued out-of-money,
0 if otherwise and the LIFE of warrants is calculated as the number of years between IPO
listing  and  warrant  expiration  day.  The  EXERCISE  dummy  takes  the  value  of  1  if  the
attached warrants have been exercised three years post-listing, 0 if otherwise and is included
to  test  Hypothesis  4.8.  WARRANTPROCEED  is the  gross  proceeds  from  warrant
subscription if they are to be exercised, calculated as the number of warrants attached in unit
IPO times the warrant exercise price. Dummy variable REPUTATION is included to control
for the underwriter reputation.
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-Value
C 0.6594 0.216206 3.050 0.002a
IRD2 -0.1580 0.094542 -1.671 0.095c
OUT -0.6019 0.309615 -1.944 0.052b
WARRANTPROCEED 4.59E-08 4.36E-08 1.054 0.292
LIFE -0.0721 0.064975 -1.110 0.267
EXERCISE 0.0991 0.399083 0.248 0.804
REPUTATION 0.9006 0.694855 1.296 0.095c
Pseudo R2 =36.98% Log likelihood= -92.56 LR Chi2=61.12
(0.000)a
Correctly predicted percentage=70.16%
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (z- test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (z- test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (z- test).
189
TABLE 4.11
Summary of testable hypotheses and results
The hypotheses proposed in Section 4.3 and the test results are summarised in the table
Hypothesis Results
Panel A:Predictions on the survival rate of unit IPO firms
H4.1: Unit firms have lower survival rate within n years of their IPOs than share-only firms Not rejected
Panel B: Predictions on the subsequent financing of unit IPO firms
H4.2: Survived unit firms are more likely to issue SEOs than survived share-only firms Not rejected
H4.3: There is a significant stock price run-up before SEOs are announced by unit IPO firms Not rejected
H4.4: There is a negative price effect to the SEO announcements made by unit IPO firms Not rejected
Panel C: Predictions on the SEO issuance and warrant characteristics
H4.5: Unit firms that are more underpriced at their IPOs are more likely to conduct SEOs Rejected
H4.6: Unit firms which issued warrants out-of-money at the time of their IPOs are less likely to conduct SEOs Not rejected
H4.7: Unit firms whose attached warrants have shorter life until expiration are more likely to issue SEOs Rejected
H4.8: Unit firms, whose attached warrants have been exercised, are less likely to conduct SEOs within five years post-listing Rejected
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FIGURE 4.1
Monthly returns on the FTSE All Share Index, the FTSE Small Cap Index, and Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index are calculated and
charted to decide the level of the market. The periods of 1994-95, 1999, and 2001-03, are when the market suffered severe declines of the index
returns (the ‘bear’ market); whereas, the sub-periods of 1996, 2000, and 2004-06 display overall price appreciation on the market index, indicating
high market level.
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FIGURE 4.2
192
CHAPTER 5
THE LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE OF UNIT IPOS IN THE UK
5.1 Introduction
The  IPO  literature  has  documented  two  major  anomalies  in  the  pricing  of  IPOs:  short-term
underpricing and long-term underperformance. In the previous CHAPTER 3, I have examined
the short-term underpricing phenomenon in relation to the inclusion of warrants in IPOs with
a  unique  sample  of  unit  IPOs  issued  in  the  UK.  My  results  are  consistent  with  the  existing
literature; pervasively positive abnormal initial returns are found on the first trading day and
the unit IPOs are even more underpriced comparing to share-only IPOs matched by size and
industry. Whilst the research on initial underpricing of IPOs and more specifically unit IPOs
has been rather united and conclusive across different regions and sample periods, the
evidence on long-term post-listing IPO performance has been controversial, with different
researchers reporting mixed and contrasting results from different markets.
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) distinguish that the US IPO firms indeed
experience significantly negative returns in the first three to five years post-IPO. Gompers and
Lerner (2003) identify that IPO performance depends on the methodology employed to
calculate abnormal returns. They find significantly negative value-weighted event-time
buy-and-hold abnormal returns for US IPOs. However, the underperformance disappears
when either equally-weighted event-time buy-and-hold or cumulative abnormal returns are
used instead. The long-run underperformance phenomenon is not exclusive to the US IPOs.
Lee et al. (1996) find that Australian IPOs exhibit severe underperformance in the long term,
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whilst Da Silva Rosa et al. (2003) find no evidence of underperformance in the two years
post-IPO in the same country. In the UK, Levis (1993) examined the three-year long-run
performance of a sample of 712 UK IPOs issued between 1980 and 1988. His work confirmed
Ritter (1991)’s finding of statistically significant underperformance of IPOs in the long term
with UK data of a similar magnitude. Espenlaub et al. (2000) re-investigated the long-term
performance of 588 UK IPOs issued between 1985 and 1992; they contribute further evidence
on the sensitivity of long-term underperformance: evidence is found that using an event-time
framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns after 3 years irrespective of the
benchmarks adopted. However, over a 5-year horizon, abnormal returns exhibit less severe
underperformance and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns varies if different
benchmarks are used. Furthermore, their results indicate that if a calendar-time approach is
employed, the statistical significance of underperformance is even less remarkable. In Hong
Kong, McGuinness (1993b) reports a significant negative market-adjusted return of -18.26%
between the close of the first trading day and the 500th day  of  listing  of  Hong  Kong  IPOs
between the period of 1980 and 1990. Paudyal et al. (1998) uncover that initial return and
underwriters’  reputation  are  important  determinants  of  long  run  performance.  Jelic  et  al.
(2001) maintain that in Malaysia, IPOs with higher initial return suffer worse
underperformance in the long term, but they find no significant relation between underwriter
reputation and long run performance; instead, they find that optimistic management earnings
forecasts, percentage of shares sold and size of issues are weakly associated with poor
performance in the long term. Overall, the international evidence on the IPO long-term
performance has been inconclusive.
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Moreover, the literature on unit IPOs and their long-term performance has been rather scarce.
Schultz (1993b) proposed the Agency Cost hypothesis in explanation of including warrants in
IPOs. He stipulates that in the US, firms include warrants in their IPOs to reduce agency costs
by binding managers to optimal investment decisions with the staged financing from warrants.
In Schultz (1993b) several predictions about the characteristics of unit firms in comparison to
share-only IPO firms are tested, and found that unit firms are younger, smaller, and riskier
than share-only IPO firms, and also that unit IPOs are typically issued by less reputable
underwriters at higher discount (more underpriced). Concerning the post-listing performance
of unit firms, Schultz (1993b) predicts that unit IPOs have lower survival rates than
share-only IPOs. However, no prediction is made concerning whether unit firms
underperform the share-only comparables and the market as a whole in the long-term.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) bring forth an alternative Signalling explanation for
including warrants in IPOs. They argue that younger, smaller, and riskier firms strategically
convey information about their firm value to the market through a combination of costly
signals, namely, the inclusion of warrants, managerial ownership in their own company’s
shares, and underpricing of the IPOs. It is predicted that firms sacrifice the cost of signalling,
in the hope that they can distinguish themselves from less quality firms in the IPO market
(who cannot afford to sacrifice the ‘money left on the table’) and recoup the costs by issuing
seasoned equity offerings later on at more favourable terms. Regardless the competing
explanation for including warrants, the long-term performance of unit IPOs is not discussed in
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997).
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Several other academic papers on unit IPOs such as How and Howe (2001), Lee et al. (2003)
have focussed on comparing the Agency Cost and Signalling theories as reasons for including
warrants in IPOs. None of them however, has examined the two competing hypotheses with a
long-term approach. To the best of my knowledge, the only focused study on the long-term
performance of unit IPOs is Mazouz et al. (2007b), which investigates a sample of unit IPOs
issued in Hong Kong. To test ‘the extent to which the Agency Cost and Signalling models
explain the reasons for unit IPOs issuance’, they provide a comprehensive comparison of
long-term performance between unit and share-only IPOs using a variety of methods for
measuring long-term stock returns. Their event-time method suggests that both unit and
share-only IPOs underperform the market index in the long term. However, the
underperformance of unit IPOs is significantly lower than those of share-only IPOs. With an
alternative calendar-time approach, the underperformance of unit firms and share-only firms
are  not  significantly  different  from zero.  Overall,  evidence  from Hong Kong concerning  the
long-term performance of unit IPOs is not conclusive and therefore unable to support either
explanation for including warrants in IPOs.
So far, no research has been carried out in the UK exploring unit IPOs and their price
performance post-listing. In this chapter, following Mazouz et al. (2007), I extend both the
Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses into a longer time-scale and test the two
competing theories for including warrants using the long-term price performance approach
with a fresh sample of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994 and 2006. In testing the
Agency Cost hypothesis, if warrants are included in IPOs to reduce agency cost, then unit
firms are expected to possess better management performance and therefore, higher long-term
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returns than share-only IPOs. According to the Signalling hypothesis, the unit firms are riskier
than share-only IPO firms. If the firm value signalled by including warrants, insider holdings,
and underpricing the IPOs successfully conveyed to the market, unit firms should yield higher
long-term returns to compensate investors for bearing the extra risk (Mazouz et al., 2007).
This chapter contributes to the literature concerning the long-term performance of IPOs in
several aspects. Firstly, there have been extensive studies on the long-term performance of
share-only IPOs, but very few aim to uncover the long-run performance of unit IPOs. In this
chapter, I focus on the unit IPOs and compare the long-term performance of them with a
portfolio of share-only IPOs matched by market capitalisation and industry. Since the unit
IPOs are explained as a form of staged financing by the Agency Cost hypothesis, it is
valuable to examine long-term performance following the first stage of financing by IPO
proceeds, and the potential second stage of financing by warrant proceeds. It would be
interesting  to  see  how  the  unit  firms  performed  in  the  long  run  with  unit  IPOs  claiming  to
reduce agency costs. Secondly, there has been remarkable previous literature on long-term
share price performance of IPOs issued in the UK, such as Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al.
(2000). However, no prior regional research of unit IPOs has been undertaken in the UK. The
UK stock market provides a unique opportunity to re-examine the robustness of the findings
on the long-run performance of US IPOs within the setting of another ‘market-based’
financial system, in which stock markets are supposed to play a crucial role in providing
company financing. In my paper, a sample of 350 UK IPOs consisting of 92 unit IPOs and
258 share-only IPOs are collected for the study of long-term performance, which contributes
to the growing body of international evidence on the long run performance of newly issued
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shares. Thirdly, the sample firms are selected from both the London Stock Exchange Official
Listing (Main Board) and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), allowing a direct
comparison of long-term performance of unit firms listed on different market locations.
Additionally, four different market indices from the UK are adopted in my study as
benchmarks.  The  FTSE  All  Share  Index  is  used  as  the  primary  benchmark  to  adjust  for
general market movements. Since unit IPO firms tend to be younger and smaller comparing to
share-only IPO firms, I also employ the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index and
FTSE Small Cap Index as benchmark for robustness check. Furthermore, because the listings
of unit IPOs in my sample are highly concentrated on the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM), I also apply FTSE AIM All Share Index as another benchmark to test the sensitivity of
the performance measures. Finally yet importantly, Mazouz et al. (2007) as the only existing
study on the long-term performance of unit IPOs focus on the comparison between unit firms
and share-only firms; in my research, I extend their research to analyse the long-term
performance in relation to the characteristics of unit IPOs and attached warrants. I believe this
unique approach can shed light on explaining the role of the warrants in unit IPOs.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 reviews the existing literature on
the long-term performance of unit IPOs and the different methodology of measuring
long-term IPO returns. Section 5.3 discusses the testable hypotheses of this study and the
motivations behind them. Section 5.4 outlines the related methodologies. Section 5.5 reveals
tests and results from various long-term returns measures, cross-sectional and regression
analysis. Finally, in Section 5.6, the test results are summarised and conclusions drawn on the
long-term performance of unit IPOs issued in the UK.
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5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Long-term performance of Unit IPOs
The only publicised study of the long-term performance of unit initial public offerings is by
Mazouz et al. (2007b). They investigate a sample of 137 unit IPOs issued in Hong Kong
between 1990 and 2002 and test the extent to which the Agency Cost hypothesis and the
Signalling hypothesis construe the reasons why companies attach warrants in unit IPOs with a
long-term price performance approach. Schultz (1993b)’s Agency Cost theory proclaims that
the inclusion of warrants in unit IPOs serves to bind managers to optimal investment
decisions by arranging small proceeds from unit IPOs and staging a second round of financing
through the exercise of warrants. Since the warrants will not be exercised if the company’s
share price stays below the warrant exercise price, accordingly the second round of financing
will not occur. Under the incentive to materialise the financing from warrant proceeds,
managers in unit firms are expected to invest only in value generating projects. Extending the
Agency Cost theory into the post-listing period, Mazouz et al. (2007) predict that unit firms
with reduced agency costs after the unit IPOs should have a better long-term performance
than that of a share-only IPO firm.
On the other hand, the Signalling hypothesis proposed by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997)
demonstrates that unit firms, which are high-risk, high-growth firms, choose to include
warrants  in  their  IPOs  to  convey  information  about  firm  value.  Together  with  other  costly
signals such as insider ownership in their own shares and underpricing of the new shares,
inclusion of warrants is a strategic arrangement of unit firms to distinguish themselves from
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lesser  quality  competitors.  With  those  costly  signals,  which  the  bad  quality  firms  cannot
afford to imitate, the unit firms can successfully stand out to the public investors and attract
post-listing interests. The management of the unit firms plan to recover these signalling costs
by issuing additional shares at higher price in the after-market. Mazouz et al. (2007) argue
from  the  Signalling  theory  that  since  unit  IPO  firms  are  customarily  riskier  than  share-only
IPO firms are, after attracting investors’ interests, they are expected to yield higher long-term
return  to  compensate  investors  for  bearing  the  extra  risk.  As  such,  despite  the  different
explanation for including warrants in the IPOs, the Signalling hypothesis also predicts that
unit firms shall outperform share-only firms in the long term.
Mazouz et al. (2007b) firstly calculate equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
and the results largely depend on the choice of benchmarks. When the market index is
employed as benchmark, the equally weighted CARs for unit and share-only IPOs are all
significantly negative. When firms matched by firm size are used as benchmark however, the
underperformance greatly decreased, and when size-and-book-to-market matched firms are
adopted as benchmarks, the underperformance of share-only IPOs disappears completely;
whilst the unit firms still significantly underperform the matching firms. The value-weighted
CARs are also reported in Mazouz et al. (2007), which provides similar results to the
equally-weighted CARs. Regardless of the benchmarks used, the value-weighted CARs
indicate significant underperformance for unit IPOs against both the market index and
share-only matching firms. However, the negative abnormal returns observed under
value-weighted  CARs are  lower  in  magnitude  than  those  generated  by  the  equally  weighted
CARs, suggesting that the equally-weighted CARs are driven by small-firm stocks. A direct
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comparison of the long-term average CARs between unit and share-only IPOs are also
conducted. Indicated by the p-values from non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests, Mazouz et al.
(2007) provide evidence that unit IPOs significantly underperform share-only IPOs in the
long term. The overall results from the cumulative abnormal returns from Hong Kong
contradict both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses, that unit firms should
generate higher long-term returns than share-only IPO firms.
Mazouz et al. (2007) also examine the long-term performance of unit IPOs with a
buy-and-hold approach over three years post-listing. The equally-weighted average
buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) indicate the long-term performance is sensitive to the
choice of benchmarks. The unit and share-only IPOs both significantly underperform the
market index, by -81% and 55% respectively. However, such underperformance shrinks
greatly when size-matched firms are used as the benchmark and disappear completely when
the long-term returns are compared with the returns of their size-and-book-to-market matched
or industry-size-and-market-to-book matched comparables. The value-weighted average
BHARs are also calculated. Similarly, to the equally-weighted BHARs, both the unit and
share-only firms underperform the market index significantly but with lower magnitude.
However, when size and industry-size-and-book-to-market matched firms are employed as
benchmarks, none of the underperformance from unit or share-only samples remains
significant. The non-parametric Mann-Whitney test again suggests that share-only IPO firms
perform better than unit firms do in the long term, which is not consistent with either the
Agency Cost or the Signalling explanations of why firms include warrants in their IPOs.
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Alternatively, to the event-time approach, Mazouz et al. (2007) reassessed the long-term
performance of unit IPOs in Hong Kong with a calendar-time approach, which automatically
resolves the potential correlation problem of individual firms in an event-time method. When
matched calendar-time regression is conducted, the underperformance of both the unit and
share-only IPOs against the market index and matching firms vanish completely. Furthermore,
no evidence is found that unit firms significantly outperform share-only firms in the long term.
Such results contradict the predictions of both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses.
Viewed collectively, none of the cumulative abnormal returns or the buy-and-hold abnormal
returns, whether weighted equally or by sample firms’ market values, under either event-time
or calendar-time, indicate that unit IPO firms possess better quality of investments and in turn
perform better than share-only IPO firms. The long-term price performance evidence from
Hong Kong rejects both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses in explaining firms’
choice of unit IPOs over share-only IPOs.
5.2.2 IPO long-term performance in the UK
To provide a solid grounding for my research in absence of existing studies of UK unit IPOs
and to understand the UK IPO market better, I also reviewed several established academic
papers, which examine the long-term IPO performance with UK data. Levis (1993) delves
into the three-year long-run performance of a sample of 712 UK IPOs issued between 1980
and 1988 using the share-price data from 1980 until the end of 1990. His work also recognises
the  important  issue  of  the  size  effect  for  UK  IPO  firms  and  sets  forth  long-run  abnormal
returns based on two market indices: the Financial Times Actuaries All Share (FTA) Index as
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the indicator of general market level and the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index,
which is composed of listed firms with small market capitalisation. Both of these indices are
included in this study of unit IPOs in the UK. The results from Levis (1993) confirm Ritter
(1991)’s finding of statistically significant long-term underperformance of US IPOs. However,
he remarks that the average underperformance in his UK sample appears to be less severe
than  in  Ritter  (1991)’s  US  sample;  they  record  underperformance  for  UK  IPOs  of  between
-8% and -23% depending on the market benchmark applied, whilst Ritter (1991) documented
underperformance of up to -29% for US IPOs.
Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999) investigate the long-term performance of IPOs issued by
UK firms between 1992 and 1995 with existing venture capital investors and underwritten by
issuing houses that are parents or affiliates of the venture capitalists. The total sample of IPOs
comprises 135 venture-backed and 114 un-backed offerings. The long-term abnormal returns
are measured relative to the FTSE All Share Index, which is also used as the main benchmark
in my research. The market-wide movements are controlled by subtracting the equivalent
return on the FTSE All Share Index. They explain that at the time of flotation, venture capital
funds generally hold substantial equity positions in the companies they invest in.
Consequently, they are in the position to put potential influence in force on the management,
have strong motivation to monitor the managerial performance and become involved in the
decision-making. Differences in long-term performance between the IPOs backed by existing
venture capitalists and other non-venture-backed IPOs are reasonably expected. On one hand,
the authors stipulate that venture-backing can be expected to significantly contribute to
improvements in IPO firms’ long term performances for several reasons: Firstly, as repeated
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players  in  the  IPO market,  venture  capitalists  are  able  to  credibly  commit  themselves  to  the
accuracy and completeness of disclosed information. Naturally, it is in their best interest for
truthful certification since false certification would only lead to the loss of their valuable
reputation, which has been built up over time. Secondly, as long-term players in the IPO
market, venture capitalists are able to form lasting relationships with other financial firms that
they attract more interest in the offering from large institutional investors and moreover have
the advantage to attract reputable underwriters and auditors at lower costs. Furthermore,
venture capitalists are also able to screen potential portfolio companies by offering them
contracts that only qualified candidates will accept. For the above reasons, venture capital
backing has the certification effect that certifies the quality of the offerings and facilitates the
issue at an earlier stage in a company’s life cycle. On a different note, Espenlaub, Garrett and
Mun  (1999)  also  brought  forth  the  clear  potential  for  a  conflict  of  interest  between  venture
capitalist-affiliated sponsors, who are generally involved in the pricing of the new shares and
underwriting the issues, and the outside investors taking up the offering. Chances are that the
underwriters are likely to have access to private information about the issuing firm and the
motivation to exploit this information at the expense of IPO investors. Especially,
‘underwriters may set offer prices too high and time share offerings so as to coincide with the
market’s  overvaluation  of  the  issuing  firm’s  equity’.  The  authors  conjecture  that  such  a
conflict of interest is likely to manifest itself into poor long-term performance of the IPO firm
if  the  market  fails  to  recognise  the  adverse  effects  of  the  underwriters’  self-interest  on  IPO
timing and pricing. Both sides of the argument in Espenlaub, Garrett, and Mun (1999) for
long-term under- and over-performance of venture-capital-backed IPOs seem to make sense.
Their results indicate that both sub-samples (venture-backed or unbacked IPOs) underperform
204
the FTSE All Share Index over the entire 36-months period post-listing. However, contrary to
the conflict of interest argument, IPOs underwritten by venture-capitalist-affiliates exhibit
substantially better long-run performance compared with IPOs underwritten by independent
issuing  houses.  While  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  (CARs)  of  the  un-backed  sample
become negative after the sixth post-issue month and continue to be negatives in each month
thereafter; the performance of the venture-backed sample is more variable, fluctuating above
and below zero. The comparison of the two sub-samples suggests that venture backing is
associated with better long-term performance. Additionally, the authors provide evidence that
the  long-term performance  of  UK IPOs is  positively  related  to  the  reputation  of  the  venture
capital backers. Therefore, despite the potential conflict of interests, reputable venture
capitalists still effectively screen the companies they invest in and certify the quality of their
IPOs. The staged financing through attached warrants in unit IPOs serves a similar monitoring
role as venture capitalists by binding managers to optimal investment decisions. After
receiving intentionally limited proceeds from unit IPOs, managers are motivated to invest
only in value generating projects in order to materialise the second round of financing through
the exercise of warrants. Inspired by Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999)’s results, I expect
that unit IPO firms should perform better in the long-term comparing to share-only IPO firms
which do not have the monitoring mechanism to reduce agency costs.
Espenlaub et al. (2000) re-investigated the long-term performance of 588 UK IPOs using a
new set of non-financial sample firms issued between 1985 and 1992. They review that the
original IPO long-term underperformance findings by Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter
(1995), and Levis (1993) are dramatic and imply that investing in recent IPOs is a poor
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investment; however, the subsequent studies by Brav and Gompers (1997) and the critical
review of Fama (1998) argue that the underperformance phenomenon is not a consensus. The
results are sensitive to performance measures and require further investigations. The UK stock
market provides a distinctive opportunity to examine the robustness of the findings on the
performance of US IPOs within the setting of another ‘market based’ financial environment.
The abnormal returns are assessed extensively against several alternative benchmarks under
different approaches. The benchmarks employed include: (1) the standard CAPM returns; (2)
a size-decile adjusted model; (3) a value-weighted multi-index model extended for size effects,
namely the difference between the Financial Time Actuaries All Share (FTA) Index and the
Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index; (4) Fama and French (1996) 3-factor Model
and finally (5) Ibbotson (1975) Return Across Securities and Times (RAST) Model. For a
particular benchmark, monthly abnormal returns are calculated for up to 60 months (5 years)
after the listing but excluding the month of new issue. To avoid any downward bias in returns
when  average  returns  are  equally-weighted  across  portfolios,  discrete  returns  are  used  as
opposed to logarithmic returns throughout their study. Furthermore, both the popular
event-time approach and the recently favoured calendar-time approach are adopted. In line
with Fama (1998)’s findings, Espenlaub et al. (2000) contribute further evidence on the
sensitivity of long-term underperformance: They report that using an event-time framework,
there are substantial negative abnormal returns after 3 years irrespective of the benchmark
used. However, over a 5-year period, abnormal returns exhibit less severe underperformance
and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns varies if different benchmarks are used.
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There are several critical differences between Levis (1993) and Espenlaub et al. (2000), which
both studied the UK IPOs. Firstly, although Levis (1993) identified the importance of size
effect for UK firms, he did not explicitly adjust for risk and size effects. Instead, Levis simply
used an alternative market index for implicitly smaller firms (the Hoare Govett Smaller
Companies  Index),  which  is  also  adopted  in  the  latter  study.  To  better  adjust  for  firm  size,
Espenlaub et al. (2000) examined the long-term IPO performance against a wider range of
alternative benchmarks and models including the Ibbotson (1975)’s RAST model and the
Fama-French  (1993)  three-factor  model,  both  of  which  are  explicitly  designed  to  adjust  for
size effects. Secondly, Levis (1993) investigates the long-term share performance of IPOs
issued between 1980 and 1990, a period during which small firms outperformed larger firms.
By contrast, Espenlaub et al. (2000) assess the long-run IPO performance over the period of
1985-1997, during which there was much greater time-series variation in the size effect as
smaller firms over performed during the initial part of the sample period (1985-1988) but
underperformed during 1989-1992 period with more reversals during 1992-1997. Last but not
the least, Levis (1993) calculated abnormal returns up to three years post listing, whilst
Espenlaub et al. (2000) extended the sample period to a longer five years after the IPO.
5.2.3 Literature on long-term price performance measurement
Another segment of the long-term performance research area focuses on the choice of metric
to measure firms’ abnormal returns. Calculating long-term abnormal returns with a
buy-and-hold strategy has been very popular (Ritter, 1991; Barber and Lyon, 1997). In
addition, the cumulative abnormal returns serve an alternative measure for long-term
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performance  on  a  continuous  basis.  The  wealth  relatives  are  also  applicable  to  provide  a
general indication of long-term performance against benchmarks. Each long-term return
measure can be calculated on an equally-weighted or value-weighted basis, which may lead to
different inclusions. Furthermore, the long-term abnormal returns computed against different
benchmarks can also alter the results of the overall performance of sample firms. Finally yet
importantly, different cross-sectional analyses can provide supporting evidence from different
research angles. Therefore, the assessment of long-term share price performance is
notoriously difficult to estimate with a high degree of accuracy. A number of academic papers
have examined and compared different measurements of IPO’s long-term performance, each
aspect of measuring long term abnormal performance has been questioned and there is no
consensus on which is to be preferred.
5.2.3.1 CARs versus BHARs
Beginning with Ritter (1991), the most popular estimator of long term performance is the
average buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). Barber and Lyon (1997) also argue that the
average BHAR is the appropriate estimate for long-term performance because it is a more
precise measure for investor experience. However, the skewness of individual-firm long-term
abnormal returns restrained statistical inference in many initial studies, which either avoided
formal statistical inference or relied on assumptions that were later on challenged, such as
normality assumption of the estimates. Evidence about various alternative methods of
measuring abnormal returns is provided such as the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and
wealth relatives (WRs), but no one method is proven ultimately preferable so far.
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Kothari and Warner (1997) state that cumulative abnormal returns are systematically biased
upward as a result of bid-ask bounce and the bias is an increasing function of the
proportionate bid-ask spread of the sample firms (E.g. Conrad and Kaul, 1993). However,
they also claim that the implied bias in a 36-month cumulative abnormal return is very small.
The compounded BHARs have been endorsed since they mitigate such bias due to cumulation.
They investigate the properties of BHARs and provide simulation evidence that common
estimation procedures can produce biased buy-and-hold estimates over a long horizon. Before
all else, bias arises from new listings, rebalancing of benchmark portfolios, and skewness of
multi-year abnormal returns, can all significantly contaminate the performance results. In
addition, test statistics using buy-and-hold returns typically use the cross-sectional standard
deviation of sample firms’ abnormal returns, which is different from the time-series standard
deviation of portfolio returns adopted by cumulative abnormal return measures.
Fama (1998) provides an additional assessment concerning the merits of different
methodologies in the literature. He argues against buy-and-hold methodology due to the
systematic errors that arise with imperfect expected returns that are compounded with
long-horizon  returns.  Furthermore,  as  a  method  that  ignores  cross-sectional  dependence  of
event-firm abnormal returns that are overlapping in calendar time, event-time buy-and-hold
abnormal returns are likely to produce overstated test statistics. Therefore, they elucidate one
of the defects of the buy-and-hold strategy; that the BHARs could magnify underperformance,
even if it occurs in only a single period, because of compounding single-period returns at a
monthly frequency. However, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and time-series
regressions, on the other hand, do not involve the compounding effect of a single period’s
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poor performance and are less likely to yield spurious rejections of market efficiency than
buy-and-hold returns. Therefore, CARs are considered as a better, less biased method to
calculate long-horizon returns comparing to BHARs. Furthermore, distributional properties
and test statistics for cumulative abnormal returns are better understood. The choice of CARs
or BHARs largely depends upon the implicit trading strategy that is being assumed.
Lyon et al. (1999) argue that buy-and-hold abnormal return is a suitable estimate for long
term performance because it ‘accurately represents investor experience’. They document that
BHARs  should  be  used  if  the  research  question  is  whether  or  not  investors  earn  abnormal
stock returns by holding stocks over a particular time horizon and the CARs method should
be applied to answer the question, ‘Do sample firms persistently earn abnormal monthly
returns?’. The authors are inclined to the more recently favoured approach that calculate
average buy-and-hold abnormal returns using carefully constructed benchmarks to avoid
known biases and assessing statistical significance of average BHAR.
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) is another critical study on the reliability of long-run abnormal
performance estimates subsequent to major corporate events. They reveal surprising evidence
that the recently favoured average multi-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns, teamed up with
statistical inference conducted via bootstrapping procedure are severely flawed. They claim
that although BHARs can capture the investors’ experience from buying and holding
securities for 3-5 years as Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) argued, there are
still  several  limitations  to  this  method.  Firstly,  there  is  only  one  type  of  investor  experience
captured, namely the buy-and-hold experience. Other reasonable trading strategies that
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apprehend alternative investors’ experience, such as periodic portfolio rebalancing, are not
reflected in buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Secondly, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns
increase with holding period, implicitly due to compounding. Because the length of the
holding period is arbitrary, such property hampers the reliability for measuring long term
performance.  If  any  abnormal  returns  existed  for  only  a  short  period  of  time after  an  event,
both 3- and 5-year BHARs can be significant and 5-year BHAR will be larger in magnitude
than 3-year BHAR. Therefore, it became an important issue to select various holding period
intervals to determine how long the abnormal performance persisted after the event, if there
was any. Finally, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) provide evidence that there are severe
statistical problems with BHARs that cannot be easily corrected.
Gompers and Lerner (2003) sought to assess the performance of IPOs by examining the
period before the creation of NASDAQ, hoping to test whether the poor performance is driven
by  some  fundamental  behavioural  anomaly  or  just  an  idiosyncratic  feature  of  the  recent
sample  period  that  has  happened  to  be  the  focus  of  academic  research.  Using  powerful
out-of-sample tests, they find that IPO firms significantly underperform the market
benchmarks using event-time BHARs as a performance measure. However, when CARs are
computed, the underperformance disappeared. In conclusion, they claim the difference in the
results between CARs and BHARs is due to the large skewness in some individual IPO firm
returns and the choice of CARs or BHARs largely rely on the implicit trading strategy that is
being assumed. However, the authors did claim that the CAR method tends to misrepresent
performance when returns are highly volatile. Therefore, they recommend using buy-and-hold
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returns and the wealth relative measures to provide further evidence for the long-term
performance of IPOs.
Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) claim that there are potential biases from summing up average
abnormal returns when calculating the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) over a long
horizon, and they propose to ‘focus on the holding period return and the wealth relatives’ as
the performance measure, also as suggested by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995).
Chi and Padgett (2005) also attempt to satisfy the great interest in Chinese evidence on the
long-term  performance  of  IPOs.  In  choosing  between  the  cumulative  returns  (CAR)  and
buy-and-hold returns (BHAR), Chi and Padgett (2005) argue that since in China the majority
of investors are individual investors and they trade much more frequently than those in other
countries,  CARs  may  give  a  better  estimate  of  the  long-run  performance  of  IPOs  in  the
Chinese Markets. Therefore, although both CARs and BHARs are calculated, CARs are
chosen as the dependent variable in the cross-sectional analysis to explain the long-term
performance of Chinese IPOs.
Goodacre et al. (2007) compared the results obtained from both cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) and the buy-and-hold return method using 454 Malaysian IPOs. The reported long
term over-performance of Malaysian IPOs is much lower when buy-and-hold returns are
adopted. Unexpectedly, such an outcome suggests that the buy-and-hold return measure
imparts a downward bias in the long horizon, which is not consistent with the arguments from
Fama (1998), Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Gompers and Lerner (2003) that imply the
buy-and-hold return measure can magnify under- or over-performance.
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A most recent Pan-Asia study by Moshirian et al. (2009) supports Barber and Lyon (1997)
and confirms that BHARs should be used as long-run performance measure instead of CARs.
They insist that CARs neglect compounding effects whereas BHARs implicitly have the
compounding effect to reflect investor experience. Overall, BHARs are recommended in
long-term studies because they correspond to an implementable trading strategy that does not
make unrealistic assumptions about transaction costs.
Overall, both the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns have
received substantial support and doubting challenges at the same time from various studies
with international evidence around the world. To add fresh evidence of unit IPOs’ long-term
performance from the UK, both the buy-and-hold and cumulative abnormal returns are
examined in this chapter.
5.2.3.2 Equally-weighted versus Value-weighted returns
Various studies imply that the long run performance measure could be very sensitive to the
weighting scheme chosen to calculate abnormal returns. Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that
bid-ask bounce can result in a rebalancing bias when equally-weighted portfolios of securities
are examined. This is because each period the portfolio is rebalanced to put more weight on
stocks that have declined in price and less weight on stocks that have increased in price.
Controversial to the popular findings of IPO long term underperformance 3 to 5 years after
listing, Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that value weighting IPO returns significantly
reduces the measured underperformance since weighting returns under event-time framework
by the number of IPOs may overstate underperformance.
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Fama (1998) noted that the choice of weighting scheme should depend on the hypothesis of
interest of the researcher. Similarly, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue ‘if one is trying to
measure the abnormal returns on the average companies undergoing some event, then each
company should be weighted equally; [this] will produce point estimates that are relevant
from the point of view of a manager, investor, or researcher attempting to predict the
abnormal  returns  associated  with  a  random  event’.  Brav  et  al.  (2000)  argue  that  the
value-weighted scheme should be employed if the aim of the research is to quantify the
average wealth change of investors subsequent to an event.
Gompers and Lerner (2003) confirmed the differences in results between value-weighted and
equally-weighted abnormal returns. As the first large-scale out-of-sample examination of the
IPO long-term performance in the US, they claim that the nominal returns on IPOs are low,
and their sample displays some underperformance when value-weighted event-time
buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed as performance measure; however, such
underperformance disappears when equally-weighted buy-and-hold abnormal returns are
employed as the alternative.
Goodacre et al. (2007) also conduct an in-depth comparison of abnormal returns between
equal-weight and value-weight schemes. Results from the equally-weighted CAR indicate that
while Malaysian IPOs temporarily outperform their matching firms in the first year (highest
CAR 8.20%) of issuing, they generally do not exhibit any abnormal performance over the
three-year horizon (the CAR falls to 0.43% by the end of month 36), which is consistent with
the  results  from  Jelic  et  al.  (2001).  However,  when  value-weighted  abnormal  returns  are
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calculated, the CARs reported are much lower, falling to -8.16% by the end of month 36,
which indicate that large IPO firms perform less well than smaller IPO firms (since they give
more ‘weight’ to the calculation). To check the robustness of this result, an alternative
benchmark was adopted. Consistent with the previous conclusion, equally-weighted CARs are
positive and statistically significant but when sample firms are value-weighted, the abnormal
the outperformance is decreased and insignificant. To reassess the difference between
abnormal returns under different weighting schemes, I calculated both equally-weighted and
value-weighted abnormal returns for unit IPOs issued in the UK, in comparison to several
market indices and matched share-only IPOs.
5.2.3.3 Selection of benchmarks
There has been substantial evidence that benchmark selection plays a crucial role in the scale
of abnormal returns from event studies. The selection of matching firms can be performed
with a pure size matching. Ritter (1991) proposed that since many of the firms going public
have low market capitalisations, a small firm index might be appropriate to use as a
benchmark portfolio. H adopted an equally-weighted index of small non-IPO stocks as
represented by the lowest decile of market capitalisation firms trading on the NYSE. This
approach however, has the disadvantage of neglecting differences in the level and
development of industries and industry risk effects and therefore delivers more coarse results.
Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that the adjustment for matching firms appears to be the most
adequate benchmark concept. They provide evidence that using matching firms to control for
similar size and book-to-market ratios generate well-specified test statistics in virtually all
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sampling situations since the matching-firm-adjusted procedure mitigates the new listing bias,
the rebalancing bias and the skewness bias.
In her long-term study of 142 German IPOs, Sapusek (2000) stressed that ‘the selection of
index is important’ due to different methods of index calculation. The author selected two
pricing indices and three performance indices. The study found that underperformance is
generally higher for the performance indices than for the price indices. The underperformance
is generally higher for the equally-weighted performance indices than for the value-weighted
performance indices. Sapusek (2000) also selected a reference portfolio of matching firms as
the benchmark according to the nearest neighbour principle. She insists that the matching
firms are very similar companies compared with the newly listed IPO sample firms. The
matching firm adjustment by size and industry is the best form of benchmark comparison,
especially because the matching firms face the same business risks as the IPO firms.
Therefore, these firms appear to be the ‘most adequate’ benchmark for the performance
comparison. The results suggests that the IPO cohorts of the whole investigation period, and
the 1983-1988 and 1989-1993 sub-periods, all significantly underperform the sample of
matching firms, implying that aftermarket performance of IPO firms is worse than that of
comparable firms matched by size and industry.
5.2.3.4 Various cross-sectional patterns of IPO long run performance
The cross-sectional patterns of long run IPO performance can provide valuable insights into
the driven factors of any abnormal returns. Various cross-sectional analyses from different
angles have been conducted by several academic papers. Ibbotson (1975) originally reported a
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negative relation between initial returns at the IPO and the long-run abnormal returns. Ritter
(1991) also records that companies, which have higher mean initial returns exhibit worse long
term abnormal returns. In a more recent study on the US market, Purnanandam and
Swaminathan (2004), established that the more over-priced the IPO is relative to its
comparables, the worse its long-run performance. With international evidence from China,
Chi and Padgett (2005) insert that IPOs are underpriced by investment bankers to create the
appearance  of  excess  demand.  Consistent  with  Ritter  (1991)  they  believe  IPO firms  that  are
more underpriced at the initial public offering will suffer lower subsequent returns in the long
run. A negative relationship between the initial returns and the long-term performance was
found to be significant at 5% level, proving that the higher the return on the first trading day,
the worse the performance will be in the long term.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) reveal that the degree of underperformance by issuing firms
differs over time. They find evidence that IPOs issued in years when there is little issuing
activity exhibit no significant underperformance comparing to those issued in years during
high volume periods that underperform severely. Ritter and Welch (2002) also document that
the degree of underperformance of an IPO varies over time. Chi and Padgett (2005) also
applied a year-dummy to detect any difference in the long-run performance between IPOs that
are listed in different years. The estimation results show that the year1997 dummy is
positively significant, suggesting that companies that went public in 1997 perform better.
Brav and Gompers (1997) find that when issuing firms are matched on size and
book-to-market ratios, IPOs do not underperform their comparables. In fact,
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underperformance is a character of small, low book-to-market firms regardless of whether
they are IPO firms or not. Such results are also supported by Ritter and Welch (2002), in
which they find that IPOs, when matched on size and book-to-market ratios, have only very
modest underperformance. Researchers on post-NASDAQ IPOs demonstrate strong patterns
of performance when firms are classified based on size and book-to-market: the smallest and
lowest book-to-market IPOs tend to have the worst performance; in contrast, larger IPOs have
performance  that  is  relatively  close  to  the  market  and  their  industries.  Gompers  and  Lerner
(2003) explore whether the pre-NASDAQ IPOs display a similar convention and find mixed
evidence of a deterioration of underperformance over a longer horizon of five years. The
underperformance after three year is smaller (-8.4%) but underperformance after five years is
larger (-33%) when IPO returns are adjusted for size and book-to-market benchmark returns,
which suggest that the returns of IPO firms initially imitate the poor performance of small,
low book-to-market firms, but perform worse in the longer term.
Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) provide evidence that IPO underperformance in the long run
is positively related to discretionary accruals in the fiscal year of the IPO, i.e. larger accruals
in the IPO year are associated with more negative performance. They claim that the levels of
discretionary accrual can proxy for earnings management and that the boosted earnings
systematically fool investors. Chi and Padgett (2005) also studied the relationship between the
long-run performance and the quality of listed firms using earnings per share as the proxy of
the profitability of the firm. A positive relationship between the average earnings per share for
the last three years before the firm’s listing and the three-year market-adjusted returns of IPOs
is expected. However, the results are statistically insignificant.
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Carter et al. (1998) examined the effect of underwriter reputation on the long-term
performance of US IPOs and found that over a three-year period, the underperformance is less
severe for IPOs issued by more prestigious underwriters. Espenlaub, Garrett, and Mun (1999)
investigated UK IPOs issued by companies with existing venture capital investors and
underwritten by issuing houses that are affiliates of the venture capitalists. They report that in
the long term, UK IPO performance is positively related to the reputation of the venture
capital backers. Jelic et al. (2001) also segregated the long-run performance results of their
sample of Malaysian IPOs by underwriter reputation. Portfolios are formed based on the
reputation of the underwriter, which is measured by the frequency of engagement in
underwriting during the sample period (1980-1995). Evidence is found that IPOs underwritten
by more prestigious underwriters provide higher long-term returns than IPOs underwritten by
less reputable underwriters. However, the results are not statistically significant. They claim
that  the  lack  of  support  for  their  hypotheses  on  the  underwriters’  role  in  valuation  of  IPOs
brings forth concerns about the role of Malaysian banks in the primary market, especially
given the ongoing reforms in the banking sector in Malay.
Cai and Wei (1997) report that Japanese issuing firms significantly underperform
size-matched non-IPO firms in most industries. To provide the Chinese evidence on the
long-term performance, Chi and Padgett (2005) examined the industry effect on the IPO
long-run returns using a high-tech dummy that measures whether a company has high-tech
products. A company is expected to have high growth in the near future if it belongs to a
high-tech industry but it will also implicitly face higher risk at the same time, which could be
rewarded by better long-run performance. As a result Chi and Padgett predict a positive
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relationship between a high-tech industry classification and the three-year market-adjusted
long term returns of IPOs. The high-tech dummy in the cross-sectional regression appears to
be positive at the 1% significance level, suggesting when a company has certain high-tech
features investors expect it to present high growth in the future.
Goodacre et al. (2007) analysed the cross-sectional pattern of 454 Malaysian IPOs’ long-term
performance. While analyses based on size and initial returns has been undertaken in previous
studies  of  Malaysian  IPOs  (Jelic  et  al,  2001),  analysis  of  the  long-term  performance  by
different boards of listing are presented for the first time. The authors claim that by breaking
down the sample in this way, the source of variation in the performance of IPOs due to a
company’s specific characteristics and broad economic characteristics could be traced.
5.3 Hypotheses
In the unit IPO literature, Mazouz et al. (2007) find evidence that under event-time approach,
both the unit IPOs and share-only IPOs issued in Hong Kong significantly underperform the
market index and that the unit firms generate significantly lower abnormal returns in the three
years after listing than share-only IPOs. Their event study provides contradicting results to
both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses, both theoretically implying that unit
firms should perform better than share-only IPO firms in the long term. There is no other
existing study on the long-term performance of unit IPOs. However, in the UK, Levis (1993)
distinguished significant underperformance of share-only IPOs in the long term with a sample
of 712 UK IPOs. Espenlaub et al. (2000) document substantial negative abnormal returns 3
years after listing under an event-time approach for UK IPOs issued between 1985 and 1992,
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irrespective of the benchmarks adopted. However, over a 5-year horizon, abnormal returns
exhibit less severe underperformance and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns varies
if different benchmarks are used. Furthermore, they point out that if a calendar-time approach
is employed, the statistical significance of underperformance is even less remarkable. Since
the unit IPO study is absent in the UK and the IPO underperformance is reported to be
sensitive to the methodology applied to measure abnormal returns, I am motivated to reassess
the long-term price performance of unit IPOs issued in the UK with different methods of
measuring long-term returns. The following Hypotheses 5.1-5.5 are proposed to test the
robustness of the long-term underperformance anomaly.
H5.1: Unit IPOs underperform the FTA Index in the 3-year period post-listing
H5.2: Unit IPOs underperform the FTSE Small Cap Index in the 3-year period post-listing
H5.3: Unit IPOs underperform the HGSC Index in the 3-year period post-listing
H5.4: Unit IPOs underperform the FTSE AIM All Share Index in the 3-year period post-listing
H5.5: Unit IPOs underperform share-only IPOs matched on firm size, year of listing, and industry
Ibbotson (1975) originally reported a negative relation between initial returns at the IPO and
the long-run abnormal returns. Ritter (1991) also records that companies, which have higher
mean  initial  returns  exhibits  worse  long  term  abnormal  returns.  However,  in  a  more  recent
study on the US market, Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) argue differently, that the
more over-priced the IPO is relative to its  comparables,  the worse its  long-run performance.
In the unit IPO literature, Schultz (1993b) predicts that unit IPOs are more underpriced than
share-only IPOs at the time of listing; in the long-term, firms, which choose to issue unit IPOs
have lower survival rate than firms choose to issue shares alone. However, no direct
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prediction has been made concerning the relation between the initial returns and the long-term
performance of unit IPOs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) explain both the inclusion of
warrants in unit IPOs and the underpricing of new shares are costly signals to convey
favourable information about firm value and for unit firms to distinguish themselves from bad
quality firms in the IPO process. Nonetheless, whether there is any association between initial
returns and long-term abnormal returns is not covered in their study. As the first and only
existing academic paper on the long-term performance of unit IPOs, Mazouz et al. (2007) did
not discuss such potential relations with unit IPOs issued in Hong Kong. One is motivated to
initiate the test of association between the short-term underpricing and long-term performance
for unit IPOs in the UK. According to the Signalling hypothesis, unit IPOs are strategically
underpriced by the issuers with the intention to signal favourable information about firm
value.  Since  the  underpricing  is  viewed  as  a  credible  signal  in  the  IPO  process,  a  positive
relationship should be expected from a signalling perspective. However, the Agency Cost
hypothesis in Schultz (1993b) explains that despite the intention to reduce agency costs, with
the restriction from the attached warrants, unit firms (which are more underpriced at the time
of listing) are more likely to fail in the absence of positive-NPV projects. Therefore, I propose
the null hypothesis in favour of the Agency Cost theory, that unit firms, which are more
underpriced at the time of IPO, should suffer worse long-term performance.
H5.6: Unit IPOs with higher initial returns exhibit worse long-term performance
The Agency Cost hypothesis reasons that firms choosing unit IPOs attempt to reduce agency
costs by arranging staged financing through exercise of warrants. Schultz (1993b) predicts
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that to create incentive and bind managers to optimal investment decisions, issuers
intentionally limit the size of the unit IPOs. The proceeds from the unit IPOs are only enough
to start production and test marketing but not enough for managers to waste on any
negative-NPV projects. Therefore, managers are encouraged to use the limited proceeds from
the first round of financing to invest in value-generating projects so that the unit firms’ share
prices  will  increase  enough  to  allow  the  exercise  of  warrants  and  the  materialisation  of  the
second round of financing. No academic papers on unit IPOs have made any implications on
the potential relation between the size of the unit IPOs and the long-term performance of unit
firms. However, in the IPO literature, Ritter (1991) identifies that US IPOs display worse
aftermarket long-run underperformance for smaller offers. The possibilities of any association
between the size of unit IPOs and the long-term abnormal returns of unit firms are twofold.
On one hand, the smaller size of the first round of financing, managers will be more
motivated to invest in positive-NPV projects and the unit firms are expected to generate
higher long-term returns. On the other hand, as Schultz (1993b) explained, managers of unit
firms sometimes will have no positive-NPV projects to invest in and with the small proceeds
from the IPOs, unit firms are less likely to survive comparing to share-only IPOs. Therefore,
it is possible that unit firms with smaller issue size will underperform the share-only IPO
firms and the market as a whole. To examine whether such relation exists, I hypothesise that
in the UK, unit IPOs with smaller proceeds at the IPO stage will exhibit worse long-term
abnormal returns than those unit IPOs that raise more capital.
H5.7: The long-term performance of unit firms is positively related to the size of the unit IPOs
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Both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses predict that unit firms are smaller than
share-only  firms.  The  study  on  the  long-term  performance  of  unit  IPOs  by  Mazouz  et  al.
(2007) also confirms that the unit IPOs in Hong Kong display smaller market value of equity
than their share-only comparables. However, no implication has been made as whether
smaller  unit  firms  suffer  worse  long-term  performance  than  bigger  unit  firms.  In  the
share-only IPO literature, on the other hand, Page and Reyneke (1997) recorded that the
degree  of  underperformance  is  greater  among smaller  companies  in  South  Africa.  Brav  and
Gompers (1997) in fact, find that underperformance is a character of small, low
book-to-market firms regardless of whether they are IPO firms or not. Such argument is also
supported by Ritter and Welch (2002), in which find that IPOs, when matched on size and
book-to-market ratios, have only very modest underperformance. Since the IPO literatures
indicate that the size of the firms have determining power on their long-term performance, I
intend to test whether the unit IPO firms’ long-term abnormal returns are also affected by
their firm size. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.8 predicts that in the UK, smaller unit firms, in terms
of market capitalisation at the offer price immediately after the unit IPOs, exhibit worse
long-term performance than larger unit firms.
H5.8: Unit firms’ long-term performance is positively related to the firm size
Mazouz et al. (2007) report significant clustering in the years of listing from unit IPOs in
Hong Kong. They illustrate the frequency distribution of both share-only and unit IPOs over
the same period and find that in the period from 1990 to 1993, the sample is fairly balanced
between share-only IPOs and unit IPOs, but the proportion of unit IPOs relative to the total
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number of IPOs has decreased sharply since 1994. The decline in the unit issues is not
exclusive to the Hong Kong market; Byoun (2004) examines the unit seasoned offerings in
the US and also documents the proportion of unit issues relative to the total number of issues
has been relatively low since 1995. However, none of the unit IPO studies has examined the
cross-sectional long-term performance of unit IPOs in relation to the year of issue. Within the
IPO literature, Loughran and Ritter (1995) find evidence that IPOs issued in years when there
is little issuing activity exhibit no significant underperformance, but IPOs issued in years
during high volume periods underperform severely. Ritter and Welch (2002) also document
that the degree of underperformance of IPOs varies over time. They showed that IPOs issued
during the year 1990-1994, averaged at a much worse 3-year BHAR of -12.7%, but IPOs
issued over the period of 1995-1998 had a positive average BHAR of 11.6%. No such
implications are provided in Schultz (1993b) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997). Therefore,
one is motivated to analyse the long-term abnormal returns of UK unit IPOs cross-sectionally
in relation to the market level of their issuing years.
H5.9: Unit IPOs that are issued during years of higher market levels exhibit worse long-term performance
Both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses predict some degree of industry
clustering  for  unit  IPOs.  Schultz  (1993b)  records  that  unit  IPOs  issued  in  the  US  are  more
popular with firms from the service sector and mining industry, in which exist higher
uncertainty about issuing firms’ future growth. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) anticipate
that firms from industries with high-technology elements are more likely to choose unit IPOs
rather than share-only IPOs because those industries suffer higher degrees of information
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asymmetry, and have more motivation to signal favourable information about firm value
during the IPO process. Mazouz et al. (2007) also display the industry distribution of their
sample IPOs and a clear indication of industry clustering in the Hong Kong IPO market has
been observed. However, they claim that the industry clustering in their sample does not
depend on whether the new issues are unit IPOs or share-only IPOs. However, none of these
academic papers have cross-sectionally examined the long-term performance of unit IPOs
categorised by their industry sectors. In the IPO literature, Cai and Wei (1997) report that
Japanese issuing firms significantly underperform size-matched non-IPO firms in most
industries. Chi and Padgett (2005) examined the industry effect on the Chinese IPO long-run
returns using a high-tech dummy that measures whether a company has high-tech products.
They predict a positive relationship between a high-tech industry classification and the
three-year market-adjusted abnormal returns of IPOs. The high-tech dummy in the
cross-sectional regression appears to be positive at 1% significance level, suggesting when a
company has certain high-tech features investors expect it to present high growth in the future.
Unit IPOs are issued when the future cash flows are uncertain, the viability of investment
opportunities may vary substantially across industries. In CHAPTER 3, I record that unit
IPOs in the UK are popularly distributed across certain industries, such as mining, Internet
technology, and biotechnology. A company is expected to have high growth in the near future
if it belongs to those industries but it will also implicitly face higher risk at the same time,
which could be the source of underperformance. Therefore, I analyse the long-term abnormal
returns relative to unit firms’ industry classification with Hypothesis 5.10.
H5.10: Unit firms from high-risk industries exhibit worse underperformance in the long-term
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Both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses predict that unit firms tend to have less
earnings prior to the IPOs than share-only firms. However, no implication has been proposed
on whether the profitability of unit firms prior to the IPO has any impact on their long-term
stock performance. In the IPO literature, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) provide evidence
that IPO underperformance in the long run is positively related to the size of discretionary
accruals in the fiscal year of the IPO, i.e. larger accruals in the IPO year are associated with
more negative performance. They claim that the levels of discretionary accrual can proxy for
earnings management and that the boosted earnings systematically fool investors. However,
according to the Agency Cost explanation for including warrants in IPOs to reduce agency
costs, unit firms should possess better managerial quality and therefore generate higher
abnormal returns in the long term after the agency costs has been reduced by issuing unit
IPOs. Whether the earnings of unit firms prior to the IPOs are boosted false attraction or does
it indicate higher profitability and asset utilisation has yet to be evaluated in relation to the
long-term performance of unit  firms. I  therefore hypothesise that unit  firms that have higher
earnings and asset utilisation prior to the IPOs should exhibit higher long-term returns
comparing to unit firms with worse earning record.
H5.11: The long-term returns of unit firms are positively related to the ratio of EBIT to total assets
Schultz (1993b) predicts that unit IPOs tend to be issued by less reputable underwriters
comparing to those who market for share-only IPOs. How and Howe (2001) provide evidence
that in Australia underwriters who issue unit IPOs are at least as reputable as those who issue
share-only IPOs. The long-term study of unit IPOs by Mazouz et al. (2007) did not discuss
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any relation between the long-term returns of unit IPOs and the reputation of underwriters
who brought the issues to market. In the share-only IPO literature, Espenlaub et al. (1999)
investigate UK IPOs issued by companies with existing venture capital investors and
underwritten by issuing houses that are affiliates of the venture capitalists. They report that in
the long term, UK IPO performance is positively related to the reputation of the venture
capital backers. Jelic et al. (2001) also segregated the long-run performance results of their
sample of Malaysian IPOs by underwriter reputation. They found that IPOs underwritten by
more prestigious underwriters provide higher long-term returns than IPOs underwritten by
less reputable underwriters. In the absence of evidence of the long-term performance of unit
IPOs in relation to the reputation of the underwriters who market for them, I hypothesise that
in the UK unit IPOs underwritten by more prestigious issuing houses will exhibit higher
long-term abnormal returns than unit IPOs issued by less reputable underwriters.
H5.12: Unit IPOs issued by highly reputable underwriters exhibit better long-term performance
According to the Agency Cost explanation for including warrants in IPOs, to bind managers
to optimal investment decisions, Schultz (1993b) predicts that the exercise price of attached
warrants are set above the offer price of the IPOs. By doing so managers will be motivated to
use the unit IPO proceeds to invest only in value-generating projects so that the share price of
unit firms will increase enough to allow the materialisation of warrant proceeds as the second
round of financing. Garner and Marshall (2005) stipulate that firms with different risk profiles
may choose to issue different types of warrants. In particular, they provide evidence that risky
firms tend to issue warrants with longer maturity and lower exercise price to offer price.
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Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) provide evidence that the firm riskiness of unit firms is
positively related to the firm value sold as warrants after controlling for the level of insider
holding.  However,  neither  of  the  above  papers  on  unit  IPOs  specifies  any  relations  between
warrant characteristics and the long-term price performance of unit firms. Mazouz et al. (2007)
insert  that  if  the  characteristics  of  warrants  attached  in  unit  IPOs  reflect  the  unit  firms’
riskiness,  the long-term abnormal returns of these unit  firms may be affected by a warrant’s
maturity and its exercise price to offer price. However, their regression results do not indicate
any significant difference in the monthly abnormal returns of unit firms segregated by warrant
maturity and exercise price to offer price ratio. They conclude that the long-term performance
of unit IPOs does not depend on the type of warrants issued. Nonetheless, Mazouz et al. (2007)
only  examined  two  of  many  characteristics  specified  in  warrant  contracts.  Other  warrant
characteristics, such as the number of warrants included in unit IPOs, and the firm value sold
as warrant proceeds have not been examined in relation to the long-term performance of unit
firms.  Furthermore,  according  to  the  Agency  Cost  hypothesis,  warrants  are  attached  in  unit
IPOs as the potential second round of financing. Whether the warrants will be eventually
exercised to materialise additional funding depends on the price performance of the unit firms
in  the  aftermarket.  If  the  share  prices  of  unit  firms  exceed  the  warrant  exercise  price
post-listing, the warrant-holders are likely to exercise the warrant contracts for profit and the
managers will have materialised the warrant proceeds as the second round of financing to
support their companies’ growth. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect such unit firms generate
higher longer-term returns. To reassess the long-term abnormal returns of unit firms in
relations  to  selected  warrant  characteristics  with  a  fresh  sample  of  UK unit  IPOs,  I  propose
several hypotheses as follows:
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H5.13: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the maturity of warrants
H5.14: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related PRATIO
H5.15: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the numbers of warrants
H5.16: The long-term performance of unit firms is positively related to firm value sold as warrants
H5.17: Unit firms whose warrants have been exercised exhibit better long-term performance
5.4 Data and Methodology
5.4.1 Selection of unit IPO firms
To be included in the final sample, IPO firms had to meet the following criteria: (1) an offer
price of at least GBP£0.01; (2) a fixed offering price, in other words, any tender offers were
excluded; (3) the underlying company to be listed on the London Stock Exchange, either on
the Official List or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM); (4) return data available on
the DataStream database for up to three years after listing; (5) the listing was not associated
with any takeover or merger, or a major restructuring scheme; (6) any investment firms,
Trusts, or Closed-End- Funds are disregarded from the sample. The final sample of 350 IPO
firms consists of 92 unit IPOs and 258 share-only IPOs.
5.4.2 Selection of matching share-only IPO firms
The matching share-only firms were chosen following Loughran and Ritter (1995). Unit IPOs
are individually matched to share-only IPO firms based on size, measured by market
capitalisation on offer price, industry group, and the year of issue. Within the share-only
sample, all the firms are ranked by their market capitalisation. To select 92 matching firms for
the unit IPO firms issued between 1994 and 2006, I firstly split the unit firms into four groups
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according to prospectus publication dates: 6 unit IPOs with prospectus dates from the years
1993-1995 are matched with share-only IPOs from the year 1994 since there is only one unit
IPO issued in 1993; 21 unit firms listed between 1996-1999 are compared with share-only
IPOs from 1996; 27 unit IPOs from 2000-2003 are matched with share-only IPOs from the
year 2000; 38 unit IPOs from 2004-2007 are compared with 2004 share-only IPOs. Secondly,
the share-only firm in the same industry, with the market capitalisation closest to, but higher
than, that of a unit firm, was selected as the matching company. Matching firms are only used
once and when there are no share-only firms that match the industry for the matching years,
another sample firm with the same industry was selected from the closest year.
5.4.3 Selection of market benchmarks
Monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are calculated as the monthly raw return on a stock
minus the monthly benchmark return for the corresponding 21-trading-day period. Five
different benchmarks are adopted: (1) FTSE All Share (FTA) Index, (2) The Hoare Govett
Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index, (3) FTSE Small Cap Index, (4) FTSE Alternative
Investment Market (AIM) All  Share Index, and (5) Reference portfolio matched by size and
industry. Following Ritter (1991), the long-term returns are calculated for both the unit IPO
sample  and  the  share-only  IPO  sample.  FTSE  ALL  Share  (FTA)  Index  is  set  as  the  main
benchmark. Since unit IPO firms tend to be younger and smaller comparing to share-only IPO
firms,  I  also  employ  the  Hoare  Govett  Smaller  Companies  (HGSC)  Index  and  FTSE  Small
Cap Index as benchmarks for robustness checks. Furthermore, since the listings of unit IPOs
in my sample are highly concentrated on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), I also
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apply  the  FTSE  AIM  All  Share  Index  as  another  benchmark  to  test  the  sensitivity  of  the
performance measures.
5.4.4 The raw monthly returns and market-adjusted monthly returns
The daily share prices of sample firms (excluding dividends) are collected for three years
post-listing from DataStream’s Equity Return Index datatype (RI). The various market index
prices are obtained for the corresponding periods. I calculated the monthly market-adjusted
returns for a period of 3 years following the first trading day. Following Ritter (1991),
monthly returns are calculated for two intervals: The initial return period (usually 1 day),
defined as the listing date to the first closing price listed on London Stock Exchange; and the
after-market period, defined as the 3 years after the IPO exclusive of the initial return period.
The event month is defined as the successive 21-trading day period relative to the listing date.
The initial return period is identified as event month 0, and the aftermarket period includes the
following 36 months post-IPO. Assuming the most common case of 1-day initial return period,
event month 1 shall consist of event days 2-22, event month 2 will be identified as event days
23-43, and so on. For IPOs in which the initial return period is longer than 1 day, the month 1
period is truncated accordingly, thus the name ‘Event-time approach’. For example, if the
initial return period lasts 3 days, against odds of a calendar month, event month 1 will be
identified as trading day 4-22. According to Kothari and Warner (1997), the issue of how to
weight  firms  that  do  not  survive  the  period  (‘drop-outs’)  can  potentially  affect  the
specification of any long-horizon test statistic. In this study, with regards to IPOs that are
delisted before their 3-year anniversary, the aftermarket period is truncated and the 3-year
buy-and-hold return ends with London Stock Exchange’s last listing date (the delisting date).
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The monthly raw return for firm i in event month t (ri,t) was calculated shown as EQATION
5.1, by comparing the closing price on the last trading day of the month to the closing price of
the previous month. Where, Pi,t is the last traded total return of the firm i in event month t and
Pi,t-1 is the last traded total return index in event month t-1.
EQUATION 5.1
The market-adjusted return for firm i in the t-th month is defined as shown in EQUATION
5.2, where, ri,t is  the  return  for  firm i in the t-th  trading  month  and  rm,t is the return on the
market index during the corresponding time period. The market-adjusted returns for firm i in
the t-th month are then used to calculate the average market-adjusted abnormal returns under
both the equally-weighted and value-weighted schemes.
tmtiti rrar ,,, -= EQUATION 5.2
5.4.5 Cumulative market-adjusted abnormal returns (CARs)
(A)Equally-weighted CARs
Cumulative average adjusted returns (CARs) are calculated with monthly portfolio
rebalancing, where the adjusted returns are computed using several different benchmarks. The
average market-adjusted return on a sample of n stocks for the t-th month is calculated as the
equally-weighted arithmetic average of the market-adjusted returns, as shown in EQUATION
5.3. The t-statistics for the average adjusted returns are computed for each month as
EQUATION 5.4, where nt is the number of observations in month t, and sdt is the standard
deviation of the adjusted returns for month t.
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EQUATION 5.4
The Cumulative market-adjusted long-run return (CAR) from event month q to event month s
is the summation of the average monthly market-adjusted returns over various intervals
during the 36-month aftermarket period, q to s, as presented in EQUATION 5.5. The
statistical significance of abnormal returns is tested by a standard one-sample Student’s t-Test.
According to Ritter (1991), to test the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal
to zero for a sample of n firms, a conventional t-statistic is calculated as EQUATION 5.6,
where csdt is the standard deviation of cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of n firms,
where, nt is the sample size in the t-th month, Var is the average cross-sectional variance over
36 months, and Cov is the first-order autocovariance of the ARt series, which is the product of
correlation efficient and cross-sectional variance.
EQUATION 5.5
EQUATION 5.6
When a sample firm is delisted from the London Stock Exchange before its 3-year
anniversary, the portfolio return for the next month is an equally-weighted average of the
remaining firms in the portfolio. The cumulative market-adjusted return for months 1 to 36,
CAR1,36, therefore implicitly involves monthly rebalancing, with the proceeds of a delisted
firm equally allocated among the surviving members of the portfolio in each subsequent
å
=
=
n
i
tit arn
AR
1
,
1
tttAR sdnARt /´=
t
tti
csd
nCAR
t
´= ,CAR ( ) 2/1]12[,where CovtVartcsd t ×-+×=
234
å
å
=
=
=
=
s
qt
tsq
n
i
tiit
ARCAR
arwAR
,
1
,
month. For the month in which an IPO firm is delisted, the return for both the IPO and the
benchmark includes just the days from the start of the month until the delisting date.
(B) Value-Weighted CARs
The value-weighted CARs are the sum of value-weighted market-adjusted returns ARt, as
shown in EQUATION 5.7, where wi is  the  value  weight  for  firm i. The value weights are
calculated as the market capitalisations of firm i at offer price immediately after the listing,
divided by the total market capitalisation of the whole unit IPO sample.
EQUATION 5.7-5.8
5.4.6 Buy-and-hold market-adjusted abnormal returns (BHARs)
The use of ‘independent’ monthly rebalancing introduced by Ritter (1991) may cause a
downward bias in CARs over a long period. To assure the robustness of the test results I
employ the buy-and-hold market-adjusted abnormal returns (BHAR) under an event-time
approach as an alternative measure of long-term performance to reduce the statistical bias in
the measurement of cumulative performance. Adopting the calculation used in Loughran and
Ritter (1995), the three-year holding period return for firm i is defined as the geometrically
compounded return on the stock in event month t minus the geometrically compounded return
on the market benchmark over the same period (EQUATION 5.9); where, ri,t is the return for
firm i in the t-th event month and rm,t is  the  return  of  the  FTSE  100  index  during  the
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corresponding time period. Min (36, delist) is the earlier of the last month of listed trading or
the end of the three-year period. The mean three-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold return is
computed as the total BHAR of the sample divided by the sample size, shown as EQUATION
5.10. A standard one sample Student’s t-test is conducted to test the null hypothesis of zero
mean three-year market-adjusted buy-and-hold return, as shown in EQUATION 5.11, where
)( iBHARs  is the standard deviation of the three-year buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns
and n is the sample size.
EQUATION 5.9
 EQUATION 5.10
EQUATION 5.11
5.4.7 Wealth Relative (WR)
Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997) argue that there exists potential bias
from summing up average benchmark-adjusted returns over the long horizon. Therefore, I
change the focus onto the holding period returns. Following Ritter (1991), the three-year total
buy-and-hold returns are then converted into wealth relatives to provide an overall indicator
of long-term relative performance. By definition, a wealth relative is defined as the ratio of
the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of shares to the end-of-period wealth from
holding a portfolio of matching companies or market benchmarks. As shown in EQUATION
5.12, a wealth relative is  computed as one plus the mean 3-year BHAR of the sample firms,
]1)1([]1)1([ ),63min(
1 ,
),63min(
1 ,
-+--+= ÕÕ == delistt tmdelistt tii rrBHAR
å
=
=
n
i
iBHARn
BHAR
1
1
nBHAR
BHARt
i
BHAR /)(s
=
236
divided by the sum of one plus the mean 3-year BHAR of the benchmarks. A wealth relative
of greater than one can be interpreted as meaning that IPOs have outperformed a portfolio of
matching firms or market benchmarks. On the other hand, a wealth relative of less than one
suggests that IPOs underperform their matching firms or market benchmark.
EQUATION 5.12
5.5 Tests and results
5.5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
TABLE 5.2 demonstrates the average FTSE All Share Index (FTA)-adjusted monthly
abnormal returns (ARt) and cumulative average FTA-adjusted abnormal returns (CAR1,t) for
the 36 months following the listing day for 92 unit IPOs issued between 1994-2006. Both the
equally-weighted and value-weighted results are presented for comparison reasons. The
two-tailed Student’s t-tests are conducted to test against the hypothesis that the mean
abnormal returns are equal to zero; and both the t-statistics and p-values are presented to
indicate the significance level of the results.
When the monthly raw returns are equally weighted across the sample, 27 of the 36 monthly
average-adjusted abnormal returns are negative and all 36  average  CARs  are  negative.  The
negative average monthly returns are also mirrored in predominantly declining average CARs,
with insignificant periodical reversals. Consistent with Ritter (1991)’s findings regarding US
IPOs’ long-term performance, in the UK, aftermarket performance of unit firms deteriorate
benchmarksonBHARyearmean
IPOsyearmeanWR
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significantly over the long-term. In the first year post-listing, the CARs are negative for all 12
months but in the first three months and event month 5, the underperformance comparing to
the market index is not significant. Proceeding into the second year, the underperformance is
highly significant at 1% level. The CARs in year 3 remain significantly negative. Overall,
measured by equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns, unit IPOs issued in the UK
significantly underperform the FTA Index three years post-listing and the underperformance
is both economically and statistically significant. Hypothesis 5.1 is not rejected.
When the monthly abnormal returns are value-weighted by the ratio of the sample firms’
market  capitalisations  at  offer  price  to  the  total  market  capitalisation  of  the  whole  unit  IPO
sample, the level of underperformance and the significance are both higher than if weighted
equally. Similar to the equally-weighted results, the underperformance in the first five months,
although significant, has much less magnitude comparing to the underperformance in the
second and third years. The CARs remain significantly negative throughout the second and
third year. Overall, the value-weighted cumulative abnormal returns exhibit worse
underperformance than the equally-weighted cumulative returns, which strengthens the result
that unit IPOs underperform the FTA Index in the three-year period post-listing.
INSERT TABLE 5.2
To test the robustness of the results from FTA-adjusted ARs and CARs, TABLE 5.3
illustrates the equally-weighted average monthly abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) comparing to the market movements of four different market
indices. Sample rebalancing has been carried out every month in case a sample firm is
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delisted from the London Stock Exchange. The FTSE All Shares (FTA) Index is still selected
to be the main market index. Since unit IPO firms tend to be younger and smaller comparing
to share-only IPO firms, I  also employ the Hoare Govett  Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index
and FTSE Small Cap Index as alternative benchmarks for robustness check. Furthermore,
since  the  listings  of  unit  IPOs  in  my  sample  are  highly  concentrated  on  the  Alternative
Investment Market (AIM), I also apply FTSE AIM All Share Index as another benchmark to
test the sensitivity of the performance measures. The market-adjusted average abnormal
returns (ARs) are calculated by taking the difference between the raw monthly returns of firm
i (ri,t) and the monthly returns of respective indexes (rm,t) for the corresponding periods. The
results in TABLE 5.3 indicate that for the first three event months, all the four
benchmark-adjusted  ARs  or  CARs  are  negative  but  only  the  HGSC-adjusted  CAR  is
significant (at 10% level) in event month 3, which is consistent with the previous result and
the US evidence from Ritter (1995), that the abnormally high initial returns at the time of
listing will persist into the aftermarket for up to five months. In event month 4, the unit IPOs
significantly underperform the other three indices, but the underperformance against the
SMALL CAP index is not significant. In event month 5, none of the adjusted CARs are
significantly negative apart from HGSC-adjusted CAR, which remains significantly negative
at 10% level. From event month 6 onwards, the cumulative abnormal returns adjusted for
movements from the FTA index, SMALLCAP index and the HGSC index, remain
significantly negative throughout all event months. By the end of the third year post-listing,
the sample unit IPOs significantly underperform the FTSE All Share index by -35.685% at
1%  level,  whilst  FTSE  SMALL  CAP-adjusted  CARs  generate  less  underperformance  of
-29.009% and becomes significant at 5% level. The unit IPOs display the most significant
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underperformance within the HGSC index by -42.276% at 1% level. The market adjustment
from the FTSE AIM index provides the least negative CAR of -13.141%, but the
AIM-adjusted CARs only stayed significantly negative until event month 20, after which
point the underperformance only remains marginally significant. The AIM-adjusted CARs
have not been identified as significantly negative since event month 20.
To obtain a visual comparison of the underperformance of unit IPOs against different indices,
FIGURE 5.1 plots equally-weighted raw monthly returns of unit IPOs and the
market-adjusted monthly returns against the four indices (ARs); FIGURE 5.2 plots the
equally-weighted CARs for the unit IPOs and the market-adjusted CARs against the four
benchmark indices. Confirming the results from TABLE 5.3, the raw and market-adjusted
ARs  in  FIGURE  5.1  display  a  general  underperformance  with  several  positive  reversals,
which explains the low significance level of the AR results. However, all five series of CARs
in FIGURE 5.2 illustrate both economically and statistically significant underperformance for
the three-year period after the initial listing. The underperformance predominantly worsens
during the three years after the initial listing.
Although all four market-adjusted CARs display significantly negative post-initial return
performance, the quantitative measure of the long-term performance of unit IPOs is sensitive
to the benchmark chosen, which is common in event studies over long-term. The
HGSC-adjusted CARs extrude the worst long-term performance, whilst AIM-adjusted CARs
were favoured with the least severe underperformance. The FTA-adjusted CARs display a
milder deterioration from the raw CARs whereas the SMALL CAP-adjusted CARs are almost
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synchronised with the movement of the raw CARs. For examining long-term performance of
IPOs, it is not possible to ascertain which characteristics comprise the ideal benchmark
portfolio. The FTA Index contains all the shares listed on the LSE; including firms of various
sizes  from  diverse  industries  and  of  very  different  span  of  trading  history.  As  a  result,  I
consider the FTA Index as a good candidate for a general benchmark, to outline the overall
long-run performance of the unit IPOs comparing to the majority IPOs on the market, but may
over-adjust the performance downwards due to inclusion of large established firms that tend
to perform well.  In consideration of the smaller size of unit  IPO firms in general,  the FTSE
Small Cap (SMALLCAP) index became another natural candidate, which consists of 300 UK
companies outside of the FTSE 350 Index (The 350 largest companies in the UK). The very
similar patterns that raw CARs and FTSE SMALLCAP-adjusted CARs share confirm the
choice  of  this  index  as  a  decent  consideration  of  size  effect.  In  May  2005,  FTSE  Group
enhanced its coverage of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) by updating the existing
index –the new FTSE AIM All Share (AIM) Index42 segments the market in a new way and
is a stock market index consisting of all companies quoted on the Alternative Investment
Market which meet the flexible requirements for liquidity and free float. The HGSC Index as
another popular index for smaller firms, measures the performance of the lowest 10 per cent
by market capitalisation of the main UK equity market.
The different underperformances against the four alternative benchmark indices can also be
confirmed by the comparison of the mean, median, and extreme values of the average
abnormal returns of the unit IPOs; the results of which are illustrated in TABLE 5.4. Focusing
42 The index is reviewed quarterly, and the constituent companies may change based on market capitalisation data as at the
end of February, May, August and November.
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first on the raw returns, the monthly average raw returns range from 6.044% to -5.156% with
the median value of -0.711% and average at -8.85%. The results of adjusting for market
movements, by subtracting the returns of the market index for the corresponding period,
greatly depend on the choice of benchmarks. Even under the same FTSE-index series, the
results vary with the different compositions of the listed companies: the FTSE All Share
Index-adjusted average abnormal returns (-0.991%) illustrate even worse underperformance
than the average raw monthly returns (-0.850%), while the underperformance shown by FTSE
Small Cap Index-adjusted abnormal returns (-0.806%) are slightly less severe and FTSE AIM
All Shares-Adjusted average return (-0.365%) is much less negative than the raw returns.
Interestingly, like the FTSE Small Cap Index, the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC)
Index also focuses on smaller companies. However, the HGSC–adjusted average abnormal
returns (-1.174%) generate the worst performance among all selected benchmarks and
HGSC-adjusted ARs suffer worst performance throughout the three-year period (-6.217%).
In conclusion, the unit IPOs in the UK exhibit significant underperformance against the FTSE
All Share index, the FTSE SMALL CAP index and the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies
Index measured by equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns. Despite the significant
underperformance against the Alternative Investment Market index up to event month 20, the
low significance level from event month 21 to 36 weakens the choice of the AIM index as a
major benchmark. The difference in the magnitude of CARs comparing to the different
indices can be attributed to the variations in performance of the selected indices. In the case of
the AIM-adjusted CARs, the low significance in the underperformance can be explained by
the more flexible listing requirements from the Alternative Investment Market index, which is
likely to result in the inclusion of high risk firms that impair the index returns as a whole. In
242
comparison, the other three indices provide better benchmark adjustments for the abnormal
returns  over  the  long-term.  With  three  different  market  indices  confirming  significant
underperformance over the three-year period post-listing, this chapter provides strong support
to  the  prediction  that  in  the  UK,  unit  IPOs  significantly  underperform  the  market  in  the
long-term measured by cumulative abnormal returns.
INSERT TABLE 5.3 HERE
INSERT TABLE 5.4 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 5.1-5.2 HERE
5.5.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and Wealth relatives (WRs)
To avoid the downward statistical bias in long-term CARs caused by the implicit monthly
rebalancing, the buy-and-hold market-adjusted abnormal returns (BHARs) and the wealth
relatives (WR) are calculated as alternative measurements of long-term performance. Panel A
of TABLE 5.5 reports the raw buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in comparison to
various market index-adjusted BHARs for different holding periods. Overall, all five series of
BHARs indicate underperformance with negative holding period returns worsening over the
three years after listing. However, the AIM-adjusted BHARs illustrate the lowest significance
level comparing to the other four benchmarks, which is similar to the result from cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs). Therefore, the analysis of long-term buy-and-hold returns are
focused on the FTA, SMALLCAP, HGSC, and matching firm-adjusted BHARs.
In  the  first  year  post-listing,  the  buy-and-hold  abnormal  returns  of  unit  IPOs  are  all  visibly
negative but not all statistically significant. The market-adjusted BHARs are only
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significantly negative in event month 6, when the unit IPOs significantly underperform the
FTA index by -7.555%, the SMALLCAP index by -7.639% and the HGSC index by
-15.082%, all at 5% level. In the same event month, the worst underperformance of unit IPOs
is against the matching share-only firms, by -31.601% despite the marginal significant p-value,
which  might  be  caused  by  limited  sample  size.  By the  end  of  the  first  year,  the  BHARs are
again all negative but only marginally significant.
By the  end  of  the  second year  after  the  listing,  the  unit  IPOs  significantly  underperform all
four market-indices and the matching share-only firms. The FTA-adjusted BHAR in event
month 24 is -31.888% with a t-statistic of -3.89 (significant at 1% level); the
SMALLCAP-adjusted 24-month-BHAR is -25.472% with a t-statistic of -3.2 6 (significant at
1% level); the unit IPOs underperformance against the HGSC index is the worst, at -34.353%
and also significant at 1% level; the average 24-month-BHAR compared to the matching
firms indicates a slightly lower underperformance of -33.880%, which is significant at 5%
level. The AIM index-adjusted 24-month-BHAR provides the mildest underperformance of
-13.757% and the result is significant at 10% level.
In Panel A of TABLE 5.5, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns suggest the most consistent
underperformance in year three (event month 28-36), when the unit firms constantly
underperform the FTA index, SMALLCAP index and the HGSC index throughout all event
months; the underperformance against the matching share-only firms are also highly
significant  with  the  exception  of  event  month  30,  and  34.  By  the  end  of  the  third  year
post-listing, the market-adjusted BHARs are -31.329% against the FTA index (significant at
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1% level), -24.027% against the SMALLCAP index (significant at 5% level); the worst
underperformance is again the HGSC-adjusted BHAR of -37.162% (significant at 1% level)
and the matching firm adjusted BHAR of -25.212% implies the mildest underperformance
(significant  at  5%  level).  Overall,  the  three-year  abnormal  returns  under  a  buy-and-hold
strategy, whilst confirming the results obtained from cumulative abnormal returns, provides
strong support that unit IPOs underperform both the matching share-only firms and the
market as a whole.
FIGURE 5.3 visually illustrates the comparison of five series of n-year BHARs (n=1, 2, and
3): (1) no adjustment (raw returns), (2) FTSE ALL Share Index adjustments (FTA), (3) FTSE
Small  Cap  Index  adjustments  (SMALL  CAP),  (4)  FTSE  AIM  All  Share  Index  adjustments
(AIM), and (5) Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index adjustments (HGSC). The BHARs
against different benchmarks for different holding periods display slight differences in the
magnitude  of  underperformance:  For  raw  BHARs,  FTA-adjusted  BHARs  and  the  SMALL
CAP-adjusted BHARs, the worst underperformance all occurred in the second year (-23.927%,
-31.888%, and -25.472% respectively). The HGSC-adjusted BHARs suffered the worst
underperformance by the end of year three (-37.162%). However, even in the second year, the
HGSC-adjusted BHAR (-34.353%) is still the most negative comparing to the other
benchmark-adjusted BHARs. Similar differences are also observed from the cumulative
abnormal returns adjusted from different market indices from previous results and again are
contributed to the difference in performance caused by different compositions of listed firms
on these indices. However, comparing to the cumulative measurements of long-run
performance, the buy-and-hold returns exhibit less severe underperformance. Despite the
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difference in the magnitude, the negative market-adjusted BHARs are statistically robust.
Overall, the results of buy-and-hold returns indicate significant long-term underperformance
for UK unit IPO firms against various market indices and matching share-only IPO firms.
Panel B of TABLE 5.5 presents the wealth relatives of unit IPO firms in comparison to four
market  indices  and  the  matching  share-only  IPO firms,  for  years  1,  2  and  3  post-listing.  All
the wealth relatives display significantly high t-statistics from the two-tailed Student’s t-tests,
indicating the results are all highly significant at 1% level. Only the 1-year and 3-year WRs
against the AIM index are higher than 1, which suggests that unit IPO firms outperform the
AIM index in year one and year three. However, as discussed before, because of the loose
listing requirements and the inclusion of large numbers of high-risk firms on the Alternative
Investment Market index, the unit firms do not underperform the AIM Index. All the other
WRs against the FTA Index, SMALL CAP Index, HGSC Index, and the matching share-only
firms are all less than 1 and all significant at 1% level, which suggests that the unit IPOs
significantly underperform all four market benchmarks and the matching share-only firms. In
conclusion, the wealth relatives indicate statistically significant long-term underperformance
from the  unit  IPO firms  comparing  to  both  the  share-only  firms  and  the  market  as  a  whole.
Such results are consistent to both the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and the cumulative
abnormal returns.
The long-term performance of unit IPOs is compared to the matching share-only IPOs in
TABLE 5.6. The 1-year, 2-year, and 3-year BHARs for both unit firms and share-only firms
are ranked respectively by ascending order. The Student’s t-test and Mann-Whitney test are
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conducted to indicate significance level in means and medians. In the first year, unit IPOs do
not significantly underperform the share-only matching firms, which can be explained by the
finding in Ritter (1995) that the abnormally high initial returns at the time of listing will
persist into the short-term aftermarket. In the second and third year, the unit firms
significantly underperform the matching share-only firms for most of the rank (apart from the
extreme  outliers  in  Rank  1  and  5)  and  the  differences  in  the  mean  and  median  BHARs  are
both significant. In the second year, the unit firms underperform the matching share-only
firms by 32.41% on average and the difference in means is significant at 1% level. The
difference in median 3-year BHARs is -23.05%. In the third year, the unit firms significantly
underperform the matching share-only firms by 21.38% at 1% level in means and 23.27% in
medians at 5% level.
In conclusion, results from both cumulative, and buy-and-hold, long-term abnormal returns
and the wealth relatives strongly support that unit IPOs in the UK underperform both the
market indices and share-only firms matched by size and industry. Despite the adjustments
from different indices and the different performance measures, the long-term
underperformance of UK unit IPOs is both economically and statistically significant.
INSERT TABLE 5.5 HERE
INSERT TABLE 5.6 HERE
INSERT FIGURE 5.3 HERE
5.5.3 Cross-sectional analysis of long-term performance
The cross-sectional patterns of long run IPO performance have been examined from several
dimensions. The mean and median values of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns for
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UK  unit  IPOs,  the  FTSE  All  Share  (FTA)  index,  and  the  matching  share-only  IPOs  are
categorised by the year of listing, industry sector, firm size, firm riskiness, the gross proceeds
of the IPO, the level of underpricing, and the listing location of the firms. The mean and
median buy-and-hold returns are compared between both unit IPOs and the FTA index, and
between unit IPOs and their matching share-only IPOs. Paired t-tests are conducted to
examine the significance level of differences in means; whilst the non-parametric
Mann-Whitney (MW) tests are conducted to examine the differences in medians. The
p-values are reported in indication of the significance levels.
5.5.3.1 Long-term performance categorised by year of listing
Panel A of TABLE 5.7 reports the equally-weighted average three-year buy-and-hold returns
for the 92 UK unit IPO firms listed over the period of 1994-2006 in comparison to the FTSE
All Share index returns, and also the matching share-only IPO firms for the corresponding
cohort periods. The cohort periods are determined according to the level of market index
returns. Monthly returns on the FTSE All Share Index, the FTSE Small Cap Index and Hoare
Govett  Smaller  Companies  (HGSC)  Index  are  calculated  and  charted  in  FIGURE  5.4  to
decide the ‘hot’ versus ‘cold’ market conditions. As indicated in FIGURE 5.4, the periods of
1994-95, 1999, and 2001-03, are considered the ‘cold’ market periods, when the market
suffered severe declines of the index returns (also known as the ‘bear’ market); whereas, the
sub-periods of 1996, 2000, and 2004-06 are considered the ‘hot’ market, displaying overall
price appreciation on the market index. The cross-sectional long-term buy-and-hold returns
illustrated in Panel A of TABLE 5.7 clearly indicates that unit IPOs generate significantly
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negative long-term abnormal returns if they are issued during years of high market levels
when the market indices generally exhibit strong performance (1996, 2000, and 2004-06). On
the other hand, unit IPOs issued during cold market periods such as 1994-95, 1997-99, and
2001-23, do not exhibit significant underperformance. Unit IPOs issued in the year 1996
(when the FTA Index procures a steady increase in index prices), display an average 3-year
BHAR of 6.473%. Despite the positive long-term returns, the unit IPOs issued in 1996
significantly underperform the market index by -46.499%, which is significant at 10% level.
The difference is their median 3-year BHARs is also significant at 10% level. The unit IPOs
also underperform the share-only IPOs issued during the same year matched by firm size and
industry. However, the difference in means and medians are not significant at a conventional
level. During the year 2000, the ‘dot-com’ bubble is driving the market up. Unit IPOs issued
in this year display significantly negative average 3-year buy-and-hold returns. Comparing to
the FTA Index, unit IPOs’ underperformance is significant in means and medians both at 10%
level. The unit IPOs also significantly underperform the matching share-only firms issued in
the same year with the difference in means significant at 5% level. However, the difference in
medians is not significant. In 2004, when the market level hit its historical high (mainly
driven by the bio-tech bubble), both unit IPOs and share-only IPOs significantly
underperform the market index, but unit IPOs issued in 2004 significantly outperform the
matching share-only IPOs. Considering the hot market condition, which is driven by certain
high-risk industries during this period, the underperformance of shares issued in this year is
expected regardless of the type of the offer. Unit IPOs issued during another ‘hot’ market
period from 2005 to 2006, consistently and significantly underperform both the market index
and their matching share-only IPOs issued in the same year. For both years, the differences in
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both means and medians are highly significant at 1% level. On the other hand, the long-term
returns of unit IPOs issued during cold market conditions, when the index suffers price
decreases (1994-95, 1997-99, and 2001-03), do not present any significant underperformance
comparing to both the market index and the share-only matching IPOs. Overall, unit IPOs that
are issued during years of higher market level exhibit worse long-term performance than unit
IPOs that are issued during years with lower market level.
INSERT FIGURE 5.4 HERE
5.5.3.2 Long-term performance categorised by industry sector
In CHAPTER 3 I record that unit IPOs in the UK are popularly distributed across certain high
risk industries, such as mining (33.70%), support services (23.91%), IT and hi-tech (13.04%),
and bio-technology (9.78%). A company is expected to have high growth in the near future if
it belongs to those industry groups but it will also implicitly face greater risk at the same time,
which could be the source of long-term underperformance. Panel B of TABLE 4.7 illustrates
the equally-weighted average 3-year buy-and-hold returns across industry groups in test of
Hypothesis 5.10 proposed in Section 5.3. Results indicate that unit IPOs from mining, support
services, and bio-technology industry groups present severe underperformance against the
market index and the differences in means and medians are all significant at conventional
levels. The worst performing industry in the long term is the biotechnology group, which
underperforms the FTA index by 43.994% over the 3-year period post-listing. The original
estimate in world markets for genetically engineered products is nearly US$100 billion by the
year 2000. The high-tech elements inject high risk into the industry, but the risk was
dismissed in favour of the appealing benefits. Investors stayed overoptimistic about the
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biotech industry up to the year 2004, before substantial doubts of the industry began to
concern investors. Investors have been stunned more by the absence of profits in their
investments than by medical progress in the sector. The mining industry is another popular
patron  in  unit  IPOs.  Indicated  by  results  from  Panel  B  of  TABLE  5.7,  mining  unit  IPOs
significantly underperform the market index by 32.819% on average. The difference in means
is significant at 5% level indicated by a paired two-tail t-test and the difference in medians is
significant at 1% level, suggested by the p-value from the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test.
For the IT industry, unit IPOs also exhibit significant underperformance against the market
index; however, the difference in means is only marginally significant, which can be
explained by the limited number of IT unit IPOs in the sample data. Nonetheless, the
magnitude of the underperformance still sheds light on the industry clustering argument.
When compared to share-only IPOs matched by firm size and industry, the underperformance
becomes insignificant in most industry groups except the support service sector. The support
sector unit IPOs significantly underperform the share-only comparables in mean values at 1%
level, although the difference in median values is not significant as suggested by the
Mann-Whitney test’s p-value. Such results confirm that there is indeed industry clustering in
the long-term performance of unit IPOs. Unit firms from high risk industries including mining,
IT, support services and bio-technology exhibit worse underperformance against the market
index in the long-term, comparing to unit IPOs from ‘other’ industry groups.
5.5.3.3 Long-run performance categorised by size of unit firms
To test Hypothesis 5.8 and to ascertain whether the unit IPO firms’ long-term abnormal
returns  are  also  affected  by  their  firm size,  Panel  C of  TABLE 5.7  segregates  the  unit  IPOs
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into three size groups by market capitalisation at offer price. The results indicate that the
average 3-year BHARs of ‘large’-size unit IPOs significantly underperform the market index
by the highest 30.081%, but the difference in means is not significant. The average BHAR of
‘medium’-sized unit IPOs underperform the market index by 27.711%, with the difference in
means significant at 10% level. The ‘small’-sized unit firms provide the least
underperformance against the market index by 23.101% and the difference in means is
significant at 5% level. However, by median values, the ‘small’ unit IPOs underperform the
market index by the highest 69.115% and the difference in medians is highly significant at 1%
level suggested by the p-value from the Mann-Whitney test. The ‘medium’ unit IPOs’
underperformance against the market index is 59.887% in median values with the
non-parametric p-value of 0.002 (significant at 1% level). The ‘large’ unit firms provide the
least underperformance of 52.355% in medians and it is significant at 1%. Overall, the results
from the differences in means and medians give the opposite indications, and therefore the
hypothesis predicting that unit firms’ long-term performance is positively related to the firm
size is rejected. In the UK, the size of unit firms does not significantly affect their abnormal
returns in the long term.
5.5.3.4 Long-run performance categorised by unit firms’ riskiness
The standard deviations of the share prices 200 days after the unit IPOs are calculated to
indicate firm risk. The unit IPOs are ranked by the riskiness in ascending order and divided
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into three groups. The ‘low’ risk group, including the top division of unit firms with lower
riskiness, display the least severe underperformance comparing to the market index in both
mean (-11.638%) and median (-53.465%), with the differences both statistically significant at
5%  level.  The  ‘high’  risk  unit  IPOs,  i.e.  the  last  division  of  the  rank  with  highest  firm
riskiness, exhibit the most severe underperformance against the market index and both the
mean (-59.664%) and the median (-72.136%) are significant at 1% level. The ‘medium’ risk
unit IPOs outperform the ‘high’ risk group but suffer worse underperformance than unit IPOs
from the ‘low’ risk group. When compared to share-only IPOs matched on firm size and
industry, only the high-risk unit IPOs significantly underperform their share-only
comparables.  The  unit  IPOs  with  ‘low’  and  ‘medium’  risk  do  not  present  significant
underperformance to the matching portfolio of share-only IPOs. Overall, the long-term
buy-and-hold abnormal returns of unit IPOs are negatively related to the firm riskiness. The
riskier the unit firms, the worse they perform in the three-year period after the unit IPOs.
5.5.3.5 Long-run performance categorised by the size of the unit offers
In  Panel  E  of  TABLE 5.7,  the  3-year  buy-and-hold  returns  of  unit  IPOs  are  segregated  into
different groups by the gross proceeds of the unit offers. The results suggest that unit IPOs,
which raise more than five million pounds significantly, underperform both the market index
and share-only firms matched on firm size and industry. The five-to-ten million group
displays the highest underperformance of -60.88% against the FTA Index and -62.056%
against the matching share-only IPOs, both of which are significant at 1% level. The unit
issues, which raise above ten million pounds underperform the market index by -45.426% in
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means and -25.863% in median values; the difference in means is significant at 1% level, and
the difference in medians is significant at 5% level. Other unit IPOs with a sizes less than five
million pounds generally significantly underperform the market, except for issues that raise
less than one and half million, in which the underperformance is not significant. However,
those smaller issues do not present significant underperformance comparing to their
share-only matching firms. Overall, the bigger unit issues exhibit worse underperformance
than smaller issues, which is consistent with the Agency Cost theory, that unit firms
intentionally limit the size of their offers to bind managers to optimal investment decisions.
The  smaller  the  proceeds  from  unit  IPOs,  the  more  managers  will  rely  on  materialising  the
second round of financing through the exercise of warrants and gain higher incentive to invest
in value-generating projects. Therefore, Hypothesis 5.7, that the long-term performance of
unit firms is positively related to the size of the unit IPOs, is rejected.
5.5.3.6 Long-run performance categorised by level of initial underpricing
In testing whether there is any relation between the initial underpricing on the first trading day
and the  long-term abnormal  returns  three  years  after  listing,  in  Panel  F  of  TABLE 5.7,  unit
IPOs are divided into three groups with low, medium, and high HGSC-adjusted first-day
initial returns (IRD2) respectively. The results clearly indicate that unit IPOs that generate
lower initial returns, i.e. underpriced less, do not significantly underperform either the market
index or the matching share-only IPOs. The negative 3-year BHAR against the FTA index is
not significant; in fact those unit IPOs appear to outperform the share-only IPOs matched on
firm size and industry, although the differences in means and medians are not significant. Unit
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firms with ‘medium’ initial returns significantly underperform the market index, but not the
matching share-only firms. Contrarily, unit IPOs with ‘high’ initial returns exhibit severe
underperformance against both the market index and the matching share-only IPOs. The
differences in means and medians are all statistically significant at conventional levels. Unit
IPOs that are highly underpriced on the first trading day suffer the worst underperformance
than the other groups. On average, highly underpriced unit IPOs underperform the FTA Index
by 55.167%, which is highly significant at 1% level; the underperformance comparing to
matching share-only IPOs is 65.302%, which is significant at 5% level. Overall, Hypothesis
5.6, stating that unit IPOs with higher initial underpricing exhibit worse long-term
performance is not rejected.
INSERT TABLE 5.7 HERE
5.5.4 Regression analysis of long-term performance
I conduct three linear regressions on the three-year BHARs of unit IPOs with the matching
share-only IPOs as a benchmark. The variables included are designed to test the long-term
performance of unit IPOs in relations to unit firm-characteristics, unit offering-characteristics,
and warrant characteristics, the results of which are illustrated in TABLE 5.8. The first
regression includes several firm characteristics as independent variables. As discussed in the
cross-sectional analysis previously, evidence was found that smaller, riskier unit firms exhibit
worse long-term underperformance. The market capitalisation (MKTCAP) and the firm
riskiness (RISK) are included as indicators of firm size and riskiness respectively. In test of
Hypothesis 5.11 that the long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the
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earnings  and  asset  utilisation,  the  ratio  of  EBIT  to  total  asset  (EBIT/TTLASSET)  is  also
included. Other variables are employed to detect any relation between the long-term returns of
unit IPOs and the age, insider holding, and leverage of the firm. The SEO dummy variable is
included in extension of previous chapter’s findings, that unit IPOs are more likely to issue
seasoned equity offerings if they survived the three-year period post-listing. The results from
Panel A of TABLE 5.8 indicate that the firm riskiness and the leverage of the unit firms are
both  significantly  and  negatively  related  to  the  3-year  BHAR  of  unit  firms.  The  riskier  the
unit firms, the higher leverage the unit firms have by the time of listing, the worse their
long-term performance. On the other hand, the earning and asset utilisation, measured by the
ratio of EBIT to total  asset  (also applied as the ‘efficiency ratio’ to indicate level of agency
costs in CHAPTER 3), is positively related to the long-term BHARs and the relation is highly
significant at 1% level. The age, insider holding and the SEO dummy is not significantly
related to the long-term performance. The R2 of  48.7%  is  not  very  high,  which  can  be
explained by the limited sample size of unit IPOs. The variance inflation factors (VIF) are all
slightly higher than 1, which do not indicate collinearity problems. Overall, the regression
provides viable results.
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EQUATION 5.13
The second regression focuses on the long-term performance of unit firms in relation to
several characteristics of the unit offering. As discussed in the cross-sectional analysis, I find
evidence that the unit IPOs that are more underpriced and have larger proceeds exhibit worse
long-term performance.  Therefore,  the  initial  returns  on  the  first  trading  day  (IRD2)  and  the
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proceeds net of expenses (NETPROCEEDS) from the unit IPOs are included in the regression
to test the robustness of previous results. In addition, to test whether the trading location has
any impact on the long-term abnormal returns, I also include the AIM dummy; which takes
the value of 1 if the unit firms are listed on the Alternative Investment Market, 0 if otherwise.
Furthermore, in test of Hypothesis 5.12, stating that unit IPOs issued by more reputable
underwriters display better long-term performance, I also employ the REPUTATION dummy
in  the  regression.  Results  in  Panel  B of  TABLE 5.8  provide  a  clear  indication  that  both  the
initial returns and the net proceeds of the unit issues are negatively related to the 3-year
BHAR of the unit  IPOs, both of which are highly significant at  1% level.  The AIM dummy
and REPUTATION dummy are both positively and significantly related to the long-term
abnormal returns of unit IPOs. Overall, the results from Regression 2 sufficiently support the
argument that unit IPOs that obtained higher initial returns and raised larger proceeds
ultimately suffer worse underperformance in the long-term. On the other hand, unit IPOs that
are listed on the Alternative Investment Market and issued by more reputable underwriters
accrue better long-term performance, compared to unit IPOs that are listed on the Main
Market and issued by less prestigious underwriters.
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Regression 3 highlights any possible relations between the long-term performance of unit
IPOs and several characteristics of attached warrants. As discussed in Section 5.3, the unit
IPO literature suggests the characteristics of warrants attached in unit IPOs can potentially
affect the long-term performance of unit IPOs. Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) provide
evidence that the firm value sold as warrants is positively related to firm riskiness. Since
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previous results in this chapter indicate that riskier unit firms suffer worse long-term
performance, the percentage of warrant proceeds as the market capitalisation of the unit firms
(VALUE) is included to examine the robustness of the Signalling hypothesis. According to
the Agency Cost hypothesis, warrants are attached in unit IPOs as the potential second round
of financing. The larger number of warrants attached indicates that more funding could be
materialised from the exercise of warrants, which could create higher incentive to reduce
agency costs and in turn improve unit firms’ performance in the long term. Therefore, the
number of warrants (NUMBER) is also included in Regression 3. Mazouz et al. (2007) find
no significant difference in the long-term performance segregated by warrant maturity with a
sample of unit IPOs issued in Hong Kong. To reassess their findings, I include the LIFE
variable measured by the calendar years between the warrant issuance and their expiration
date. Furthermore, whether the warrants will be eventually exercised to materialise additional
funding  depends  on  the  price  performance  of  the  unit  firms  in  the  aftermarket.  If  the  share
prices of unit firms exceed the warrant exercise price post-listing, the warrant-holders are
likely to exercise the warrants as the second round of financing to support unit firms’ growth.
The EXERCISE dummy in Regression 3 takes the value of 1 if attached warrants in the unit
IPOs are exercised by the time of this research, 0 if otherwise. Schultz (1993b) also predicts
that unit firms set the warrants exercise price above the IPO offer price to create incentives for
managers to improve their companies’ performance. I adopt the ratio of warrant exercise price
to the offer price (PRATIO) in the regression in examination of the Agency Cost hypothesis.
Results of Regression 3 are demonstrated in Panel C of TABLE 5.8. The firm value sold as
warrants  is  positively  related  to  the  3-year  BHAR  of  unit  IPOs  and  the  result  is  highly
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significant at 1% level. Viewed collectively with the significantly negative relation between
firm riskiness and long-term performance of unit IPO in the previous results from Regression
1 and the cross-sectional analysis, the long-term performance evidence of UK unit IPOs does
not support the Signalling hypothesis. On the other hand, the number of warrants attached to
the unit IPOs is positively related to the long-term performance of unit firms; which is
consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis in that the larger the warrant proceeds, the higher
the incentive to bind managers to optimal investment decisions and in turn better the
long-term performance. The PRATIO is also positively related to the 3-year BHARs of unit
IPOs. The higher the ratio, the higher the incentive for managers to invest only in
value-generating projects and in turn materialise the exercise of warrants. Such results
strengthen the support of the long-term evidence towards the Agency Cost hypothesis. The
maturity  of  the  warrants  and  the  proportion  of  warrants,  which  have  been  exercised,  are  all
positively related to the long-term performance of unit IPOs. However, the coefficients on
these  two  variables  are  not  significant  at  conventional  levels.  Nonetheless,  results  from
Regression 3 provide strong evidence that certain characteristics of warrants attached in a unit
IPO can indeed affect the long-term performance of the issuing firm.
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5.6 Summary and conclusions
According to both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses, regardless of whether
warrants are included in IPOs to reduce agency cost or to signal favourable information about
firm value, unit firms are expected to generate higher long-term returns than share-only IPOs.
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In this chapter, both the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses for including warrants are
examined with a fresh sample of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994 and 2006. The
long-term performance of UK unit IPOs are compared to four market indices and share-only
firms matched on firm size and industry. Additionally, the long-term performance of unit
IPOs are also analysed in relation to the characteristics of unit IPOs and attached warrants.
Firstly, results from the cumulative abnormal returns, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and
the wealth relatives all provide strong evidence that unit IPOs in the UK significantly
underperform both, the market indices and share-only firms matched by size and industry.
Comparing to the cumulative measurements, the buy-and-hold abnormal returns exhibit
significantly less severe underperformance.
Secondly, cross-sectional patterns of long run IPO performance have been categorised by
listing year, industry, firm size, firm riskiness, issue size, and the level of underpricing. Unit
IPOs issued during years of high market levels generate significantly worse underperformance
compared to unit IPOs issued during years of low market levels. Unit firms from high-risk
industries including mining, IT, support services and biotechnology display significantly
worse long-term underperformance comparing to unit IPOs from less risky industry groups.
However, in the UK, the size of unit firms does not significantly affect their abnormal returns
in  the  long  term.  In  addition,  evidence  is  found that  the  long-term BHARs of  unit  IPOs  are
negatively related to the firm riskiness.  The riskier the unit  firms, the worse they perform in
the three-year period after the unit IPOs. When unit IPOs are segregated by their gross
proceeds, bigger unit issues with larger proceeds exhibit worse underperformance than
smaller  issues.  Such  a  result  is  consistent  with  the  Agency  Cost  theory,  that  unit  firms
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intentionally limit the size of their offers to bind managers to optimal investment decisions.
Moreover, less underpriced unit IPOs do not significantly underperform either the market
index or the matching share-only IPOs. Contrarily, unit IPOs with high initial returns exhibit
severe underperformance against both the market index and the matching share-only IPOs.
Last but not least, the linear regression results indicate that the firm riskiness and the leverage
of the unit firms are both significantly and negatively related to the 3-year BHAR of unit
firms.  The  riskier  the  unit  firms  and  the  higher  leverage  the  unit  firms  have  by  the  time  of
listing, the worse their long-term performance. On the other hand, the earning and asset
utilisation, measured by the ratio of EBIT to total asset is positively related to the long-term
BHARs and the relation is highly significant at 1% level. The age, insider holding and the
SEO dummy is not significantly related to the long-term performance. The second regression
examines relations between the long-term performance of unit firms and several
characteristics of the unit offerings. The results confirm the argument that unit IPOs that are
more underpriced, and raise larger proceeds, exhibit worse underperformance in the long-term.
On the other hand, unit IPOs that are listed on the Alternative Investment Market and issued
by more reputable underwriters achieve better long-term performance, compared to unit IPOs
that are listed on the Main Market and issued by less prestigious underwriters.
Regression 3 highlights relations between the long-term performance of unit IPOs and several
warrant characteristics. The firm value sold as warrants is positively related to the 3-year
BHAR of unit IPOs and the result is highly significant at 1% level. Such a result contradicts
the Signalling hypothesis’ perdition of a positive relation between the firm value sold as
warrants and firm riskiness, since previous cross-sectional analyses found that the long-term
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underperformance increased with firm riskiness. On the other hand, the number of warrants
attached to the unit IPOs is positively related to the long-term performance of unit firms,
which is consistent with the Agency Cost hypothesis, that the larger the warrant proceeds, the
higher the incentive to bind managers to optimal investment decisions and in turn the better
the long-term performance. The PRATIO is also positively related to the 3-year BHARs of
unit  IPOs.  The  higher  the  ratio  of  exercise  price  to  offer  price,  the  higher  the  incentive  for
managers to invest only in value-generating projects to increase the unit firms’ share prices
and in turn materialise the exercise of warrants. Such a result strengthens the support of the
long-term  evidence  towards  the  Agency  Cost  hypothesis.  Both  the  maturity  of  the  warrants
and  the  proportion  of  warrants,  which  have  been  exercised  present  positive  coefficients,  but
these two variables are not significant at conventional level. Nonetheless, it is safe to
conclude that certain characteristics of warrants attached in a unit IPO have significant impact
on the long-term performance of the issuing firms.
To sum up, unit IPOs issued in the UK present significant underperformance across both the
matching share-only IPOs and various market indices, regardless of the methods adopted to
calculate abnormal returns (BHARs, CARs, and WRs; equally-weighted and value-weighted).
Such results are unable to directly support either the Agency Cost hypothesis or the Signalling
hypothesis, both of which imply that unit firms should exhibit better performance in the long
term. However, the cross-sectional and regression analyses provide some insight within the
unit IPO sample. Certain characteristics of the unit firms, the unit issues, and the attached
warrants can significantly affect the long-term performance of unit IPOs.
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TABLE 5.1
Definition of included variables
Variables Definition
IRD1 Discrete raw initial return calculated using the first closing bid price and offer price at the IPO
IRD2 HGSC-adjusted first-day initial returns
IRD3 The continuously compounded first-day initial return is the natural logarithm of (1+ IRD2)
IRW1 HGSC Index-adjusted first-week initial returns
IRW2 The continuously compounded first-week initial return is the natural logarithm of (1+ IRW1)
AGE Number of calendar days between firm incorporation and the listing date
MKTCAP Market capitalisation of the issued share capital following the listing at the placing price
TTLASSET Total assets of the sample firms by end of the fiscal year prior to the IPO
ASSET The ratio of total assets divided by the gross proceeds from IPO
MKT2BK Market-to-book ratio of IPO firms immediately post-listing
INSIDER Percentage of directors’ holdings in their own company immediately after the listing
RISK Firm riskiness, measured by the residual standard deviations of the discrete share return 200 days
following the IPO
TTLREVENUE Total revenue of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
REVENUE The ratio of total revenue divided by the gross proceeds from IPO
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax of the IPO firm by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
NI Net income after tax by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
LEVERAGE Ratio of total debt to total assets by the end of the fiscal year prior to the IPOs
DEBT The ratio of total debt divided by the gross IPO proceeds
DELAY Number of calendar days between the registrations of prospectus and commencement of trading
EXPENSE Percentage total expense to gross proceeds of the IPOs
REPUTATION Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the underwriter has a high reputation ranking, 0 if otherwise
PROCEEDS The expected gross proceeds of the IPOs
Ln(PROCEED) The natural logarithm of the expected gross proceeds from the IPO
VALUE Firm value sold as warrants calculated as warrant proceeds as a percentage of  firm market
capitalisation after IPO
UNIT Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the IPO includes warrants, 0 if otherwise
NUMBER Number of warrants included in the unit IPOs
LIFE Number of years before warrant expiration
PRATIO The ratio of warrant exercise price to the offer price
AIM Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the IPO firm is listed on Alternative Investment Market (AIM),
0 if otherwise
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TABLE 5.2
FTA Index - Adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for Unit IPOs
Equally-weighted and value-weighted average FTSE All Share Index (FTA)-adjusted abnormal returns (AR) and average cumulative abnormal returns
(CAR) for the 36 months following the unit IPOs are presented. The calculations are shown in EQUATION 5.3-5.8. Two-tailed Student’s t-tests are
conducted for each month’s returns against the zero-mean hypothesis. The t-statistics for the average adjusted return is computed for each month
following EQUATION 5.4 The t-statistic for the cumulative average returns in each month,  is  calculated according to EQUATION 5.6.  The level of
significance is indicated by associated p-values.
Equally-Weighted Value-Weighted
Month Sample
Firms AR% t-stat p-value CAR% t-stat p-value AR% t-stat p-value CAR% t-stat p-value
1 92 -0.571 -0.29 0.775 -0.571 -0.29 0.775 -5.254 -2.47a 0.015 -5.254 -2.47a 0.015
2 92 -1.374 -0.70 0.486 -1.945 -0.69 0.508 -4.794 -1.35 0.182 -10.048 -2.17b 0.033
3 92 -1.183 -0.96 0.339 -3.128 -1.31 0.176 -2.834 -1.41 0.163 -12.882 -2.23b 0.029
4 92 -1.714 -1.39 0.169 -4.842 -1.75c 0.120 -2.652 -1.21 0.231 -15.534 -2.13b 0.036
5 92 -0.039 -0.02 0.987 -4.881 -1.16 0.249 -0.016 -0.01 0.996 -15.550 -1.84c 0.069
6 92 -3.331 -1.94b 0.056 -8.212 -1.85b 0.058 -5.958 -1.44d 0.154 -21.508 -1.83c 0.071
7 92 -2.627 -1.47d 0.144 -10.839 -2.12b 0.037 -8.001 -1.57d 0.121 -29.509 -1.80c 0.074
8 92 -4.226 -2.18b 0.032 -15.065 -2.89a 0.010 -6.433 -2.80a 0.006 -35.942 -1.99b 0.050
9 92 0.040 0.020 0.984 -15.025 -2.45a 0.016 -5.757 -1.25 0.213 -41.699 -1.91c 0.060
10 92 3.893 1.13 0.262 -11.133 -1.45d 0.150 -6.070 -0.97 0.332 -47.769 -1.72c 0.089
11 92 -5.835 -3.03a 0.003 -16.968 -2.11b 0.038 -2.783 -0.40 0.690 -50.552 -2.18b 0.032
12 91 -1.367 -0.54 0.594 -18.334 -2.13b 0.036 -6.654 -1.65c 0.101 -57.205 -2.26b 0.026
13 91 -4.207 -2.32a 0.013 -22.542 -2.49a 0.014 -1.998 -0.50 0.617 -59.203 -2.24b 0.027
14 91 -2.435 -1.73c 0.087 -24.977 -2.77a 0.007 -6.343 -1.60c 0.104 -65.546 -2.20b 0.031
15 90 -1.304 -0.59 0.560 -26.281 -2.73a 0.008 -8.422 -1.63c 0.103 -73.968 -2.15b 0.034
16 90 -0.097 -0.05 0.964 -26.378 -2.69a 0.009 -2.859 -0.45 0.650 -76.827 -1.99b 0.050
17 90 -2.478 -0.84 0.403 -28.856 -2.82a 0.006 0.354 0.11 0.913 -76.473 -1.95b 0.054
18 90 0.950 0.42 0.677 -27.905 -2.69a 0.008 5.708 0.66 0.508 -70.765 -2.19b 0.031
(Continued)
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Month Sample
Firms AR% t-stat p-value CAR% t-stat p-value AR% t-stat p-value CAR% t-stat p-value
19 90 -1.634 -0.65 0.516 -29.539 -2.88a 0.005 -1.861 -0.42 0.678 -72.626 -2.30b 0.024
20 90 -1.133 -0.47 0.640 -30.672 -2.93a 0.004 5.721 0.65 0.515 -66.904 -2.55a 0.012
21 90 -0.743 -0.31 0.755 -31.415 -3.02a 0.003 0.891 0.22 0.823 -66.014 -2.82a 0.006
22 90 0.332 0.19 0.849 -31.083 -2.93a 0.004 -2.655 -1.10 0.275 -68.669 -2.82a 0.006
23 90 -1.659 -0.80 0.425 -32.742 -3.13a 0.002 -0.155 -0.03 0.976 -68.824 -3.14a 0.002
24 88 -3.070 -1.36 0.177 -35.812 -3.43a 0.001 -0.114 -0.04 0.965 -68.938 -3.22a 0.002
25 88 0.453 0.14 0.890 -35.359 -2.95a 0.004 -5.221 -1.23 0.221 -74.159 -3.14a 0.002
26 88 -1.010 -0.39 0.698 -36.370 -2.95a 0.004 0.808 0.18 0.857 -73.351 -3.34a 0.001
27 87 -1.437 -0.75 0.453 -37.807 -3.03a 0.003 -0.468 -0.17 0.863 -73.819 -3.29a 0.001
28 86 -0.930 -0.44 0.660 -38.737 -3.09a 0.003 -2.049 -1.22 0.226 -75.868 -3.26a 0.002
29 85 -2.836 -1.32 0.189 -41.573 -3.18a 0.002 -6.571 -1.56d 0.121 -82.440 -3.11a 0.002
30 84 -1.112 -0.38 0.703 -42.685 -3.31a 0.001 2.712 0.49 0.626 -79.728 -3.05a 0.003
31 84 0.278 0.15 0.878 -42.406 -3.85a 0.001 1.626 0.44 0.660 -78.102 -2.98a 0.004
32 83 6.094 1.31 0.195 -36.312 -2.77a 0.007 -2.336 -0.89 0.375 -80.438 -2.86a 0.005
33 81 0.419 0.16 0.874 -35.893 -2.66a 0.009 -2.859 -0.73 0.466 -83.297 -2.69a 0.008
34 81 -0.930 -0.42 0.674 -36.824 -2.67a 0.009 1.106 0.26 0.797 -82.191 -2.74a 0.007
35 80 -0.116 -0.06 0.955 -36.940 -2.63a 0.010 -5.027 -1.09 0.278 -87.218 -2.61a 0.011
36 78 1.255 0.40 0.692 -35.685 -2.55a 0.012 -2.565 -0.64 0.522 -89.782 -2.75a 0.007
a, one sample t-Test is significant at 1% level
b, one sample t-Test is significant at 5% level
c, one sample t-Test is significant at 10% level
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TABLE 5.3
Four Market index-adjusted CARs for unit IPOs
Robustness Comparison
Monthly abnormal returns are calculated following EQUATION 5.2 against four different
benchmarks:  (1)  FTSE  All  Share  Index  (FTA),  (2)  FTSE  Small  Cap  Index,  (3)  FTSE  AIM
(Alternative  Investment  Market)  All  Shares  Index,  (4)  The  Hoare  Govett  Smaller  Companies
(HGSC) Index. å = -×= t
n
i tmtit
rrn
1 ,,t
)(/1AR
, where ri,t is  the  monthly  return  on  unit  firm i in
event month t, and rm,t is the monthly return of the respective market benchmarks for the
corresponding time period43. The t-statistics for the average adjusted return (AR) and for the
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in month t, is calculated according to EQUATION 5.4 and
EQUATION 5.6 respectively. The t-statistics are presented in brackets and the subscripts a, b, c,
represent the significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, indicated by associated
p-values.
FTA-Adjusted
(%)
SMALL-Adjusted
(%)
AIM-Adjusted
(%)
HGSC-Adjusted
(%)
t ARt CAR-FTA ARt CAR-SMALL ARt CAR-AIM ARt CAR-HGSC
1 -0.571
(-0.29)
-0.571
(-0.29)
-0.481
(-0.25)
-0.481
(-0.25)
-0.849
(-0.48)
-0.849
(-0.48)
-0.623
(-0.32)
-0.623
(-0.32)
2 -1.374
(-0.70)
-1.945
(-0.69)
-1.451
(-0.75)
-1.933
(-0.68)
-0.348
(-0.18)
-1.197
(-0.43)
-1.677
(-0.85)
-2.300
(-0.83)
3 -1.183
(-0.96)
-3.128
(-1.31)
-1.410
(-1.22)
-3.342
(-1.03)
-0.497
(-0.38)
-1.694
(-0.54)
-1.620
(-1.30)
-3.920
(-1.64)c
4 -1.714
(-1.39)
-4.842
(-1.75)c
-1.508
(-1.27)
-4.850
(-1.37)
-1.903
(-1.58)c
-3.597
(-1.06)
-2.089
(-1.67)c
-6.009
(-2.08)b
5 -0.039
(-0.02)
-4.881
(-1.16)
0.418
(0.19)
-4.432
(-1.06)
1.035
(0.43)
-2.562
(-0.62)
-6.217
(-0.92)
-12.226
(-1.62)c
6 -3.331
(-1.94)b
-8.212
(-1.85)b
-3.806
(-2.23)a
-8.238
(-1.84)c
-3.088
(-1.70)c
-5.650
(-1.25)
-3.807
(-2.22)b
-16.032
(-3.42)a
7 -2.627
(-1.47)
-10.839
(-2.12)b
-2.321
(-1.36)
-10.559
(-2.09)a
-2.123
(-1.16)
-7.773
(-1.51)
-2.690
(-1.55)
-18.723
(-3.53)a
8 -4.226
(-2.18)b
-15.065
(-2.89)a
-3.879
(-2.07)b
-14.438
(-2.57)a
-3.335
(-1.70)c
-11.108
(-1.90)c
-3.984
(-2.08)b
-22.707
(-4.41)a
9 0.040
(0.02)
-15.025
(-2.45)a
-0.520
(-0.27)
-14.958
(-2.49)a
1.258
(0.64)
-9.850
(-1.58)c
-0.626
(-0.32)
-23.333
(-3.44)a
10 3.893
(1.13)
-11.133
(-1.45)
4.667
(1.35)
-10.291
(-1.47)
5.462
(1.51)
-4.389
(-0.61)
4.594
(1.32)
-18.739
(-1.95)b
11 -5.835
(-3.03)a
-16.968
(-2.11)b
-5.266
(-2.74)a
-15.556
(-2.430)a
-4.333
(-2.18)b
-8.722
(-1.32)
-5.097
(-2.67)a
-23.836
(-4.87)a
12 -1.367
(-0.54)
-18.334
(-2.13)b
-1.457
(-0.58)
-17.013
(-2.02)b
-0.729
(-0.28)
-9.452
(-1.49)
-1.300
(-0.51)
-25.136
(-3.46)a
13 -4.207
(-2.32)a
-22.542
(-2.49)a
-3.856
(-2.20)a
-20.869
(-2.47)a
-3.196
(-1.69)c
-12.647
(-1.46)
-4.090
(-2.28)b
-29.226
(-4.37)a
43 The  FTSE  AIM  (Alternative  Investment  Market)  All  Share  Index  is  only  available  from  29th December 1995 onwards;
therefore, five sample unit firms issued before that date are excluded from the calculation, leaving the sample size to be 87 for the
AIM-adjusted CARs.
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14 -2.435
(-1.73)b
-24.977
(-2.77)a
-2.024
(-1.40)
-22.893
(-2.68)a
-1.441
(-0.97)
-14.088
(-1.58)c
-2.405
(-1.64)c
-31.631
(-5.98)a
15 -1.304
(-0.59)
-26.281
(-2.73)a
-1.005
(-0.46)
-23.898
(-2.97)a
0.081
(0.04)
-14.007
(-1.64)c
-1.274
(-0.58)
-32.905
(-4.38)a
16 -0.097
(-0.05)
-26.378
(-2.69)a
0.134
(0.064)
-23.764
(-2.68)a
-0.370
(-0.17)
-14.378
(-1.56)c
-0.544
(-0.26)
-33.449
(-4.18)a
17 -2.478
(-0.84)
-28.856
(-2.82)a
-1.789
(-0.61)
-25.553
(-2.53)a
-1.527
(-0.49)
-15.905
(-1.48)
-2.210
(-0.74)
-35.658
(-3.01)a
18 0.950
(0.42)
-27.905
(-2.69)a
0.661
(0.30)
-24.893
(-2.48)a
1.382
(0.59)
-14.523
(-1.58)c
0.673
(0.29)
-34.985
(-3.55)a
19 -1.634
(-0.65)
-29.539
(-2.88)a
-1.689
(-0.70)
-26.581
(-3.44)a
-2.051
(-0.84)
-16.574
(-2.00)b
-2.150
(-0.90)
-37.135
(-4.41)a
20 -1.133
(-0.47)
-30.672
(-2.93)a
-0.283
(-0.12)
-26.864
(-3.52)a
0.341
(0.13)
-16.233
(-2.20)a
-0.582
(-0.24)
-37.717
(-4.77)a
21 -0.743
(-0.31)
-31.415
(-3.02)a
0.130
(0.06)
-26.734
(-2.59)a
1.667
(0.73)
-14.566
(-1.37)
-0.005
(-0.02)
-37.722
(-3.26)a
22 0.332
(0.19)
-31.083
(-2.93)a
0.446
(0.25)
-26.287
(-2.50)a
1.046
(0.58)
-13.520
(-1.24)
0.319
(0.18)
-37.403
(-4.75)a
23 -1.659
(-0.80)
-32.742
(-3.13)a
-1.603
(-0.76)
-27.891
(-2.69)a
-0.969
(-0.44)
-14.488
(-1.35)
-1.856
(-0.87)
-39.258
(-4.06)a
24 -3.070
(-1.36)
-35.812
(-3.43)a
-2.222
(-0.99)
-30.112
(-2.90)a
-1.500
(-0.62)
-15.988
(-1.49)
-2.469
(-1.09)
-41.728
(-3.77)a
25 0.453
(0.14)
-35.359
(-2.95)a
0.487
(0.15)
-29.626
(-2.50)a
0.739
(0.22)
-15.249
(-1.25)
0.696
(0.21)
-41.032
(-3.01)a
26 -1.010
(-0.39)
-36.370
(-2.95)a
-1.037
(-0.40)
-30.663
(-2.63)a
-0.626
(-0.23)
-15.875
(-1.34)
-1.239
(-0.48)
-42.271
(-3.27)a
27 -1.437
(-0.75)
-37.807
(-3.03)a
-1.765
(-0.96)
-32.428
(-2.74)a
-0.953
(-0.50)
-16.828
(-1.35)
-1.624
(-0.89)
-43.895
(-4.88)a
28 -0.930
(-0.44)
-38.737
(-3.09)a
-0.260
(-0.12)
-32.688
(-2.63)a
0.017
(0.01)
-16.811
(-1.29)
-0.111
(-0.05)
-44.006
(-3.55)a
29 -2.836
(-1.32)
-41.573
(-3.18)a
-2.090
(-0.98)
-34.778
(-3.62)a
-1.208
(-0.51)
-18.019
(-1.59)
-2.164
(-0.99)
-46.170
(-5.49)a
30 -1.112
(-0.38)
-42.685
(-3.31)a
-0.925
(-0.32)
-35.703
(-2.80)a
-0.387
(-0.13)
-18.406
(-1.38)
-0.868
(-0.30)
-47.038
(-3.25)a
31 0.278
(0.15)
-42.406
(-3.85)a
-0.130
(-0.07)
-35.833
(-2.87)a
0.527
(0.29)
-17.880
(-1.37)
-0.097
(-0.05)
-47.135
(-4.11)a
32 6.094
(1.31)
-36.312
(-2.77)a
5.384
(1.17)
-30.449
(-2.40)a
5.614
(1.15)
-12.266
(-0.95)
5.198
(1.11)
-41.937
(-2.94)a
33 0.419
(0.16)
-35.893
(-2.66)a
0.686
(0.27)
-29.762
(-2.26)b
0.832
(0.31)
-11.434
(-0.88)
0.317
(0.12)
-41.620
(-2.89)a
34 -0.930
(-0.42)
-36.824
(-2.67)a
-1.076
(-0.50)
-30.839
(-2.30)b
-1.333
(-0.62)
-12.767
(-0.94)
-0.920
(-0.42)
-42.540
(-2.83)a
35 -0.116
(-0.06)
-36.940
(-2.63)a
1.040
(0.46)
-29.799
(-2.17)b
-0.484
(-0.22)
-13.251
(-0.96)
-0.413
(-0.20)
-42.953
(-3.00)a
36 1.255
(0.40)
-35.685
(-2.55)a
0.790
(0.25)
-29.009
(-2.13)b
0.110
(0.03)
-13.141
(-0.95)
0.677
(0.21)
-42.276
(-2.74)a
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TABLE 5.4
Average Abnormal Returns (ARs) of Unit IPOs
The minimum (Min), median, maximum (Max) and mean values of the average abnormal returns
of  unit  IPOs  are  presented  in  percentage.  Also  shown  are  the  standard  deviations  (St.D)  of  the
monthly returns. The first column is the raw monthly returns of unit IPOs, the next four columns
are market-adjusted average monthly abnormal returns against four different indices: FTSE All
Share (FTA) Index, FTSE Small Cap Index, the FTSE Alternative Investment Market (AIM) All
Share Index, and the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index,
RAW FTA SMALL CAP AIM HGSC
Min -5.156% -5.835% -5.266% -4.333% -6.217%
Median -0.711% -1.123% -1.021% -0.491% -1.257%
Max 6.044% 6.094% 5.384% 5.614% 5.198%
Mean -0.850% -0.991% -0.806% -0.365% -1.174%
St.D 0.0204 0.0214 0.0205 0.0202 0.0220
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TABLE 5.5
Market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) and wealth relatives (WRs)
The n-year holding period return for firm i is defined as the geometrically compounded return
presented in EQUATION 5.9. Min (36, delist) is the earlier of the last month of listed trading or
the end of the three-year period. The average BHARs is equally rebalanced by the number of
actively  trading  unit  firms  (N)  by  the  end  of  each  month.  One-sample  Student’s t-tests are
conducted  to  test  the  null  hypothesis  of  zero  mean  as  shown  in  EQUATION  5.11.  In  Panel  B,
wealth relatives (WR) are calculated as the ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a
portfolio of issuers to the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of matching companies
or market benchmarks (EQUATION 5.12). The Student’s t-tests are conducted to test the
difference, the p-values of which are presented to indicate the significance level.
Panel A: Market-index adjusted Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs)
Holding period N RAW (%)
FTA
(%)
SMALL
(%) HGSC (%)
AIM
(%)
MATCH
(%)
2 Months 92 -0.248(-0.08)
-1.608
(-0.74)
-1.606
(-0.56)
-1.892
(-0.67)
-0.876
(-0.31) -12.131(-1.49)
6 Months 92 -5.068(-1.23)
-7.555
(-2.12)b
-7.639
(-2.13)b -15.082(-2.07)b
-5.119
(-1.22) -31.601(-1.27)
9 Months 92
-5.047
(-0.57) -8.408(-1.07)
-8.351
(-1.08) -15.671(-1.57)
-3.496
(-0.39) -31.300(-1.21)
12 Months (1 Year) 91
-5.181
(-0.58) -9.360(-1.08)
-7.816
(-1.04) -14.684(-1.51)
2.672
(0.21) -23.856(-0.79)
18 Months 90
-6.224
(-0.45) -12.580(-1.01)
-9.202
(-0.75) -17.874(-1.26)
0.275
(0.02) -20.922(-1.01)
20 Months 90
-12.478
(-1.00) -18.834(-1.67)c
-14.839
(-1.35) -23.046(-1.83)c
-5.882
(-0.48) -23.651(-1.25)
22 Months 90
-15.335
(-1.40) -23.093(-2.37)a
-17.658
(-1.86)c
-26.133
(-2.34)b
-7.253
(-0.68) -32.173(-1.53)
24 Months (2 Years) 88
-23.927
(-2.77)a
-31.888
(-3.89)a
-25.472
(-3.26)a
-34.353
(-3.77)a
-13.757
(-1.67)c
-33.880
(-1.93)b
28 Months 86
-22.734
(-2.07)b
-29.060
(-2.90)a
-22.133
(-2.25)b -30.530(-2.74)a
-9.946
(-0.92) -25.398(-1.62)c
30 Months 84
-24.582
(-2.03)b
-32.033
(-2.86)a
-23.976
(-2.09)b -33.366(-2.71)a
-9.589
(-0.81) -24.036(-1.50)
34 Months 81
-22.973
(-1.89)c -31.264(-2.86)a
-23.360
(-2.19)b -34.849(-2.80)a
-9.272
(-0.85) -30.210(-1.50)
36 Months (3 Years) 78
-23.733
(-1.84)c -31.329(-2.63)a
-24.027
(-2.05)b -37.162(-2.77)a
-9.141
(-0.78) -25.212(-2.30)b
Panel B: Wealth Relatives (WRs)
N FTA SMALLCAP HGSC AIM MATCH
WR- 1 Year 91 0.9102(8.46)a
0.8831
(9.15)a
0.8518
(9.16)a
1.0410
(8.40)a
0.8040
(6.74)a
WR- 2 Year 88 0.7032(9.96)a
0.7269
(9.82)a
0.6817
(9.80)a
0.9410
(8.86)a
0．6919
(4.55)a
WR- 3 Year 78
0.7078
(8.01)a
0.7187
(7.73)a
0.6719
(7.66)a
1.003
(6.82)a
0.7540
(3.76)a
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TABLE 5.6
Rank distribution of buy-and-hold returns post-listing
In the table, n-year buy-and-hold returns (n= 1, 2, and 4) are ranked by ascending order for
both the unit IPOs and their share-only counterparts matched on firm size and industry. The
mean and median values of n-year buy-and-hold returns for each sample are calculated and
illustrated. The Student’s t-tests are conducted to test the difference in means and
non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests are conducted to test the difference in medians. The
p-values from both tests are presented to indicate the significance level in the difference of the
buy-and-hold returns between the unit sample and the matching share-only sample.
One-Year Buy-and-hold
(%)
Two-Year Buy-and-hold
(%)
Three-Year Buy-and-hold
(%)
Rank Unit Match Difference Unit Match Difference Unit Match Difference
1 -92.41 -100.00 7.59 -100.00 -100.00 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 0.00
5 -77.40 -80.98 3.59 -96.06 -96.11 0.05 -100.00 -98.22 -1.78
10 -72.89 -71.47 -1.43 -89.76 -88.64 -1.12 -96.95 -94.32 -2.63
15 -62.15 -63.08 0.93 -87.75 -83.47 -4.28 -95.40 -90.49 -4.91
20 -53.86 -56.02 2.16 -79.67 -74.11 -5.56 -91.09 -85.19 -5.90
25 -51.07 -46.68 -4.39 -69.75 -66.94 -2.81 -85.66 -80.77 -4.89
30 -46.15 -36.62 -9.53 -64.47 -56.60 -7.88 -79.65 -72.19 -7.46
35 -42.99 -25.55 -17.44 -56.85 -44.44 -12.41 -69.12 -61.43 -7.69
40 -40.48 -20.83 -19.64 -53.12 -33.03 -20.09 -64.67 -48.02 -16.65
45 -28.44 -7.69 -20.75 -49.23 -25.00 -24.23 -55.05 -38.37 -16.68
50 -17.52 0.00 -17.52 -42.86 -18.01 -24.84 -50.00 -25.00 -25.00
55 -11.11 0.59 -11.70 -32.85 -4.50 -28.35 -42.86 -18.41 -24.45
60 -4.76 6.63 -11.39 -14.70 -0.06 -14.65 -33.33 -4.47 -28.86
65 7.33 21.87 -14.54 0.00 29.04 -29.04 -14.70 0.00 -14.70
70 14.29 29.07 -14.78 1.85 41.14 -39.29 4.17 22.35 -18.19
75 25.63 38.34 -12.71 16.67 62.51 -45.84 14.72 49.40 -34.67
80 36.29 55.53 -19.24 42.00 96.21 -54.20 79.30 102.72 -23.42
85 68.48 62.49 5.99 92.69 109.82 -17.13 134.06 150.00 -15.94
90 122.86 108.33 14.52 125.00 232.01 -107.01 212.35 413.99 -201.63
91 563.73 233.10 330.63 176.02 249.51 -73.49 407.89 529.63 -121.73
92 900.00 2527.43 -1627.43 493.37 1322.21 -828.84 673.50 653.84 19.66
t-test
and
MW-test
p-value
t-test
and
MW-test
p-value
t-test
and
MW-test
p-value
Mean -2.12 21.48 0.356 -22.89 9.52 0.000a -19.25 2.13 0.000a
Median -27.64 -6.85 0.1438 -47.05 -24.00 0.097c -54.73 -31.46 0.109b
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TABLE 5.7
Cross-sectional analyses of the long-term performance
The mean and median values of three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (%) for UK
unit  IPOs,  the  FTSE  All  Share  (FTA)  index,  and  the  matching  share-only  IPOs  are
categorised by the year of listing, industry sector, firm size, firm riskiness, the gross
proceeds of IPO, the level of underpricing, and the listing location of the firms. The mean
and median buy-and-hold returns are compared between both unit IPOs and FTA index,
and between unit IPOs and their matching share-only IPOs. Paired t-Tests are conducted
to examine the significance level of differences in means; whilst the p-value from the
Mann-Whitney (MW) tests is reported for the significance level of differences in
medians.
Panel A: Long-run performance by Year of listing
Cohort Year UNIT
(%)
FTA
(%)
Paired t-test
and MW test
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
and MW test
1994 –1995 Mean 0.359 34.059 0.560 -30.467 0.518
Median -0.548 0.321 0.379 -39.580 0.876
1996 Mean 6.473 52.972 0.092c 55.643 0.430
Median 0.000 52.512 0.076c -29.729 0.948
1997 –1999 Mean 37.635 0.884 0.601 15.902 0.786
Median -39.255 -5.129 0.162 11.820 0.521
2000 Mean -55.473 -35.669 0.109c -19.803 -0.018a
Median -86.579 -35.197 0.073c -61.767 0.366
2001 –2003 Mean 31.321 3.021 0.520 76.618 -0.649
Median -36.778 -3.070 0.393 -38.372 0.743
2004 Mean 1.730 46.811 0.040b -45.081 0.013a
Median -19.890 43.875 0.036b -54.582 0.023b
2005 Mean -76.183 6.036 0.000a -31.024 0.012a
Median -79.650 1.399 0.000a -78.871 0.167
2006 Mean -67.937 -21.478 0.003a 13.107 0.010a
Median -80.834 -20.887 0.000a 3.561 0.008a
Panel B: Long-run performance by Industry Sector
Industry UNIT
(%)
FTA
 (%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
Mining Mean -14.622 18.197 0.081b -10.833 0.884
Median -45.702 30.442 0.001a -23.805 0.294
IT & Mean -18.946 7.582 0.315 38.316 0.293
Technology Median -58.243 -2.390 0.058b -40.000 0.505
Support Mean -46.283 -5.139 0.004a 47.959 0.157
Services Median -57.823 -18.468 0.023b -43.834 0.630
Healthcare Mean -51.054 -7.060 0.019a -21.659 0.312
& Bio-Tech Median -66.764 -12.962 0.021b -70.152 0.427
Others Mean -20.792 9.319 0.282 12.150 0.436
Median -42.857 13.479 0.057b -8.310 0.293
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(Continued)
Panel C: Long-run performance by Size of the firms
Firm Size UNIT
(%)
FTA
 (%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
Small Mean -3.391 19.710 0.026b 11.357 0.658
Median -42.857 26.258 0.006a -32.453 0.972
Medium Mean -25.372 2.399 0.070c -8.210 0.466
Median -64.674 -4.787 0.002a -19.000 0.179
Large Mean -29.308 0.773 0.224 3.270 0.376
Median -55.850 -3.495 0.000a -51.066 0.291
Panel D: Long-run performance by Risk ranking of firms
Risk UNIT
(%)
FTA
 (%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
Low Mean 0.596 12.234 0.038b 0.965 0.987
Median -23.077 30.388 0.035b -29.729 0.612
Medium Mean -6.534 10.139 0.199 -10.083 0.617
Median -56.851 22.960 0.003a -13.804 0.278
High Mean -66.398 -6.734 0.000a 15.945 0.022b
Median -80.135 -7.999 0.000a -60.027 0.045b
Panel E: Long-run performance by Gross Proceeds from the offerings
Proceeds
(£000)
UNIT
(%)
FTA
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
100-999.99 Mean -2.963 24.869 0.225 23.436 0.554
Median -28.083 31.630 0.094c -43.834 0.955
1,000-1,499.99 Mean 21.523 2.620 0.669 -8.715 0.178
Median -43.606 -8.715 0.186 -46.943 0.597
1,500-2,499.99 Mean -39.355 7.207 0.030b -50.544 0.687
Median -63.268 -6.284 0.012a -55.766 0.713
2,500-4,999.99 Mean -23.111 5.799 0.066c 42.847 0.138
Median -52.799 -2.390 0.007a -28.315 0.292
5,000-9,999.99 Mean -58.190 2.690 0.000a 3.866 0.055a
Median -67.598 -3.070 0.000a -29.729 0.074c
Above 10,000 Mean -49.136 -3.720 0.019a -9.141 0.099c
Median -49.747 -23.885 0.036b -7.984 0.093c
Panel F: Long-run performance by Level of Initial Underpricing
Initial
Returns
UNIT
(%)
FTA
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
Low Mean 4.312 10.262 0.758 -11.341 0.592
Median -7.873 8.769 0.062c -46.477 0.530
Medium Mean -36.130 4.500 0.004a -0.886 0.169
Median -57.547 -2.730 0.000a -16.106 0.154
High Mean -48.060 7.107 0.000a 17.242 0.038b
Median -56.816 -2.146 0.000a -39.643 0.097c
Panel G: Long-run performance by Board of Listing
Listing
Board
UNIT
(%)
FTA
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
MATCH
(%)
Paired t-test
MW p-value
Main Board Mean -50.041 12.533 0.000a 41.892 0.012a
Median -51.273 19.303 0.002a 38.562 0.038b
AIM Mean -15.494 7.113 0.067b -2.723 0.515
Median -54.948 -1.696 0.000a -39.007 0.366
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TABLE 5.8
Regression Analysis of the long-term performance
Regression 1: Long-term BHAR and unit firm characteristics
xaa
aaaaaa
+++
+++++=
SEOLEVERAGE
TTLASSETEBITINSIDERAGEMKTCAPRISK
76
543210 /BHAR
Independent
Variables
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value VIF
Constant -1.2090 0.7849 -1.54 0.127
RISK -16.7890 8.412 -2.00b 0.049 1.03
MKTCAP -0.0000 0.000 -0.41 0.683 1.02
AGE 0.0030 0.000 1.54 0.128 1.06
INSIDER -0.2880 0.7279 -0.40 0.694 1.01
EBIT/TTLASSET 0.1636 0.0638 2.56a 0.012 1.04
LEVERAGE -0.2759 0.1201 -2.30b 0.024 1.00
SEO -0.4240 0.3327 -1.27 0.206 1.06
R2=48.7% F-statistic=3.62a Durbin-Watson statistic=2.15
Regression 2: Long-term BHAR and IPO characteristics
xbbbbb +++++= REPUTATIONAIMEDGROSSPROCEIRBHAR D 43210 2
Independent
Variables
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value VIF
Constant -1.2065 0.5848 -2.06 0.042
IRD2 -0.1758 0.1106 -2.58a 0.016 1.00
NETPROCEEDS -0.7856 0.0000 -2.41a 0.068 1.03
AIM 1.2276 0.5854 2.17b 0.039 1.02
REPUTATION 2.8005 0.7459 3.54a 0.001 1.00
R2=43.6% F-statistic=3.41a Durbin-Watson statistic=2.15
Regression 3: Long-term BHAR and Warrant characteristics
xqqqqqq ++++++= PRATIOEXERCISELIFENUMBER 543210 VALUEBHAR
Independent
Variables
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic p-value VIF
Constant -0.0307 0.4144 -2.07 0.094
VALUE 1.6660 0.1022 2.63a 0.012 1.02
NUMBER 0.0003 0.0001 4.50a 0.000 1.01
LIFE 0.0243 0.0728 0.33 0.739 1.02
EXERCISE 0.2122 0.4706 0.45 0.653 1.08
PRATIO 0.1124 0.0874 2.28b 0.020 1.01
R2=42.8% F-statistic=4.28a Durbin-Watson statistic=2.12
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TABLE 5.9
Hypotheses and Test results
The hypotheses proposed in Section 5.3 and the test results summarised from Section 5.5 are presented in the table
Hypothesis Results
H5.1: Unit IPOs underperform the FTA Index in the 3-year period post-listing Not rejected
H5.2: Unit IPOs underperform the FTSE Small Cap Index in the 3-year period post-listing Not rejected
H5.3: Unit IPOs underperform the HGSC Index in the 3-year period post-listing Not rejected
H5.4: Unit IPOs underperform the FTSE AIM All Share Index in the 3-year period post-listing Not rejected
H5.5: Unit IPOs underperform share-only firms matched on firm size, year of listing, and industry in the 3-year period post-listing Not rejected
H5.6: Unit IPOs with higher initial returns exhibit worse long-term performance Not rejected
H5.7:The long-term performance of unit firms is positively related to the size of the unit IPOs Rejected
H5.8: Unit firms’ long-term performance is positively related to the firm size Rejected
H5.9: Unit IPOs that are issued during years of higher market levels exhibit worse long-term performance Not rejected
H5.10: Unit firms from high risk industries exhibit worse underperformance in the long-term Not rejected
H5.11: The long-term returns of unit firms are positively related to the ratio of EBIT to total assets Not rejected
H5.12: Unit IPOs issued by more reputable underwriters exhibit better long-term performance Not rejected
H5.13: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the maturity of warrants Rejected
H5.14: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the ratio of warrant exercise price to IPO offer price Not rejected
H5.15: The long-term performance of unit IPOs is positively related to the numbers of warrants attached in the IPOs Not rejected
H5.16: The long-term performance of unit firms is positively related to firm value sold as warrants Not rejected
H5.17: Unit firms whose warrants have been exercised outperform unit firms whose warrants are expired Rejected
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FIGURE 5.1
Equally-weighted monthly abnormal returns (ARs) of the unit IPOs. Five AR series are plotted for the 36 months after the initial offering: (1) no
adjustment (raw returns), (2) FTSE ALL Share Index adjustments (FTA), (3) FTSE Small Cap Index adjustments (SMALL CAP), (4) FTSE AIM All
Share Index adjustments (AIM), and (5) Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index adjustments (HGSC).
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FIGURE 5.2
Equally-weighted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the unit IPOs. Five CAR series are plotted for the 36 months after the initial offering: (1) no
adjustment (raw returns), (2) FTSE ALL Share Index adjustments (FTA), (3) FTSE Small Cap Index adjustments (SMALL CAP), (4) FTSE AIM All
Share Index adjustments (AIM), and (5) Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index adjustments (HGSC).
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FIGURE 5.3
Equally-weighted n-year BHARs with n=1, 2, and 3. Five series of BHARs are calculated: (1) No adjustment (raw returns), (2) FTSE ALL Share Index
adjustments (FTA), (3) FTSE Small Cap Index adjustments (SMALL CAP), (4) FTSE AIM All Share Index adjustments (AIM), and (5) Hoare Govett
Smaller Companies Index adjustments (HGSC).
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Main findings
This thesis investigates a sample of unit IPOs issued in the UK between 1994 and 2006 in test
of  the  Agency  Cost  versus  the  Signalling  hypotheses  in  explanation  of  why  firms  choose  to
include  warrants  in  their  IPOs.  My  results  support  both  the  Agency  Cost  and  the  Signalling
hypotheses’ prediction that unit firms are smaller and riskier than share-only firms. In unique
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis, evidence is found that the unit IPOs that are
underwritten by less reputable underwriters raise smaller proceeds than that of share-only IPOs.
However, contrary to the Agency Cost hypothesis, unit firms are not necessarily younger than
share-only firms in the UK and the proportion of insider holding is not significantly different
from the unit and share-only samples.
The initial underpricing relative to the IPO offer price in unit IPOs is found to be significantly
higher than that of share-only IPOs, on both the first trading day and during the first trading
week, which provides strong support to the Agency Cost hypothesis. The short-term
after-market performance calculated as BHARn relative to the first trading day, indicate that
unit firms significantly outperform share-only firms for up to 21 days in the after market.
In  direct  test  of  the  Agency Cost  hypothesis,  the  levels  of  agency  costs  are  measured  by  the
‘efficiency ratios’, which are found to be significantly lower than unit firms. The lower the
efficiency ratio, the lower the profitability and asset utilisation, and in turn the agency costs are
indicated to be higher for unit firms compared to share-only firms. Such results strengthen the
short-term evidence obtained in support of the Agency Cost hypothesis. On the other hand, in
direct test of the Signalling hypothesis, both the firm riskiness and the delay between
announcement of unit IPOs and the first trading day are calculated to proxy for the level of
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information asymmetry. These measurements suggest that unit firms possess higher levels of
information  asymmetry  than  that  of  share-only  firms,  which  is  consistent  with  the  Signalling
hypothesis. Both linear and logistic regressions are conducted in examination of the
determinants of underpricing and the choice of offer types. Strong support to the Agency Cost
hypothesis is obtained from the regression results. The UNIT dummy remains positive and
highly significant, implying that the choice to include warrants significantly increases the
degree of underpricing on the first trading day.
The survival study of unit firms reports strong evidence that fewer unit firms have survived
than share-only firms. Besides the offer type, other characteristics can affect the survival of
unit firms as well. Evidence is found that in the first year post-listing, higher insider ownership
and the initial returns on the first trading day increase the chance of firms’ survival. In the third
year post-listing, IPOs issued by more reputable underwriters and with higher insider
ownership are more likely to survive. In the fifth year following the IPOs, only underwriter
reputation and the offer type remain significant in affecting firms’ long-term survival.
I also examine the likelihood of SEO issuance, a much higher 82.09% of survived unit firms
are found to have issued seasoned equity offerings comparing to only 50.22% for survived
share-only firms. Such percentage results are in line with the Agency Cost hypothesis that
despite the lower survival rate, survived unit firms are more likely to receive additional funding
through seasoned equity offerings. In addition to the offer type, the size of the IPO issue also
has an impact on a firms’ decision to issue seasoned equity offerings. Firms that raise less
funding in the initial public offerings are more likely to issue a second seasoned offering after
their IPOs. An apparent price run-up before the SEO announcements and significant decline in
share prices after the announcement are observed for unit firms, which issued additional shares.
Seasoned equity offerings are announced when the firm’s stock is overvalued and investors
revise the firm value downwards due to ‘adverse selection’. However, the significant negative
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relationship found between SEO dummy and initial underpricing implies that more underpriced
unit IPOs are less likely to issue additional shares. Such result contradicts the Signalling
hypothesis that unit firms use costly signals at the time of listing in the hope that they can
recover the signalling cost by issuing seasoned issues after the market verified their quality.
Overall, the survival and subsequent financing study for unit firms in the UK provide strong
support to the Agency Cost hypothesis but fail to support the Signalling hypothesis for
choosing unit IPOs instead of share-only IPOs.
CHAPTER  5  examines  the  long-term  performance  of  unit  IPO  firms  in  comparison  of  the
market indices and the share-only IPO firms matched on firm size and industry. The Agency
Cost hypothesis stipulates that small and growing businesses tend to go public via unit IPOs
because the attached warrants can form a staged financing strategy to help unit firms reduce
agency costs. The Signalling hypothesis interprets the inclusion of warrants in IPOs as one of
the costly signals that are strategically adopted for high risk, good quality firms to convey
favourable information about firm value and distinguish themselves from bad quality
competitors. In the long-term, both hypotheses predict that unit firms are expected to
outperform share-only firms, which go public without any warrants attached in the IPOs.
However, this thesis provides evidence that unit IPOs issued in the UK present significantly
worse underperformance comparing to both the matching share-only IPOs and various market
indices, regardless of the methods adopted to calculate abnormal returns (BHARs, CARs, and
WRs; equally-weighted and value-weighted). Cross-sectional analyses confirm that unit IPOs
issued during years of high market levels, unit IPOs with high initial returns with larger
proceeds, and unit firms from high-risk industries exhibit significantly worse long-term
underperformance against both the market index and the matching share-only IPOs. Such
results are unable to support either the Agency Cost hypothesis or the Signalling hypothesis’
prediction that unit firms should be better performers in the long-term.
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6.2 Empirical implications of this thesis in the wider context of finance literature
Existing  theories  for  the  use  of  unit  IPOs  instead  of  share-only  IPOs imply  that  warrants  are
valuable to investors or underwriters but are costly to the issuing firm. However, in this thesis,
the unique investigation on warrant characteristics in relationship to unit IPOs suggests that
certain features of the warrant agreements are not decided randomly. On the contrary, the
maturity of warrants, and the choice of warrant exercise price have strategic value to the
issuing firm, not just to investors. Exercised or not, warrants attached in unit IPOs represent a
conditional option to obtain additional equity financing relatively quickly and cost effectively.
The research into the inclusion of warrants in unit IPOs is therefore important especially now
that the finance profession has developed an increased interest in the types and characteristics
of securities issued by firms. My examination of warrant issues, especially in combination to
IPOs in the context of different institutional setting in the UK provide further evidence to the
understanding of such corporate financial decisions.
6.2.1 The bonding effect of warrants
Paul Schultz (1993) provides evidence that by issuing units, firms pre-commit to a seasoned
offering at the warrant exercise price, which is set in advance. In my UK sample, 54.35% of
the unit warrants are issued with their exercise price set equal to the placing price; 33.7% of the
warrants  are  issued  out-of-money  with  their  exercise  price  set  above  the  placing  price;  only
11.96% of the warrant are issued in-the-money. Evidence was also found that unit firms, which
set the warrant exercise price above the IPO offer price are less likely to rely on SEOs for
further funding post-listing. Unit IPO issuers obviously did not choose the warrant exercise
price randomly. Instead, they intentionally set the warrant exercise price either above or equal
to the IPO offer price. The different choices of warrant exercise price reflect different strategies
for including warrants. By including out-of-money warrants in unit IPOs, issuers can
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effectively create incentives for manager to increase the company’s share price in order to
materialise warrant financing. By issuing warrant at the IPO offer price, unit firms can signal
firm value to public investors and bridge the asymmetry information gap. In either case,
warrants inclusion is a theoretically positive spell over the unit IPOs.
However, this thesis also find evidence that unit firms are more likely to fail than share-only
firms; and survived unit firms are more likely to receive further funding through seasoned
equity issues. Unit IPO firms also exhibit significantly worse long-term returns comparing to
share-only IPO firms three years post listing. In my UK sample, almost 59% of the unit
warrants were left exercised until expiration, only 16% were actually exercised to materialise
second round of financing. If the decision to include warrants in unit IPOs can serve to either
reduce agency costs or signal firm value or both, why have they not improve unit firms’
survival and long-term performance? Schultz (1993b) explains that managers of small business
are motivated to take on any (even negative NPV) projects to maintain their jobs, and will do
so if given enough free cash flow up front. Unit IPOs in the UK generally raise less proceeds
comparing to share-only IPOs. Incorporating warrants in an IPO effectively forms a second
round of financing, but the funding can only be materialised when the share prices exceed the
warrant exercise price, otherwise the warrants will be left to expire. The bonding effect of
warrants will prevent management from wasting the proceeds from the IPO on non-profitable
projects. In reality, however, many unit firms will find that there are no positive-NPV projects
to ascertain their company’s value, resulting in unit warrants left unexercised and expired and
the potential second round of funding falls through. By including warrants in unit IPOs, the
issuing firm may reduce agency costs by staging the funding but not necessarily be able to
improve their  chance of survival.  The eventual outcome of warrant contracts not only rely on
the quality of management, but also depend on the market conditions. The abnormally high
degree of underpricing for unit IPOs may attract more aftermarket trading, however, if there
are no value-generating projects available for unit firms to invest in, only by efficient
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management will not be able to materialise the warrant financing. Even with reduced agency
problem a unit firm can still go out of business if lack the funding to support their operation.
6.2.2 Manager’s strategic intention versus investors’ free will
Evidence is found that there is an apparent price run-up before the announcement of the
seasoned issues, and that seasoned equity offerings are announced when the firm’s stock is
overvalued. However, probit regression results project a negative relation between the level of
initial underpricing and the likelihood of SEO issuance. As previously reported, unit IPOs are
more underpriced than share-only IPO firms at the time of the initial public offering.
According to the Signalling hypothesis, the managerial insiders intentionally underprice the
initial sale of shares in hope that they can recoup the cost of underpricing through seasoned
offerings at a more favourable price. On the contrary, the results suggest that unit IPO firms
that achieved high initial returns (highly underpriced) are less likely to conduct a seasoned
offer within three years of the initial offering. Therefore, the UK evidence from subsequent
financing of unit firms does not support the Signalling hypothesis’ prediction. Underpricing
exhibited in unit IPOs is not intentionally planned by the management in order to issue
seasoned shares in the future at higher price.
On a different note, the level of the price increase before SEO announcements are positively
affected by unit firms’ insider ownership and debt leverage in the unit firms. Such a positive
correlation implies that the higher leverage unit firms possess at time of the initial public
offering can significantly influence new investors’ expectations in prediction of the
announcement of a seasoned issue, and cause higher levels of price increase before the
announcement day. Investors also assume that managerial insiders have more information
about the expected future cash flows of their companies. Since it is costly for managers to hold
a substantial fraction of their own company’s shares, managers are motivated to hold large
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stock positions only if they expect higher future cash flows than the firm’s current value.
Therefore, rational investors will view managerial holdings as a credible signal of firm quality.
A high level of insider holding even at time of the IPO can positively influence the investors’
predictions of any seasoned issues in the near future. Overall, the overpriced SEOs are more
likely to be a result of investors’ reactions towards the information they obtained on firm value,
rather than a strategic plan on behalf of the management.
6.2.3 Good intention does not proxy for good performance
Evidence is found in CHAPTER 5 that unit IPOs in the UK significantly underperform both,
the market indices and share-only firms matched by size and industry; which contradicts both
the Agency Cost and the Signalling hypotheses. Such a result implies that unit firms, being
smaller and riskier businesses before they are publicly listed, cannot significantly improve
performance by simply attaching warrants, regardless as whether they are used to reduce
agency costs or to signal firm value. After all, good intention does not proxy for better
performance in the long-term. A much higher percentage of unit IPOs are delisted within three
post-listing comparing to share-only IPOs. The finance literature largely focuses on the costs
and benefits of public versus private ownership with too little analysis on how these costs and
benefits evolve over time. Whether some firms will be better off staying private, whether some
firms went public prematurely, what is the optimal timing for public market entry and the
possibility and consequences of entry requires further investigation. Going public decisions and
IPO  failure  rates  may  also  be  related  to  conditions  in  other  segments  of  the  capital  markets.
Favourable credit market conditions may provide either substitute or additional sources of
investment capital and in turn affect the survival of IPOs issued during the same periods.
However,  the choice to include warrants in IPOs is not in vain.  This thesis provides evidence
that in the UK, the underperformance of unit firms is negatively related to the degree of initial
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underpricing and the size of unit issues; while being positively related to the reputation of
underwriters employed to market for the issues. In fact, the cross-sectional analyses suggest
that unit firms that raise smaller proceeds at lower discount (less underpriced) do not
significantly underperform their share-only counterparts or the market as a whole. More
importantly, several warrant characteristics are found to influence the long-term performance
of unit firms positively. The number of warrants, the firm value sold as warrant proceeds, and
the ratio of warrant exercise price to offer price, are all positively and significantly related to
the long-term abnormal returns of unit firms.
 6.2.4 Underwriters matter
For firms needing outside equity, going public is often the ultimate step in this process. There
is considerable debate in the financial economics literature regarding the initial underpricing
followed by long-term underperformance for IPOs. Previous studies explain the pricing
anomalies with investors’ overoptimistic expectation about the earning potential of young
growth companies (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995) and inefficient earnings
management by issuers (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998, etc.). Both lines of research provide
some evidence in support of their arguments, however, still fail to explain the pricing puzzle in
the IPO process completely. The US evidence indicates that underpricing has become more
extreme over time and particularly so during the recent bubble period of 1998-2000. Average
first-day IPO returns in the US increased from 7.4% in the 1980s, to 11.2% in the early 1990s,
to 18.1% in the mid-1990s and to 65% in the bubble years (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Recent
behavioural  finance  researchers  focus  on  the  role  of  the  major  players  in  the  IPO process,  in
particular, reputable underwriters, institutional investors, and venture capitalists. Loughran and
Ritter (2004) propose the ‘corruption hypothesis’ as a rationale for underpricing, which implies
a conflict of interest between the issuer and the underwriters (or/and venture capitalists). They
found that underwriters creased their traditional certification function and took advantage of
exuberant investor sentiment during the bubble years of the late 1990s.
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The segmented study of unit IPOs in this thesis add evidence of abnormal underpricing on the
first trading day and worse long-term performance from UK and contributes to the existing
literature with the examination of unit IPO performance in association with underwriter
reputation. The study found that unit IPOs in the UK are issued by less reputable underwriters
comparing to share-only IPOs. These unit IPOs tend to be more underpriced initially but will
have less chance of surviving the three-year period post-listing. Even the survived unit firms
significantly underperform their matching share-only counterparts and the market index in the
long-term. Such results suggest inefficiency in the methods used by poor quality underwriters
to price IPOs, which shed some light on the institutional characteristics of the going public
process as alternative explanation for the IPO puzzle. Multiples valuation methods based on
comparable companies are the principal approach adopted to determine IPO offer prices in
practice (Kim and Ritter, 1999). However, such method may introduce a survivorship bias into
the pricing of new issues and resulting in overestimated survival probabilities of some firms
that are masked by the artificial initial underpricing on the first trading day. This valuation
inefficiency is especially likely when financial intermediaries are pricing younger riskier firms
because comparison firms are difficult to be correctly identified.
Owing to the unsatisfied demand for external financing, policy makers have been taking steps
to increase the offer of capital available to young firms. Regulators in the UK also made effort
to ease the listing requirements for small capitalisation firms and launched the Alternative
Investment  Market  with  less  strict  listing  requirements  on  the  firm  size  and  issue  size  alike.
Within such an encouraging market environment, small business might be overoptimistic about
the timing and consequences of entering the public market and less careful in choosing
underwriters to bring them public. Low quality screening, pricing and certification functions by
underwriters may account for the long-term underperformance and eventually failure of the
underlying firms. In the financial crisis of 2008, the stock prices of the clients of Lehman
Brothers, Merril Lynch, and Bear Stearns suffered tremendous decline thanks to their troubled
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underwriters, which provides a live example for the importance of underwriters and at the same
time, the vulnerability of the market makers. Therefore, the management of issuing firms
should be more cautious when chooses agents to underwriter their new issues. Not only should
the  IPO  firms  assess  the  investment  banks’  pricing  and  marketing  skills,  they  should  closely
evaluate the underwriter’s financial health.
6.3 Potential limitations of the thesis and further research
Significant effort has been made in this thesis to investigate a sample of 92 unit IPOs and 258
share-only IPOs issued in the UK between 1994 and 2006. However, I am aware that within
the limited time scale, there are several potential limitations and further improvement is
proposed for future research interest. Firstly, the sample size of unit IPOs is limited due to the
availability of data and implicitly the population of unit IPOs issued during the sample period.
At the beginning of this research, after excluding unit IPOs from investment funds and real
estate companies only 92 unit firms are finalised in the sample. The limited sample size might
have biased the significance level of certain results. Since unit IPOs have become increasingly
popular in more recent sample years, I am convinced that a more recent sample incorporating
unit IPOs issued between 2007 and 2010 will potentially provide new insight in test of the
competing Agency Cost and Signalling hypotheses. Secondly, warrant characteristics discussed
in this thesis are collected from the IPO prospectuses. Features such as numbers of warrants
included in unit IPOs, the firm value sold as warrants, maturity, and exercise price of warrants
are proven to have significant impact on unit firms’ performance in both short-term and
long-term studies. However, Due to the availability of data on the detailed warrant contracts
and information on further amendment after the unit IPOs, this thesis does not discuss the
extension of warrant terms and any reduction or step-up arrangement of warrant exercise price
after their issuance. Some warrants attached to unit IPOs in my UK sample did contain a
provision in the warrant agreement that the issuing firm reserve the right to change the exercise
287
price of the warrants if certain criteria met. Howe and Su (2000) provide evidence that firms
lower the exercise price of equity warrants after their issuance are largely young, small firms
with poor operating performance at the time of amendment. On the other hand, Garner and
Marshall (2004) find that unit firms with higher levels of insider ownership are less likely to
lower the exercise price of the warrants after the issuance. They interpret this with the
managerial insiders’ reluctance to dilute its ownership since the issuing firm faces the potential
dilutive effects to its share price should the warrants be exercised. According to Garner and
Marshall (2004 and 2005), warrant amendments including life extension, reduction or step-up
arrangement of exercise price are rather frequent corporate decisions. By any stretch, there is
certainly space for further investigation into any change of warrant contractual features
post-IPO in the UK. More detailed data on such warrant characteristics might reveal further
evidence as to why companies choose to include warrants in their IPOs and may attract future
research interests. In addition, the calculation of survival rate in this thesis simply accounts for
firms that are still listed on the London Stock Exchange, the voluntary delisting of IPOs due to
either mergers or acquisition are not incorporated into the results. Conditions in the market for
mergers and acquisitions may be an important determinant of the long-term survival of IPOs.
Higher volume conditions in the merger and acquisition market might be associated with
higher unit IPO delisting. Therefore, future research of unit IPO survival is encouraged to take
into consideration of any voluntary delisting from the exchange. More sophisticated methods,
such as the Kaplan-Meier method, should also be applied to account for data censoring issues
in calculation of survival rate. Last but not least, the calendar-time approach for long-term
performance is not applied in this thesis due to the limited sample size. I am confident that
providing a larger sample of unit IPOs in future research, the calendar-time approach will
present better statistical inference on the robustness of tests results.
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APPENDIX I
Robustness Check for TABLE 3.9 using first-week initial return (IRW1)
Determinants of underpricing and offer types
Panel A illustrates results from the Ordinary Least Square regression (EQUATION 3.7) on the determinants of
underpricing examining 258share-only IPOs and 92 unit IPOs issued during the period of 1994-2006.The
dependent variable is the HGSC-adjusted first-week initial return IRW1 relative to the offer price (IRW1), which is
used as the alternative measure of underpricing for robustness check purpose. Due to limited sample size of the
unit IPO sample, Panel B exhibits results from the Two-staged Least Square Regressions as robustness check for
omitted variable problem (EQUATION 3.8-3.9). The offer type dummy UNIT is selected as the instrumented
variable in the first-stage regression. The instruments include: insider holding (INSIDER), firm riskiness (RISK),
time lag between Prospectus publication and listing (DELAY), MINING industry dummy, POST2000 listing year
dummy, firm AGE, total asset (TTLASSET), total debt (TTLDEBT), and net income (NI) of issuing firms prior
to the  IPOs,  all  of  which  are  potential  factors  that  might  affect  a  firm’s  decision  to  choose  unit  IPOs instead  of
share-only IPOs. The instrumented offer-type dummy (Noted as Inst.UNIT) and other motivated factors are then
included in the second stage regressions to test for any relationship between the degree of underpricing and the
offer  type  of  the  IPOs.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  the p-values of coefficients to indicate significance level.
Regression 1 includes ALL variables in discussion, whereas Regression 2 and 3 respectively include variables on
the ‘profitability’ and ‘leverage’ of the underlying IPO firms prior to listing. Regression 4 highlights the
characteristics of the offering at the time of the IPO. Regression 5 summarise variables, which remain significant
in all the previous regressions. Definitions of variables refer to TABLE3.1. a, b, and c: Significantly different from
zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively
Panel A: OLS regressions on determinants of underpricing and offer type (N=350)
iiii
iiiiiW
REPUTATIONPROCEEDLnBKMKT
PROCEEDDEBTPROCEEDREVPROCEEDASSETUNITIR
xaaa
aaaaa
++++
++++=
765
43210
)(2
)/()/()/(1
N=350 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept 0.5686
(0.075)c
0.0976
(0.002)a
0.1026
(0.001)a
0.5793
(0.069)c
0.1025
(0.005)a
UNIT 0.3317
(0.000)a
0.3571
(0.000)a
0.3679
(0.000)a
0.3457
(0.000)a
0.3418
(0.000)a
ASSET/PROCEED -0.0194
(0.043)b
-0.0081
(0.030)b
-0.0177
(0.063)c
REV/PROCEED -0.0093
(0.038)b
-0.0064
(0.046)b
-0.0091
(0.043)b
DEBT/PROCEED -0.0191
(0.409)
-0.0195
(0.424)
MKT2BK -0.0002
(0.289)
-0.0002
(0.274)
-0.0002
(0.234)
-0.0003
(0.219)
Ln(PROCEED) -0.0294
(0.107)c
-0.0292
(0.105)c
-0.0286
(0.096)c
REPUTATION -0.0081
(0.089)c
-0.0134
(0.083)c
-0.0237
(0.077)c
Adjusted R2 11.42% 10.69% 10.57% 10.74% 12.32%
F-statistic 7.43
(0.000)a
14.93
(0.000)a
11.32
(0.000)a
10.38
(0.000)a
9.66
(0.000)a
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(Continued)
Panel B: 2SLS regressions on determinants of underpricing and offer type
Stage One:
Stage Two:
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REPUTATIONPROCEEDLnBKMKT
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)/()/()/(.1
N=350 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5
Intercept -0.2951
(0.446)
-0.0228
(0.596)
-0.0137
(0.084)c
-0.3316
(0.419)
-0.0542
(0.316)
Inst.UNIT 0.9218
(0.000)a
0.9020
(0.000)a
0.8992
(0.000)a
0.9388
(0.000)a
0.9463
(0.000)a
ASSET/PROCEED -0.0213
(0.043)b
-0.0137
(0.122)
-0.0222
(0.037)b
REV/PROCEED -0.0062
(0.214)
-0.0029
(0.368)
DEBT/PROCEED -0.0215
(0.145)
-0.0206
(0.152)
MKT2BK -0.0006
(0.019)b
-0.0006
(0.018)b
-0.0006
(0.015)b
-0.0006
(0.015)b
-0.0006
(0.016)b
Ln(PROCEED) -0.0161
(0.106)c
-0.0185
(0.108)c
-0.0166
(0.092)c
REPUTATION -0.0971
(0.094)c
-0.0903
(0.104)c
0.1156
(0.106)c
Adjusted R2 10.16% 9.12% 10.12% 9.36% 11.16%
F-statistic 7.16
(0.000)a
5.68
(0.000)a
7.09
(0.000)a
5.98
(0.000)a
9.15
(0.000)a
iiii
iiiii
NITTLDEBT
TTLASSETAgeDELAYRISKINSIDER
xaaaa
aaaaaa
+++++
+++++=
2000POSTMINING
)(LnUNIT
9i876
543210i
298
APPENDIX II
Robustness Check for TABLE 3.12 using first-week initial return (IRW1)
 Unit offering underpricing and warrant characteristics
Linear Square Regressions are estimated for a sample 88 unit  IPOs after excluding 4 outliers identified by
Cook’s Distance44. Alternative underpricing measure (IRW1), defined as the HGSC-adjusted first-week initial
return relative to IPO offer price, is adopted as the dependent variable in each regression as robustness check.
Regression 1 include ALL the motivated variables. Regression 2 hightlight warrant characteristic variables.
Regression 3 focus on all the dummy variables and Regression 4 confirms all the significant variables from
previous regressions. The p-values of coefficients are reported in parentheses to demonstrate level of
significance. INSIDER is the percentage managerial holding in the issuing firm. RISK of firm is calculated
as the residual standard deviations of the share prices 200 days post-listing. EXPENSE is the total cost of
IPOs as percentage of expected gross proceeds. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total asset one year
prior to the IPO. PRATIO is the ratio of warrant exercise price to the offer price, PRATIO>1 indicates
warrants are issued out-of-money, whereas PRATIO<1 imply that warrants are issued in-the-money.
VALUE is the firm value sold as warrants, calculated as the potential warrant proceeds at exercise price as
percentage of unit firms’ market capitalisation at offer price immediately post-listing. LIFE is computed as
the number of years from the issuance of warrants until expiration. CALLABLE takes the value of 1 if the
warrants attached in the unit IPO are callable before expiration, 0 if the warrants are still outstanding or
lapsed.  REPUTATION  is  set  to  the  value  of  1  if  unit  IPOs  are  marketed  by  reputable  underwriters,  0  if
otherwise. AIM is equal to 1 if unit firms are listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 0 if
otherwise. MINING is set to be 1 if the unit firm is from the mining industry, 0 if otherwise. POST2000
takes the value of 1 if the unit IPO is issued during the sample period 2000-2006, 0 if during the sample
period 1996-1999.
N=88
(After excluding 4 outliers)
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 0.0861
(0.089)c
0.2226
(0.029)b
1.0480
(0.000)a
0.0625
(0.184)
INSIDER 0.7254
(0.054)b
0.7084
(0.055)b
RISK 1.1923
(0.059)c
1.6052
(0.039)b
LEVERAGE -0.2013
(0.171)
-0.2201
(0.126)
PRATIO 0.1700
(0.003)a
0.1872
(0.002)a
0.1687
(0.002)a
VALUE -0.3828
(0.342)
-0.4340
(0.290)
LIFE -0.0100
(0.757)
-0.0050
(0.880)
CALLABLE 0.3992
(0.017)b
0.3866
(0.029)b
0.3218
(0.064)c
0.3509
(0.026)b
REPUTATION -0.5812
(0.004)a
-0.5600
(0.005)a
-0.5013
(0.008)a
AIM -0.3680
(0.076)c
-0.4103
(0.053)b
-0.4100
(0.023)b
MINING 0.1180
(0.468)
 0.1920
 (0.241)
POST2000 0.0624
(0.714)
0.2165
 (0.215)
F-statistic 4.75
(0.000)a
3.56
(0.005)a
3.76
(0.004)a
5.74
(0.000)a
Adjusted R2 34.32% 13.72% 18.12% 32.62%
a: Significantly different from zero at 1% level (two-tailed test).
b: Significantly different from zero at 5% level (two-tailed test).
c: Significantly different from zero at 10% level (two-tailed test).
44 The same procedure to deal with outliers with Cook’s Distance is employed as in TABLE 3.12.
